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Lingering anti-Sinic sentiments in post-Communist Mongolia: Why dislike the Chinese?

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Sino-Mongolian relations have been amicable ever since the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Mongolian rapprochements of the late 1980s, after over three decades of hostility. Today Mongolia and the People's Republic of China have broadened relations in all areas of cooperation, returning to a state of relations similar to the 1950s. However, in Mongolia, anti-Chinese discourses continue to appear in daily conversations, the news media, in Internet comments, literature, hip-hop, and even graffiti. This paper advances four reasons for such lingering anti-Chinese sentiment. First, like any small state, Mongolia remains vulnerable to the dominance of its two large neighbors. Memories of colonization are still vivid. Second, Mongolians, like many other ethnic groups, are concerned with the population's "purity of blood." Third, the communist regime's use of anti-Chinese sentiment during the Sino-Soviet conflicts of the 1960s-70s has had a lingering impact on the views and attitudes of Mongolians toward China, Chinese people, and Chinese culture. The anti-Chinese myths and narratives that were institutionalized have not been critically analyzed. Finally, various external and internal actors use anti-Chinese sentiment to forward their business interests.

Introduction

A few days before the 2009 presidential election in Mongolia, the candidate Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, with tears in his eyes, asked his mother to speak on national television to prove that his father was not of Chinese origin.[1] This dramatic scene touched many viewers even though the making of allegations about someone's ethnic Chinese ties is an often-used tactic in Mongolian politics. Following anti-Sinic discourses in contemporary Mongolia, one will readily conclude that the pervasiveness of such discourses is the result of the institutionalization of anti-Chinese ideology, anti-Sinicism.[2] From graffiti and hip hop to media coverage, online comments, and daily conversations, anything related to China, Chinese people, and their culture is often negatively depicted. Western scholarly works and foreign news media coverage never fail to mention the uneasy feelings of Mongolians toward Chinese. Mongolian public opinions on China are noticeably negative in domestic opinion polls, as well as comparative polls like barometer studies.[3] Billé rightly argues that, "Anti-Chinese discourse in Mongolia cannot be solely ascribed to political games, and the pervasiveness of these sentiments has a number of social and psychological underpinnings."[4]

My generation, which grew up during the communist regime, sang anti-Chinese songs, enjoyed reading novels and watching movies in which Chinese were negatively depicted, were inspired to look for Chinese spies, and learned to make prejudicial judgments of Chinese-like appearances. In retrospect, however, I am saddened at the thought of my beloved Mongolian language teacher having to deny that her father was Chinese or that she had Chinese language ability, as well as at the idea of those of my classmates who were afraid of being teased with derogatory terms, such as *huaqiao* (overseas Chinese), *danjaad* and *luuhaan* (nicknames for Chinese nationals in Mongolia), *erliiz*, or *hurliiz*, because of their physical appearances.[5]

These reflections led me to ask the following question: Why is it that Mongolians dislike Chinese? Critical scholarship on the notion of race, particularly Balibar's concept of neo-racism, only provides partial explanations of the phenomenon, because, in the absence of any biological distinction (e.g., skin color), the clearest differentiation between Chinese and Mongolians appears to be their culture (especially language).[6] The most common approach to grasping this phenomenon has been that of identity politics; however, I argue that multiple factors contribute to lingering anti-Chinese sentiments in post-communist Mongolia.[7]

I advance four reasons. First, anti-Chinese feeling is related to memories of colonization. Similar to any small state, Mongolia feels vulnerable on account of its geographic location between two populous, armed, and expansionist major powers—China and Russia. Memories of Chinese and Russian colonization are still vivid. Second, Mongolians, like many other ethnic groups, are concerned with the population's "purity of blood." The Mongolian state and society employ a form of biopower, in Foucault's sense, to maintain the purity of the population.[8] Third, the communist regime's use of anti-Chinese sentiment during Sino-Soviet conflicts in the 1960s-70s has had a lingering impact on the views and attitudes of Mongolians toward China, Chinese people, and Chinese culture. There has been no deconstruction of institutionalized anti-Chinese myths and narratives. Lastly, various external and internal actors use anti-Chinese feelings to further their own economic interests.

Two cautionary remarks must be made before expanding my arguments. First, the temptation of making generalizations about popular anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia without a careful study should be avoided.[9] As a result of increased interactions between Mongolians and Chinese, and the availability of information following the normalization of Sino-Mongolian relations from 1990 on, we must acknowledge the existence of diverse and changing views and attitudes toward Chinese people and their culture. Second, we must not exaggerate the violent character of anti-Chinese sentiments, and in comparison to anti-Chinese violence in other parts of Asia, the degree of violence has been low in Mongolia. Therefore, my aim in this paper is to explain some factors for the lingering anti-Chinese discourses to be found in public conversations, media, and virtual spaces. I have no intention of trying to determine the scope, intensity, and consequences of this under-examined social phenomenon, namely anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia.

Memories of Colonization

After two centuries of dominating Eurasia, the Mongol Empire underwent centuries of power struggle and gradually disintegrated into three major parts: Inner Mongolia, Mongolia (known as Outer Mongolia), and Western (*Oirad* or *Zuungar*) Mongolia. All three became colonies of the Manchu-led Qing Dynasty of China in the 17th–19th centuries, and of the Republic of China in 1915-1921. Inner Mongolia remained part of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Mongolia became a Soviet satellite state between 1921 and 1990.

Mongolia's subjugation to the Qing Dynasty was unique in several ways. First, the Manchus, who are non-Chinese people ethnically and linguistically, established the Qing Dynasty, which lasted from 1644 until 1911. Inner Mongolia and Mongolia yielded voluntarily in 1636 and 1691 respectively.[10] The main reason for the voluntary subjugation of the latter was related to its fear of Western Mongolian military threats. Second, the Qing Dynasty treated Mongols[11] differently to Chinese subjects because of their similarities in terms of ethnicity (nomadic culture, religion, language) and even physical appearance.[12] The Manchus and Mongols of the Bureau of Outer Mongolia ran Mongolian affairs. This was the only department in which the Chinese held no official positions.[13] Interestingly, relations between Manchus and Mongols were strengthened by the early Manchu policy of marrying their princesses with Mongolian nobles.[14] Third, at the request of the Mongols, the Manchus implemented special protectionist policies to defend the Mongols from ethnic and cultural assimilation with Han Chinese. For example, detailed regulations for Chinese traders were formulated for their entry and trade in Mongolia. These regulations prohibited the Chinese from marrying Mongolian women or from taking their families to Mongolia.[15] Fourth, Mongolia was strategically and militarily important for the Manchus. The Mongols were used as a military reserve to suppress rebellions and to conduct expansionist campaigns within China. Mongolian territory, especially the western parts, served as a military and logistics base to support the military campaign against the Western Mongols and to prevent Russian expansion into Mongolia.[16]

At the same time, the Manchus were cautious about Mongolian unification, which could present a challenge to their rule over China. Therefore, the Manchus deepened the division between Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia, introduced more administrative subdivisions within each,[17] enhanced the dissemination of the Buddhist religion, and discouraged economic development to keep it a backward, restive colony.[18] Manchu policies towards Mongolia remained intact until the last Manchu Emperor accepted a Chinese colonization proposal to increase the Han population and to protect the borders of Mongolia.[19]

In 1902, Chinese officials of the Qing Dynasty established a new administration for Mongolia in order to open the lands of Inner Mongolia and Mongolia to Chinese settlers for the cultivation and extraction of natural resources, the construction of a railway, and an increased assimilation with Chinese culture (e.g., to permit Chinese marry to Mongolian women and to settle, to write official documents in Chinese, and to use Chinese names).[20] Despite resistance to such colonization, the new administrative policy was implemented in Inner Mongolia but failed in Mongolia. Mongolia declared its independence as the 1911 Revolution in China marked the collapse of the Qing Dynasty. To inherit the territory of the Qing Dynasty, the Chinese Republic denounced Mongolia's independence at the tripartite discussions with Mongolia and Russia at Khiagt in 1915 and occupied Mongolia militarily from 1919 to 1921.[21] The Chinese military occupation increased the number of Chinese settlers, provided more privileges to Chinese business activities,[22] and brutally suppressed the Mongolian population.[23] However, the Chinese occupation of Mongolia ended in 1921, when Mongolian nationalists, together with first, fleeing White Russian militaries, and later the extensive Soviet support, liberated Mongolia from the Chinese military occupation.[24] However, Inner Mongolia, including its restive Barga region, was to remain part of China. Even though official Chinese statements claiming Mongolia as a lost territory ended upon the formal recognition of Mongolian independence by the Chiang Kai-shek government in 1945 and the PRC in 1949, informal claims have since been made by both Chinese and Taiwanese officials.

The Russian domination of Mongolia began in 1921 and went through several different stages. The most brutal stage of Russian domination occurred during the period of 1924 to 1947, during which time the Soviet secret police were instructed to carry out massive purges of the Mongolian anti-communist, nationalistic elites, intellectuals, public servants, and monks.[25] Following this period, Mongolia benefitted from extensive Soviet assistance to transform it from a backward agrarian state into a socialist-style economy, and particular achievements were made in education, health, and state-institution building.[26] Soviet domination differed in several respects from Chinese colonial policies. First, Russia was regarded as a potential protector of Mongolian interests, since it supported the Mongolian declaration of independence in 1911. Second, Soviet Russia did not appear to have the intention of bringing a large number of Russian settlers or of annexing Mongolia like the other Central Asian republics. Third, the Soviet military deployment to Mongolia also served the Mongolian interest of maintaining its independence, in addition to serving overall Soviet geo-strategic objectives. The Mongolian military was deployed three times in accordance with Soviet geo-strategic rationale vis-à-vis Japan and China: to destroy the fleeing White Russians forces in 1921-1925,[27] to fight against Japanese expansion in 1936-1945,[28] and to strengthen its strategic advantages during Sino-Soviet tensions in the 1960s-1970s.[29] Finally, Mongolia secured Chinese recognition of its independence and UN membership in 1961 with the explicit supports of the Soviets.

As a small, vulnerable nation, Mongolia feels insecure and uncertain about the intentions of its expansionist neighbors

As a small, vulnerable nation, Mongolia feels insecure and uncertain about the intentions of its expansionist neighbors. In his seminal works, Owen Lattimore has rightly compared the fate of the Mongols with that of the native Indians of North America.[30] Mongolia and other nations with pastoral economies in Central Asia became victims of Chinese and Russian colonial expansion during the 18th and 19th centuries. Their fates were decided by Russia and China without consideration for these nomadic nations. Mongolia sees itself as a victim of colonial powers. As a result of domestic power struggles and geopolitics between major powers, it has been divided into several parts: Inner Mongolia has remained part of the PRC; Mongolia gained its independence with Russian backing; while the Buryats and Tuvans came under Russian rule. By 2010, about 80% of the population of Inner Mongolia was Han Chinese and 66% of the Buryatia Republic is ethnically Russian.[31] Particularly in the Chinese case, the Sinicisation process was expedited during the Cultural Revolution, in which over 22,900 were killed, 120,000 injured, 790,000 imprisoned, and 5,000 senior Mongolian cadres purged.[32] Thanks to the competing geo-strategic and economic interests of China and Russia, only Mongolia remains as a buffer zone. History shows numerous examples of Russian and Chinese attempts to disadvantage each other by asserting their influence in Mongolia. For example, the 1911 revolution in China triggered Russian dominance in Mongolia, while the 1917 Revolution in Russia caused the Chinese to occupy Mongolia militarily. Chinese weaknesses during the world wars created opportunities for the Soviets to consolidate their bases in Mongolia. As China has gained power, however, it has begun to demand that Russia scale down its influence in Ulaanbaatar. Due to fear of falling under the domination of either major power, or of experiencing the fate of the Inner Mongolians or the Russian Buryats, Mongolians feel vulnerable and often seek ways to escape from the colonial paths.

Out of the three colonial experiences, the Chinese one was the most brutal and humiliating. While the Mongols were treated as lower-ranking partners by the Manchus and the Russians, they were regarded as colonial subjects during the Chinese military occupation.[33] While the Soviets helped Mongolians to establish their national institutions (e.g., provision of resources, training of national cadres) and to run their external and internal affairs (especially the latter), Chinese and Manchu domination aimed to keep Mongols as disintegrated and backward as possible, using the land merely as a resource base. Unlike the Manchus, the Chinese and particularly the Russians are ethnically, linguistically, and physically different to Mongols. However, Chinese domination has featured the arrival and settlement of a large number of Han Chinese. This occurred during the last periods of the Qing Dynasty, and the brief Chinese occupation of Mongolia in 1919-1921. In contrast, Russian presence in Mongolia has always been only on a temporary basis. As a result, Mongolia's past colonial experience with China at the beginning of last century remains vivid and contributes

to lingering anti-Sinic sentiment in contemporary Mongolia. The small state's feelings of insecurity can be triggered by any Chinese issues relating to Mongolia, ranging from the large number of Chinese labor migrations to informal Chinese claims of Mongolian irredentism.

Blood Purity—Maintaining "Mongolness"

Mongolian identity is a complicated one due to the many nomadic tribes of Inner Asia that claim their ancestral origins to be in the Mongol Empire of the 13th and 14th centuries. I thus discuss three types of identities in relation with the discourses on blood purity in post-communist Mongolia, and explain why the concern with "blood purity" contributes to lingering anti-Sinic sentiments in Mongolia. All of those discourses are focused on three major identities: Greater Mongol identity, *Halh* identity,[34] and non-Mongol identity. Greater Mongol identity includes all nomadic tribes who claim they have ancestral ties with Chinggis Khaan,[35] while the latter two serve the purpose of protecting *Halh* Mongolian identity.

Identity discourses are focused on three major axes: Greater Mongol identity, *Halh* identity, and non-Mongol identity

Greater Mongol identity, Bulag argues, is linked to a "cultural concept of identity [as] overriding the present nation-state borders, without any political implications."[36] The main attributes of Greater Mongol identity are based on ancestral ties to Chinggis Khaan, Buddhism, Mongolian scripts, nomadic lifestyle, and culture. Following the fall of the Mongol Empire, Mongols fought to unite all the nomadic tribes in order to establish a Pan-Mongol state. However, attempts failed due to the geopolitics of the major powers, as well as to internal power struggles among Mongols themselves. Two examples are worth mentioning here. Upon declaring its independence in 1911 and 1945, Mongolia's efforts to unite Inner Mongolia were discouraged by Russia. Moreover, Japan supported fleeing White Russian units to establish Great Mongolia in 1920 and then launched a military campaign in 1936-1939 to create a Pan-Mongol state, which it would use as a wedge between China and Russia. Appeals to Greater Mongolia automatically trigger concerns in Beijing and in Moscow, particularly ones related to territorial and national integrity, since many Mongols who share the Greater Mongol identity reside within their borders (i.e., Inner Mongolians in the PRC and Buryats, Kalmyks, and Tuvans in the Russian Federation). Since the 1990s, Mongolians and Mongols in neighboring countries have sought to promote this Greater Mongol identity in areas of cultural and economic exchanges.

In independent Mongolia *Halh* identity is the most dominant, and it was consolidated during the communist period of 1921-1989. As the *Halh* sub-ethnic group of Mongols dominated in independent Mongolia, *Halhs* claim to be the purest Mongolian identity and to possess the purest blood. At the same time, other Mongols also perceive the territory of independent Mongolia to be their ancestral center. This fact has strengthened the *Halh* claim to purity. However, other Mongols, and especially Inner Mongolians, rightly contest this *Halh*-centric claim. As Bulag argues, "The institutionalization of *Halh* identity as the most authentic Mongol one and as constituting the 'Whites' of Mongolia is also something unacceptable to many non-*Halh* Mongols."[37] *Halh* identity is closely related to Mongolian citizenship, so identifying as a *Halh* provides some socio-political advantages (and did so especially during the period of communist rule). In Mongolia, there are two other sub-ethnic groups: Western Mongols (usually represented by the *Dörvöd*) and *Buryats*. There are no concerns of intermarriage and or restrictions on socio-political status among *Halh, Dörvöd,* or *Buryat* people. Based on the claim to purity of blood, the *Halh*-centric identity also serves as the basis for loyalty arguments against Mongolians with mixed blood and Mongols living in China and Russia. For example, suspicions concerning Chinese assimilation and takeover are most commonly voiced against Mongolians with Chinese ethnic origins and Mongols of the PRC.

The last identity category includes the Kazakh minority and nationals of other foreign countries, namely Russian and Chinese nationals. As a result of Kazakh migration from the 19th century on, a visible Kazakh minority has come to constitute about 4 percent of Mongolia's population.[38] Although these Kazakhs reside

in the Bayan-Ulgii province, some are also scattered in the major urban centers. Because of their linguistic, religious, and cultural differences, Kazakhs have been provided more privileges (e.g., usage of Kazakh language) in addition to their citizenship entitlements.[39] Marriages between Mongolians and Kazakhs are rare mostly due to their sharp cultural differences. The number of Chinese and Russian nationals changes usually due to the political context. However, Mongolian state institutions are reluctant to provide citizenship entitlements to Chinese or Russian settlers.[40] However, each of these groups has received rather different treatment, notably during the communist period, during which Mongolia's close alliance with the Soviet Union meant that Russians had greater privileges than Chinese nationals, who were subject to state surveillance, expulsion, and discrimination.

All three categories—Greater Mongolian, *Halh*-centric, and non-Mongol identities—are constructed with different purposes. A Greater Mongol identity aims to be the most inclusive collective Mongol identity, posited in opposition to Russian and Chinese cultural identities. The *Halh*-centric identity serves the purpose of consolidating the *Halh* as the purest identity among Mongolians and Mongols. The non-Mongol identity, shared by those who reside within Mongolia's borders, first, classifies them as the "other" identity, and second, assigns them a different socio-economic and political status (as Kazakhs are given citizenship status, while the other two minority groups—Chinese and Russians—are not). Relatedly, mixed-blood Mongolians (called *erliiz* or *hurliiz*) also encounter various types of discrimination, despite having grown up in Mongolian cultural contexts and having mastered the language. During the early stages of the communist revolution and during Sino-Soviet tensions of 1960s-1980s, Mongolians with any connections (mostly unproven ethnic/blood ties) to Chinese nationals were victimized as "Chinese spies," excluded from the public service, and marginalized in society.[41]

Mongolia's concern for "blood purity" and for consolidating its identity has increased with its opening up to the global economy, the normalization of relations with China, and democratization

Mongolia's concern for "blood purity" and for consolidating its identity has increased with its opening up to the global economy, the normalization of relations with China, and democratization. Mongolia's has thus attempted to increase the extraction of its natural resources, to develop its infrastructure, to export agricultural products, and attract foreign investment and labor. Public outcry over the increased presence of Chinese businesspeople and construction workers has pressured the government to take more preventive measures against potential demographic expansion. Given its economic growth and available labor, China is unquestionably Mongolia's main source of economic development (a key market and investor) and of cheap, organized labor for major construction projects (e.g., houses, roads). Besides China, more foreign nationals are now settling on permanent and temporary bases.[42] At the same time, the Constitution provides Mongolians with the right to travel, to reside, and to work and study abroad without restriction. The 2010 census indicated that 107,140 Mongolians reside abroad; however, other sources claim that the number already exceeds 150,000, including undocumented immigrants.[43] This increases the chances of intermarriage between Mongolians and other nationalities. Although these factors—the global economy, democratization, and normalized relations with China—complicate the state's ability to advance policies to maintain blood purity and to consolidate a *Halh*-centric identity, state and social attitudes remain concerned about Chinese demographic expansions.

In 1994 the National Security Concept defines nine national security concerns for independent Mongolia, one of them being the security of the population and its "gene pool".[44] As highlighted in the security document, disease, inbreeding in rural areas, and alcoholism were defined as the three main causes of the population's genetic insecurity, and the government was instructed to draft a comprehensive policy to ensure gene pool health and sustained population growth. Interestingly, a revival of the tradition of tracing family genealogy up to seven to nine generations is considered the most important method for preventing inbreeding within nine generations. Sixteen years down the track, the revised National Security Concept of 2010 continues to treat genetic security as a key national security concern. It touches on three specific goals: first, the reduction

of inbreeding, of alcoholism, and of narcotics intake; second, finding a resolution to the problem of dual citizenship; and third, improving control of foreign nationals, including migrants.[45] In accordance with this new National Security Concept, immigration law limits the number of total foreign immigrants to Mongolia to a maximum of 0.5 percent, of which immigrants from any one nation should not exceed 0.17 percent.[46]

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Even though these documents do not explicitly address Chinese nationals, the fact that they were drafted after Mongolia's normalization with China may certainly be a sign of the country's historic concern of Chinese demographic expansion. Aside from state policies to protect the population's genetic pool, the public has become more vociferous against the employment of mostly Chinese labor in construction projects, and against the presence of Chinese business investment, notably in mining, retail, and service sectors. The increased number of mostly Chinese males in Mongolia, in turn, triggers public concern for "blood purity" and suspicions of Chinese assimilation via sexual contacts. At the same time, this perception tends to give rise in Mongolia to nationalistic, racial, and xenophobic groups, which target Chinese businesses and nationals as well as Mongolian women with connections to them. Although the activities of these groups are non-violent, they along with the overwhelming negative media coverage of Chinese activities in Mongolia, anti-Chinese hip-hop songs, graffiti, and a few small, ethnically motivated clashes, have created a threatening, insecure environment for Chinese nationals as well as for Mongolian women with various links to Chinese businesses. As argued by a well-known activist, Undarya,

> Conservative/xenophobic nationalism is the most, so to speak, woman-hostile discourse; it emphasizes the need to protect the biological-cultural purity of the Mongolian nation as a precondition for preserving Mongolia's sovereignty; it strongly advocates the reinforcement of patriarchal and patrilineal traditions that place Mongolian women's bodies and sexuality under strict masculine control.[47]

Mongolia's identity construction and maintenance of "blood purity" might be explained in relation to its populous southern neighbor. First, Mongolians have witnessed the assimilation of the Manchus and Inner Mongolians into Chinese culture, and of the *Buryats, Kalmyks*, and *Tuvans* into Russian culture in the 20th century. Secondly, Mongolians feel more threatened demographically because Mongolia is the only Chinese neighbor whose population is much smaller than that of its co-ethnics in China (2.8 million versus 5.8 million). Finally, Mongols coexist with Chinese people, whose demographic expansion has historically triggered the concerns of faraway states in Africa, Europe, North America, and the Pacific.

The State Use of Anti-Chinese Sentiments

The current impact of lingering anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia is also related to the way that the Russian and Mongolian states have exploited such sentiment, at least since 1911. The Russian state has always considered Mongolia a key geostrategic landscape for defending Siberia. A similar geostrategic logic applies to China, since the most successful attacks on Beijing have tended to come from its north. This geostrategic competition between two major states has resulted in the separation of co-ethnic groups of Mongols. Unquestionably, China and Russia have used "anti" sentiments to consolidate their dominance in Inner Mongolia and in Mongolia respectively. This next part explains how the Russian and Mongolian states have used anti-Sinic sentiments in the pursuit of specific goals and the ongoing impact of their policies.

As Tsarist Russia expanded into northeast Asia, it responded favorably to the call of Mongolians for independence in 1911; however, Tsarist Russia was not capable of providing substantive military and economic assistance for the Mongolian Kingdom, because of its own external and internal challenges. Indeed, Tsarist Russia managed to limit Chinese influence and to advance its economic interests in Mongolia until the 1919 Chinese military occupation. After establishing a communist government in Moscow, Soviet leaders began to realize Mongolia's geo-strategic importance for defending the Russian Far East and expanded

Comintern (the Communist International) activities to northeast and inner Asian states. Thus, the Soviet state used the desire of Mongolians for independence and anti-Chinese sentiment to deploy the Soviet Army units and to strengthen the pro-communist Mongolian government.

Soviet leaders directed the Mongolian communist government to eliminate nationalistic leaders on the grounds of their being pro-Japanese, pro-Chinese, and counterrevolutionary. The massive government purges caused many Mongolians as well as foreign nationals, including Chinese, to flee from Mongolia.[48] The Japanese plan of establishing a Pan-Mongolian state (unifying both Inner and Outer Mongolia), to separate China and Russia physically, and to take Russian Siberia militarily, induced another round of Soviet military deployments in 1937-39 and the elimination of Mongolian nationalist elites and intellectuals who were against the brutal Soviet domination. From 1939 to 1949, the Mongolian territory was used by the Soviet Union to support Chinese struggles against Japan and separatist movements in East Turkestan. Following the establishment of China's communist government, three nations, namely China, Mongolia, and Soviet Russia, enjoyed over a decade of friendship, during which the mutual use of "anti" sentiments ceased. Mao's government recognized Mongolia's sovereignty in 1949, offered developmental aid along with 300,000 Chinese laborers (Mongolia accepted only 20,000), demarcated Sino-Mongolian borders in 1962, and expanded bilateral relations in all areas of cooperation.[49] During this period, Soviet geo-strategic interests in Mongolia waned on account of its postwar re-construction efforts and its focus on Central and Eastern Europe.

The amicable period of the 1950s ceased with the onset of Sino-Soviet tensions, which caused the third Soviet military and political presence in Mongolia. By 1966, the friendly relationship had disappeared, and there was, as one foreign visitor observed, a huge Soviet presence, not to mention the disappearance of Chinese participants in the annual *Naadam* parade, and guarded encampments of Chinese laborers—all of which was in stark contrast to the earlier visible Chinese presence, the small numbers of Soviet advisors, and the participation of Chinese workers in the *Naadam* parade in 1959.[50] Numerous explanations can be given for the sudden mood swing away from China in the 1960s. First, Mongolia, unlike North Korea, was caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet tensions by virtue of its geography. Second, ties between the Mongolian leadership and the Soviets were stronger than those between the Chinese and most of the Mongolian leaders, who were mostly educated in the Soviet Union. Third, anti-Chinese sentiments were again employed at the state level because some of the Mongolian political elites were fearful of Chinese assimilation and were uncertain about Chinese intentions. Anti-Chinese sentiments also served the political calculations of leaders to maintain a repressive control over society.[51] Finally, the Soviets desired to eliminate the spread of Chinese influence in Mongolia and to use Mongolia as a geo-strategic buffer for their military operations against China.

During this period, anti-Chinese sentiments were forcefully institutionalized. Yumjaagyn Tsedenbal, President and Prime Minister from 1952 to 1984, and his followers easily used all of the available means of propaganda, education, and repression to frame negative narratives and images about China and Chinese people. By the 1960s, the Soviet-style education and propaganda organizations, along with other controlling organizations, had been fully established, equipped with new instruments, and manned with Mongolian specialists, who were educated and trained in the Soviet Union.[52] For example, a section at the Ministry of Internal Affairs was tasked with censoring media and literature material, becoming a special Department of Control for Media and Literature. Department personnel worked directly under the party leaders and the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party Central Committee in 1953. The department was responsible for censoring all publications, newspaper materials, and radio broadcasts (from 1934), as well as television transcripts (from 1967) prior to public dissemination; for controlling the content of foreign publications, pre-screening films, documentaries, and plays; and for confiscating anti-regime publications or other restricted materials.[53] The secret police was also fully institutionalized in order to maintain control over the population.

Several sources of new information were available for Mongolians at the time: education, works of organized propaganda, newspapers, radio and television (with one Mongolian channel, and later, a Soviet channel), and

rumors. From the mid-1960s and into the 1970s, most history textbooks were re-written to highlight the sacrifices made by Mongolian communists and Soviets to protect Mongolia's independence and help transform a backward agrarian society into a socialist one. Obviously, China, as the main target of the propaganda, was depicted as a nation whose historical intentions were to colonize Mongolia and to assimilate the Mongolian population, as had been the case for Inner Mongolians and Tibetans. Organized propaganda and the news media played a major role in portraying the evil intentions of the Chinese and the need for Soviet military protection.[54] The Chinese military build-up along the Sino-Mongolian borders, the Sino-Indian war in 1962, the Chinese nuclear test in 1964, Mao's statements and claims about Mongolia,[55] the Chinese Cultural Revolution (particularly in Inner Mongolia), the Ussuri River Armed Conflict in 1969, and later, the Sino-Vietnam conflict in 1979 were cited as proof of China's threat. The Mongolian communist party leaders made a barrage of critical statements against the Chinese government and expressed Mongolia's support of Soviet Union policy toward China. Whether the statements were made because of pressure from the Soviets or from Mongolians to appease their colleagues in Moscow is hard to know. At the same time, the communist party classified any news that could be used for enemy propaganda, such as accidents, failures, or mistakes that involved Mongolians and Soviets.[56] Negative rumors about a Chinese takeover, conspiracy of a *coup d'état* by Chinese nationals and mixed blood Mongolians, Chinese spy rings, or possible sabotage attempts, were widespread.

Communist president Tsedenbal eliminated some of their opposition, who were alleged to have Chinese ethnic ties or were even falsely reported as having connections with the Chinese government

Besides these sources of new information, national films, drama, and literature were used to introduce negative images of China and Chinese people. A Mongolian national film studio was established in 1954 and its production increased in the 1960s, as Mongolian producers were graduating from the Soviet Union. Only one movie, *Ardiin Elch (*People's Envoy*),* depicted a positive image of the Chinese settlers in Mongolia. The movie was produced at the height of friendly Sino-Mongolian relations, in 1959. The movies, documentary films, dramas, literature, and patriotic songs all painted an image of Chinese people as evil. Chinese citizens, mostly laborers and their families, were also controlled (guarded) until their departure in 1964. Moreover, Chinese settlers, their children, people who were believed to have Chinese ethnic links, and experts on China (linguists, historians, and others with experience in China) were marginalized from the society by having their access to privileges (party membership, higher education, and government works) limited, and they were kept under the control of the secret police.[57] Tsedenbal and his colleagues eliminated some of their opposition, who were alleged to have Chinese ethnic ties or were even falsely reported as having connections with the Chinese government. Acts of repression and control systematically created fear among the population, to the point that people avoided talking about China and Chinese people; interacting with Chinese settlers, their children and the purged people; or talking negatively about the Soviets. People with Chinese ethnic connections hid their true ethnicity and most registered themselves as *Halh*, the dominant ethnic group in Mongolia.

From these parallel events, we can conclude that Mongolian political leaders fomented anti-Chinese sentiment to justify their acts of repression and purges, and that their discrimination against Chinese nationals and people of mixed-descent was about consolidating their political clout and allowing Russian leaders to reassert their influence in Mongolia. For many Mongolians, however, the acts were perceived as the government's effort to protect the Mongolian genetic pool and their nomadic culture from Sinicization.

The Mongolian state's use of anti-Chinese sentiments continued well beyond the normalization of Sino-Mongolian relations and the Soviet political and military withdrawal from Mongolia in the 1990s, for several reasons. First, its political elites and intellectuals, who were subject to extreme anti-Chinese propaganda for more than two decades and who are unfamiliar with the new China, have been unwilling to undertake a critical examination of the intentionally negative narratives about China since the Cold War. Perhaps one might say that a nation needs to have an "enemy" or "uncertainties" to justify its national security policy.

Second, films and literature increasingly fall under a nationalistic and patriotic *genre* that continues to employ anti-Chinese sentiment. Third, Mongolia has succeeded in making its political transition, while the Chinese people's call for democracy has been ignored. Finally, media coverage has mainly been focused on negative events and incidents involving Chinese people and the low quality of goods in Mongolia. Moreover, Western negative media coverage on China began to be welcomed into the Mongolian media, as was the case during the Cold War. Because these love/hate relations between neighbors have been viewed extremely darkly for 24 years, few intellectuals have ventured to make positive comments about China, while most politicians have been afraid to make such a move, deeming it "suicidal." Consequently, negative information and images continue to be used by Mongolians to highlight their key differences to the Chinese: pastoral nomadic society vs. agrarian society; Buddhism and Shamanism vs. Confucianism; Mongolian language vs. Chinese language; and democracy vs. authoritarian governance.

Use of Anti-Chinese Sentiment for Economic Interests

Historically, anti-Chinese sentiment has been used to foster economic interests in Mongolia, a landlocked economy based on mining, animal husbandry, and, due to its severely dry continental climate, a limited agricultural plantation. From the late 18th century, Mongolia was considered, on the one hand, as a source of animal products and of natural resources such as coal, and, on the other, as a market for Chinese goods and banking services. Many historical records demonstrate that Mongolians incurred enormous debts to Chinese merchants and bankers, and used mostly Chinese products by the beginning of the 20th century.[58] As a result, anti-Chinese sentiment often led to violent struggles against the Manchu and then Chinese colonial authority, as well as against Chinese traders and speculators. This certainly helped Russia, which took advantage of anti-Chinese momentum in Mongolia to introduce Russian goods, to obtain favorable trading conditions for Russian traders and bankers, and to expand its economic interests into Northeast Asia. Except for the period of 1950-1964, Russia monopolized Mongolia's economy right up until the Soviet Union's dissolution in 1991, while Sino-Mongolian economic relations ceased for about three decades. Following the normalization of bilateral trade relations in 1989, China became Mongolia's largest trading partner (90 percent of exports and 30 percent of imports), and biggest foreign investor within two decades.[59] Even though Chinese economic interests have grown in Mongolia, anti-Chinese sentiments still serve the interests of the Mongolian state and external players, Mongolian national economic entities, and individuals (such as buyers) in the free market economy.

The revised National Security Strategy drafted in 2011 imposes restrictions on foreign direct investment to one-third of Mongolia's total foreign direct investment

The most logical strategy for the Mongolian state is to have balanced economic relations with its two neighbors, while increasing its integration into the international economic system. However, such has been impossible over recent centuries. Today Mongolia is pursuing policies aimed at reviving its economic ties with Russia and regional partners like Japan, the two Koreas, Taiwan, and the European Union, in order to avoid total economic dependency on China. There are many examples. First, because of its proximity to China and the East Asian market, Mongolian natural resources have been attracting Western investors and state owned enterprises both from China and from Russia. The Mongolian state has provided more opportunities for exploring larger projects to Western companies since 1993 (e.g., from oil projects to American companies in 1993 to the major copper deposit, Oyu Tolgoi, to Canadian and Australian companies in 2010). The revised National Security Strategy drafted in 2011 imposes restrictions on foreign direct investment to one-third of Mongolia's total foreign direct investment.

Second, the Mongolian parliament has extensively debated the extension of Mongolian railways using either the Chinese (narrow) or Russian (broad) gauge.[60] Third, the parliament passed legislation to restrict investment by state-owned enterprises, in the aftermath of a disclosure about a Canadian company's secret deal to sell Mongolian mining stocks to Chinese state-owned enterprises.[61] Mongolian state policies to reduce Chinese economic dominance could be explained by a fear of Chinese assertiveness and its claims of lost

territory. At the same time, multi-national corporations and Russian state-owned enterprises may have tried to manipulate anti-Chinese sentiment for their own economic interest.

Mongolian business firms also engage in anti-Chinese sentiment as part of their rivalry with the many Chinese companies that compete for similar natural resources and animal products

Mongolian business firms also engage in anti-Chinese sentiment as part of their rivalry with the many Chinese companies that compete for similar natural resources and animal products (e.g., wool, hide, cashmere). Mongolian business entities pressure the government and appeal to the public to support national industries—most noticeably cashmere producers, vegetable and grain growers, and meat producers—by limiting Chinese imports of raw materials and exports of cheap products. Ole Bruun sees in this the protection of economic interests:

> the most remarkable improvement in the herders' general conditions came from increasing competition in the cashmere market (induced by China), which brought vastly higher prices to the producers [herders] but threatened Ulaanbaatar's languishing cashmere industry, in which political and native business interests are strong.[62]

Similarly, just before the New Year in 2010, the media revealed the "insidious" Chinese policy of controlling Mongolian meat markets, prompting government inspection agencies to investigate the Chinese meat business in Mongolia. Interestingly, anyone who questioned the rationality of the anti-Chinese debates was soon attacked with anti-Chinese laden jargon. Mongolian politicians, business people, and organizations often use similar anti-Chinese rhetoric. They talk as if these Chinese business interests are part of a well-orchestrated, well-funded, and long-term strategy for the economic takeover of Mongolia. Obviously, it is difficult to prove any such takeover strategy, but it impacts negatively on Mongolian herders wanting to sell their products at higher prices, and many Mongolian companies are willing to take advantage of the Chinese market.

At the individual level, anti-Chinese sentiment is usually expressed as dissatisfication with the poor quality of Chinese products and China's allegedly hidden intention to harm the health and well-being of ordinary Mongolians. Chinese plans to poison Mongolians through food have become the most popular form of anti-Sinic expression. According to Kaplonski, numerous stories have been recorded about poisoned food supplies from China, but only one story described bad food from Russia. He noted:

> It was a fairly common experience in 1993 to hear of people taking ill through Chinese food or drink (such talk seemed absent in 1997 and later). Children ended up in the hospital, or comatose, because of Chinese sugar; a man went blind from Chinese alcohol; Chinese grain was infested with insects. The stuff the Chinese were selling as salt wasn't really salt, either. The list seemed to go on and on.[63]

When Mongolia's trade with the Soviet Union and communist bloc countries ended in 1990, so Mongolian peddlers imported food products from China. Because of the low income of most Mongolians, and the state's inability to enforce food import standards, these small-scale traders tended to buy large quantities of low-quality products. Rumors and media coverage on low-quality Chinese food products and other goods were mostly said to be part of the traditional Chinese method of poisoning and harming the health and minds of Mongolians. Even today, it is not uncommon to hear rumors linking the death of a high-level politician with Chinese food and drink, or complaints about the low quality of Chinese machinery, consumer goods, and food in Mongolia.

In addition, most concerns expressed at the individual level are about the increasing number of Chinese business activities and the presence of Chinese nationals.[64] Since 1990, the number of permanent Chinese residents has not increased, but their presence in Mongolia has become more seasonal. There are three major groups of Chinese residents in Mongolia. The first is construction workers that have been either invited by a Mongolian company or sent by the Chinese government to work on Chinese assistance projects. The second

is a group of business entrepreneurs who collect raw animal materials (hides, wool, cashmere), especially in the spring and fall. The third is that of Chinese investors who are involved in various economic projects, which predominantly consist of medium and small-sized mining companies.

According to the statistics of the Mongolian Ministry of Economic Development, Chinese companies constitute about 50 percent of foreign direct investors, whereas South Korea (18 percent) and Russia (8 percent) rank as the second and third.[65] Some anecdotal evidence also suggests that Mongolia is considered to be a safe haven away from an authoritarian and overcrowded China, or may serve as a transit point to other destinations for some Chinese and Inner Mongolian nationals. According to official Mongolian statistics, the number of Chinese travelers to Mongolia is greater than foreign tourists from other countries; however, these statistics need further examination to identify trends among Chinese travelers to Mongolia (Table 1).

Table 1. Number of Arrivals by Top Four Countries[66]

	2000	2008	2009	2010
China	57,546	196,832	229,451	193,730
Russia	49,456	109,975	108,105	121,647
South Korea	8,039	43,396	38,273	42,231
Japan	11,392	14,939	11,401	7,527

Conclusion

In comparison with the periods of institutionalized discrimination against Chinese nationals and mixed-blood Mongolians with unproven Chinese ethnic ties, the situation has improved significantly. No discriminatory state policies exist any longer and people are now able to declare their true ethnic origins. However, anti-Chinese sentiment and violent discourses still linger in daily conversations, news media, Internet comments, literature, hip-hop, and even graffiti. Mongolia's public opinion voices its opposition to the possible Sinicisation that could result from letting an all-male Chinese labor force into Mongolia. It is also concerned about Chinese mining companies (though other foreign and domestic companies are also involved) causing possible environmental degradation, and the potential threat to local businesses and employment. In this paper, I have advanced four reasons for the impact of lingering anti-Chinese sentiment: memories of colonization, concern for "blood purity," the communist state's use of negative sentiment, and the economic interests of various groups. To understand the changing nature of public attitudes to foreigners and Mongolians of mixed-descent, researchers should engage in a careful study rather than making generalizations. Moreover, comparative studies of public attitudes in states that are much smaller than their neighbors might help us to capture similarities and differences as well as dynamics. Lingering anti-Chinese sentiment in Mongolia might be similar with such "anti" feelings in many of China's neighbors.

[1] Five days before the presidential election, journalist D. Ariunaa's coverage about the Chinese origins of Elbegdorj was aired by TV5 channel, a Mongolian commercial news channel, on May 19, 2010. According to her sources, Elbegdorj's father was believed to be a Chinese migrant.

[2] The terms "Sinic" and "Chinese" are used interchangeably.

[3] According to a 2013 opinion survey by the Research Center of the independent, non-profit, Sant Maral Foundation, respondents indicated that Mongolians were better in communication and cooperation with Russians (43%) and with Chinese (38.3%). Respondents also indicated that Russia (71.9%) would be the best partner for Mongolia, while only 23.8% indicated that China would be the best partner. Available at http://www.santmaral.mn/sites/default/files/SMPBE13%20Apr.pdf

[4] F. Billé, "Different Sides of Blue: Gay Men and Nationalist Discourse in Mongolia," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*,

10, no. 2 (2010), 188.

[5] *Erliiz,* a concept of "half-breed" or "hybrid," and *hurliiz*, one born of an *erliiz,* according to anthropologist Bulag, "conceived not only as biological category but also as a cultural one." See U. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 140.

[6] Balibar argues that "a racism whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples' in relation to others but 'only' the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions." See E. Balibar, "Is There a Neo-Racism?" in E. Balibar, and I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities* (London: Verso, 1991), p. 21.

[7] For the identity politics explanation of anti-Chinese sentiments in Mongolia, see O. Bruun, *Precious Steppe: Mongolian Nomadic Pastoralists in Pursuit of the Market* (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006); G. Delaplace, "Chinese Ghosts in Mongolia," *Inner Asia,* 12, no. 1 (2010): 127-141; and F. Billé, "Different Sides of Blue: Gay Men and Nationalist Discourse in Mongolia," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism*, 10, no. 2 (2010):187-203.

[8] See M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France (1975-1976)* (New York: Picador, 2002), p. 256.

[9] Although public opinion polls suggest the persistence of "anti" attitudes in any nation, more studies are needed to validate such a claim. Public attitudes are dynamic. Even when people appear to demonstrate coherent, unfavorable attitudes, they have multiple attitudes depending on the issue. Their attitudes are subject to change due to personal factors (cultural and religious orientation, education, experience, and age), as well as political, socio-economic, and geographic factors.

[10] G. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position* (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1949), p. 151.

[11] I use the term "Mongols" to refer all Mongolian ethnic groups, namely Mongols of Inner Mongolia, of Mongolia (Outer Mongolia), and of Western Mongolia, while reserving the term "Mongolians" exclusively for the people of independent Mongolia.

[12] O. Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), pp. 7-21.

[13] G. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, op. cit.,* p. 154.

[14] Ibid., p. 152.

[15] Ibid, p. 155, and O. Lattimore, *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, op. cit.,* pp. 13-14.

[16] P. Perdue, *China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Eurasia* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005); and C.R. Bawden, *The Modern History of Mongolia* (London: Kegan Paul International, 1968), p. 104.

[17] D. Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 9-10.

[18] O. Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), and *Nationalism and Revolution in Mongolia, op. cit.*, and G. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, op. cit.,* p. 155.

[19] See, M. Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," in S. Kotkin and B. Elleman (eds.), *Mongolia in the Twentieth Century: Landlocked Cosmopolitan* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 41.

[20] Ibid., pp. 40-53.

[21] See B. Batbayar (Baabar), *Twentieth Century Mongolia: History of Mongolia* (Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 1999), pp. 188-195; G. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, op. cit.,* pp. 163-193.

[22] G. Friters, *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position, op. cit.,* pp. 156-162; M. Lan, "China's 'New Administration' in Mongolia," *op. cit*., p. 41.

[23] Although the numbers differ, there were about 80,000 Chinese in Mongolia from 1919 to 1920. See G. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), p. 59. Many of them were merchants who were expelled after Mongolia's independence in 1911 and now come to collect their properties and debts.

[24] R. Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), pp. 23-29; G. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia*, *op. cit*., pp. 1-28.

[25] Out of the 30,000 people who were executed in 1930s, 17,000 were monks in addition to the 20,000-25,000 monks who were persecuted in the 1920s. And, 20-30,000 Mongolian refugees entered Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang escaping from the communist regime brutality. See, S. Sandag and H. Kendall, *Poisoned Arrows: The Stalin-Choibalsan Mongolian Massacres, 1921-1941* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) and Batbayar (Baabar), *Twentieth Century Mongolia: History of Mongolia*, *op. cit*., p. 309. The total number of the Mongolian population at that time was debatable, but lay between 647,000-800,000. See Liu, X. *Reins of Liberation* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), p. 23; and G. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia*, *op. cit*., p. 180.

[26] See A. Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society* (London: Frances Pinter Publishers, 1987), pp. 84-123.

[27] G. Murphy, *Soviet Mongolia*, *op. cit*., pp. 1-29.

[28] A. Coox, *Nomonhan Japan against Russia, 1939* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985).

[29] R. Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled, op. cit.*, pp. 30-36, 45-49, 84-86.

[30] O. Lattimore, *Studies in Frontier History, op. cit.*, pp. 134-159, 307-324.
[31] The 2010 Population Census Data of the PRC and Russian Federation. The *Han* Chinese settlements in Inner Mongolia began with the New Administration policies of the Republic of China (as it built railways and encouraged land cultivation by Chinese peasants).
[32] D. Sneath, *Changing Inner Mongolia: Pastoral Mongolian Society and the Chinese State, op. cit.*, pp. 114-115.
[33] In regards with Chinese frontier nations, China employed the explicit racial policy that defines *Han* Chinese as a dominant race and treats other ethnic groups, especially Mongols, as barbarian, uncivilized people.
[34] The *Halh* sub-ethnic group of Mongols dominated in independent Mongolia.
[35] Munkh-Erdene explains the significance of the *Chinggisid* lineage in the constructing and imaging of Mongolian identity based on his analysis the structure of narratives. See L. Munkh-Erdene, "The Mongolian Nationality Lexicon: From the Chinggisid Lineage to Mongolian Nationality," *Inner Asia,* no. 8 (2006): 51-98.
[36] U. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, op. cit.*, p. 62.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid, pp. 97-103. Results of the 2010 population census, National Statistical Office of Mongolia, available at http://www.toollogo2010.mn/doc/Main%20results_20110615_to%20EZBH_for%20print.pdf
[39] A. Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society, op. cit.*, pp. 45-47.
[40] By the 2010 Census, there were over 8,000 Chinese nationals, 2,474 Russians, and, interestingly, 1,500 South Korean nationals in Mongolia.
[41] S. Radchenko, "Mongolian Politics in the Shadow of the Cold War: The 1964 Coup Attempt and the Sino-Soviet Split," *Journal of Cold War Studies,* (2006): 95-119; U. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, op. cit.*, pp. 150-151, 160-161.
[42] The visible group is the Korean nationals. Their number increased from 400 to 1500 between 2000 and 2010. See *The Result of the 2010 Census of Mongolia*, http://www.toollogo2010.mn/doc/Main%20results_20110615_to%20EZBH_for%20print.pdf.
[43] See *The Result of the 2010 Census of Mongolia*.
[44] National Security Concept of Mongolia (Ulaanbaatar: Government Press, 1995).
[45] Ibid.
[46] Article 29.5, Law on Legal Status of Foreign Nationals, 2010.
[47] T. Undarya, "Fighting Over the Reinterpretation of the Mongolian Woman in Mongolia's Post-Socialist Identity Construction Discourse," *East Asia,* 19, no. 3 (2001): 139.
[48] According to report of the Mongolian Foreign Minister in 1925, 51,207 foreigners, including 23,919 Chinese, were in Mongolia. In 1929, the government forcibly expelled all foreigners. See Ts. Batbayar, *Foreign Presence in Mongolia: Current Status and Problems* (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Academy of Science, 2002), p. 143.
[49] R. Rupen, "The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Mongolian People's Republic: 1921-1971," *Asian Survey,* 13, no. 5 (1973): 467; A. Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society, op. cit.*, p. 149.
[50] H. Salisbury, *Orbit of China* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1967), pp. 107-121.
[51] Yumjaagiin Tsedenbal, who served as President and Prime Minister from 1952 to 1984, was personally not favorable toward Han Chinese. See Ts. Batbayar, "Mongolian-Russian Relations in the Past Decade," *Asian Survey,* 43, no. 6 (2003): 953-954; M. Milivojevic, *The Mongolian Revolution of 1990: Stability or Conflict in Inner Asia?* (London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, 1991), pp. 19-20. He had studied in Russia for nine years and married a Russian woman. At the outset, the young 36-year-old prime minister needed to consolidate his political clout by eliminating his opponents and critics. At the time, his pro-Soviet stand was criticized by senior party leaders and intellectuals, especially during the Mongolian version of the de-Stalinization process, which involved eliminating the cult following of *Khorloogiin Choibalsan*'s personality and the rise of nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s.
[52] See Sanders, *Mongolia: Politics, Economics and Society, op. cit*.
[53] The Department was also responsible for re-calling published materials, and directing and controlling the correction process. For instance, if high-level individuals were purged, the department would recall materials published by them or that included their names, images, or statements.
[54] R. Rupen, *How Mongolia is Really Ruled,* pp. 92-100.
[55] Although the Sino-Mongolian Border Treaty was an historic gesture of the Chinese Communist Party toward Mongolia, it was not highlighted in the Mongolian press. The Chinese Foreign Minister's positive statement on the Mongolian boundary (29 September 1965) was not noted in any Mongolian publications. In his statement, he recognized Mongolia's independence and acknowledged "There are *Han* chauvinists in China, who have always refused to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic. We are opposed to such *Han* chauvinism. Since its founding, New China has provided the Mongolian People's Republic with large amounts of aid. In recent years, the leading group in Mongolia has been following Khrushchev revisionists in opposing China. But we do not cancel our aid to it on this account…. It is for the Mongolian people themselves to decide whether co-operation with China is more in their interests. We do not

oppose our will on them." See A. Lawrence, *China's Foreign Relations Since 1949* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 146.

[56] Crimes or accidents involving Soviet military personnel and Soviet citizens in Mongolia, various types of technical accidents, and Soviet facilities in the country were not reported in the domestic news. However, many of these were finally disclosed in the early 1990s.

[57] U. Bulag, *Nationalism and Hybridity in Mongolia, op. cit.*.

[58] For detailed discussions, see Lattimore, 1962, Batbayar, 1999, Friters, 1949, Bawden, 1968, and Lan, 1999.

[59] Prior to 1990, Russia was almost Mongolia's only trading partner. See M. Rossabi, *Modern Mongolia from Khans to Commissars to Capitalists* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 82-85 and L. Narangoa, "Mongolian in 2011: Resources Bring Friends and Wealth," *Asian Survey,* 52, no. 1 (2012): 82-85.

[60] "New Railroad Policy of Mongolia" Government Press, *UB Post*, June 24, 2009.

[61] 2012 Strategic Entities Foreign Investment Law of Mongolia.

[62] O. Bruun, *Precious Steppe: Mongolian Nomadic Pastoralists in Pursuit of the Market*, *op. cit*., p. 228.

[63] C. Kaplonski, "Prelude to Violence," *American Ethnologist,* 35, no. 2 (2008): 43.

[64] Chinese settlements in Mongolia began in the 1700s, when Qing emperors used Chinese nationals to provide food for their military campaign in Western Mongolia and Central Asia. Most Chinese nationals, believed to number around 100,000, fled during the Mongolian revolution in 1921. The official statistics counted 23,919 Chinese nationals in 1925 and the majority of Chinese nationals were expelled in 1929 upon Soviet instruction. In the 1950s, around 18,000 Chinese construction workers along with their families were living in Mongolia, but most of them left in 1964 and remained expelled up until the 1980s. See Ts. Batbayar, "Foreign Migration Issues in Mongolia," in T. Akaha (ed.), *Human Migration Issues in Northeast Asia* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2006); E. Green, "China and Mongolia: Recurring Trends and Prospects for Change," *Asian Survey,* 26, no. 12 (1986): 1337-1363.

[65] *Foreign Direct Investment Statistics* (*1999 to 2010*) of the Ministry of Economic Development of Mongolia.

[66] Annual Statistical Bulletins of National Statistical Office of Mongolia (www.nso.mn).

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