Authors:
Aitolkyn Kurmanova is an expert on economic policy in Central Asia, and authored several studies on regional economic cooperation, trade, commodity and financial markets. She has a bachelor’s degree in international relations from Al-Farabi Kazakh National University and Executive MBA from HEC Paris.
Wesley Alexander Hill, Assistant Director: Energy, Growth, and Security at International Tax and Investment Center is a Washington D.C. based foreign policy professional with a special emphasis on geoeconomics and Chinese influence in Central Asia. He is a former CLFP fellow at NBR, and a contributor to Forbes . Wesley graduated from Tulane University.
From the Caspian Sea in the west to beautiful Lakes Zaisan, Alakol and Issyk Kul in the east, and from the fortress of Petropavlovsk in the north to the Karakum desert and the mountains of Gorno-Badakhshan in the south, the map of contemporary Central Asia unfolds like a vibrant tapestry—offering a colorful and diverse patchwork of geography, languages, cultures, traditions, and a multilayered history. Although often overlooked, Central Asia serves as a vital connection between East and West, embracing global values such as openness, connectivity, and multiculturalism. The ancient trade routes of Central Asia played a pivotal role in sustaining empires such as Persia and China, laying the groundwork for the modern era of globalization. The people who inhabited these lands valued trade, art, and power. Their products, symbols, and beliefs spread East and West, while nomadic horsemen influenced military tactics and established a formidable ruling presence.
This fascinating history has bound the peoples and cultures of Central Asia together, creating a paradox of diversity and commonality. Central Asia has never been a single unified state on its own. Regional power dynamics have included tribal confederations, fleeting military alliances, and subjugation to larger empires. Historically, moves toward regional cooperation or integration have often disintegrated due to external pressures, internal rivalries, or the forces of tribalism.
It was the economic benefits gained from joint production, consumption, and trade of luxury items (notably silk) that truly held the broader region of Central Eurasia together, not war or extortion. This economic phenomenon lasted for almost two millennia, from the second century BCE with a peak under Pax Mongolica (13th-14th centuries) to gradual decline until the Manchu-Qing Dynasty takeover of China in the 17th century. With Russian-Chinese partition of the region in the late 17th century, economic integration and continental trade came to a halt, and the great Silk Roads ceased to exist.[1] Despite these challenges, the idea of common prosperity through unity in Central Asia has persisted and survived through centuries in the popular imagination, evolving through various iterations of the Silk Road concept.
In the discourse on Central Asian integration, two predominant outlooks emerge: the optimistic view of revived Central Asian integration and the pessimistic view that integration is impossible. We suggest a balanced approach—acknowledging each nation’s unique circumstances while advocating for a more flexible confederation that recalls some of the region’s most significant achievements in global trade and shared prosperity.
In the 21st century presents contemporary Central Asian states with a unique opportunity to remember their history, modernize on their own terms, assert their distinctiveness, and contribute to the security and stability of the vast Eurasian landmass. A remarkable unity and collective identity, as seen in the European Union, may be challenging to replicate. But a Central Asian Union and the concept of “Central Asianism” can follow the EU’s example and build the foundations for a future based on solidarity and cooperation, rather than division and competition.
INTRODUCTION:
The past decade has seen seismic geopolitical shifts in Eurasia with the end of war in Afghanistan, the rise of China, and the Russia-Ukraine war. The Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) have initiated remarkable political and economic diversification efforts in response—building new connections within the greater Eurasia region. These political and economic efforts include neighboring powers such as Russia and China, as well as relatively new actors like the Gulf countries, Turkey, and the European Union, fostering more interregional cooperation than ever before.
Despite geopolitical uncertainty, Central Asian leaders remain optimistic. As IMF Director Kristalina Georgieva noted, “Trade is like a river. When you put an obstacle in front, it tends to go around it.”[2] The ongoing war in Ukraine and economic uncertainties in Russia and China have compelled Central Asian nations to explore new geopolitical options and pursue greater diversification, while continuing to promote sources of investment and growth within their own region.
These sources of investment and growth come from across the region. In an August 2024 article, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev referred to the current cooperation in Central Asia as a “Central Asian Renaissance.”[3] This is merely the latest incarnation of Kazakhstan’s pro-integration agenda after its founding president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, long championed the cause of regional integration. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, advocating for Central Asian cooperation, has proposed efforts to build a new regional identity, a “Central Asia with one past and a common future.”[4] In March of 2025, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan signed a historic agreement resolving border disputes that had led to bloody conflicts in the past, signaling a capacity for cooperation between Central Asian states.
Thought leaders in Central Asia often evoke memories of the distant past, when the region played a crucial role in international history. Though many Westerners may have heard of the Silk Road, it is unlikely that most could name the places it ran through. The longing for regional integration is rooted in the history of the Silk Road, Turan, and Pax Mongolica, reflected in concepts such as Turkestan and Eurasianism, and illustrated through the imagery of historic figures such as Genghis Khan and Emir Timur[5] (Tamerlane), who aimed to unite the region and establish it as a stronger and more visible force amidst various foreign powers.
The lived history of Central Asia often contrasts with these unifying ideas. The regional history is rich with distinct peoples bearing unique identities and beliefs in their own stories, as well as interactions between various groups—whether Turkic, Mongolian, or Iranian—who had vastly different lifestyles, ranging from sedentary to nomadic. They lived, interacted, and traded with each other, but also competed fiercely for scarce resources. Nevertheless, the concept of the Silk Road, when the region traded more than it fought, was never wholly lost. It persists as a distant legend, an inexact idea with little left for posterity—the remains of caravanserais (the roadside inns used by traders and their caravans along the Silk Road) and contracts written on papyrus.
This report seeks to explore a broad question: How can a geopolitical and geo-economic idea lead to implementation? But also: What binds Central Asia together despite wars, bitter rivalries, modern nationalization, and other barriers to cooperation in a highly competitive and hostile environment? How significant is the integration agenda for the people and the elites of the region? Is the integration process bottom-up or top-down, with elites seeking legitimization through historical narratives? The timeline of ideas detailed in this report demonstrates that the concept of a peaceful, prosperous, and integrated Central Asia has been debated for centuries and remains a dream that resonates deeply with many of its people.[6] Prosperity in the region is linked to openness, a point well justified from both geographic and economic perspectives. This report will also briefly examine how the concept of a unified Central Asia has evolved, as nationalistic, imperial, personal, or foreign elements were added to the overall dream in the service of various political agendas.
In ancient times, the multiple polities of Central Eurasia had to cooperate while acknowledging competition among equals. Today, the series of Consultative Meetings among the heads of Central Asian states, which President Mirziyoyev has facilitated since March 2018, are often presented in the media as the need of all these five leaders to coordinate their positions. In Russian this has been described as “sverka chasov,” which literally means to synchronize clocks or compare notes.
There is competition in Central Asia, but there is also a need to cooperate, which can provide a basis for integration. The Consultative Meetings have proven to be very effective, along with another innovative format for meetings in Central Asia: the C5+1. This format allows Central Asian countries to collectively engage with major powers such as China, Russia, the United States, the European Union, Japan, and others on regional matters. No country wants to be left out, as many of the issues under discussion are regional, such as water, climate, religion, and security.
Both the Consultative Meetings and the C+1 may be seen as the first steps towards tighter political unification, as they have effectively become the dominant diplomatic formats preferred by Central Asian states.[7] However, there are issues, such as significant limitations to shared identity. Any further progress toward actual political union that delegates national sovereignty to supra-national structures would need to accurately and delicately represent the collaborative potential of Central Asian countries, allowing them to work together while maintaining their individual identities.
What form should a Central Asian Union take? It would need to prioritize economic, transportation, and trade issues, as these areas hold the most promise for shared benefits. However, collaborative strategies would require significant technical and financial assistance to accomplish key tasks, such as harmonizing multiple agreements and digitalizing customs. Free trade agreements in the region face resistance due to conflicting arrangements with the WTO or the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Additionally, free trade could lead to price imbalances and trade distortions within the region, resulting in uneven economic development. Given the limited trade interactions among these countries, a free trade agreement alone, without the necessary protections and exceptions, might not be sufficient. Fully open borders may also not be viable due to security concerns and domestic political considerations. There is competition for investment, each country has different resources, and not every country in the region benefits from transportation and trade between China and the EU.
To address these challenges, integration in Central Asia should be pursued as a multi-step and complex process. The initial focus should be on cooperative interregional projects and a unified approach to transit passage, allowing for rapid and expeditious transfer of goods from one location in the region to or through another.
The issues facing the region require deep technical expertise, considerable funding to hammer out legal and economic treaties, committed political leadership, and one or more flexible agreements. Considerable work will be required, however, and accords can be established that address tariffs, trade, and investment issues. For example, conditions can be set for the transit of third-party goods, as well as incentives for investment to develop and encourage production and assembly chains across more than two countries. Agreements can be reached that facilitate interregional trade, investment, and a common transportation network.
Central Asia needs considerable international assistance in this process. Many actors would be interested in helping, including the European Union, China, and the United States. Each, of course, has its own political agenda. However, Central Asia is a vital connection between East and West. It offers a wealth of natural resources (including rare earth minerals) for export, and instability in the region would not benefit any of the great power actors.
In its few short years of independence, Central Asia has asserted its own agency.[8] Amid great power competition, Central Asian leaders quickly learned how to equalize, neutralize, and distance themselves when needed. The clever “multi-vector policy” was championed by the first Kazakh President, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and quickly replicated elsewhere in Central Asia. This approach has transformed into broader multilateralism, where diversification and neutrality have become more valuable than commitment to a core idea—or to any one powerful patron. Moreover, there is increasing recognition among the leaders of the Central Asian states that unity is key to promoting regional interests when dealing with any of the neighboring or distant great powers.
For the United States, the core of a Central Asian-focused foreign policy should be put in context of great power and regional relations. The rise of Central Asia is inextricably linked to the rise of Asia and peace in Europe. It promises shared prosperity and an elevated role in global trade and security. To advance these ideas and develop them institutionally in a new era of Central Asian integration, they must be examined together.
THE HISTORY OF IDEAS:
According to an ancient myth,[9] the mother of all Mongols, Alan Gua, had five sons. Two of them were born when her husband was alive, and three more after her husband’s death. This led her two older sons to suspect their three younger brothers had been fathered by a servant. Hearing of these suspicions, Alan Gua summoned her five sons for a meal, then gave each of them one arrow and asked them to break it. Next, she made a bundle of five arrows and asked them to break it. When none of them could break the bundle, she told them that this was the power of unity.
Unity was a prized asset in the Eurasian steppes, where diverse people formed various confederations and warring alliances to protect themselves and their communities. The vastness of the region, its predominantly nomadic economy, scarce natural resources, and harsh weather conditions made sustainable domestic production challenging. Unions of the nomadic people with settlers were frequent, as they traded with each other even more at times than they traded with peripheral actors. However, there were seldom lasting power arrangements between them if not imposed by external conquest. The most remarkable unifications happened under the Scythians, the Turks, Genghis Khan, and much later, the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.
While ideals of unification, control, and peaceful trade, have traversed through centuries, they have been subject to various interpretations and debates. A central question persists: can genuine regional integration be achieved with or without the involvement of external actors? More often than not, these ideas have been deliberately transformed into divisive concepts alloyed with nationalism and political/imperial ambitions, claiming legitimacy for various political forces that sought control of the vast territories and diverse peoples of Central Asia.
DISTANT TIMES:
The vast steppes of Central Asia and the early domestication of horses gave rise to various highly mobile nomadic groups of people who moved through the region and shifted history so dynamically that the question of who was first to come to dominate the area is one of the most contentious questions in Central Asia, even today.
The Iranian people were among the early inhabitants of the Central Eurasian steppe zone and agricultural regions of Central Asia, dominating them before 1600 BC. The Scythians, notable Eastern Iranian pastoral nomads, migrated into the Western Steppes and were the first to develop a unifying trade system that connected Eurasian civilizations, including Europe, the Near East, South Asia, and East Asia.
The Turks arrived by the 6th century CE, conquering the early urban centers of Central Asia and continuing trade along the Silk Road. The Turk Qaghanate (khanate, a nomadic/feudal monarchy) was the first trans-Eurasian empire[10] in history, which dominated much of Inner Asia in the 6th and 7th centuries CE.
The Turkic vs. Iranian dichotomy remains most divisive in Central Asia as Turks, powerful and fierce nomads, expanded in the region already settled by the ancient Iranians. Turko-Mongolian groups eventually became the region’s elite and claimed to be its core, but the Persian element is integral to Central Asian identity as Persian was a lingua franca, the language of administration, and Persian scholars and artisans contributed to the cultural flourishment in the 7th-11th centuries and later in the Timurid Renaissance (14th 16th centuries). Thus, the Turko-Persian Islamicate culture[11] was prominent in Central Asia.
The Silk Road originated from the trade boom in ancient Persia, where rulers bought extravagant products and spent lavishly on buildings and military, further supported by trade between Rome and China. The Han Dynasty (206 BC-AD 220) expanded westward until it met nomadic tribes. Instead of fighting, the Chinese preferred trading with them, starting with horses, rice, textiles, and silk. Trade and diplomacy developed to make deals and maintain peace. Trade grew slowly due to Central Asia’s extreme geography, including mountains, rivers, and deserts. But eventually the roads were established and Bactrian camels followed designated routes with written passes and trade contracts. Bazaars and new towns with irrigation canals appeared.[12]
The level of activity on The Silk Road has fluctuated throughout history. In China, the Tang dynasty sought to revive the glory of the Han Dynasty, and the Silk Road was reopened, flourishing even after the fall of Rome.
Culture flourished too. Under the Abbasids, Central Asian scholars got access to the works of Indian, Greek, Persian, and Chinese authors and spread their knowledge and literacy beyond the region.[13]
The Middle Ages in Central Asia were characterized by a strong emphasis on trade and diplomacy. Many authors point to the Silk Road as a source of not only economic prosperity but also a shared political ideology of military expansion.[14] Every empire aimed to expand in all directions, and in this expansion, they collided with one another, recognizing that these were equal forces. This created political alliances and diplomacy under circumstances where they had to agree with each other more often than disagree. Thus emerged an interconnected world.
In the 8th century, that world began to disintegrate with rebellions erupting in many places, especially in the Tang Empire, which turned against the Sogdians, among others. The decline of commerce from China did not trigger an immediate economic decline in Central Asia, partly because of its inclusion in the Islamic world. Central Asia remained a center of commerce, culture, and knowledge until conservative religious reaction suppressed it.
In the 13th century, Genghis Khan unified the region under a single empire. The Pax Mongolica, often referred to as the golden age of Central Asia, preserved the Silk Road’s ethos of “trade and protect.” Despite the Mongol Empire splitting into uluses and the disintegration of the Yuan Dynasty and the Ilkhanate in the late 14th century, the Jochid and Chaghatayid uluses and their descendants continued to rule much of Central Asia for the next four centuries[15].
The Black Death played a significant role in the decline of Pax Mongolica, turning the once-thriving trade routes into channels of death. The violence brought by Timur’s campaigns in the 14th century weakened the Golden Horde. Although Timur’s rule (1370-1405) marked a cultural and political peak for urban Central Asia, his empire soon fragmented. With the decline of continental trade and the intensification of internal conflicts, another notable division occurred between the Qazaqs and the Shibanid Uzbeks at the turn of the sixteenth century.
The rise of sea routes and the emergence of the Russian Empire marked the final chapter for the Silk Roads. In the late 17th and early 18th centuries, the Oirats on the border of China, who formed the militant Junggar empire, attempted to conquer Central Asia and take control of the growing trade between Russia and the Qing Dynasty. This was the last steppe empire, and they ultimately lost to the Qing, who successfully applied the tactic of “fighting barbarians with other barbarians.” China-Russia trade, with no nomadic intermediaries and direct treaties of Nerchinsk and Kyakhta (today’s Buryatia), became very important to Russia and partly funded its successful expansion into one of Europe’s great powers.
During this period, Central Asia still experienced significant economic development through modernization, infrastructure construction, and its continued function as a trade route—for example, between Russian and India[16]. However, this was on a much smaller scale and did not involve the entire region.
Meanwhile, the grand idea of a unified Central Asia succumbed to the more powerful unification of the Islamic Ummah until the 20th century, when it was revived with different intentions—to assert nationalism and identity.
Interestingly, there was one rare call for regional unity during this period that came from the top elites. Nadir Shah, who ruled Iran from 1736 to 1747,[17] used his Turkic heritage to bolster his legitimacy as a ruler within the broader Eurasian region, attempting to style himself as the new Timur or Genghis Khan. In modern times, the resurrection of the cults of Timur and Genghis Khan has become more customary among politicians asserting their national identities and political legitimacy but also revive the regional unity narrative.
MODERN TIMES:
In the early 20th century, Central Asia was part of the Russian Empire.[18] Following the capture of Tashkent in 1865, the Russian authorities designated the region as the Turkestan Territory. In 1867, they transformed it into the Turkestan General-Governorate, which excluded Kazakhstan. The northern lands of the Kazakhs, annexed by the Russian Empire before the rest of Central Asia, did not become a separate administrative unit and remained part of the Siberian and Orenburg General-Governorates.
Historians note[19] that the Russian authorities intended to divide the region into nomadic and sedentary people, believing that the Kazakhs, with their less pronounced religiosity, were easier to integrate into the empire. Faced with the challenge of categorizing the region into distinct ethnic groups, the Russians ultimately decided to differentiate based on the old divide between nomadic and settled populations.
The Russian Empire modernized itself and, whether intentionally or not unified Central Asia in the process. New roads, railroads and locomotives, irrigation canals, cotton machines, printed books, and schools tied the region together and integrated it into the Russian economy. A new generation of educated politicians emerged across Central Asia with an intense interest in national identities, and in the course of the Russian Revolution, they put forward the idea of regional autonomy (“Turkestan”).
The 20th century, marked by the rise of nationalism globally, saw the introduction of potentially divisive foreign strains of thought in Central Asia, such as communism and Pan-Turkism in the early 20th century and Eurasianism towards the century’s end.
Pan-Turkism, a troubled concept born in the late 19th century amid imperial struggles between the Ottoman and Russian Empires, builds on an expansive Turkic identity, the glory of its conquests, the uniqueness of its culture, and the commonality of its languages. However, it is also deeply divisive, not only between the interconnected Iranian and Turkic peoples of Central Asia but also within Russia, which resisted it fiercely. Pan-Turkism is tainted by massacres initiated by Turkish nationalists; and the German Reich also played with its use as a wedge to disintegrate the Soviet Union. Despite this, the idea of linguistic and cultural identity was so compelling that many intellectuals in Central Asia continue to discuss it today[20]. Pan-Turanianism[21]—a closely related movement—is more inclusive, recognizing the unification of Turkic peoples with the Finno-Ugric peoples, for whom a common ancient homeland in “Turan” is ascribed.
Although the concept of Pan-Turkism originated in the Russian-controlled Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, where many Central Asians had been educated, it was instrumentalized by the Turkic nationalist movement in the final years of the Ottoman Empire with a clear anti-imperial message against Russia and Iran. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, founding father of the Republic of Turkey, said: “To unite different nations under one common name . . . and thus to found a mighty state is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one.”[22] However, Pan-Turkism had many interpretations, and in Central Asia, it was more about modernization, education, and democratization. There, the movement was more influenced by the journalist Ismail Gasprinsky of the Crimea, who also inspired the Jadidist movement.
The Jadids—zealous Central Asian modernizers—were young people from various backgrounds who encouraged “comprehensive modernizing cultural reform” in the region supported education and gender equality, advocated for tolerance towards other religions, and favored openness to the cultural heritage of Europe. Even though many Jadids were of Iranian origin and spoke Persian, they supported the unity of Turkic culture, seeing it as a powerful, unifying idea that could lead to the autonomy of the region and supplant the old rulers.
Central Asian Jadids mostly welcomed the Russian Revolution and helped Bolshevism’s advance into the region. But this support was not universal among the masses, as the Jadids had clashed regularly with more conservative ulemas who sought autonomy too[23]. Basmachis, another movement with similar Pan-Turkist ideas, differed from Jadids due to their fervent religious stance and support for the old order. They mobilized militant grassroots resistance against the Bolsheviks but were defeated by force.
The brightest minds of Central Asia were followers of the Jadidist movement in Bukhara and Khiva, while westernized Kazakhs formed their own Alash Orda party with similar ideas. Both movements interacted with each other and had high hopes for autonomy within Soviet Russia as well as democratization. However, they went on to create separate autonomies. The Alash Autonomy was founded in September 1917 by Kazakh-educated elites who formed their own government and issued legislative orders. The Turkestan Autonomy or Kokand Autonomy followed their example and in November 1917. Both autonomies were short-lived, with the Turkestan Autonomy lasting 72 days before being suppressed militarily. Yet, both represent the only historical attempts to democratically bring about the political unification of Central Asia. Prominent Kazakh politician Mustafa Shokay, who served as Prime Minister of the short-lived Turkestan Autonomy, suggested joining the Steppe regions with Turkestan, but his idea was cautiously rejected.[24]
In 1920, Turar Ryskulov, a Kazakh revolutionary leader and a follower of the Jadids, in response to Soviet plans to divide Turkestan into three ethnic republics, argued that the population of “the enormous area of Turkestan with Bukhara and Khiva is 88% Turkic-speaking and, in terms of common cultural characteristics with the remnants of Iranians, the entire Muslim population constitutes 97% of Turkestan’s population. All these large and small groups of Turkic-speaking peoples are closely linked to one another by a common world view, legal consciousness, language and everyday customs.”[25] In an effort to defend the idea of Red Turkestan, Ryskulov wrote about it as “an integrated and powerful vanguard of social revolution in the East, that combined into a single whole can draw the neighboring Turkic khanates into the cycle of social revolution and through them will wage a struggle against the predators of the Far and Middle East.”
Ryskulov’s project was rejected. After initially supporting Central Asian revolutionaries and promising them autonomy, the central authority in Moscow ultimately decided to follow the principle of divide and rule: create separate, national entities that could be monitored and controlled.
After several attempts and renamings, five new Soviet repubics emerged: the Uzbek S.S.R. (now Uzbekistan) was created in 1924, the Turkmen S.S.R. (now Turkmenistan) in 1924, the Tadzhik S.S.R. (now Tajikistan) in 1929, the Kazakh S.S.R. (now Kazakhstan) in 1936, and the Kirgiz S.S.R. (now Kyrgyzstan) in 1936. Thus, the Kazakhs became separate from the Uzbeks; as speakers of a Persian group language, the Tajiks were separated from their Turkic-speaking neighbors; the nomadic Turkmen were set apart from the sedentary Uzbeks. Similarly, the Kyrgyz of the Issyk-Kul region (whom the Russians first called “Kara-Kirgiz,” while applying the name “Kirgiz” to the Kazakhs) were declared to be separate from their Kazakh neighbors.[26] These were, according to a historian Yury Bregel, “artificially created entities based on ethnic principles which never have been ethnically and linguistically homogenous.”[27]
Most of Central Asia’s intelligentsia, including Ryskulov, members of Alash Orda, and the Jadids, were physically eliminated in Stalin’s purges. The next generation of scholars and intellectuals, trained in Moscow, began writing national histories that justified their separate political entities and divided the shared cultural heritage. For instance, al Farabi was claimed as Kazakh, al Biruni as Uzbek, and Firdausi as Tajik. While this nation-building process was successful in defining new borders, it was disastrous for any sense of unity within Central Asia[28].
Economically, the Central Asian republics under Soviet rule developed interregional connections and infrastructure, particularly in the water and energy sectors. They served as exporters in the Soviet economy; however, few production value chains, especially across the region, were established. The Central Asian Soviet republics specialized in producing oil, cotton, gold, raw minerals, and natural gas. These materials were then sent to other Soviet republics, particularly Russia, for processing and manufacturing. Some effects of the centrally planned economy were shared across republics, as were certain Soviet-triggered environmental disasters, like the Aral Sea catastrophe.[29]
Despite the pervasive Russian grassroot racism, Soviet Central Asian leaders enjoyed a respected place among the Moscow elites and played instrumental roles in shaping Soviet policies toward other Asian countries, such as India, and to a lesser extent China.
Central Asian nationalism, supported by historiography, ultimately became one of the forces that contributed to the Soviet Union’s disintegration, which erupted in Almaty in 1986. Meanwhile, Russians themselves sought to explore their own roots through movements like Eurasianism—an ideology that first gained traction among Russian émigrés in the 1930s and saw a revival in the 1980s, notably with the historical explorations of Lev Gumilev and later reincarnated with stronger, menacing anti-Western messages by the controversial Alexander Dugin and Alexander Panarin. Eurasianism in its general form asserts Russia’s central role in Eurasia, positioning it as a sort of heir to the Mongol Empire.
In his 1925 booklet “Nasledie Chingiskhana: Vzgliad na russkuiu istoriiu ne s Zapada, a s Vostoka” (The Legacy of Genghis Khan: A Perspective on Russian History Not from the West but from the East), Nikolai Trubetskoi welcomed “a new, unique entity, the national Russian type, which is in essence not pure Slavic but Slavo-Turanian.”[30]
Both Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism proved to be enduring ideologies, extending into the 21st century and reaching the highest echelons of power. They have broadened Central Asian identity while suggesting that Central Asia is merely one block of a greater regional framework, necessitating deeper integration with external powers. Across Central Asia today, the Jadids and Alash Orda are commemorated as champions of Central Asian modernism and enlightenment.
INDEPENDENCE:
In the 1990s, the region formerly known in the USSR as Srednyaya Aziya and Kazakhstan (Central Asia and Kazakhstan) came to be recognized collectively as Central Asia. This change was justified not only to shorten the term but also because, although Soviet scholars often distinguished between the two, they consistently treated them as inseparable parts of a single historic-cultural region.[31] It was also a symbolic rebranding, proposed by Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev, to designate the independent region that resisted being defined by Soviet terms.
The Belovezha Accords, which declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and established the CIS, were signed on December 8, 1991. The agreement was signed by the leaders of three Soviet Slavic republics: Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, which initially caused quite a stir. One of the most prominent politicians and negotiators of the era, Nursultan Nazarbayev—an experienced navigator of the Communist Party system who was serving as first president of Kazakhstan—had a keen understanding of how to balance relations within the former Soviet Union. He recalls in his memoirs[32] that four days after the Belovezha Accords, on December 13, he met with the heads of all other Central Asian republics in Ashgabat and persuaded them to abandon the proposal, put forward by the Turkmen side, to create a single Central Asian union. Nazarbayev and other contemporaries report that Russian President Boris Yeltsin was concerned the Belovezha Accords might lead to the formation of a counterbalancing Central Asian “Muslim” union.
While the Belovezha Accords remained largely a historic declaration, the official protocol on the dissolution of the Soviet Union was signed on December 21, 1991, in Almaty, Kazakhstan—a notable achievement for Nazarbayev—by representatives of 11 of the 12 remaining Soviet republics.
However, the concept of a Central Asian Union continued to be discussed among the countries over the following months, especially as Russia began to quickly withdraw from the economic sphere of the former Soviet Union. The abrupt economic exodus by Moscow led to chaos in the Central Asian economies, prompting these countries to introduce their own currencies and establish separate monetary systems. Fearing economic crises, Central Asian nations began to contemplate the creation of a common market to save the existing production and supply chains and logistics. They outlined that cooperation should be based on economic foundations, envisioning a common market for goods, services, capital, and labor, which required tightly coordinated monetary and even fiscal policies through single tariffs. The heads of the Central Asian republics agreed to hold annual summits to demonstrate their progress externally and leverage their position with Russia.
During this period, Tajikistan was embroiled in a civil war that lasted from 1992 to 1997. This not only complicated the country’s discussions with its Central Asian neighbors, leading some politicians in Tajikistan to suspect that Turkic countries wanted to form their own union, but also introduced a security dimension to the talks. Central Asian countries were concerned about security threats from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, making the issue of free movement across borders increasingly complicated, while elevating the role of Russia’s security guarantees provided to the region through the mechanism of CSTO (the Collective Security Treaty Organization).
Nevertheless, Central Asian countries in the early years of their independence demonstrated a commitment to institutionalizing their cooperation. On January 10, 1994, in Tashkent, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan signed a treaty to create a Common Economic Space. Three months later, a trilateral treaty between Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan was signed in Cholpon-Ata, on the shores of Issyk-Kul, establishing the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). On December 5, 1995, Presidents Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan, and Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan met in Dzhambul, Kazakhstan, and agreed to set up several institutions, including the Central Asian Bank for Reconstruction and Development, a Central Asian peacekeeping battalion under UN auspices, a Council of Defense Ministers, and a Central Asian Parliament.[33]
Some of these steps may seem overly ambitious in retrospect, especially the Parliament. Economic cooperation was not well fleshed out, as the elites struggled to bring each of their countries through the post-Soviet period. Nonetheless, the flurry of activity demonstrates the degree to which these national leaders understood the need for regional coordination, including on environmental issues. In 1993, they established the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea (IFAS) following a year of lobbying by Nursultan Nazarbayev (who later became the fund’s first president) towards other Central Asian heads of state. In 1997, they proclaimed Central Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone and proposed creating three international consortia in hydropower, food, and mineral resources.
In 1997, Tajikistan announced its membership in the common economic space of Central Asia, and Turkmenistan’s President Saparmurat Niyazov expressed readiness to join, hosting the 1998 meeting in Ashgabat. Niyazov and Nazarbayev were interested in the joint transportation of oil and gas across the Caspian Sea to Europe, as diversifying energy routes had become a top priority for the resource-rich region.
On December 27-28, 2001, in Tashkent, the presidents of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan held an extraordinary meeting and upgraded the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) to the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO). This strategic move aimed at “improving the forms and mechanisms of regional economic integration, deepening mutual understanding on the formation of a common security space, and developing joint actions to maintain peace and stability in the region.”[34]
The Treaty on the establishment of the CACO was signed on February 28, 2002, in Almaty, with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan as parties to the treaty. CACO ceased to be a Central Asian organization two years later when Russia joined it.
It could be said that CACO was born at the wrong time. By the early 2000s, the economic shocks of the previous decade had been resolved. The Central Asian countries, with varying degrees of success, had learned how to manage their economies on their own, establishing new global routes and partners, and increasing exports. The inflow of currency from exports, foreign investment in some of the Central Asian countries, and privatization reinforced independent financial markets. Significant income opportunities for utilizing the existing economic structures based on natural resources reduced incentives to institute structural reforms. The need for state-building increased while the need for a purely Central Asian market had decreased, as the common market within the CIS began to function, trade with Russia grew, and labor migration from demographically strong Central Asian countries to Russia began to take shape. Additional factors came into play in the 2000s: the new Russian president, Vladimir Putin, committed to sustaining Moscow’s dominance, the events of 9/11, and a commodity boom in the 2000s that reflected the rise of demand from China made Central Asian exports even more valuable.[35] During this period, Central Asian integration lost out to the larger economic processes involving the broader Eurasian space.
President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan was one of the most fervent advocates of post-Soviet integration. Throughout his tenure, he strove to elevate Kazakhstan’s role in the region. Known as the father of the CIS, which was signed into life in Almaty, Nazarbayev consistently sought to deepen the organization’s integration. In March 1994, he delivered a noteworthy speech at Moscow State University, urging the CIS states to form a comprehensive union with unified economic and defense policies. Inspired by the European Union, he proposed the creation of a Eurasian Union.
This would serve as the impetus for further regional integration in Central Asia. The Central Asian Economic Community, created in 1994, was later in 2002 transformed into the Central Asian Cooperation (which included every country but Turkmenistan). When Russia formally joined after a 2014 summit in Dushanbe, the Eurasian Economic Community was born.
Even though the liberal government of President Yeltsin was not interested in deepening post-Soviet cooperation, the ideas of Eurasianism were already growing among Russian intellectuals. In a more superficial and pre-Western interpretation that dominated in the early years after the fall of the USSR, Eurasianism was seen as a partnership between Russia and its CIS allies with Europe – “Eu-ru-asianism.”[36] As Soviet and Russian historian Lev Gumilev said in his last interview of 1982, “if Russia is to be saved, it will be saved only as a Eurasian power and only through Eurasianism.”[37]
But historic and ideological considerations aside, the post-Soviet market had to be restored in some way or another since independence. The countries tried to pick up pieces of a shattered common economy fractured by abrupt dissolution—and sign numerous agreements in trade, industrial cooperation, energy, consumer, and financial markets. For a while, for Central Asian countries and Kazakhstan in particular, economic growth was tightly connected with Russia. In May 2000, shortly after being elected the second President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, with his own understanding of history and the future for the post-Soviet space, signed a declaration on the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with Kazakhstan, Belarus, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. In 2004, Russia joined the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC). In late 2005, Uzbekistan expressed an interest in joining EurAsEC, prompting other CACO members to negotiate a merger of the two organizations, effective January 25, 2006. On October 16, 2008, Uzbekistan requested withdrawal from EurAsEC. In June 2009, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia agreed on a unified customs tariff.
For a time, Eurasianism appeared to have won as the dominant concept for post-Soviet integration, but the reality was more complex. The commodity boom of the 2000s ended with the world financial crisis of 2008-09, disrupting the inflow of capital to Central Asia. In 2014, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia signed an Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union. 2014 also saw the end of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan and the Russian capture and occupation of the Crimea. The Central Asian countries found themselves insufficiently industrialized, with multiple barriers to regional trade, rigid political structures, and an unstable business climate, all of which had failed to attract diversified foreign direct investment (FDI). At the same time, Russia’s escalating conflicts with the West prompted its partners to pursue greater diversification both politically and economically.
For Central Asia, Russia’s approach to economic integration had proven disappointing as it was largely a continuation of Soviet-era economic value chains linking the region’s resource extraction to Russian processing industries. This approach would limit the inflow of advanced technologies from more developed partners like China, the European Union, and the West, ultimately hindering long-term productivity growth in Central Asia.
Western powers became important actors in Central Asia after 9/11. All of the Central Asian countries, including Kazakhstan Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, offered their transit routes, airspaces, and other infrastructure to facilitate military logistics and transportation during the coalition’s war in Afghanistan, showcasing their skills in setting up successful transiting corridors within the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), another iteration of the Silk Road. Even prior to the operation, the United States and Europe had recognized the region’s wealth in natural resources. In his book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives,[38] Zbigniew Brzezinski, who had served as National Security Advisor under Jimmy Carter, stressed America’s strategy for Central Asia—neither dominance nor exclusion. The U.S. aim was to prevent any single power from controlling this region and ensure global access.
Both for Europe and the United States, investment in natural resources and related transportation were key issues in discussions with the Central Asian partners. In 1993, the EU proposed the TRACECA Program (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia)[39]. In 1999, the U.S. Congress passed the Silk Road Strategy Act[40], covering Central Asia and the Caucasus as part of a strategy to support communication networking projects between Europe and Asia through the Caucasus and Central Asian regions (bypassing Russian territory). The act combined the region of the South Caucasus and Central Asia, rich in oil and gas “that can reduce the dependence of the United States on energy from the volatile Persian Gulf region.”
It seemed that Central Asia alone was not enough and needed to be combined with other strategic areas to gain more weight in international affairs and to justify greater interest from the United States. In 2005, S. Frederick Starr, head of the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University, put forward the concept of “Greater Central Asia,” which aimed to unite the republics of Central Asia with Afghanistan and South Asian countries as the Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development established by Washington. This concept was criticized[41] for attempting to more aggressively detach the region from Russia and China. For Central Asian countries, the connection with Afghanistan was unappealing: even though they appreciated plans to build more transportation infrastructure in the southern direction, the fear of Islamic radicalism has prevented them from cooperating more with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan until recently.
The recurring idea of an ancient Silk Road shaped U.S. strategy in the region and was later used again as the New Silk Road in 2009. The main goal of the New Silk Road, like the Greater Central Asia project, was to create conditions for increasing trade relations between the countries of Central and South Asia. However, it ultimately lost to China, a real actor in the Silk Roads, which came to dominate the Central Asian discourse on connectivity with its “Belt and Road” initiative.
China initially branded its initiative as “New Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.” China’s leader Xi Jinping proposed the first land-based Belt at Nazarbayev University in Astana in September 2013, and the second sea-based Road at the Indonesian Parliament a month later. These are two strategies for China’s partners in Asia—landlocked Central Asia and maritime South-East Asia. As Xi initially noted, “In ancient China, the Silk Road stretched across the world, telling a moving story of friendly exchanges and mutual benefit between peoples of countries along the route.”[42]
However, since this strategy had evolved to a more global approach outside of Asia (it now includes some 148 countries around the world), China decided to remove the “Silk Road” designation and renamed the initiative to “One Belt, One Road” and then modified it to the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI). Central Asia, however, remains a very important arena.
China’s “March West” policy was developed in response to the U.S. strategic shift to Asia.[43] The relationship between the U.S. and China has become increasingly contentious, especially in East Asia. In contrast, the region west of China—comprising Central Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East—does not present similar risks. Strategically, Washington’s withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan indicates a retreat from the region, providing China with opportunities to expand its influence.
China’s strategy in Central Asia focused on building solid bilateral relations with each country, had been evolving since the 1990s. China’s interests in Central Asia are seen as so broad and important to security (particularly exacerbated after the protests that broke out in Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in China in 2009) that General Liu Yazhou of China’s People’s Liberation Army once said Central Asia is “the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the heavens.”[44]
In the early years of Central Asian independence, China provided loans and investments and gained some land concessions through border demarcation agreements with Central Asian nations. It also proposed its security umbrella through the Shanghai Security Organization, an organization combining Russia, China, Central Asia, and later other Asian countries.
China also focused on energy and transportation, successfully outbidding Western interests by quickly constructing new oil and gas infrastructure, positioning Central Asia as a significant energy supplier to China. The main infrastructure includes the Central Asia-China Gas Pipeline, which has three lines (A, B, and C) that carry natural gas from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to China, and a fourth line (D) that is planned to include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, is under construction. The Kazakhstan-China Oil Pipeline carries oil from the oil fields that China acquired early on in Kazakhstan.
Unlike Eurasianism, the BRI is more important for the idea of Central Asianism, enhancing regional cooperation. In the tradition of the anti-imperial Communist propaganda approach, China stressed its non-divisive, inclusive, and equalizing nature. Second, it provided a real alternative to the Russian-controlled transportation system, giving the region collective leverage.
Finally, another dimension to Central Asia cooperation is provided by Turkey (Iran is less influential in this respect, despite the same historic and cultural leverage). Turkey was the first country to acknowledge the independence of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. Turkey warmly welcomed brotherly nations and pushed for cultural ties. Economic cooperation and trade were also important, but Turkey has limited potential in this area. It prefers to dominate the Central Asian cultural discourse and enjoys the status of special partner.
On July 12, 1993, an agreement was signed in Almaty after Nursultan Nazarbayev’s initiation to establish the Organization for the Joint Development of Turkic Culture and Art (TURKSOY), which expanded to include 16 participants, incorporating the Turkic-speaking entities of the Russian Federation and several autonomous regions alongside the six sovereign states. With Tajikistan, Turkey has established a separate Cooperation Council.
Turkey is the only major power that does not have a “C5+1” format with Central Asia. During the 1990s Turkey initiated talks for the formation of a “Turkic Council,” but these meetings were purely consultative. This ultimately culminated in the 2008 establishment of the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic-Speaking Countries.
On August 28, 2004, Japanese Foreign Minister Yoriko Kawaguchi met for the first time in Astana with her colleagues from all five Central Asian republics (except Turkmenistan, which was represented by an ambassador). This meeting “Central Asia + Japan” resulted in a press release titled “Japan-Central Asia Relations Enter a New Era.” Following Japan, South Korea adopted the “C5+1” format, creating the Central Asia + Republic of Korea Cooperation Forum.[45] This format, which involves all five Central Asian countries, along with one external partner, comprises an inclusive regional format first proposed by Japan to engage Central Asia on terms similar to ASEAN+.
Towards the end of Barack Obama’s administration, the United States also began transitioning to the “C5+1” format. On August 3, 2016, then-Secretary of State John Kerry and the foreign ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan issued a joint statement on partnership and cooperation following the second ministerial-level meeting of the C5+1 format in Washington, D.C.
Today, Central Asia has nine active “C5+1” formats with China, Russia, the United States, the EU, Germany, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Japan, Korea, and India. It is noteworthy that even Russia, which was looking at this format somewhat suspiciously, later adopted it within the logic that “considering that only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the Eurasian Union, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are members of CSTO, and Turkmenistan generally has the status of “positive neutrality”, in what format can Russia discuss all these issues, if not in the “Russia + 5” format?”[46]
These formats are often complemented by full high-level summits. For example, the inaugural China-Central Asia summit was held in 2023[47]. The first EU–Central Asia Summit was held in Uzbekistan on April 4, 2025. It is a significant achievement for these countries to define their common foreign policy goals, something even the EU has struggled to develop, and to pursue them through a unique regional platform without the need for formal institutionalization.
By 2016, a quarter-century after gaining independence, the Central Asian countries had achieved notable success in implementing their policies and adeptly balancing the interests of major powers. They had strengthened their domestic statehoods, quickly absorbed the geopolitical lessons from the Afghanistan conflict, and begun to critically assess their long-term economic prospects. But with all their efforts to diversify, the role of China had become more dominant in the region compared to all other actors.
PRESENT COOPERATION:
After nearly a decade-long break in regional summits among the Central Asian states, “the ice began to melt” in March 2018,[48] when the leaders of the five Central Asian countries gathered in Astana, Kazakhstan’s capital, for the first Central Asia Consultative Meeting. During this inaugural Consultative Meeting, participants agreed to continue the initiative with subsequent gatherings. As of 2025, the Central Asian countries have held six such meetings: Astana (2018), Tashkent (2019), Turkmenbashi (2021), Cholpon Ata (2022), Dushanbe (2023), and Astana (2024).
Some observers might be disappointed by the distinctly “consultative” nature of the meetings between the top leaders of Central Asia (despite media outlets terming them summits, the official terminology emphasizes a more informal format). However, at present, these Consultative Meetings, reminiscent of the initial regular gatherings held in the 1990s, are the only functional vehicles to revitalize the regional cooperation process. Along with C5+1, these fora enable Central Asian countries to avoid formal institutionalization, maintaining flexibility while avoiding overcommitment. As such, they may be more durable than quickly proposed and poorly designed multilateral organizations.
Under Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov, long the chief skeptic of Central Asianism, regional cooperation faced significant obstacles. Although Karimov acknowledged the fabric of regional unity, famously referring to Uzbek-Tajik relations as “one people – two states,” he prioritized industrial and tariff policies aimed at achieving economic autonomy and self-sufficiency for Uzbekistan, a populous and double-landlocked country heavily reliant on its neighbors.
Karimov’s relationship with Nursultan Nazarbayev, the Kazakh leader, was often strained; he gratuitously suspected Nazarbayev of steering regional cooperation to fulfill his own ambitions. In one interview, Karimov pointedly asked: “What is new in the Eurasian idea? Just to create more institutions and secure high positions in them?”[49] Karimov was also concerned about security following terrorist attacks in Tashkent in 1999 and began fortifying the borders amid CACO talks about “free movement.”
Two decades after independence, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—the core countries of Central Asia—presented contrasting models. Under Nazarbayev, Kazakhstan adopted a more liberal and open approach to economics and trade, accepting a foreign trade deficit and allowing greater flexibility in its currency. It actively borrowed from foreign markets and sought out foreign investment. In contrast, Uzbekistan maintained high protective tariffs, controlled its exchange rate and prices, and strictly regulated tourism and foreign visitors.
The second Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev, who served as Prime Minister under Karimov since 2003, was likely aware of these limitations long before Karimov’s death in 2016, as his reversal of Uzbek economic policy towards greater liberalization and openness was dramatic. Even though Mirziyoyev maintained the multi-vector (or “equidistant”) foreign policy of Karimov, he overhauled Uzbekistan’s regional policy strategy and prioritized the Central Asia vector. It made sense economically and geographically, as Uzbekistan cannot trade without its neighbors, being double-landlocked. As a result of Mirziyoyev’s prompt actions, all disputes concerning Uzbek borders were resolved by the early 2020s. Uzbekistan re-established direct flights between Tashkent and Dushanbe, reopened previously closed border checkpoints, and removed many of the obstacles that affected the ease of travel across the region. In 2017, over five thousand people crossed the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border on the first day the “Dustlik” checkpoint was opened.[50]
The conflict between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan that flared in 2021–22 was also resolved with significant input from Mirziyoyev. On March 31, 2025, the presidents of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan met in the Tajik city of Khujand to declare an end to all their territorial disputes.
Although multiple factors contributed to the relatively seamless transition in Uzbekistan, Mirziyoyev’s leadership demonstrates that Central Asian integration can be more effectively mobilized from the top down than from the grassroots, as many analysts have hoped. At the same time, the broadly positive reception of the new Uzbek policies among populations across Central Asia indicates that regional cooperation holds firm at the grassroots level. However, lasting change requires substantial intellectual and political leadership from the top.
Nursultan Nazarbayev, then serving as president of Kazakhstan, eagerly welcomed the new Uzbek policy. He insisted on hosting the first regional integration meeting in Astana in 2018. Although he transferred presidential power to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in 2019, Nazarbayev continued to participate in subsequent meetings in Tashkent and Turkmenbashi as a significant “sixth force” driving regional integration. Within the post-Soviet leadership hierarchy, Nazarbayev was regarded as a sort of “aksakal” (respected elder) of the region, and the other Central Asian presidents recognized his contributions to the region’s openness and centrality.
Nazarbayev’s mastery of multi-vector diplomacy was emulated by his partners throughout Central Asia. His ambition to elevate Central Asia to a status equal to the great powers, rather than merely a middle power, remained unmatched. Constant invention of new formats and organizations (for example, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia proposed by Nazarbayev among many others in 1992), Kazakhstan’s chairmanship of the OSCE in 2010, and high-profile forums exemplified this vision, even if they likely overstretched the country’s economic capacities. Nazarbayev’s role as a chief negotiator, mediator, and central figure helped elevate Central Asia’s collective agency in the world. What he calls the “economization of foreign policy” reflects a pragmatism that has since spread throughout the region.[51]
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the current president of Kazakhstan, has calibrated this policy with even more diversified multilateral alignments beyond Russia and China. This shift is reflected in his restrained Eurasianism rhetoric, increased outreach to Western and Asia-Pacific partners, and cautious engagement with regional blocs to avoid dependence on dominant powers. Analysts view Tokayev’s strategy as a sovereignty-focused recalibration, prioritizing economic interests and strategic buffering.[52]
What Nazarbayev and Mirziyoyev envisioned back in 2018 regarding Central Asian cooperation has changed by now, with at least several important factors in play today: China’s economic slowdown after the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and a new economic context. These three factors are pushing Central Asians to find more innovative ways toward economic diversification.
The COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted global trade networks, highlighting the critical importance of resilient and well-integrated regional value chains. The disruption underscored the need for countries and regions to strengthen localized production capacities and diversify suppliers to mitigate risks from future global shocks. Additionally, the pandemic had a multifaceted impact on the Chinese economy, even though it recovered relatively quickly. Pandemic has prompted Central Asian countries to reevaluate their position in the global economy and again asserted the need for economic diversification, considering their dependence not only on Russia but also on China.
The new economic context for Central Asia is also shaped by the gradual exhaustion of the region’s natural resource extraction sectors. The region’s oil and gas deposits are reaching maturity. Uzbekistan, for example, has ceased to be a net gas exporter and is purchasing gas from Russia.[53] As of 2023, the Central Asian gas pipeline is now operating in reverse, bringing natural gas from Russia to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.[54] The looming energy deficit in the region, at a time when electricity generation has become vital for any economy seeking to utilize advanced technology, necessitates that countries explore alternative energy sources. Uranium-rich Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are planning ambitious nuclear energy projects to compensate for declining hydrocarbon deposits.
Rare earth metals are another valuable resource that Central Asian countries are preparing to explore. The republics possess vast expanses of known mineral resources, many of which remain underdeveloped. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan are known to have rare earth and critical minerals, and Tajikistan may also hold such deposits.[55]
Generally, all the countries in the region aim to develop higher value-added production and expand their services sectors to diversify their economies. The Belt and Road Initiative has thus far not succeeded in reindustrializing Central Asia; instead, it has primarily aided in building and renovating transport and energy infrastructure, including building rail links compatible with China’s railways. The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) may have even exacerbated Kazakhstan’s dependence on imports from Russia, although it has given some impetus to Kyrgyzstan’s manufacturing sector. Central Asia’s agricultural potential and export capacity have not been fully realized due to a lack of funding, climate challenges, and other obstacles.
In this new context, transit and transportation have become key economic priorities. Quoting Nazarbayev, “Although Central Asia has no access to the sea, we have two oceans – China and Russia, and these are our best oceans, if only land communication is opened.”[56] Moscow’s war in Ukraine has redefined trade routes in Eurasia, leading to the development of several alternative transport corridors that bypass Russia. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR) is the primary project—essentially another modern iteration of the Silk Road concept—that builds on Central Asian connectivity while extending beyond the region. It is also known as the Middle Corridor because it serves as a central route for China, whose northern Belt and Road Initiative corridor through Russia to Europe has been blocked, while the southern corridor faces obstacles due to conflicts involving Iran and the broader Middle East.
The Middle Corridor is a major multimodal trade route connecting China to Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, the South Caucasus, and ultimately Turkey. It serves as an alternative to the traditional northern rail route through Russia and the maritime southern route via the Suez Canal. The route originates in China, passes mainly through Kazakhstan (bypassing some other Central Asian countries), then moves to Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea ports in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, continues by rail through Georgia and Turkey, and finally reaches Europe.
The Middle Corridor is another somewhat limiting concept that primarily integrates Kazakhstan with the Caspian region and Turkey, while giving less attention to the rest of Central Asia. Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are not on the main route of the Middle Corridor, though they can access it via connections through Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan.
The corridor benefits from strong funding and political support from all parties involved, including the European Union. Azerbaijan, in particular, has invested significantly in modernizing its infrastructure. Due to sanctions on Russia and the ongoing war in Ukraine, the Middle Corridor has experienced recent increases in cargo volume and reductions in transit times. However, challenges remain: bottlenecks continue to affect efficiency, unresolved issues around harmonization and digitalization persist, and overall costs are still significantly higher than those of sea routes.
To capitalize on current momentum and actively pursue the development of new infrastructure, Central Asian countries should be looking into building their own new Belt. Rather than simply integrating themselves into fast transit routes from China to Europe, Central Asian nations need to develop a progressive network of transport links that enhance connectivity within their own borders and beyond.
The Silk Road was never a single route. It presented an entire complex of roads, cultures, and polities. China’s rise was a decisive factor that coincided with Central Asian independence and the waning influence of Russia. Central Asian economic prosperity has been closely linked to China’s prosperity for several millennia, and this remains true today.[57] However, Central Asian countries need to look beyond this factor and build further connections amongst themselves.
Greater Central Asia is great within its own borders, as it touches numerous neighboring regions and serves as “the Eurasian core,”[58] connecting East and West. Indeed, Central Asia has the potential to offer expanded connectivity southward through Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and the Gulf countries by fully utilizing its transit capabilities. Ultimately, this vision includes the eventual reopening of transport routes via Iran and Russia, currently being affected by sanctions.
By focusing on regional integration and strengthening internal and external linkages, Central Asian countries can become dynamic hubs of Eurasian connectivity.
Fortunately, East-West interaction is poised to increase. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, stated that in an “era of hyper-competitive and hyper-transactional geopolitics,”[59] Europe should “engage constructively with China – and find solutions in our mutual interests.” The first EU–Central Asia Summit, held in April 2025, concluded with a promise from the EU to invest EUR 12 billion in the region to deepen cooperation on transport, critical raw materials, digital connectivity, water, and energy. This represents a significant initial step amid ongoing global uncertainty.[60]
There are other key actors involved beyond the EU and China. India aims to expand its trade routes and plans to establish a direct sea link between the port of Mumbai and the Iranian port of Chabahar. From Chabahar, goods can be transported by a rapidly developing railroad network to Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics, and onward to neighboring regions, effectively bypassing Pakistan by sea.[61] Additionally, ongoing discussions within the “Central Asia – Gulf Cooperation Council” focus on strengthening trade and economic ties and developing new logistics routes.
Central Asian governments have so far opted for a “light” form of regionalism, “greater than cooperation but less than integration.” They cooperate in selected areas that require collaboration, such as security, trade, and transport connectivity. Recent proposals by President Mirziyoyev,[62] advocating for deeper integration through the creation of a trade zone, common industrial linkages, joint geological exploration, climate policy coordination, and cultural and media programs, have been met with interest. However, the Consultative Meeting of the Heads of States has, for now, agreed to explore these options only on paper.
Today, the countries of Central Asia have established stable and flexible channels for communication and coordination. However, these may not be sufficient to address the various changes and challenges that could impact Eurasia’s uncertain future. Given the unpredictability of major political processes such as security, peace, trade, climate, energy, and broader geopolitical realignments, a more robust collective mechanism is needed in Central Asia.
PROSPECTS FOR IMPLEMENTATION:
In their search for models, analysts who advocate for Central Asian integration often look to successful examples of regional cooperation elsewhere, such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the Nordic Council.[63] However, they frequently overlook the unique features of Central Asia—its location, geography, and economic landscape. Central Asia has historically been, and continues to be, a vital transit region, serving as a crossroads for trade and movement for centuries. It’s hard to imagine another region in the world with such unique characteristics.
A more apt comparison for Central Asia might be found in the United States today—a vast territory featuring a dense network of highways used for truck cargo transportation across numerous states, each with its own legislation, and with relatively limited rail infrastructure. The US truck cargo transportation system forms the backbone of its freight and logistics network, moving more than 70% of all freight (by weight) nationwide.[64] This extensive system is essential to supporting e-commerce businesses, supply chains, and consumer needs across the continent. Interestingly, many Central Asian immigrants now work as truck drivers or owners within this system—modern nomads, in a sense—contributing to its operation.
Despite frequent calls for deeper political unification in Central Asia, there are clear limitations. As history shows, genuine political unification in the region has rarely—if ever—happened by choice, and usually only because of conquest. Modern mechanisms of economic integration are typically built around free trade zones. Central Asia does have its own relatively common trade regime, but there are important caveats for tighter integration: countries have significant economic disparities, they are all major importers of many consumer goods, and this can lead to price distortions and even social tensions.
The concept of developing a collective industrial zone, where Central Asian states could participate together in nearshoring manufacturing for Chinese producers, is even more appealing. However, the region faces significant barriers, such as a relatively inexperienced and unqualified labor force and a lack of interlinked supply networks. Achieving this kind of integration would require major efforts in capacity-building, retraining, and fostering industrial linkages.
Although regional trade within Central Asia is gradually increasing,[65] it remains insufficient to surpass the volume of trade these countries conduct with partners outside the region. Interestingly, this pattern is not unique to Central Asia. For example, within ASEAN, a regional bloc often praised for its economic cooperation, member states do not extensively trade with each other either, compared to their levels of trade with external partners such as China, the United States, and the European Union. This example reveals that geographic proximity and formal regional cooperation agreements do not automatically translate into dominant intra-regional trade flows.
The limited intra-regional trade in both Central Asia and ASEAN highlights the complexity of regional economic integration. It suggests that, beyond establishing trade agreements, successful integration requires addressing broader structural challenges such as infrastructural connectivity, harmonization of standards, diversification of economic activities, and the political will to overcome historical and strategic differences. Strengthening these internal factors is essential for regional trade to become a more significant driver of growth and development.
Central Asia enjoys numerous strategic entry and exit points along its borders with economically developed neighbors. By establishing a common border authority, Central Asian countries could jointly manage these gateways not just to the east and west, but also to the south, where Tajikistan—often overlooked in broader Eurasian dynamics—could play a pivotal role in forging new connections with Afghanistan,[66] alongside Uzbekistan, and potentially even with Iran in the future.
Realizing such an initiative would require a robust framework of public-private partnership. The project would depend heavily on the construction, modernization, and maintenance of an extensive network of roads and railways to connect Central Asia internally and with its neighbors. International financing, development banks, and multi-party coordination would be essential components. Crucially, private sector involvement by companies specializing in e-commerce, road maintenance, automotive repair, hospitality, retail, and logistics, could foster job creation, support small businesses, and stimulate local economies. The trucking industry in particular, encompassing both companies and individual drivers, would stand to gain significantly from increased cross-border and long-distance activity.
To ensure smooth operations, another common body could be established to regulate the transit of third-party goods, standardize transit fees, and enforce the fair distribution of revenue. Alongside such structures, legislative and customs harmonization among the Central Asian states would represent a significant and necessary undertaking—one that could require the involvement of external technical and legal experts.
Specific regional institutions would be needed to oversee the development of interregional cooperation with a common fund for mutual investment, regional stock and commodity exchanges, a regional development bank, regional digital customs and a cargo tracing agency, or a regional market information agency, thereby paving the way for a more robust business infrastructure. A regional one-stop service provider would be essential for facilitating cross-border investments by providing companies with a range of support services such as legal assistance, export facilitation, and support with customs declarations.
In the longer term, improved transit infrastructure should pave the way for much more than just the flow of goods. Expanded communication networks and new mobility corridors would encourage joint production chains, regional industrial development, expanded market opportunities, tourism, enhanced intraregional trade, and greater economic spillovers. Such developments would gradually build the foundation for broader regional economic integration.
This vision might seem elusive—perhaps a modern mirage along the new Silk Road. Still, it presents a compelling example of how Central Asian nations can pursue innovative, collaborative pathways to development without needing full political unification or heavy supranational bureaucracies. Implementation could proceed through intergovernmental treaties ratified by national parliaments. Central Asian countries could embrace a flexible yet effective strategy, tailored to their unique geography and shared ambitions, for collectively advancing their role as a vital Eurasian bridge.
In a manner consistent with the reality of each individual Central Asian country, it will be important as projects and institutional progress move forward for the intent of joint efforts to be communicated, and to the extent possible, for popular feedback to be obtained. Any meaningful and sustainable project for Central Asian cooperation must build grassroots support. It is essential that such initiatives be inclusive rather than divisive and that they serve the broader population rather than merely becoming tools for foreign actors or political elites to secure legitimacy. Broad societal involvement can help ensure that regional cooperation is grounded in widespread consensus, making it both resilient and enduring.
Furthermore, it is crucial that the idea of Central Asian integration becomes a high priority in the national agendas of all countries in the region, despite their increasing adoption of multi-vector foreign policies. Only with a unified vision can the region maximize its strategic potential and speak with a stronger voice on the international stage.
A series of practical steps toward this goal could include:
- The establishment of a joint Central Asian research and investment fund. Such a fund would enable in-depth studies on joint transit potential and harmonized systems and standards, without excessive interference in individual national economies.
- Seeking technical and financial assistance from external partners. Engaging expert support from the European Union, the United States, or China can provide valuable international perspectives and ensure that Central Asian projects align with global best practices and standards.
- Creating mechanisms to encourage private sector engagement and initiative. Fostering open forums and public-private partnerships will not only expand economic opportunities but also ensure that policies reflect the needs and experience of entrepreneurs and business leaders operating on the ground.
- Engage in messaging, positioning Central Asia as a unique entity, highlighting its history, main markets, comparative advantages, and economic and cultural features. An effective public diplomacy campaign, combined with economic outreach, can raise the region’s profile and attract investment, talent, and tourism.
The era of nomadic empires is now a part of distant history. The way forward for Central Asia is to reinvent itself within the current and future global context—embracing innovation, openness, and cooperation—while still cherishing the rich and diverse legacy inherited from generations of Central Asians who laid the foundations for today’s aspirations.
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[5] To trace their lineages and traditions of statehood, contemporary Uzbekistan honors Timur, Kazakhstan focuses on the history the Jochi Ulus (the Golden Horde), Tajikistan – the Persian Samanid Empire, and Kyrgyzstan the history of the Qaghanate of the Yenisei Kyrgyz people who lived in southern Siberia.
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[66] Tajikistan is currently rejecting cooperation with the Taliban government of Afghanistan
