Centralising Science Governance in Kazakhstan
by Aikerim Bektemirova
Aikerim Bektemirova is an early-career researcher from Kazakhstan. She recently served as a Non-Resident Scholar at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University, where this working paper was developed. She received her PhD and MPhil from the University of Cambridge. Her research interests lie at the intersection of education, politics and sociology, with a particular focus on knowledge production, higher education governance and institutional change Policy context and policy statement
Starting in 2022, the government of Kazakhstan initiated a major restructuring of the National Academy of Sciences. These recent reforms to the Academy (2022–2025) culminated in the dissolution of the ‘old’ Academy (public association) and consolidation of the ‘new’ state-affiliated, presidential Academy. In practical terms, the reform has involved a reorganisation of the Academy’s governance structures, shifting decision-making authority away from the scholarly community and towards state-appointed actors. While officially framed as a necessary modernisation effort to enhance the institutional efficiency and scientific prestige of the Academy, these reforms have sparked significant debate about academic self-governance, institutional autonomy and the state’s role in knowledge production.
In the aftermath of the January 2022 events, a series of reforms under the framework of Zhana Kazakhstan (New Kazakhstan) were introduced across multiple sectors: the constitutional referendums (June, 2022 and March, 2026) in the political sphere; the selective de-oligarchization (Law on the Return to the State of Illegally Acquired Assets, 2023) in the economic sphere; the state-led content monitoring (Law on Online Platforms and Advertising, 2023) and expansion of regulatory surveillance (Law on Mass Media, 2024) in the media sphere. Within this broader trajectory, the Academy reform can be understood as part of a wider process in which
the state has sought to strengthen coordination and oversight in key sectors of society.
This paper examines the legal and institutional dimensions of this reform, focusing on how governance structures, decision-making processes and distribution of authority within the Academy have changed. It argues that while presented as a modernisation effort, the reform has resulted in a significant centralisation of scientific governance with important implications for institutional autonomy of the Academy. More specifically, it conceptualises this process as a state-led institutional envelopment, whereby formally autonomous institutions are not dismantled, but reshaped within a state-controlled governance framework.
Policy Landscape Analysis
This policy analysis maps the formal reform landscape affecting the National Academy of Sciences through an analysis of key policy documents. The analysis draws primarily on the texts of governmental and presidential decrees, statutory law and institutional charters.
Soviet Period (1946–1991)
Kazakhstan’s National Academy of Sciences was established in 1949 as a branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Resolution No. 439 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR, the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR, and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan). The 1977 Charter (Decree No. 548) gives the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences the role of “the highest scientific institution of the Kazakh SSR” (Article 1). The Academy of Sciences was from the outset established as a state institution, deriving its mandate and budget directly from the government. Article 1 describes it as “subordinate to the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR” and “also guided by the Presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences”. The Article 10 states that the Academy’s budget is “included in the State budget of the Kazakh SSR”. Thus, initially the Academy was a centralised, state-embedded institution.
In addition to its institutional integration into the state, the Academy’s activities were closely tied to the system of central economic planning (Articles 2, 3, 4). Because Soviet science was subordinated to state economic planning, the research priorities of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences were correspondingly aligned with the Five-Year Plans (FYPs). Firstly, the Academy possessed the capacity for structural oversight through its monopoly over the material and financial infrastructure of science (e.g., salaries, laboratories, equipment, etc.)1, as it functioned as the “apex” institution2 coordinating all science in the Kazakh SSR. Secondly, it also acted as the “chief credit administrator” by approving the annual budget estimate, distributing the government funds (based on the “plan of scientific research”) and overseeing their “correct expenditure” (Article 46). This
1 The Article 6 explicitly lists the material assets and institutions that form the Academy: “The composition of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR includes scientific research institutes, sectors, observatories, stations, libraries, botanical gardens, as well as auxiliary institutions, enterprises, and organisations”.
2 The Article 3: “coordinates scientific research works in scientific institutions and higher education institutions of the Republic”.
constituted significant material and organisational power, enabling the Academy to effectively channel the scientific labor and resources into state-prioritised fields aligned with FYPs.
Beyond its economic function, the Academy was also expected to perform an ideological function in support of socialism. Article 3 explicitly tasks the Academy with assisting in the “practice of communist construction”. Hence, the 1977 Charter confirms that the Academy was also structurally integrated into the Soviet ideological apparatus, as it produced not only scientific knowledge and technical expertise, but also contributed to reinforcing the ideological foundations of the Soviet system through scientific rationality and ideological legitimacy. Moreover, the Academy also possessed regulatory control over ideological compliance and conformity through its authority to deprive members of their academic title. The Article 29 explicitly states that the Academy could not only grant the status of an ‘academic’, but also remove it: a member could be “deprived of their title” if their activity was “directed to the harm of the USSR” or “discredits the high title of a Soviet scientist”. Thus, the vague definition of ‘harm to the USSR’ granted the Academy discretionary power to remove members whose activities were deemed politically undesirable.
The 1977 Charter was amended in 1989, and this version introduced some limited, but meaningful changes, which reflect the late-Soviet discourse of ‘Perestroika’. The 1989 Charter outlines the internal procedures with greater specificity. Firstly, Article 15 replaced the irregular periodicity with formalised election cycles (“once every three years”), reinforcing the image of a stable, rule-based institution. Secondly, Article 31 expanded the internal legislative power by adding that the General Assembly now “approves Statutes on Departments, Research Institutes, and Elections”. This transfers some decision-making power from the executive vertical (as this power to approve regulations (statutes) belonged to the Presidium in the 1977 Charter, Article 44) to the professional collective (General Assembly). Thirdly, Article 34 broadened the scope of the secret ballot by mandating that “all personnel questions be decided by secret ballot”. Lastly, Article 59 introduced a ‘bottom-up’ mechanism, which mandated that institute directors be chosen ‘from among candidates considered by the general meeting of the Labor Collective’. This ensured that the opinion and preferences of rank-and-file scientists would be taken into account. In sum, these changes went beyond procedural refinement, introducing limited but meaningful shifts in internal governance that contributed to an image of greater professional autonomy.
Notwithstanding the procedural refinements introduced in the 1989 Charter, both the 1977 and 1989 Charters still share the same core features: the Academy’s subordination to the executive authority, its integration into state economic planning, and its dependence on the state budget. Therefore, the Academy’s function as a mechanism of state-led coordination of scientific activity, rather than as an autonomous system of scientific self-governance, remained unchanged throughout the Soviet period. This establishes a baseline in which scientific institutions were embedded within the state, providing a historical reference point against which the post-2003 period of formal
autonomy, and its later 2022-2025 reversal through institutional envelopment, can be understood.
Post-Independence (1991-2022)
In the post-independence period, the Academy’s legal status underwent a series of legal and organisational transformations. In 1996, it was merged with the Academy of Agricultural Sciences and the Ministry of Science and New Technology, creating a single, central executive body within the government structure: the Ministry of Science – National Academy of Sciences (Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 2895 “On Measures to Improve the System of State Administration of Science in the Republic of Kazakhstan”). This was followed by its conversion into ‘Republican State Institution’ in 1999 (Decree of the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan No. 34 “On National Academy of Sciences Republic of Kazakhstan”). However, when the Academy was separated from the Ministry in 1999, the research institutes remained with the Ministry, resulting in a major reduction in institutional capacity. This can be contrasted with the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences, which based on 1977/1989 Charter, had “scientific research institutes, sectors, observatories, stations, libraries, botanical gardens, as well as auxiliary institutions, enterprises, and organisations” included in its composition (Article 6). Thus, prior to 1996, these were structurally integral to the Academy, which exercised administrative and financial control over them3.
The most significant structural change occurred in 2003, when the presidential decree (No. 1208 “On measures to improve the system of organising scientific activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan”) mandated the reorganisation of the National Academy of Sciences into a Republican Public Association. This was a major institutional shift, when the Academy formally ceased to be a state institution and was reconstituted as a public association with a civil-society legal form, presented as being the initiative of the academicians themselves 4 . Consequently, as the 2003 Charter demonstrates, the Academy’s relations with the state became primarily advisory in nature, with the Academy functioning primarily as an external expert and advisory body participating in the formation of science policy (Articles 9-10).
In the 2003 Charter, the Academy kept the key internal governance mechanisms of the Soviet Charter of 1977/1989, notably retaining the General Assembly’s status as “supreme governing body” (Article 12) with the right to elect the Academy’s President (Article 37). The membership rules also largely remained the same, preserving the ‘Weberian status group’ logic (e.g. the members are elected by the General Assembly (Articles 12, 18), and the membership is based on scientific merit (Articles 13)). However, a relative shift in
3 The Academy, as a chief distributor of funds, not only had direct financial authority over these entities (Article 46), but also had the power to create, re-organise, and liquidate these institutes (Article 44). It also possessed the authority to evaluate institutes every three years, appoint Institute Directors (Article 44).
4 In the commentary to the presidential decree it is stated that “this Decree was adopted taking into account the opinion of the country’s leading scientists and academicians of the NAS RK, who are concerned about the fate of domestic science and the role and place of the National Academy of Sciences in modern society, and who proposed transforming it from a republican state institution into the public association”.
normative framing from duty-centred obligations towards rights-based membership language occurred. Whereas in the 1977/1989 Charter the emphasis was on the members’ duty (e.g. Article 26- ideological duty; Article 29- political accountability; Article 26- reporting), the 2003 Charter the reframes membership more around rights (e.g. Article 1 names the members as the “equal founders”; Article 31 grants the “right to free withdrawal” etc.). This marks a certain change from the agents of a state bound by duty to right-bearing founders.
Another meaningful change was the elimination of the Soviet-era ‘purge clause’5 . In contrast to the 1977/1989 Charters, the 2003 Charter omits the disciplinary clause that allowed the General Assembly or the Academy’s President to deprive its members of their title. Hence, the members of the Academy cannot be expelled, except for voluntary exit (Article 31). So, while before the status of academic was conditional on political and ideological loyalty to the Soviet state, the 2003 Charter effectively removed disciplinary revocation mechanisms, thereby making membership practically irreversible except through voluntary exit. Thus, the 2003 Charter transformed the Academy from a state organ into an autonomous status group formally separated from the state apparatus.
In 2015, the Charter was amended, and this introduced a number of significant changes. Firstly, Articles 25–27 and 31 show how the Academy’s internal model shifted further away from a collegial academic model towards a more presidential governance structure. In particular, the 2015 Charter codified the principle of “one-man command” (“президент действует на принципах единоначалия”) (Article 31), which was absent in the 2003 Charter. For example, while the 2003 Charter stipulated that both departmental and regional leaders were elected by the General Assembly upon nomination by the Presidium (Articles 33–34), the 2015 revision replaced this with more centralised procedures: departmental heads are elected by the Presidium, while regional leaders are directly appointed by the Academy’s President (Articles 25–26). Taken together, these changes place leadership selection under procedures controlled by the President, granting him a central gatekeeping role over key leadership positions. Thus, the 2015 charter introduced a more hierarchical governance structure, which later facilitated the state’s 2022-2025 intervention.
Secondly, the 2015 Charter introduced several new clauses, which institutionalised the Academy’s role as an official consultative body to the Kazakhstani state. For example, the Article 6 explicitly defined the Academy’s subject of activity as the “implementation of state scientific policy”, mandating the preparation of the ‘Annual National Report on Science’ submitted to the President of the Republic, the evaluation of state scientific projects, and the execution of tasks “under contracts with state bodies”. Moreover, the Article 31 institutionalised the Academy President’s role as a key intermediary, responsible for coordinating and ensuring the Academy’s representation in key national
5 As it was stated earlier, the Article 29 (1977/1989) stated that a member could be “deprived of their title” if their activity was “directed to the harm of the USSR” or “discredits the high title of a Soviet scientist”.
scientific councils and commissions6. While representation may involve other members, it is channelled through procedures controlled by the Academy’s President, reinforcing his position as the central interface between the Academy and the state. This ‘state advisory’ role did not exist in the 2003 Charter in such an explicit, formalised way. Thus, we see a stronger integration into state governance circuits.
Other notable changes of 2015 Charter include the addition of the de-politicisation clause and introduction of performance-based membership. The depoliticisation language is evident in the new clause (Article 23), which states that the members must not use the Academy platform for political or religious purposes. While being part of civil society implies a space for political debate, this clause limits the Academy’s role as forum for political expression, rather reinforcing its position as a neutral expert body. While in the 1990s and early 2000s, the academicians could, at times, publicly criticise the government policies, the 2015 Charter introduces constraints that make such engagement more institutionally risky. Thus, this shift can be interpreted as positioning academicians as technocratic experts to the state rather than independent public intellectuals who might challenge the system.
Next, according to the Articles 6 and 19 of the 2015 Charter, members must submit “annual report on personal contribution to science”, publish “reviews and analytical materials”, contribute to the “preparation of the Annual National Report” and participate in the “expert evaluation”. These requirements introduced a formalised regime of performance accountability, which were largely absent from the 2003 Charter7. This also laid the groundwork for the later prioritisation of publications in indexed, non-zero impact factor journals, as admission to the Academy became contingent upon publications in Scopus or Web of Science (WoS) (Rules for the election of academicians National Academy of Sciences Republic of Kazakhstan, 2024). Yet, despite the introduction of performance control in 2015, the period of decoupling of the Academy from direct state oversight (since 2003) was accompanied by widespread allegations of non-meritocratic recruitment. Unlike the 1977/1989 Charter, which imposed a state-determined cap on the total number of members (Article 14 8 ), the 2003/2015 Charters did not retain this provision. This coincided with the major expansion of the Academy’s membership, with the number increasing from 131 to 243 in the post-Soviet period. Moreover, some memberships were controversial or outside the mainstream science, involving the admission of political figures, business elites and members of the First President’s circle, whose academic credentials were publicly questioned. Thus, during the ‘Public Association’ era (2003–2022), the Academy’s membership practices became a point of public critique, fuelling debates over the Academy’s legitimacy within the scholarly communities. All in all, the 2003 reorganisation repositioned the Academy within civil
6 E.g. the Government Higher Scientific-Technical Commission, National Science Council, National Center for State Scientific and Technical Expertise.
7 For example, while the 2003 Charter contained general reporting expectations, the 2015 Charter version institutionalised these as mandatory.
8 The Article 14 (1977/1989) states that the membership cap “is determined by the Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR”.
society, granting it formal autonomy from the state. However, the 2015 Charter shows signs of the Academy already starting to shift towards a semi-state role, even while legally remaining a public association.
This trajectory towards performance-based governance was further consolidated by the “State Program for the Development of Education and Science for 2020–2025” (the Government Resolution No. 988), adopted in 2019. This program established a technocratic framework for scientific governance, explicitly prioritising mechanisms such as the “corporate governance”, the “key performance indicators” (KPIs) and the “commercialisation” of research. While this state program was already constructing a narrative of the systemic crisis in Kazakhstani science (e.g. citing “ageing personnel”, “low scientific productivity”, “underfunding of R&D” (0.12% of GDP)), it contained no provisions for the reform the ‘old’ Academy or the creation of a new ‘presidential’ one. This absence is also evident in the subsequent National Project “Quality Education- Educated Nation” adopted in 2021. The absence of this structural reform in the state’s long-term planning documents may suggest that the Academy’s reform (2022–2025) may indeed represent a specific political adjustment within the post-Qantar 2022 context, rather than the continuation of a pre-existing policy roadmap.
The 2022–2025 Reform
In response to nearly two decades of decline, the government initiated a comprehensive reform in 2022. During his speech at the Academy’s 75th anniversary session, Tokayev (2022) called for its transformation as a necessary step to turn the Academy into “a center of scientific thought and analysis” and “an authoritative expert institution”. This process began on December 14, 2022, with a presidential decree establishing the “National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan” as a non-profit joint-stock company fully owned by the state. A subsequent decree on March 27, 2023, added the designation “Under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan”.
This led to a temporary period of institutional duplication, during which the ‘old’ Academy (the Public Association) and the ‘new’ Academy (under the President) operated in parallel. This generated a major tension, as both institutions claimed the symbolic status of ‘National Academy’ and legitimacy in the scientific field. This culminated in an open letter from the members of the old Academy to President Tokayev. Although the necessity of reform was widely accepted by the members of ‘old’ Academy, the government’s implementation faced substantial critique. In the letter (November, 2023), they protested the “organisational chaos” caused by “shoving” the Academy into a corporate “Joint Stock Company” structure. The conflict was further escalated by proposals to demote pre-1996 members of the ‘old’ Academy to ‘honorary’ status, stripping them of their voting rights.
The Charter of the ‘National Academy of Sciences under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan’ was adopted in April 2023. The new Academy’s governance structure, as defined by this state-approved charter, consists of the Sole Shareholder (supreme body), the Board of Directors (management body), the Management Board (executive body), the General Assembly (representative body), the Presidium (consultative-advisory body), and
the Internal Audit Service (control body) (Article 49).
Since the Academy is a non-profit joint-stock company with 100% state-ownership, the Sole Shareholder (the Government, represented by the Ministry of Science and Higher Education) being defined as the “supreme body” (Article 49.1) aligns with the standard Kazakhstani “Law on Joint-Stock Companies” (2003, Article 339). The sole shareholder retains the ultimate control, including the power to amend the Charter, approve governance codes, reorganise or liquidate the Academy, appoint and dismiss the Academy’s President, form the Transitional Presidium and approve major financial decisions (Article 51). In this regard, it is important to highlight that the General Assembly (Article 49.4, 103) is redefined as a “representative body”, which lacks any binding executive power. Its functions are limited to the development of recommendations regarding the Academy’s efficiency and strategic priorities, while retaining the authority to elect academicians and members of the Presidium (Article 104). The recommendations by the General Assembly are subject to mandatory consideration by the Presidium and the Management Board, but are not binding (Article 106).
The legal framework for the ‘new’ Academy was further solidified by the “Law on Science and Technology Policy” adopted on July 1, 2024. This legislation designates the ‘new’ Academy as the “supreme scientific organisation” (Article 15.1), and places its financing under the direct determination of the Government (Article 15.28). While the 2023 Charter adheres to the corporate terminology of the Law “On Joint-Stock Companies” (2003), referring to the governing body as the Board of Directors, the 2024 Law replaces this with the term Board of Trustees, signalling a shift in institutional language rather than in the underlying distribution of authority.
However, a legal inconsistency becomes apparent regarding the new Academy’s internal hierarchy. While the 2023 Charter, adhering to the standard logic of the “Law on Joint-Stock Companies”10(2003), defines the Sole Shareholder (the Ministry) as the “Supreme Body” (Article 49.1), in the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024), the Board of Trustees is defined as the “Supreme Body” (Article 15.4). Moreover, according to the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024), the government directly appoints the Chairman of the Board of Trustees (Article 15.5). So, while the 2023 Charter established that the Board of Directors is empowered to elect its own Chairman from among its members1112 (Article 63), the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024), effectively superseding the
9 Article 33 explicitly defines the supreme body: “1) supreme body – the general meeting of shareholders (in a company where all voting shares belong to one shareholder – this shareholder)”.
10 The Article 14 of the 2023 Charter explicitly states that “The Society in its activities is guided by the Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan…and the Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan dated May 13, 2003 ‘On Joint-Stock Companies’ (hereinafter – the Law)”.
11 According to the 2023 Charter, while the Sole Shareholder (the Ministry) determines who sits on the Board of Directors (Article 51, item 6), the Board of Directors possesses the internal autonomy to elect its own Chairman from among its members by secret ballot (Article 63).
12 Under the standard legal framework governing the Academy’s corporate form, Article 56.1 of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies (2003) also explicitly dictates that the Chairman “is elected from among its members… by secret ballot”, ensuring a degree of internal peer accountability.
2023 Charter provision in practice, mandates that the Chairman of the Board of Trustees is appointed directly by the government, thereby replacing internal election procedures with direct governmental appointment, and reconfiguring the governance mechanism in favour of external control. However, while the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) is silent on the election of the remaining members of the Board of Trustees, it delegates the specific “formation procedure” to the Academy’s Charter (Article 15.4). This delegation appears critical: the 2023 Charter lists the “determination of the quantitative composition, term of office of the Board of Directors, election (re-election) of its members and early termination of their powers” as the exclusive competence of the Sole Shareholder (the Ministry) (Article 51.6). Consequently, the state retains a decisive authority over the composition of the Board: appointing the Chairman directly via the Law, and selecting all remaining members via its rights as the Sole Shareholder. Moreover, since the Charter itself is subject to Ministry approval, the state retains the formal authority to amend the Charter (Article 51.1).
While the 2023 Charter, mainly adheres to the Law ‘On Joint-Stock Companies’ (2003), as the Academy is a non-profit joint-stock company fully owned by the state, the subsequently adopted Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) rather appears to function to legitimise the new structure, reframing its corporate legal structure in language more familiar to academic governance, without altering the underlying distribution of authority (e.g. switches terminology to from Board of Directors to Board of Trustees)13. For instance, the Article 15 of Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) establishes a dual governance structure, leveraging the traditional prestige of the General Assembly and Presidium, while the financial and strategic authority remains concentrated in the Board of Trustees. The General Assembly is formally described as exercising “general leadership” (Article 15.12), but in practice remains limited to recommendation-making functions. Ultimately, this shift in the status of ‘supreme body’ – from the Sole Shareholder (2023 Charter) to the Board of Trustees (Law on Science and Technology Policy)- does not alter the essence of state control (as the Chairman remains a Government’s appointee, while the Government also has power over the election of the remaining members of the Board). Thus, by designating the Board of Trustees as the “Supreme Body” (instead of the Sole Shareholder), the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) reframes the Academy as a self-governing institution, while leaving effective control with the Sole Shareholder (the Ministry).
The centralising character of the 2023 Charter and the 2024 Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) also becomes apparent when compared to the Academy’s previous Charters. Whereas the previous model designated the General Assembly (academicians) as the “highest organ”14, the 2024 Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) and 2023 Charter transfers this status to a Board of Trustees (Article 15.4) and the
13 The 2023 Charter is full of elements like the Board, shareholder, internal audit service, compliance service, ombudsman, development plans and KPI, the language typical of a corporate entity, not an academic body or learning society.
14 According to the Charter 1977/1989 (Article 30), the Charter 2003 (Article 37) and the Charter 2015 (Article 29), the General Assembly is the “highest organ”.
“Sole Shareholder” (Article 49.1), respectively. So, before, the collective of scientists was the supreme authority and source of power in the Academy. By removing the General Assembly of this status, the 2023 Charter significantly reduced the decision-making authority of the scientific community, as the Academy is no longer managed by the scientists themselves.
In the Soviet charters, although the political subordination existed (e.g. to the Council of Ministers), the scientific legitimacy remained collective, and the internal governance was shared by the General Assembly and its elected Presidium. So, because the leadership was formed within the scientific community, the structure was more oriented towards representation. By contrast, the 2023 Charter abolishes the elective leadership at the executive level and removes decision-making authority from elected academic bodies. Whereas the Academy’s President was previously elected by the scientific community (General Assembly)15, the 2023 Charter reserves the right for “appointment and dismissal of the President” for the Sole Shareholder (Article 51.12), while granting the Board of Directors control over the establishment and structure of branches (Article 57.15) (with the appointment of their heads remaining with the President).
This is reinforced by the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024), which empowers the authorised body (Ministry) to “approve the rules and criteria for the election of academicians” (Article 6.4,15.13), transferring the ‘gatekeeping’ function from the peer community of scholars to the state. Moreover, the specific mechanism for bypassing the ‘old’ Academy was the creation of a state-appointed “Transitional Presidium” (2023 Charter, Article 113.2-113.3). Formed directly by the Sole Shareholder, this Transitional Presidium was tasked with conducting the first election of new members at the ‘new’ Academy. Ultimately, the current Academy reform substantially reduced the elements of internal collegial governance (however limited) that characterised the previous Charters, and arguably represents a higher degree of formal centralisation than late Soviet governance arrangements.
Following this consolidation of vertical control, the most recent shift occurred when the Academy was transformed again by the government decree of 30 December 2024 (No.1142 “On Certain Issues of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan”) into a “Higher Scientific Organisation”. This reorganisation formally abolished its status as a corporate entity (a joint-stock company), and placed it under the direct sectoral governance of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education. However, this shift does not appear to signal a restoration of academic autonomy. Rather, it consolidates a vertical system of scientific governance in which the Academy functions primarily as a state-managed entity rather than a self-governing scholarly community.
Despite the 2024 ‘Law on Science and Technology Policy’ and the new Academy’s (state-affiliated) 2023 Charter, the ‘old’ Academy (public association) adopted a new Charter of
15 According to the Charter 1977/1989 (Article 31), the Charter 2003 (Article 37) and the Charter 2015 (Article 29), the Academy’s President is elected by the General Assembly.
its own in November 202416 and continued to contest the new’ Academy’s claim to exclusive legitimacy. However, on March 27, 2025, the members of the Republican Public Association voted to dissolve their organisation, thereby eliminating the institutional overlap. To ensure this closure was permanent, subsequent amendments to the “Law on Science and Technology Policy” (adopted on June 30, 2025) now explicitly prohibit “Academies created in the form of a legal entity without state participation” from using the title “National” (Article 11.3), mandating the court-ordered liquidation of any that fail to “bring their name into compliance” (Article 53.1).
Conclusion
This paper argued that the dissolution of the ‘old’ Academy (public association) and the consolidation of the ‘new’ Academy (state-affiliated, presidential) can be interpreted as part of state consolidation in the governance of science. While officially framed as modernisation and administrative update, this top-down reform allowed the state to facilitate the incorporation of the ‘old’ Academy not through overt repression, but through an indirect strategy of institutional displacement (e.g. new Academy was created, the old one was later dissolved) combined with selective incorporation (e.g. the Academy’s name, history, prestige, functions). This reform can be understood as a process of institutional envelopment, through which the Academy was not dismantled, but reconstituted within a state-led governance structure that limits its autonomy, while preserving its institutional form.
Institutionally and legally, the state shifted primary decision-making authority from the collective of scientists (General Assembly) to state-appointed actors (Board of Trustees/Board of Directors), eliminated institutional duplication with old Academy and subordinated the new Academy to the executive vertical through control over appointments and charter authority.
The Academy reform should not be viewed as an isolated policy change, but can be situated within a broader set of post-January 2022 institutional reforms, including developments in the political, economic and media spheres, which collectively point to a trend of re-centralising state authority. In this context, the transformation of the Academy reflects a wider reconfiguration of state–society relations, extending into the governance of knowledge production and scientific institutions. This raises important questions about the future of academic self-governance and the role of scientific institutions in Kazakhstan’s policy system.
Ultimately, the case of the Kazakhstani Academy of Sciences challenges the assumption that modernisation reforms necessarily lead to greater institutional autonomy or democratisation. Instead, it highlights a more general paradox: reforms designed to improve organisational performance may simultaneously reduce institutional
16 The 2024 Charter retained the Soviet-style power of a peer-elected President to appoint institute directors (Article 27), while legally defining the Academy’s members as the true ‘founders’ of the institution (Article 2).
independence, particularly in political systems where accountability mechanisms remain vertically structured.
Recommendations
- Strengthen institutional safeguards for academic self-governance
The transfer of decision-making authority from the General Assembly to the state-appointed bodies (in the Law on Science and Technology Policy (2024) and 2023 Charter) shows the importance of preserving mechanisms of peer governance within scientific institutions. Policymakers should consider reintroducing or to strengthen the role of elected academic bodies in the strategic decision-making. For example, the strategic decisions should require formal agreement (concurrence) between state-appointed bodies and peer-elected academic structures inside the Academy, such as giving to the General Assembly a formal veto/co-decision role for approval of the Academy’s Charter amendments and leadership appointments.
- Ensure transparency in governance and appointments
The introduction of state-led appointments to key leadership positions (e.g. Chairman of the Board of Trustees/the Board of Directors) in the Academy shows need for more transparency in appointment procedures and more clear criteria for leadership selection. The selection process for the Academy’s President and Board members could include elements of an open ‘search committee’ process. Furthermore, the criteria for election of academicians can be developed together with an independent committee of active researchers to reduce the risk that gatekeeping functions become used for political purposes. While the Academy publishes announcements, candidate lists and formal criteria, this publicly available information does not clearly specify the composition of evaluation bodies or the role of independent researchers in decision-making. Policymakers could therefore strengthen transparency by more openly disclosing the composition of committees and by introducing mixed evaluation bodies, which include both the state-appointed representatives and independent scholars.
- Maintain plurality in the organisation of scientific institutions
The dissolution of the ‘old’ Academy and the consolidation of a single state-affiliated structure has reduced institutional diversity. Although the law “On Science and Technology Policy” (2024) legally allows for non-state scientific entities to exist, they are referred to as “public associations” or “scientific public associations”, which means their protection is coming from general laws on NGOs/Public Associations. Accordingly, legislative amendments can be considered in order to introduce more clearly defined legal status for non-state scientific associations within science policy legislation, strengthening their role beyond general NGO frameworks. While independent associations are guaranteed “equal rights to participate in competitions for scientific projects and programs” funded by the state budget (Article 9.2) and can also access tax deductions for
R&D expenses (Article 39), their participation in the national science system is conditional on mandatory state accreditation (Article 27), which serves as prerequisite for legal recognition and access to state support. Moreover, non-state scientific associations are also integrated into consultative structures, such as the Higher Scientific-Technical Commission (Article 20), National Scientific Councils (Article 22) and the Appeal Commission (Article 21), where their role remains embedded inside state-led decision-making frameworks. While these provisions ensure a degree of inclusion, policymakers could consider strengthening the legal status and independence of such non-state scientific organisations beyond accreditation-based recognition, so that their participation in the scientific system is not only mediated through state-controlled structures.
- Enhance dialogue between policymakers and the scientific community
The limited impact of critical perspectives or alternative views (e.g. members of the old Academy actively contested the reform) on the trajectory/ outcome of the Academy reform suggests some level of disconnect between public debate and state decision-making. Although the Law “On Science and Technology Policy” (2024) provides for participation of scientific community in policy implementation (Article 11.4) and establishes advisory bodies such as the Higher Scientific-Technical Commission (Article 20) and National Scientific Councils (Article 22), it does not require systematic consultations with the scientific community prior to major policy reforms. Moreover, participation in these bodies is based on appointment from authorised state bodies rather than election by peers, which limits their representative function. Policymakers could therefore strengthen the institutionalisation of dialogue by introducing formal consultations at the early, policy design stage. This could include making mandatory public or expert consultations for major science policy reforms, as well as including peer-elected academic representatives into advisory bodies. Such measures would help ensure that engagement with the scientific community is not only consultative in form, but also more representative and having real effect in practice.
Policy Analysis Data Corpus
– Government and Ministry Resolutions
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh SSR & Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR. (1949, June 1). Ob uchrezhdenii Akademii nauk Kazakhskoy SSR [On the establishment of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR] (Resolution No. 439).
Council of Ministers of the Kazakh SSR. (1977, December 6). Ob ustave Akademii nauk Kazakhskoy SSR [On the charter of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh SSR] (Resolution No. 548). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P770000548_
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2022, December 14). O voprosakh sozdaniya nekommercheskogo aktsionernogo obshchestva “Natsional’naya akademiya nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan” [On issues of creating the non-profit joint-stock company “National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan”] (Resolution No. 1003). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2200001003
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2023, April 11). O pereimenovanii nekommercheskogo aktsionernogo obshchestva “Natsional’naya akademiya nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan” [On renaming the non-profit joint-stock company “National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan”] (Resolution No. 281). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2300000281
Committee of State Property and Privatization of the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2023, April 11). Ustav nekommercheskogo aktsionernogo obshchestva “Natsional’naya akademiya nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan” pri Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan [Charter of the Non-Profit Joint-Stock Company “National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan” under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Order No. 326).
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2024, December 30). O nekotorykh voprosakh Natsional’noy akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan pri Prezidente Respubliki Kazakhstan [On certain issues of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Resolution No. 1142). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2400001142
Minister of Science and Higher Education of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2024, September 23). Ob utverzhdenii Pravil i kriteriyev izbraniya akademikov Natsional’noy akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan [On approval of rules and criteria for election of academicians of the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Order No. 457). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/V2400035119
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2019, December 27). Ob utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy programmy razvitiya obrazovaniya i nauki Respubliki Kazakhstan na 2020 – 2025 gody [On approval of the State Program for the Development of Education
and Science of the Republic of Kazakhstan for 2020 – 2025] (Resolution No. 988). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P1900000988
Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2021, October 12). Ob utverzhdenii Natsional’nogo proyekta “Kachestvennoye obrazovaniye ‘Obrazovannaya natsiya'” [On approval of the National Project “Quality Education ‘Educated Nation'”] (Resolution No. 726; Repealed). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2100000726
– Laws (Statutes)
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (1996, May 31). Ob obshchestvennykh ob”yedineniyakh [On public associations] (Law No. 3). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/eng/docs/Z960000003_
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2001, January 16). O nekommercheskikh organizatsiyakh [On non-profit organizations] (Law No. 142). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z010000142_
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2003, May 13). Ob aktsionernykh obshchestvakh [On joint-stock companies] (Law No. 415). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z030000415_
Parliament of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2024, July 1). O nauke i tekhnologicheskoy politike [On science and technology policy] (Law No. 103-VIII). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/Z2400000103
– Presidential Decrees
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (1996, March 11). O merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy gosudarstvennogo upravleniya naukoy v Respublike Kazakhstan [On measures to improve the system of state administration of science in the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Decree No. 2895). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U960002895_
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (1999, February 12). O Natsional’noy Akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan [On the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Decree No. 34; Repealed). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U990000034_
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2003, October 21). O merakh po sovershenstvovaniyu sistemy organizatsii nauchnoy deyatel’nosti v Respublike Kazakhstan [On measures to improve the system of organization of scientific activity in the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Decree No. 1208). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U030001208_
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2023, March 27). O nekotorykh voprosakh Natsional’noy akademii nauk Respubliki Kazakhstan [On certain issues of the National
Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan] (Decree No. 152). Adilet. https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/U2300000152
– Public Statements & Letters
President of the Republic of Kazakhstan. (2022, June 1). Vystupleniye Glavy gosudarstva Kasym-Zhomarta Tokayeva na yubileynoy sessii Natsional’noy akademii nauk [Speech by the Head of State Kassym-Jomart Tokayev at the anniversary session of the National Academy of Sciences]. Akorda. https://www.akorda.kz/ru/vystuplenie-glavy-gosudarstva-kasym-zhomarta-tokaeva-na-yubileynoy-sessii-nacionalnoy-akademii-nauk-15243
Members of the Republican Public Association “National Academy of Sciences”. (2023, November 24). Otkrytoye pis’mo akademikov NAN RK Prezidentu Respubliki Kazakhstan
K. K. Tokayevu [Open letter of NAS RK academicians to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan K. K. Tokayev]. AgriExpert. https://agriexpert.ru/articles/1887/otkrytoe-pismo-akademikov-nan-rk-prezidentu-respubliki-kazaxstan-k-k-tokaevu
