Author: Adilet Beisenov
Adilet Beisenov is an MA candidate in the Eurasian, Russian, and East European Studies program at Georgetown University. He earned his undergraduate degree at Nazarbayev University in 2021, majoring in Political Science and International Relations. He focuses on such areas as state-building, public opinion, and nationalism in Kazakhstan.
Turkestan is a city in the south of present-day Kazakhstan with a rich history of settlement. The Kazakh government’sextensive investment in post-2018 Turkestan since 2018 is a spectacle-like attempt to portray ethnic Kazakhs as peoples with an established urbanist tradition. In this vein, it is similar to the project of the eye-catching city of Astana, to which the Akorda1 has dedicated trillions of tenge since 1997, having built a capital and political-economic hub in the country’s center.2 On a more practical scale, however, it is also an attempt to financially resuscitate and urbanize an economically struggling region3 with the help of better infrastructure and tourism, the results of which are difficult to assess for the time being. A project started initially by Kazakhstan’s first president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, and then continued under the current administration of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Turkestan of the future is envisaged as the next big Central Asian and pan-Turkic tourist destination. Coupled with modernization efforts in the form of new buildings, services, schools, hospitals, and technology (digitalization), the goal is to reanimate Kazakhstan’s poorest region, which once had flourishing medieval settlements such as Turkestan, Otyrar, Sayram, and Sauran, with Turkic4 populations along the Silk Road routes. In other words, Turkestan is supposed to become an example of “Eternalstan,”5 wherein the past and future meet in a city that had always been Kazakh.
Introducing Astana and Turkestan
Scholars have written at length about Kazakh capital of Astana’s urban plans of grandeur.6 As a project, Astana is former long-time president Nazarbayev’s state-building initiative teeming with extravagant and futuristic-looking high-rise buildings, which mimics the rapidly and incessantly sprawling megapolises of East Asian tigers or the Middle Eastern petro-states. Beginning in 1997, this northern city underwent a continuous transformation from the small Soviet town of Tselinograd/Akmola to becoming a puzzlingly empty Potemkin village-like administrative center disliked by other cities, to arguably a distinct capital with its own identity and some 1.3 million denizens. Mikhail Akulov, a professor of history at Nazarbayev University, writes that Astana is an example of “Eternal Futurostan”—its architecture like the ambitious Khan Shatyr entertainment center, which looks like a giant nomadic tent but is of course completely immobile, is supposed to represent an urban Kazakh culture that is at once modern but also has a legacy dating centuries back.7 In other words, it is a statement by the authorities that Kazakhs have always had urbanism8— an attempt to carve out a common identity on the national level, the counterweight being a mobile, nomadic past with few cities or permanent settlements, decentralized power and numerous khans. Such nomadic history is not as strong of an identity-binding glue in the current urban-dominated world: these days, the state relives Kazakh nomadism largely once a year by setting up yurts in celebration of Nowruz, the Persian/Turkic New Year. The English word “civilization” itself comes from the Latin word civis, meaning “city dweller.” Hence, the very word we use to describe developed societies with statehood evades peoples who used to be either nomadic or semi-nomadic just a century ago.
Being a new city, Astana is by no means a finished project. New buildings, monuments, parks, street names, and memorials keep being produced every year to commemorate national heroes. Nevertheless, since 2018, the government’s eyes and money have turned to the country’s south, where the fabled cradle of Kazakhs is located: the city of Turkestan—literally the “Land of the Turks.” To quote the website and travel agency Asia Adventures, which offers tours of Central Asia, “Turkestan city (Yasy) was well-known as a mental-political center of the Turk people in the large region Desht-i-Kipchak (Kipchak Steppe) and was the ancient capital of Kazakh Khans.”9 It is regularly painted as the apex of Kazakh historical heritage and its spiritual capital exemplified in its main tourist attraction, the mausoleum of Khoja Ahmed Yasawi, built by the Turco-Mongol conqueror and ruler Amir Timur in the 14th–15th centuries (and now a UNESCO World Heritage). Ahmed Yasawi (1093–1166) himself was a poet and mystic of the Sufi tradition, an esoteric, non-scripturalist Islamic philosophy defined by an inner connection to God. Overall, Turkestan has 1,663 monuments, of which 31 are of national and 421 of local importance.10
Turkestan’s population doubled from 81,200 in 1991 to 161,539 in 2018. Moreover, as of 2022 the number of inhabitants had increased to 200,153, with a state-mandated master plan to reach 500,000 by 2050.11 Such a rise is caused by Turkestan’s receipt of a new status as a regional center in 2018,12 which was followed by extensive funding and construction works: 257 buildings were erected in 2018–2020, with plans to build and put into operation around 26,500 apartment units,13 and 566 billion tenge (approximately US $1.34 billion) was invested in Turkestan in 2020—twice as much as in 2019, with half of the sum being state budget money.14 As of 2022, 2.5 trillion tenge (about $5.35 billion) was invested in the region since 2018 and another trillion ($2.14 billion) in private capital will be spent until 202515— a continuation of Nazarbayev’s 2018 directive for big business to build in Turkestan.16 Due to the city’s history and special place in the Kazakh legendarium, Turkestan is set to be “revived” and become a beacon of Mangilik El(eternal peoples/country), evidence of the Kazakh people’s continuous statehood.
How Urban Projects Relate to Nation States
Outside of practical economic considerations that warrant improving a struggling area’s infrastructure, this Turkestan project is directed at both local and external audiences from a nation-building viewpoint: local in a way that corresponds to the growing appetite of well-off Kazakh-speaking middle and upper classes’ calls for the ethno-nationalization of the country17 in the context of a steady emigration of non-Kazakhs, and external insofar as to entice tourists to revered historical sites while also erecting new attractions such as the Venice-like Karavan-Saray18 tourist complex, and the Samruk Flying Theater, which are inspired by Kazakh history and myths. But can it be considered an assertion of continuous urban culture in the same way as Astana, given that Turkestan has actually been a dwelling place for centuries if not millennia?
The answer is equivocal: on the one hand, it is another assertion of Kazakh statism and urbanism directed at such loud claims as Russian President Vladimir Putin’s praise of Nazarbayev for creating and ruling a state in Kazakhstan for the first time: “Kazakhs had never had statehood [gosudarstvennos’],” he said in 2014.19 On the other hand, some historians interpret the Kazakh Khanate (1465–1847) as a very decentralized body that would be difficult to call a traditional state in its post-Westphalian, Weberian conception — that is, a settled state that enjoys exclusive sovereignty over its territory and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. In the Kazakh Khanate, which was a nomadic tribal/household confederation, khans often wielded no considerable power, and numerous khans simultaneously could be seen roaming the steppe with pretensions to the throne—ruling over nomads is naturally challenging and impractical.20 The nomadic way of life is not entirely compatible with a great degree of centralization—the people themselves may not even be taxable due to their mobility. Turkestan itself was a settlement populated by people conscious not of their ethnic but rather their urban and Muslim identity. This is typical of cases in pre-capitalist feudal societies, reflected in the names of renowned figures such as Ahmed Yasawi (Yasa was one name of Turkestan) or the scholar Al-Farabi (Farab was a name for Otyrar, another city in the Turkestan region and former capital of various Turkic states/confederations).
This tension is felt acutely within modern Kazakhstan. As a nation-state, it relies on an urban-fostered sense of nationalism, be it civic or ethnic, for people to be patriotic and feel a sense of belonging to the state. Kazakhstan within its current borders achieved independence and status as a sovereign state only after the USSR’s unexpected collapse in 1991. Therefore, first Nazarbayev and now Tokayev keep probing and implementing different ways of building national consensus, while also reacting to the changing demographic dynamics in the country. The Akorda utilizes a combination of methods, publicly touted as “multivectoralism,”21 when stressing civic identity or ethnic Kazakh national identity, depending on the message and its audience.22 There is constant confusion on the grassroots level between the concepts of nationality and ethnicity. The vernacular words ūlt (Kazakh) and natsionalnost’ (Russian) can mean either nationality or ethnicity (or both), depending on the context.23 This is likewise a manifestation of these new countries’ lack of a strong ideological foundation, for they did not undergo the contingent process of forming as nation-states as did European democracies (such as the latter’s hammering out the Treaty of Westphalia, the development of print-capitalism and vernacular languages, strong institutions, the Enlightenment, etc., over the course of centuries). For these reasons, Kazakh authorities also use the framework of a developmental state, promising stable economic growth with such projects as Kazakhstan 2030 and Kazakhstan 2050.24
In Kazakhstan’s case, this presence of several competing notions of a nation-state is exacerbated by a relative lack of an urban culture before the era of the USSR in general. As Akulov puts it when describing Khan Shatyr, “With the building thus functioning as a monumental theatrical prop, the superficial resemblance gives substance to the contrary assertion, to wit, that of Kazakh sedentariness—much to the satisfaction of those historians, who, driven by embarrassment and ignorance, deny or minimize the centrality of the nomadic experience in favour of a largely imagined ‘urban tradition.’”25 It is not a coincidence, therefore, that both the state and opposition utilize symbols and rhetoric of prominent Alash movement figures (Akhmet Baitursynov, Alikhan Bokeikhanov, etc.) who were members of the early-20th-century Kazakh intelligentsia and constitutional democrats educated by imperial Russian institutions, and who had a vision for an autonomous Kazakh republic before being repressed by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin.26
Analysis of Turkestan-Related Discourse
In the case of Turkestan, the state sees both economic and cultural promise. When it comes to the presidents themselves, their explanation for the need for Turkestan’s revival is that of the site’s spiritual importance to Kazakh and Turkic peoples, with increased tourism and economic fortunes as the urban development’s expected outcome. These two points are consistent across the numerous messages of both Nazarbayev and Tokayev. For example, Nazarbayev claimed in a visit to the city in November 2019 after resigning from the presidency that he thought about making Turkestan the capital of Kazakhstan right after independence, adding that “Turkestan is the cradle of the Turkic world. I am sure that the fraternal Turkic states will also assist us,” and that the authorities expected a surge of tourism in the area following construction works.27 He reiterated the same points in September 2020, talking about the city as an attraction for global and domestic tourists, an impetus for the development of the entire region, a plan to host a summit of Turkic nations in Turkestan, and its revival as something of particular importance for “our people.”28 Nazarbayev’s last statements on Turkestan came in 2021: “We have built another major object. Turkestan has never seen such a revival over its long history. A completely new, unique city. All architecture is based on Turkic and modern architecture. This will be a unique place not only for Kazakhstan but for everyone.”29
In these citations Nazarbayev does not pretend that the planners somehow restored Turkestan to its authentic former glory, but instead highlights that the city is completely new but based on Turkic and modern architecture. Nazarbayev’s fixation on both the past (Turkestan’s historic sites) and the future (the combination of “traditional” and state-of-the-art architecture) is seen acutely in the case of Astana as well:
The state borrowed heavily from ancient Turkic myths, visions of nomadic past grandeur and futurist imagery to construct what we may christen history incomplete, a story of collective becoming snapped at its midpoint, stretched tautly between the onset of early civilizations and the advent of the far future (Kazakhstan-2050). This interpretation, part restorationist and part clairvoyant, set the framework within which the state could harmoniously combine its two functions: namely, as the guardian of antiquities, made all the more fragile by virtue of their intangibility, and as the guide on the road towards a bright, albeit uncertain, finale.30
Put more pedantically, Turkestan is a project in a similar vein to that of Astana, but with more emphasis on the time-honored angle of virtuous, venerable urban culture and less on the high-tech dimension.
It is not an exaggeration to claim that Turkestan is Nazarbayev’s personal initiative: when Tokayev succeeded him in 2019, the project had already been in full swing, and Nazarbayev continued to pay official visits in 2020 and 2021. In September 2022, Tokayev recycled familiar points about the “sacred” city’s status as a spiritual-historical capital,31 “cradle of the Turkic world” and “shanyraq32 of the Kazakh people” during his second visit to the city as the president.33 He also lauded the locals’ morals: “In this region, mothers raise worthy sons and decent daughters. Reasonable young people are growing up who follow the guidance of their ancestors. Indeed, those who come to Turkestan can get to know the true essence of our people.”34 Tokayev flattered the locals on the one hand, and on the other reaffirmed the state’s vision that in this urban, sedentary setting35 lies true Kazakhness, in this fashion pushing a rewritten historical narrative. Not even to mention the times of the Kazakh Khanate of 1465–1847, but just a century ago after the October Revolution and during the Russian Civil War, Turkestan was not a part of the Alash Autonomy (a self-proclaimed Kazakh government from 1917– 1920), but instead fell within the Kokand/Turkestan Autonomy, which was comprised of different Central Asian groups (Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kyrgyz, etc.) and united by a common Muslim identity as opposed to an ethnic one.
Added to the carnival of the new Karavan-Saray and other modern touristy attractions coupled with numerous old tombs is the restoration of Kultobe, an actual medieval-era settlement near the Khoja Yasawi Mausoleum. The following ambitious quote from Aktoty Raimkulova, at the time the Minister of Culture and Sports (2019–2022), envisions old Turkestan’s restoration and high-reaching tourist numbers:
The Turkestan region will become the tourist region of the future, and Turkestan the historical and spiritual center of Turkic peoples. … Active work continues to restore Turkestan’s medieval settlement. As a result of the reconstruction, the number of visitors and tourists will increase to several tens of millions, and the time of their stay will increase from several hours to several days, which will provide significant investments in the region’s economy.36
Much work awaits Turkestan to move it in that direction: as of September 2021, 1.3 million pilgrims and tourists had visited Turkestan over a nine-month period. The region’s former governor, Ömirzaq Shukeyev (resigned in 2022), intended to increase the annual tourist flow to 2.5 million by 2025.37 Currently, however, the bulk of tourists are local Kazakhstanis as opposed to international citizens. The new $160 million Hazret Sultan Airport opened in 2020 and established direct flights to and from Istanbul, as an example of efforts to attract foreigners, particularly those from countries with Turkic ancestry. It follows, then, that Turkestan is supposed to become a pan-Turkic tourist hub with a Muslim bent, considering that the Central Asian and Turkic nations and ethnic groups are predominantly Muslim. The Turkestan region has two prominent pilgrimage sites of Muslim saint veneration (seen as idolatrous by more puritanical or Middle Eastern Muslims): the aforementioned Ahmed Yasawi Mausoleum, as well as the Arystan Bab Mausoleum, both of the Sufi tradition.
The Economic Dimension
The region’s economic problems are an urgent issue for the government and have led to a range of post-2018 investments in infrastructure, starting with basic needs to improve quality of life. Shukeyev claimed in March 2022 that in three years, 30% of the city was connected to a sewer system, which had been all but nonexistent before. He also listed road and sidewalk repairs, providing 98.5% of the city with electricity, and improving ecological conditions.38 Likewise, many of the city and region’s completed improvements are intended for the long term, such as the creation of 64,000 permanent jobs in 2019–2022 (with a plan to create up to 143,000 in 2022–2025), a 13,000-hectare greenbelt with 3.5 million trees already planted (important because of the region’s arid and hot climate), completed gas supply, and so on.39 There are also many projects slated for the future, such as developments in agriculture, renewable energy, or the 28 new schools for 40,000 students by 2035, plus 44 kindergartens, and 10 healthcare facilities including three public polyclinics (diagnostic centers) for the city of Turkestan.40 The construction of the initial bulk of schools (86 in the entire Turkestan region) was confirmed in 2022, set to be carried out in 2023–2025 with a 400 billion tenge ($892 million) national budget.
All this investment, however, has not helped alleviate the region’s poverty levels.41 One implausible justification for poverty outlined by the authorities is the region’s high population density (with just seven people per square kilometer nationwide).42 Turkestan also has a higher birthrate compared to the rest of Kazakhstan, and it continues to be the poorest and second-most populous region in the country, with 9.8% of the population living below the subsistence level, out of a regional population of just over two million inhabitants overall, while also being one of the smallest regions by area.43 Shukeyev believed that the region’s demographic conditions were the core of the problem: he said in 2021 that because almost a third of the country’s mothers with many children44 live in the Turkestan region, families’ resources are spread thin among their high numbers of children.45 While emphasizing Turkestan’s high fertility rate relative to other Kazakh regions, this explanation does not address the government’s poor performance in bolstering Turkestan’s economy and education before the post-2018 investment. The region’s status as an agrarian and raw-materials center during Soviet times, especially in grain and cotton production, led to underdeveloped infrastructure, insufficient investment in industry, and lagging urbanization, with 75% of the population currently living in rural areas.46 This turned especially pernicious after Kazakhstan’s liberalization following independence, when previous members of collective villages became private farmers and found themselves at the mercy of market fluctuations and drought-induced losses while the government neglected the agricultural sector.47 As a result, the volume of the Turkestan region’s agricultural production kept decreasing. By 1998, it had fallen to just 48% of what it had been in 1991.48
Secondly, the government’s long-term commitments have not had enough time to start paying dividends, as investment on a large scale began only in 2018. Projected to pull the region out of poverty, Turkestan city’s general plan was approved and signed by former Prime Minister Askar Mamin in November 2020, which replaced the previous 2011 plan. The new plan includes three project periods: (1) the base year of 2018 (start of investment), (2) the next stage, starting in 2025, and (3) the end term in 2035 (eseptik merzim / raschetnyj srok), when the plan’s implementation will be assessed.49
Officials may list such stats as an 18% increase in the volume of industry in the region from 2018 to 2021, a 34% increase in agricultural production, and so on,50 but criticism regarding the trillions of tenge spent can be heard coming from the bottom up in the form of indignant remarks on social media platforms. The unjustified expenses of local Kazakh authorities, at the very least, indicate their incompetence and even possible embezzlement. To illustrate, an investigation by ProTenge51 showed that a play called Borte about Genghis Khan’s first wife set in Turkestan’s new theater that opened in October 2021 cost the state budget 246.7 million tenge (about $500,000), but made a profit of only 22.7 million tenge (about $50,000) in 9 months—a bewildering expenditure emblematic of the authorities’ (at best) careless spending.52
Conclusion
More than four years have passed since the start of this Turkestan project. The degree of effectiveness of the state’s large-scale economic endeavors in terms of provision of jobs, housing, education, poverty alleviation, and plans to turn Turkestan into a pan-Turkic tourist center will be gradually made evident in the coming years. The bureaucracy’s proneness to corruption and kickbacks, however, may stall these developmental-political goals. Nevertheless, on the state-building and symbolic fronts, Turkestan is a compelling declaration of Kazakh urbanism and consequently Kazakh nationalism and statism, despite the decentralized essence of the titular nation’s nomadic past. The city acquired the status of the Kazakh spiritual capital of true Kazakhness because it is best equipped to do so among modern Kazakhstani cities thanks to its ancient/medieval archaeological sites and historical ties as a city with pronounced Central Asian, Turkic, and Muslim heritage and identity. The shining high-tech political capital of Astana, while definitively a factory of national myths as well, is built on the foundations of the Russian imperial settlement Akmolinsk and the subsequent Soviet town of Tselinograd, so it lacks connection with any continuous ethnic Kazakh urban culture. While it is the country’s cultural center, Almaty was likewise first established as the imperial Russian fortification of Verniy in the mid-19th century. Therefore, the two metropolises and international symbols of Kazakhstan are inadequate fits for the objective of having a city with a distinctly Kazakh urban heritage.
In the contemporary context, projects like Turkestan are attempts to fit into the global city-dominated nation-state system while appealing to both the past and modernity. Turkestan’s history and location enable Kazakhstan to claim Turkestan as a distinctly Kazakh city despite its more contingent and diverse past encompassing multiple identities. This is done with the help of myths of continued traditions, like Tokayev’s comments on the virtuousness of the Turkestani people thanks to their proper upbringing according to the long-held customs of their ancestors.53 At the same time, the ethos of an honorable Turkic past aided by the presence of historical sites and mausoleums, and the erection of Central Asian-styled architectural attractions such as Karavan-Saray, are intended to attract transnational capital in the form of visiting tourists and pilgrims. Nazarbayev’s idea of Mangilik El,54 propped up enthusiastically by both Kazakh authorities and nationalists, is a synonym for “Eternalstan,” an appearance of a state that had always existed. Mangilik El is epitomized, among many things, in the triumphal arch erected in Astana in 2011,55 and streets bearing the same name in numerous Kazakhstani cities. In such a way, a perennial Kazakh urbanism is symbolically willed into existence on the spot.
Footnotes
[1] The Kazakh government’s administrative center in Astana.
[2] Almaty, the former capital, is in the country’s south. Establishing Astana, among other things, had the geopolitical goal of consolidating a distinctly independent Kazakh city in an area of the country where imperial Russian and Soviet cities predominated. Nevertheless, it was built on the foundation of Tselinograd, a small Soviet-era city, so it is not a purely Kazakh city built from scratch.
[3] Every tenth person in the Turkestan region lives below the poverty line (229,000 people as of 2021), making it the poorest region in the country. “Kazhdyj Desjatyj Zhitel’ Turkestanskoj Oblasti Zhivet Za Chertoj Bednosti,” Liter.kz, March 11, 2021, https://liter.kz/kazhdyj-desyatyj-zhitel-turkestanskoj-oblasti-zhivet-za-chertoj-bednosti/.
[4] I say “Turkic populations” because of their medieval cultural and linguistic links to modern Kazakhs, but the more ancient settlements in the same area included Indo-Iranian peoples.
[5] The Persian suffix -stan means “place,” or “country.”
[6] Adrien Fauve, “Global Astana: Nation Branding as a Legitimization Tool for Authoritarian Regimes,” Central Asian Survey 34, no. 1 (January 2015): 110–124; Natalie Koch, “The Monumental and the Miniature: Imagining ‘Modernity’ in Astana,” Social & Cultural Geography 11, no. 8 (December 2010): 769–787; Bernhard Köppen, “The Production of a New Eurasian Capital on the Kazakh Steppe: Architecture, Urban Design, and Identity in Astana,” Nationalities Papers 41, no. 4 (July 2013): 590–605.
[7] Mikhail Akulov, “Eternal Futurostan: Myths, Fantasies and the Making of Astana in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan,” in Theorizing Central Asian Politics, eds. Rico Isaacs and Alessandro Frigerio (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019): 189–210.
[8] Kazakhs, however, had been a nomadic people (to the extent that “Kazakhs” as a separate ethnic group existed in its modern conception) before forcible collectivization by Soviet planners in the 1930s.
[9] “Turkestan,” Asia Adventures (website), 2022, accessed December 15, 2022, https://centralasia-adventures.com/en/sights/turkestan.html.
[10] “Nazarbaev O Turkestane: My Postroili Eshhe Odin Ser’eznejshij Ob”ekt,” Forbes Kazakhstan, May 12, 2021, https://forbes.kz/process/urbanity/nazarbaev_o_turkestane_myi_postroili_esche_odin_serezneyshiy_obyekt/.
[11] “Pravitel’stvo Utverdilo Plan Razvitija Turkestana Do 2050 Goda,” Sputnik Kazakhstan, November 3, 2020, https://ru.sputnik.kz/20201103/Pravitelstvo-utverdilo-plan-razvitiya-Turkestana-do-2050-goda-15373038.html; “Turkestan (Gorod)” [Russian-language edition of “Turkestan (City)” page], Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, last modified May 14, 2023, https://ru.wikipedia.org/?curid=72708&oldid=126855569.
[12] Nazarbayev created a new Turkestan region (previously part of the South Kazakhstan region).
[13] Aidos Ukibai, “Nazarbaev I Turkestan: Skeptiki Ne Uchli Vazhnyj Faktor,” Tengri News, May 13, 2021, https://tengrinews.kz/opinion/nazarbaev-i-turkestan-skeptiki-ne-uchli-vajnyiy-faktor-1099/; Serik Sabekov, “Turkestan Razvivaetsja Dazhe Bystree Stolicy – Nursultan Nazarbaev,” Kazinform, May 11, 2021, https://www.inform.kz/ru/turkestan-razvivaetsya-dazhe-bystree-stolicy-nursultan-nazarbaev_a3786608.
[14] Natalya Kachalova, “Kto Stroit Turkestan,” Kursiv Media, January 28, 2021, https://kz.kursiv.media/2021-01-28/kto-stroit-turkestan/.
[15] Anastasiya Novikova, “V Razvitie Turkestana Vlozhat Eshhe Trillion Tenge Chastnyh Investicij,” Otyrar.kz, 2022, https://otyrar.kz/2022/11/v-razvitie-turkestana-vlozhat-eshhe-trillion-tenge-chastnyh-investitsij/; “K. Tokaev: Turkestan Dolzhen Stat’ Duhovnoj Stolicej Strany,” Khabar 24, September 27, 2022, https://24.kz/ru/news/policy/item/565802-k-tokaev-turkestan-dolzhen-stat-dukhovnoj-stolitsej-strany.
[16] After assigning Turkestan a regional center status, Nazarbayev enlisted the biggest Kazakh construction corps to build projects in Turkestan: Bazis A’s Aleksandr Belovich promised to build a theater; ERG’s Patokh Shodiyev a museum of Turkic peoples; KazMunaiGaz’s Sauat Mynbayev a new stadium; BI Group’s Aidyn Rakhimbayev a Center of Kazakh khans, bis, and batyrs; HighVill Kazakhstan a residential complex, and many more (airport, hotels, etc.); “Podarki Turkestanu: Nazarbaev Objazal Biznesmenov Zastroit’ Gorod,” Kursiv Media, October 2, 2018, https://kz.kursiv.media/2018-10-02/podarki-turkestanu-nazarbaev-obyazal-biznesmenov-zastroit-gorod/.
[17] Diana Kudaibergenova and Marlene Laruelle, “Making Sense of the January 2022 Protests in Kazakhstan: Failing Legitimacy, Culture of Protests, and Elite Readjustments,” Post-Soviet Affairs 36, no. 6 (November 2022), 454.
[18] A caravanserai is an inn built around a large court for accommodating caravans along trade routes in Central and Southwestern Asia. Typical of the Islamic world, its roots stem from the Iranian times before the common era and the proliferation of Islam. “Caravanserai,” in The Free Dictionary, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/caravanserai.
[19] Dinmukhamed Kalikulov, “V Kazahstane Ozadacheny Slovami Putina O Russkom Mire,” BBC News, September 2, 2014,https://www.bbc.com/russian/international/2014/09/140901_kazakhstan_putin.
[20] Thomas Welsford, “The Disappearing Khanate,” in Turko-Persian Cultural Contacts in the Eurasian Steppe: Festschrift in Honour of Professor István Vásáry, (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2015).
[21] The term is traditionally used in relation to Nazarbayev’s foreign policy approach, which called for a balancing act among foreign powers. It usually refers to balancing between China, Russia, and the Western world (US and Europe).
[22] Diana Kudaibergenova, “The Use and Abuse of Postcolonial Discourses in Post-Independent Kazakhstan,” Europe-Asia Studies 68, no. 5 (July 2016), 921.
[23] This is a consequence of the USSR’s first constructivist, later primordial treatment of the concept of nationality/ethnicity.
[24] David Lewis, “Varieties of Authoritarianism in Central Asia,” in Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Central Asia, eds. Rico Isaacs and Erica Marat (Abingdon: Routledge, 2021): 76–77.
[25] Akulov, “Eternal Futurostan,” 202.
[26] Their short-lived autonomy (1917–1920) was dissolved by the Soviets. In the aftermath of the 1937 Terror, all their leaders were executed.
[27] “Dumal O Turkestane V Kachestve Stolicy – Nazarbaev,” Tengrinews.kz, November 4, 2019, https://tengrinews.kz/kazakhstan_news/dumal-o-turkestane-v-kachestve-stolitsyi-nazarbaev-383278/.
[28] “Nursultan Nazarbaev Pribyl V Turkestan,” Primeminister.kz, Official Information Source of the Prime Minister of the Republic of Kazakhstan, October 28, 2020, https://primeminister.kz/ru/news/nursultan-nazarbaev-pribyl-v-turkestan-2885640.
[29] “Nazarbaev: Turkestan Nikogda Ne Videl Takogo Vozrozhdenija,” Sputnik Kazakhstan, 2021, May 12, 2021, https://ru.sputnik.kz/20210512/nazarbaev-turkestan-17021408.html.
[30] Akulov, “Eternal Futurostan,” 191, italics in original.
[31] Tokayev also hinted at the government potentially ascribing such status to the city officially.
[32] The domed part of the nomadic yurt is a positive symbol of home, peace, and life.
[33] “Glava Gosudarstva Provel Vstrechu S Obshhestvennost’ju Turkestanskoj Oblasti,” Akorda.kz (presidential website of Kazakhstan), September 27, 2022, https://www.akorda.kz/ru/glava-gosudarstva-provel-vstrechu-s-obshchestvennostyu-turkestanskoy-oblasti-2784832.
[34] Sputnik Kazakhstan, “Tokaev: Turkestan.”
[35] There is a little bit of irony in calling an immobile settlement a shanyraq, which is a nomadic element.
[36] “Nursultan Nazarbaev Pribyl V Turkestanskuju Oblast’,” Almaty TV, November 5, 2019, https://almaty.tv/news/politika/1326-nursultan-nazarbaev-pribyl-turkestanskuyu-oblast.
[37] Zhuldyz Shukenova, “Kolichestvo Turistov V Turkestane Uvelichilos’ Pochti V 5 Raz,” Otyrar.kz, November 19, 2021, https://otyrar.kz/2021/11/kolichestvo-turistov-v-turkestane-uvelichilos-pochti-v-5-raz/.
[38] “Roads and sidewalks have been repaired. In our work, we are focused on the improvement of not only the new, but also the old part of the city, improving its infrastructure. 98.5% of the city of Turkestan is provided with electricity, of which 84% is uninterrupted supply. This year, it is planned to complete the construction of three facilities and bring the indicator of high-quality electricity supply to 99%”
“Umirzak Shukeev Otvetil na Volnujushhie Turkestancev Voprosy,” Tengrinews.kz, March 31, 2022, https://tengrinews.kz/news/umirzak-shukeev-otvetil-volnuyuschie-turkestantsev-voprosyi-465409/.
[39] Zhanara Mukhamediyarova, “Bolee 250 Tys. Rabochih Mest Sozdadut V Turkestanskoj Oblasti,” Kazinform.kz, July 19, 2022, https://www.inform.kz/ru/bolee-250-tys-rabochih-mest-sozdadut-v-turkestanskoy-oblasti_a3956673
[40] Khabar 24, “K. Tokaev”; Sputnik Kazakhstan, “Pravitel’stvo”; Sputnik Kazakhstan, “Tokaev: Turkestan.”
[41] One may rightfully note that the goal of mitigating poverty encounters natural hurdles in a crony capitalist system.
[42] Kazakhstan ranks 233rd out of 248 countries worldwide in terms of population density. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_and_dependencies_by_population_density.
[43] “Nazvany Dve Samye Bednye Oblasti Kazahstana,” Kazahstanskaya Pravda, April 26, 2022, https://kazpravda.kz/n/nazvany-dve-samye-bednye-oblasti-kazahstana/.
[44] Of families with four or more minor children (under 23 years old if full-time students), 25% live in the Turkestan region (86,585 out of 340,377 overall). Such families have the status of “families with many children.” Of poor families in Kazakhstan, 90% are families with four or more children. Irina Sevost’yanova, “90% Bednyh Semej Kazahstana – Mnogodetnye,” Informburo.kz, November 5, 2021, https://informburo.kz/stati/90-bednyx-semei-kazaxstana-mnogodetnye; “Mnogodetnye Sem’i V Kazahstane,” Sputnik Kazakhstan, March 1, 2019, https://ru.sputnik.kz/20190301/mnogodetnye-semi-kazakhstan-9485844.html; “Tokaev: Turkestan Javljaetsja Zolotym Stolpom Nashego Naroda,” Sputnik Kazakhstan, September 27, 2022, https://ru.sputnik.kz/20220927/tokaev-turkestan-yavlyaetsya-zolotym-stolpom-nashego-naroda-27962243.html.
[45] “Pochemu Turkestanskaja Oblast’ Schitaetsja Samym Bednym Regionom – Ob”jasnenie Shukeeva,” Sputnik Kazakhstan, June 19, 2021, https://ru.sputnik.kz/20210619/turkestanskaya-oblast-shukeev-17389967.html.
[46] This is the second-biggest rural population proportion across Kazakh regions, which are exceptionally sparsely populated compared to figures for most other countries. Coupled with a demographic explosion starting in the 1960s and continuous population growth thereafter, these led to poverty after 1991, when state support diminished.
[47] Martin Petrick and Richard Pomfret, “Agricultural Policies in Kazakhstan,” Discussion Paper no. 155, 2016: 10.https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/130714/1/857482297.pdf
[48] “Indexes of Physical Volume of Gross Production (Services) of Agriculture*,” Bureau of National Statistics of the Agency for Strategic Planning and Reforms of the Republic of Kazakhstan, May 26, 2023, https://stat.gov.kz/api/iblock/element/50887/file/en/.
[49] Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Kazakhstan, “O General’nom Plane Goroda Turkestana Turkestanskoj Oblasti (Vkljuchaja Osnovnye Polozhenija),” Adilet.zan.kz, November 25, 2020, https://adilet.zan.kz/rus/docs/P2000000793#z10.
[50] Ukibai, “Nazarbaev I Turkestan.”
[51] A web account that investigates where Kazakhstani taxpayer money goes (and oftentimes disappears): https://www.instagram.com/protenge.kz/?hl=en.
[52] ProTenge, Telegram FZ LLC and Telegram Messenger Inc., Telegram, 2022, https://t.me/protenge/1706.
[53] Ancestor worship or veneration continues to be a big part of modern Kazakh culture, a constant since the pre-Kazakh times of nomadic animist/Tengrist beliefs.
[54] As mentioned, Mangilik El means “eternal people” or “eternal country” in Kazakh.
[55] 2011 marked the 20th anniversary of Kazakhstan’s independence.
