Inside the Pyramid: Is Central Asia Authoritarianism Stable?

Patrimonial, patronal, clientelistic: Central Asia’s authoritarian power is often classified in these terms. The proliferation of analytical rubrics and conceptual lenses to delve into regional developments confirms that, if anything, Central Asian politics are profoundly complex. The regional conformation of power does however remain relatively stable. Regime durability, in most cases, is supported by the intricate connection of domestic patronal networks with international alliances; sophisticated propaganda machines have also sustained local élites in their drive to conceal disastrous socio-economic policies. For all intents and purposes, a calculated combination of softer authoritarian strategies and more repressive governance methods has allowed the Central Asian leaders to reduce internal political processes and mechanisms to regimes’ monopolies.

Incumbency continues to dominate politics in the region, as confirmed by the long tenures of first-generation leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and of Emomali Rahmon in post-conflict Tajikistan. The outcome of the Turkmen transition in 2006-2007, on the other hand, suggested that the persistence of authoritarian governance is likely to survive eventual leadership changes. Ultimately, it is a picture of apparent stability that informs how international observers have understood, digested, and framed the interconnection between power and politics in post-Soviet Central Asia.

These two workshops aim to challenge directly this characterization, by discussing a specific set of factors, processes, and actors that are eroding – silently yet not insignificantly – the stability that is proverbially enshrined within Central Asia’s authoritarian governance. While the weak nature of Central Asia’s statehood has been appropriately questioned in current scholarly debate, this workshop series intends to challenge the myth of Central Asia’s regime infrangibility. An accurately designed work of regime diagnostic does therefore sit at the analytical core of these workshops; succession prognosis does not, except indirectly.

View the full program.