It is an exciting time to study migration in the Eurasian region. Migration policies and patterns are receiving crucial attention from governments, scholars, and activists alike. Old, new, and changing patterns are making important impacts on home and host societies. The region is marked by some of the freest migration in the world through the free labor zone of the Eurasian Economic Union and the visa-free regime of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, however, it faces restrictions in the form of Soviet-era registration procedures, active use of re-entry bans in Russia, and heavy-handed efforts to regulate emigration in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In this context, migration is not only an issue requiring domestic policy attention, but also a critical focus of geopolitical bargaining.

Given the political and theoretical salience of migration in the Eurasian region, the NAC-NU Central Asia Studies Program chose as its second theme “external and internal migrations in Central Asia.” The call for papers generated proposals related to the development of Central Asian economies from migration and remittances, the dynamics of migration to Russia (the major destination), rising alternative destinations, and political factors in home and host countries. On the basis of these papers, we convened a conference in Astana in September 2017, which brought together junior and senior scholars with ties to the region and to international academic institutions. This group of scholars is well placed to mediate the empirical work being done in the region and broader theoretical perspectives.

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Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies
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**Acronyms**

AIDS  Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome  
AKDN  Aga Khan Development Network  
AKP  Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)  
APU  Asia Pacific University  
BAM  Baikal-Amur Motorway  
BEEPS  Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey  
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States  
CS  Copenhagen School  
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EEU  Eurasian Economic Union  
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment  
FMS  Federal'naia migrationnaia sluzhba (Federal Migration Service)  
FSB  Federal'naia sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service)  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
GIZ  Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (German Agency for International Development)  
GNI  Gross National Income  
GUVDM  Glavnoe upravlenie po voprosam migratsii (Main Directorate for Migration Affairs)  
HIV  Human Immunodeficiency Virus  
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies  
IOM  International Organization for Migration  
ISIS  Islamic State of Iraq and Syria  
IUJ  International University of Japan  
IJCA  Japan International Cooperation Agency  
MEXT  Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology  
MIA  Ministry of Internal Affairs  
MSME  Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise  
MTO  Money Transfer Operator  
NELM  New Economics of Labor Migration  
NGO  Non-Governmental Organization  
ODA  Official Development Assistance  
OMON  Otriad mobil’nyi osobogo naznacheniia (riot police)  
PKK  Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)  
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity  
SFSR  Soviet Federative Socialist Republic  
SME  Small and medium enterprise  
SP  Sole proprietorship  
SPTU/PTU  Spetsial’noe professional’no-tekhicheskoe uchilishche (Specialized Professional-Technical College)  
SSR  Soviet Socialist Republic  
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme  
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
VAR  Vector Autoregression
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Introduction
Eurasian Migration Studies: Challenges and Developments

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It is an exciting time to study migration in the Eurasian region. Migration policies and patterns are receiving crucial attention from governments, scholars, and activists alike. Old, new, and changing migration patterns are making important impacts on home and host societies. The region is marked by some of the freest migration in the world through the free labor zone of the Eurasian Economic Union and the visa-free regime of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, however, it faces restrictions in the form of Soviet-era registration procedures, active use of re-entry bans in Russia, and heavy-handed efforts to regulate emigration in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In this context, migration is not only an issue requiring domestic policy attention, but also a critical focus of geopolitical bargaining.

Given the political and theoretical salience of migration in the Eurasian region, the NAC-NU Central Asia Studies Program chose as its second theme “external and internal migrations in Central Asia.” The call for papers generated proposals related to the development of Central Asian economies from migration and remittances, the dynamics of migration to Russia (the major destination), rising alternative destinations, and political factors in home and host countries. On the basis of these papers, we convened a conference in Astana in September 2017, which brought together junior and senior scholars with ties to the region and to international academic institutions. This group of scholars is well placed to mediate the empirical work being done in the region and broader theoretical perspectives.

The Russian-language scholarly literature has long looked at the Eurasian migration sphere and has adapted to capture new dynamics in the post-Soviet era. Sociologists and demographers active during the Soviet period—such as Zhanna Zionchkovskaya, Vladimir Mukomel, Anatoly Vishnevsky, and Irina Ivakhnyuk—were instrumental in carrying the Russian-language literature through to the current period. The next generation of scholars, including Dmitry Poletaev, Sergei Ryazantsev, and Sergei Abashin, has taken up the challenge of moving migration studies forward. Building on the work of these scholars, a new cohort has arisen, represented by some of the authors in this volume, many of whom were born in the region but educated abroad. As a result of all of these efforts, Eurasian migration studies has increasingly brought together intellectual traditions, theoretical perspectives, and approaches to data that historically separated the English and Russian-language literatures.

Several key challenges remain for Eurasian migration studies in the immediate future, many of which are being tackled by the scholars in this volume. First is more fully integrating the Eurasian experience into the broader migration literature. The English-language literature is primarily focused on Western receiving countries and developing sending countries, with a secondary interest in “South-South” migratory patterns. In this context, Eurasian migration studies has the potential to challenge and redefine accepted theoretical perspectives that are based on a narrow selection of cases and experiences. This involves drawing theoretically relevant parallels with previously researched cases. It also entails pushing those theories further, critiquing inadequate concepts, and expanding our understanding of the migration world to include the Eurasian region.

Migration in the Eurasian region is marked by a number of phenomena that are well analyzed in the broader migration literature. Flows of migrants follow colonial linkages between center and periphery established in the Soviet Union and Russian Empire. They are further marked by economic and demographic push-pull factors related to relative prosperity yet low birth rates in Russia and de-
pression and instability, coupled with higher birth rates, in Central Asian countries. Early post-Soviet migration studies focused on dynamics driven by ethnic repatriation, turning to labor flows only in the 2000s, yet economic and demographic factors became salient long before the end of the Soviet Union, as Bahovadinova & Scarborough show. This volume further demonstrates that migration flows are not limited to the Central Asia-Russia corridor. Central Asian migrants have not only found alternative destinations in the region (see the chapters by Irnazarov and Tatibekov & Hanks) but they are also moving further abroad to Turkey and East Asia for work and education (discussed by Sodatsayrova and Nurdinova).

Broader work on remittance flows, developmental impacts, and transnational/translocal migrant networks also finds parallels in the Eurasian system. The scholars who have contributed to this volume are producing foundational work that establishes the relevance of related theoretical principles in the region. They are also pushing the boundaries of current theories to challenge views of how ideas of citizenship are constructed (Chekirova), to demonstrate how technology aids the maintenance of transnational and translocal ties (Urinboyev), and to explore how the state navigates and circumnavigates legal spaces in its interactions with migrants (Round & Kuznetsova). These theoretical contributions are embedded in historical legacies, relationships to authority and to members of the community (family and non-family alike), and legal understandings that are fundamentally different than in a Western rule of law context and are likewise unexplored in the broader migration literature. Thus, building theory based on the Eurasian experience is not simply a matter of ensuring that scholars of the region adhere to the norms of Western scholarship. Bridging the gap requires mediating local knowledge and ensuring that it is authentically represented in the theories being developed.

A second key challenge for scholars of Eurasian migration studies is overcoming data problems. Official data is perhaps best developed in Russia, but still suffers from a number of deficiencies. While initial data collection may be quite good (depending on the bureaucratic capacity of local government departments), coordination of different agencies responsible for various aspects of migration-related data remains uneven. For example, primary points of data are the numbers of foreign citizens crossing borders, registering at a particular residence, and receiving work documents. These data are collected by government agencies that have different mandates concerning migration and do not coordinate their activities with each other. Border statistics are collected by security agencies, while other migration data are collected by migration and/or labor agencies based on self-reporting by migrants, employers, and landlords. Often, the data issued from various government departments does not match, and there is no official attempt to reconcile different statistics. Another major data deficit is the lack of non-governmental agencies with the capacity and funding to offer independent and alternative data assessments.

As a result of these data deficits, reliance on single points of official data cannot hope to capture the complex migration processes in the region. However, as scholars in this volume show, data deficiencies can be addressed by triangulating different sources of data and especially through multidisciplinary approaches. What we have now is still a mosaic of the migration experience in the region rather than a cohesive picture of how complex dynamics work together. This moment in the development of the regional literature can perhaps stand as a reminder to the broader migration literature of the value of micro-level and multidisciplinary approaches.

The various glimpses of migration realities we gain from the studies in this volume are instrumental in identifying promising new research agendas. For example, we can infer from the findings of scholars in this volume that different and changing social factors in home countries will lead to different migration experiences in destination countries (addressed by Urinboyev and Kholmatova). Based on these findings, future research could take up the challenge of exploring how different groups of migrants adapt to and integrate into Russia and other destination countries.

Because the field of Eurasian migration studies is still relatively small, it lends itself to interdisciplinary discussions, such as the one that occurred when we convened our conference in Astana in September 2017. This volume’s section on remittances (which includes contributions from Abdurakhimov, Atabaeva, Kakkhkarov, and Zhanaltay) aptly demonstrates how different approaches to the question of what can be transmit-
Introduction Eurasian Migration Studies: Challenges and Developments

ted or gained through migration can benefit not only from a variety of methodologies but also from different theoretical starting points defining what comprises a remittance and how it is transferred.

A final challenge for Eurasian migration studies is engaging with policy-relevant research without becoming overwhelmed by political interests. Because migration issues are politically salient in Eurasian countries, they are also sensitive to politicization. This contributes both to certain framings of migration by state actors and to specific responses by international organizations. Because governments and international organizations are often the main sources of funding for research in the region, these factors have no small influence on the direction of scholarship.

Take, for example, the recent attempt to link migrants to radical religious extremism. After the metro bombing in St. Petersburg in 2017 and reports that there were fighters of Central Asian origin in the Islamic State group, many were quick to point to migration as a potential source of radicalization. There was a consequent rash of funding opportunities for scholars to research the issue. While most studies concluded that there was only a dubious link between migration and religious radicalism, the continued attention of governments and especially of international organizations is not without consequences. These projects have not only diverted the attention of scholars from potentially more important aspects of migration, but have perhaps unwittingly reinforced the rhetorical link between migrants and radicalism through continued projects, reports, and conferences, sensitizing governments and publics to further anxiety about migration.

As Bashirov demonstrates in his article in this volume, governments’ uses of security-related frames have an important rhetorical function, but are not necessarily concretely linked to actual security risk. Thus, there are inherent risks to scholarship chasing politically motivated issues, risks that are compounded when research funding is linked to specific topics. In the study of Eurasian migration, clearer delineation is needed between experts whose research is driven by the interests of policy organizations and scholars whose research—while policy-relevant—is oriented toward the theoretical questions of the migration literature. It was our intention, through the NAC-NU Central Asian Studies Program, to support projects of scholarly value that could speak to important policy issues while being theoretically guided by the broader literature. The result is a set of chapters that address a wide range of political, social, and economic aspects of the Eurasian migration system. These chapters reflect a larger body of work being done by scholars of Eurasian migration to increase engagement with migration studies more generally.
When we first met Faridun, he was already on his way out of Dushanbe. Although he had been born in the city, he was now oriented toward Russia: this, he thought, was a better place to raise his children. Having lived and worked in Lipetsk for more than five years, he had only returned to Dushanbe in the spring, he said, to “make documents” for his youngest child. After moving to Russia for work, he had received a commercial driver’s license, become a bus driver in Lipetsk, and even acquired Russian citizenship. Now he was in the process of passing that citizenship on to his wife and children, so that they could all move to his new home together. A few months after we met Faridun, he disappeared from the corner where he had been working as a taxi driver in Dushanbe. His colleagues later told us that he had returned to Russia.1

Thinking about Faridun, we found ourselves comparing his story to that of Solim Dodoev, another young man from Tajikistan, who had traveled to Russia a few decades earlier. In September 1986, Solim traveled from Leninabad (Khujand) in the north of Tajikistan to Leningrad to study at the 142nd Specialized Professional-Technical College (Spetsial’noe professional’no-tekhnicheskoe uchilishche, or SPTU/PTU), where he intended to qualify as a “textile production assistant.” Unfortunately, however, after a year of study, Solim found that he was unable to find a job either in Tajikistan or in Russia. While the Komsomol program that had sent him to Leningrad had presumed he would work for a textile factory, it seemed unable to help him get established at any particular enterprise. According to those who interviewed him in 1987, Solim seemed resigned to his fate and was unsure if his training would prove of any use. It certainly seemed impossible to stay in Russia.2

Faridun and Solim are highly representative of their respective eras. Today, tens of thousands of Tajik citizens move permanently to the Russian Federation each year, a tendency that is often overshadowed by the larger flows of seasonal and temporary labor migration between the two countries. In 2016, for example, 23,012 Tajik citizens acquired Russian citizenship, while another 18,882 became permanent residents.3 The Russian government’s “compatriot” (sootechestvenniki) program, together with other legal and semi-legal pathways to citizenship, has allowed individuals like Faridun to settle in Russia or simply maintain long-term links to the Russian labor market. During the mid-to-late 1980s, Tajikistan likewise attempted to send thousands of its young men and women to Russia each year as part of long-term relocation and labor training programs. These programs were much smaller in scale than today’s programmatic and market-driven migrations, however, with at most a few thousand participants each year. In addition, they were largely unsuccessful: much as in Solim’s case, it proved difficult to provide the necessary conditions to persuade workers and families to stay in Russia. Many more returned home than stayed.

While Faridun and Solim’s stories—and the broader trends they represent—may differ in terms

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1 Ethnographic fieldnotes, Dushanbe, April–June 2017.
of their resolutions, their underlying structure is surprisingly similar. Both young men were responding to forces larger than themselves—in Faridun’s case, the demands of the international labor market; in Solim’s, the dictates of the planned economy—that oriented them toward Russia as a place to work and earn a livelihood. Both tried to fill economic niches that nominally existed in Russia, which, in the 1980s just as much as today, was facing a demographic shortage of workers. In both cases, the young men’s departure from Tajikistan was seen as a necessary step toward progress: just as Faridun believed moving to Russia would help guarantee his family a better future, the bureaucrats helping to send Solim felt they were developing the Tajik economy and working to bring Tajik society in line with Soviet ideals.

These many parallels are anything but serendipitous. As this article shows, labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia in recent years has been built directly on the structural and discursive framework instituted during the final decade of the USSR. Intended to provide a freer labor market within the Soviet Union, these incipient steps may have been failures from the perspective of their architects, but they provided a well-developed construct on which post-Soviet labor migration could later build. In addition, since many individual bureaucrats moved from the Tajik Socialist Republic (SSR)’s Ministry of Labor to the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Tajikistan (and the independent Migration Service that was later founded), there was clear institutional and personnel overlap between the Soviet and post-Soviet eras. When labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia took off in the early 2000s, it did so from a platform long ready for its arrival. The only thing missing, it turned out, had been the structural incentives of capitalism, which sprung into motion after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Tajik civil war.

This pre-history of labor migration to Russia provides an aspect of the story that has been otherwise overlooked in recent academic works. While Central Asian labor migration to Russia is the subject of an enormous body of literature, little has been said about the institutional Soviet frameworks that have maintained their influence long after the disintegration of the Union. Where discussion has touched on these questions, labor migration has generally been identified as a marker of the post-Soviet period, brought about by the travails of the market economy and the necessary transition away from the guarantees of the Soviet system. Without labor markets or structural incentives for mobility, it has been argued, the Soviet Union became bogged down with “labor overload” (trudnoizbytochnost’) in some regions and faced labor deficits in others. When the restrictions of Soviet labor policy were stripped away in 1991, this line of argument goes, workers were finally able to move freely as the market demanded, providing the contours of the labor migration system on display today in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

While not structurally inaccurate, this narrative tends to focus on the dichotomy between the “static” planned economy and the nominally “dynamic” market that replaced it, to the detriment of the real contradictions inherent in both. This article demonstrates that there were real examples of labor markets built into the late Soviet economy, most notably the attempts made by the Soviet state to incentivize Central Asians to move to Russia. Rather than a clean shift from no labor market to an open labor market, what the collapse of the USSR represented for


Tajikistan was, more than anything, a structural turn to the insecurity of post-industrial capitalism. Much as in many other post-colonial environments and developing nations, the complete absence of earlier social guarantees, combined with wage differentials and the promise of a better life “over there,” provided the incentive workers needed to move into international markets.

During the Soviet period, these insecurities were unknown: no matter how frustrated Solim may have been with the lack of specialized work in Tajikistan, the basic level of support he enjoyed in his native village was enough to keep him from moving back to Russia. When these guarantees finally collapsed during the 1990s and the Tajik civil war, however, the earlier institutional attempts to entrench a labor market within the USSR proved to have laid the groundwork necessary for the post-Soviet labor migration regime. Faridun traveled along structural routes that would have been familiar to Solim both in their institutional geography and in their discursive framing. This comparative history of Soviet and post-Soviet migration routes to the Russian Federation, we argue, will help align the regional literature with other global histories of labor migration. In the same way as nurses have traveled to the US from the Philippines since the mid-20th century or Moroccans to France over the same period, so too did Tajiks react to market forces and move in large numbers to Russia at the turn of the 21st century. They just had to wait a little longer for the arrival of capitalist insecurity to incentivize their movement.

Overcoming Rural “Immobility”

When Solim traveled from Leninabad to Leningrad in the mid-1980s, the Soviet bureaucrats who had organized his travel expected that he would acquire the technical skills needed by many Soviet factories and enterprises. Even more immediately, they hoped that he might stay in Russia.

By the mid-1980s, few Soviet politicians or analysts doubted that something had to be done with Tajikistan’s growing population. There were simply too many people in the republic—and too few jobs. By 1985, the population of the Tajik SSR had reached 4.65 million, representing one of the fastest rates of growth in the USSR. In the less than 50 years between its founding (in 1926) and 1970, the population of the Tajik SSR had increased threefold; between 1959 and 1973, it grew by 62 percent compared to 19 percent population growth in the Soviet Union as a whole. Moreover, in contrast to most other parts of the country, this growth was primarily rural: Tajikistan’s rural population had increased by a factor of 2.1 between 1959 and 1986, compared to a decrease of 9 percent across the USSR as a whole.

With job growth concentrated in industrial enterprises and factories, which were located in cities and larger communities, this left a large share of the Tajik SSR’s population without access to jobs outside of the cotton-producing kolkhozes and sovkhozes located near their villages.

Unsurprisingly, unemployment in the Tajik SSR was a constant and growing problem. The word “unemployment” (bezrabotitisa) was taboo in Soviet discourse, but bureaucrats openly discussed the number of people “unengaged in social production” (nezaniaty v obshestvennom proizvodstve), essentially code for “without a job.” In the mid-1980s, the number of workers in the Tajik SSR without jobs varied, but was often calculated at around 200,000. Tajikistan was not unique in this regard—many other republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus faced similar problems—but its particularly high rates of unemployment placed it at the top of the list of regions with “labor excess.” The European republics of the Soviet Union, by contrast, were deemed to be areas of labor shortage. In these republics, demand for labor


11 TsGART f. 18, op. 8, d. 3643, l. 181. Average birth rates were approximately 5.7 per female resident of the Tajik SSR.


13 Estimates for 1985 included 120,000; 200,000; and 270,000. See RGASPI, f. 17, op. 154, d. 2375, l. 11; RGAE f. 1562, op. 68, d. 2368, l. 22, 57; and GARE f. 5446, op. 147, d. 647 l. 8-9, respectively. This might have been roughly 10-15 percent of the total possible workforce.
of all kinds outstripped available workers, limiting economic growth and creating competition for laborers between enterprises. Official Soviet discourse likewise avoided discussion of a “labor market,” but over the decades institutional and informal practices had developed to incentivize workers’ movement to priority areas of industrial development, often in Russia. As a result, the Soviet economy’s earlier practice of promoting development through the mobilization of workers from the European republics to large-scale projects on the margins the Soviet Union halted, and by the late 1970s the balance of Slavic migration to Central Asia was at times even negative.

Evidently, therefore, no one had any doubt that there were too many rural (and, often, unemployed) workers in the Tajik SSR, particularly in its many outlying villages. The question was what to do with this “labor excess.” Part of the answer to this question depended on the suggested causes of the glut of labor power. For some late Soviet academics, the underlying problem was the Soviet development project itself, which had encouraged immobility by providing the basics of modern life in the village, while at the same time aggressively promoting cotton harvesting in Tajikistan to the detriment of all other productive activity. Together, these structural incentives had even led to deurbanization: among the Soviet republics, Tajikistan was unique in having become less, rather than more, urbanized over the years. By the 1980s, only one-third of the republic’s population lived in cities, the lowest rate in the USSR. As the former deputy head of the Tajik SSR’s State Labor Committee later noted, the Soviet state constantly struggled with the fact that Tajiks were “immobile.” Although problems with employment existed, he suggested, there was still no overwhelming reason for Tajiks to leave their villages: even if they worked only as kolkhoz members, they still had jobs and a decent standard of living. “Therefore, they did not want to leave,” he said, since “no matter how many of them there were, the state would be obliged to provide them with jobs.”

For those considering the structural causes of the population’s “immobility,” the solution also seemed clear. The Soviet state should build as many smaller factories and industrial units as possible in the Tajik SSR, an idea that had been discussed for decades. By developing labor-intensive industries, these authors argued, it would be possible to take advantage of Tajik labor. In addition, the introduction of mechanized production and industrialization to the republic’s outlying regions would also promote social and educational development, leading to long-term urbanization and many of the other markers of Soviet modernity that had been lacking. This would simultaneously solve the problem of under- or unemployment, with an estimated 400,000 unemployed workers being brought into industrial jobs within a short period of time.

At first, these arguments in favor of local industrial development seemed to be winning out. In the early 1980s, for example, an all-Union seminar on regional demographic forecasting was held; it undertook to evaluate how the problem of labor was being recognized and how the republics could find ways of resolving it. By and large, this seminar recommended local-level industrial development and the promotion of labor-intensive industries. These recommendations took hold at the republic level, and by the final years of the USSR (1985–1991) a number of investment projects were underway in the Tajik SSR that were intended to boost its light industry and other “labor intensive” production capacity in rural areas. In a letter to the Soviet Council of Ministers

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16 Mukomel’, “Vremia otvetstvennykh reshenii.”
17 Morozova, “Trudnoizbytochna li Tsentral’naia Aziia?”
19 Alisher Isotullovich Yarbabaev, personal interview with the authors, February 2015.
from 1988, the leaders of the Tajik republic affirmed the need for economic growth “on the basis of overwhelming development of labor-intensive production,” listing more than a dozen related local projects under way in the republic.23 In Moscow, Gosplan had also approved renewed industrialization in the region, nominally clearing the way for increased investment and rural development.24

These were not, however, the only proposals on the table. Parallel to programs meant to increase employment within the Tajik SSR, voices were increasingly being heard advocating employment elsewhere in the USSR. Just as the Tajik SSR was experiencing “labor excess,” the Russian SFSR and other European republics were experiencing its shortage.25 It made better sense, some economists and sociologists argued, to solve two problems at once. Instead of building new industry in Tajikistan and Central Asia, they said, the excess labor from those republics ought to be sent to the RSFSR to fill existing labor gaps.26 This was also seen as a solution to the problem of Tajik immobility. The advocates of sending labor to Russia tended to consider immobility culturally dependent, with its roots going back to ‘Tajiks’ limited acculturation and assimilation to Soviet norms, rather than the result of structural economic incentives.27 By encouraging migration to the RSFSR and other more developed corners of the USSR, it was argued, Tajiks would increasingly be exposed to Soviet norms of behavior, with an important social effect. Programs quickly developed that proposed sending up to 40 percent of the “excess” labor observed in Tajikistan and Central Asia to regions that lacked manpower.28

In theory, the two programs could have existed in parallel, with unemployment brought down through both increased industrialization and outward migration. In practice, however, the latter strategy began to dominate. In the context of perestroika, when central funds for development programs became scarce,29 the idea of resolving labor excess in Tajikistan and labor scarcity in Russia at limited cost was apparently just too appealing to pass up. By the late 1980s, many of the regional factories that were supposed to have been built in Tajikistan were being delayed or mothballed,30 and Moscow was largely unwilling to send additional funds for industrial production. Instead, the Soviet center under Mikhail Gorbachev was increasingly exploring ways of developing its internal labor market as a method of promoting economic growth. While guaranteed employment had long been a central element of the Soviet industrial project, Gorbachev argued that industries were hoarding unnecessary workers, many of whom should be “freed” (read: fired) from their positions. This would allow them to change jobs and fill the many industrial positions that had long gone unfilled at other industrial enterprises. While never stated explicitly, the idea was to introduce a fluid labor market to the USSR, together with the limited amount of structural unemployment that this implied.31 In this context, the task for outlying republics with “labor excess” was clear enough: they ought to be sending as many laborers as possible to those republics with labor shortages to help grease the wheels of the developing Soviet labor market.

Exporting Excess Tajik Labor

This task was quickly reflected in Tajik republican policy. In January 1986, Kahhor Mahkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party, spoke during the republic’s 20th Party Congress about the problem of labor excess and the need to find jobs

23 “Pis’mo Mahkamova i Khayoeva v SM Soviet Union ot 23.06.1988,” GARF f. 5446, op. 149, d. 290, l. 91-100.
31 See Isaac Scarborough, “Chapter IV: Perestroika’s Economic Reforms” (PhD diss., LSE, in progress); Filtzer, Soviet Workers and the Collapse of Perestroika, 16.
for the Tajik SSR’s unemployed. He called on participants to promote the “export” of the republic’s labor power. In his speech, he encouraged the Party “to support and promote among the youth in every possible way the desire and readiness to work wherever the interests of our multinational motherland demand, where large-scale macroeconomic objectives are being met and [where] energy and territorial production complexes significant for the growth of our country are being developed.”

Some local academics also supported the call, arguing that due to the republic’s particular demographic situation, the inclusion of Tajik labor into Soviet production was of all-Union importance. In fact, attempts to encourage the out-migration of Tajik workers to other Soviet republics had been under way for years; Mahkamov’s speech only certified this as policy and added to the overall vigor of program design and implementation.

Prior to and during the first years of perestroika, labor migration from Tajikistan was largely restricted to the provision of contract workers (limitchiki) to individual Russian factories. Essentially workers who worked on short-term contracts at large industrial complexes in major Soviet cities, limitchiki were officially limited in number, hence their unofficial title. While fulfilling many industries’ need for mobile skilled workers, limitchiki embodied the ideological difficulty of representing an internal Soviet labor market: they demonstrated both the existence of real unemployment and workers’ non-proletarian drive to sell their labor at the highest price. In addition, limitchiki were typically not afforded many of the protections enjoyed by regular industrial workers; this made them cheaper for industrial enterprises (and thus preferable), but more expensive and less preferable for the state, which was often left to cover housing or other costs. Before perestroika changed the ideological stakes, limitchiki were largely tolerated, but their number was restricted. Their existence was also frequently used to criticize and harangue the factory managers who employed them. As the 1980s wore on, however, the discourse, scale, and scope of labor migration from Central Asian republics to Russia began to change radically, much as Mahkamov’s words had implied.

In part, this meant expanding efforts to employ Tajik workers as limitchiki in European Soviet factories and on “all-Union” construction projects. As the years went on, the Department on Employment and Migration at the Tajik SSR’s State Labor Committee stepped up its efforts to mobilize local Tajik workers, organizing the recruitment of migrant workers to the Kamaz and Avtovaz automobile factories, as well as the Baikal-Amur Motorway (BAM) construction site in the Far East. The Tajik republican government also coordinated with logging enterprises (leskhozy) in the RSFSR’s Irkutsk Oblast, to which hundreds of Tajik workers were sent during the latter half of the 1980s. By 1986, moreover, the central Soviet government in Moscow had developed a project “On the recruitment of Central Asian republics’ labor resources for the logging industry on the territory of the RSFSR,” according to which Tajikistan was meant to recruit at least 8,600 qualified loggers for temporary out-migration by 1990.

Interestingly, labor migration also began to involve the idea of permanent resettlement in the RSFSR, rather than just employment on short-term contracts. The Tajik State Committee for Labor, for example, launched an initiative in the mid-1980s that facilitated the resettlement of workers from Tajikistan to Khabarovsk krai in the RSFSR, where it was presumed that they would work in agriculture. The program provided resettled families with free transport to the krai by rail, as well as a house or apartment and a loan of 600-800 rubles (to be repaid to the state in 3-5 years). In addition, resettled families enjoyed free utilities for two years, as well as a tax exemption on their income for the first eight years. Using such financial incentives, the State Committee for Labor had planned to resettle 15,000 people to a variety of regions in Siberia over a period of five years. By 1985, however, only 5,000 individuals had been resettled, including 569 families in Khabarovsk. Despite this limited success, plans were

35 Alisher Izotulloyevich Yarbabaev, personal interview with the authors, February 2015.
36 GARF f. 5446, op. 147, d. 647, ll. 1-4.
37 GARF f. 5446, op. 147, d. 647, l. 50.
made to increase the size of resettlement programs. The Deputy Chairman of the Tajik State Committee for Labor explained the resettlement schemes as the Tajik Republic’s contribution to the economic development of the country: “There was a time when Tajikistan was in need of qualified labor and the country supplied it. Now, the republic is in a position to render help with manpower.”

Finally, there were the programs aimed at individuals like Solim—young people sent from Tajikistan to study in Russian and Ukrainian PTUs. In the 1980s, thousands of young people were recruited to participate in such programs, which were organized through the Tajik Komsomol. It was assumed that at least a subset of these young people would end up staying in the RSFSR or elsewhere, simultaneously easing the demographic pressure on Tajikistan and filling gaps in Russia’s labor market. This seemed to be a win-win solution: Tajikistan would receive trained professionals and export part of its excess labor power, while enterprises in European parts of the USSR would receive the workers they needed for production. Initially, plans called for a slow start to the program, with numbers ramping up to a total of 27,000 students to be exported during the 12th five-year plan (1986–1991), for an average of just under 6,000 per year. Early research had indicated that at least 30 percent of PTU students from Tajikistan had stayed in Ukraine and Russia after completing their studies, and in many cases both the targeted youth and their organizers in the Komsomol reported optimism. Of course, questions remained about the exact jobs many of those encouraged to move would later find, but no matter the costs or consequences, the Tajik republic emphasized, out-migration was simply unavoidable. As I. Volokhin, then the head of the Tajik Gosplan’s Department of Labor, Wages, and Labor Resources, summarized in 1989:

Our goal…is to plan the employment (zaniatost’) of the population, whereas its job placement (trudoustroistvo)—that is not in our mandate. Understand one simple thing: we need to remove as many people from the republic as possible. Tajikistan’s labor resources are colossal; there is no application (primenenie) for all of them. Yes, of course few choose to stay and work away from home, but the more we can remove, the more will stay.

The “removal” of as many workers from the Tajik SSR as possible certainly did not lack for political will. The republican government was clearly behind it, and it aligned with both Mikhail Gorbachev’s efforts to develop a labor market in the USSR and perestroika’s broader easing of restrictive labor policies and encouraging worker movement. It was also in line with official Gosplan policy, which since 1983 had held that “there was a proven and real possibility for territorial population redistributions from areas of labor excess to those of labor shortage.” Yet even this level of political backing was unable to guarantee success. As matters played out over the 1980s, it quickly became clear that far fewer Tajik workers were moving to Russia than had been planned and expected. The reasons for these failures varied depending on the program in question.

39 GARE f. 5446, op. 147, d. 647, l. 25.
40 Gelischanow, “Recruitment and Resettlement,” 2.
41 Gurshumov and Khonaliev, “Eksperiment po podgotovke,” 15-16. Initial plans were more limited, with approximately 3,000 students planned to be sent each year. See GARE f. 5446, op. 147, d. 647, l. 25.
44 Gurshumov, “Synov’ia ili pasynki?”
46 ARAN f. 1977, op. 1, d. 414, l. 16.
Temporary workers, such as *limitchiki*, were sent to Russian enterprises, but in numbers much lower than had been hoped. In many cases, the republican authorities were unable to recruit the necessary workers: when asked to find 8,600 logging workers, for example, the Tajik SSR argued that at best it might track down 3,350. The situation proved even more difficult when it came to resettlement and training programs. The number of families moving to various Russian oblasts proved difficult to sustain; by the end of the 1980s, some had begun to return to Tajikistan in the face of economic difficulties in Russia.

In addition, republican authorities in Tajikistan soon found that it was hard to mobilize local youth (especially girls) to leave for study in Russian or Ukrainian PTUs. Of those who left, moreover, it soon became clear that the absolute majority were returning to Tajikistan. In many cases, such as Solim’s, there simply were not any jobs available for them in the other republics. His training in textile production turned out to be unneeded by factories in Leningrad or elsewhere in Russia. In many such cases, students had been encouraged to choose the professional tracks beneficial to PTUs rather than those demanded by the Soviet labor market. PTUs needed to fill different study programs with students in order to retain funding—and so they continued to recruit students, including those from Tajikistan, for professions that were not in demand. Iso Juraev, for example, studied to be a “computerized machine operator,” even though the majority of Soviet factories in the 1980s remained manually operated. Like Solim, Iso was unable to find an industrial job in either Russia or Tajikistan, and returned to Tajikistan to work in his home kolkhoz. Young women from Tajikistan were also frequently encouraged by PTUs to study to be seamstresses, although there was little demand anywhere for them. There was a clear mismatch between the professional workers that were needed and the ones the PTUs were producing.

As a result, Soviet out-migration from Tajikistan proved a difficult and largely unsuccessful affair. It was difficult to overcome Tajik workers’ “immobility,” and program recruiters often found both workers and potential students skeptical about moving away from home to a new republic. Parents were also opposed to the idea of their children leaving, complicating the work of the Tajik Komsomol. In addition, when workers or students did make it to Russia or Ukraine, they frequently returned, often with new wives and children in tow, hardly helping the demographic pressures faced by Tajikistan. As the years of the 12th and final five-year plan (1986–1991) ground on through perestroika, the underlying problems of the republic’s economy grew worse and worse. By the time the USSR collapsed in December 1991, unemployment in Tajikistan had reached 30 percent. Notwithstanding the republican government’s many efforts, migration outflows from the Tajik SSR simply never reached the levels necessary to make up for the increasing lack of jobs.

**Export Today: Updating Soviet-Era Practices**

Today, with one of every three adult Tajik men working abroad in Russia, the idea of an “immobile” Tajik population seems almost laughable. It is also easy to forget. When, during a migration-themed event in Dushanbe, we remarked on this contrast to Russian sociologist Vladimir Mukomel, who had written about Tajik immobility in the 1980s, he looked at us askance. “Who said that?” he asked. “When was it that Tajiks were considered immobile?” They certainly are not today. While statistics can vary significantly—with Russian numbers often seeming exaggerated and Tajik figures understated—it is clear that around 700,000 to 800,000 Tajik men and women are in the Russian Federation at any one time. Working in the construction, service, and other sectors, they frequently travel back and forth between the two countries, filling the Russian labor market’s need for seasonal, temporary, and low-paid labor. As some are banned from traveling to Russia due to migration or other minor administrative violations, others quickly

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49 Alisher Izotulloevich Yarbabaev, personal interview with the authors, February 2015.
50 RGASPI f. 17, op. 160, d. 1672, l. 3
51 Vladimir I. Mukomel, conversation with the authors, February 2015. For his views in the 1980s, see Mukomel, “Vremia otvetstennykh reshenii.”
52 See, for example, “Rossiia: Kolichestvo grazhdan Uzbekistana sokrashchaetsia, chislo priezzhikh iz drugikh stran regiona—rastet,” Fergana.ru, March 4, 2016.
take their place.\textsuperscript{53} In Dushanbe, it can sometimes feel as though the entire population is constantly on the move.

In recent years, moreover, an increasing number of migrant workers from Tajikistan have been taking advantage of relocation programs and other methods of moving permanently to the Russian Federation. Initial research in Dushanbe and Russia has shown a growing number of migrant workers using programs such as the "resettlement program" (\textit{programma pereseleniia}) for Russian "compatriots" (\textit{sootechestvenniki}), and statistics reveal a significant number of Tajik citizens receiving either Russian residency or citizenship each year.\textsuperscript{54} Even students who study in Russia, often in programs funded by the Russian government, have begun to orient their futures toward Russia, thinking of a career and future life not in Tajikistan but rather in their new home. A young woman whom we know left Tajikistan a few years ago in Tajikistan but rather in their new home. A young

Ironically, in many ways, independent Tajikistan has managed over the past fifteen years to fulfill the migration goals embedded in late Soviet planning. Tajik citizens have become notably mobile, traveling far from their native towns and villages. The residents of rural Tajik villages have also gained some of the trappings of "internationalism" that the Soviet state wished for them: knowledge of Russian, experience with other cultures and peoples, and access to a much wider world. As in decades past, moreover, the out-migration of a large share of the Tajik workforce is seen as a central element of the republic's economic development. During a migration forum held in Dushanbe in July 2017, for example, a high-ranking official from the Tajik Ministry of Labor said, "There are 150,000 newcomers to the labor market annually...Whether we want to or not, we need to send a share of our people [abroad] for work."\textsuperscript{56} His words were largely identical to those uttered by the Gosplan functionary Volokhin nearly thirty years before. The only difference is that the modern Tajik state has been far more successful in mobilizing its population to work abroad than its Soviet predecessor.

It is also important to remember that the migration flow of workers from Tajikistan to Russia was built upon foundations laid down during the Soviet period. After independence, the Department on Employment and Migration of the Tajik SSR's State Labor Committee slowly began to work on a variety of migration-related issues. Over time, it developed into the Migration Service of the Tajik Ministry of Labor, which later underwent a series of reforms that saw it become a department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and then an independent state agency before being reincorporated into the Ministry of Labor.\textsuperscript{57} In the years following the collapse of the USSR, moreover, the bureaucratic staff of the Department of Employment and Migration transitioned to the new independent Tajik institutions, carrying with them knowledge and experience of relocation programs initially developed during the Soviet period.\textsuperscript{58}

That the out-migration so sought-after by Soviet programs finally came to fruition in the post-Soviet period, however, was the result of changing structural factors. Together, these changes wrought an underlying social insecurity that incentivized movement far more than institutional fiat had previously engendered. First of all, shortly after becoming independent, Tajikistan was plunged into a bloody civil war that created massive population displacements and a significant refugee population. The legacy of the war and its impact on contemporary migration patterns deserve further study. While the war officially lasted from 1992 to 1997, large-scale violence occurred only in 1992, when 20,000 people died (of the estimated 23,500 over the course of the war).\textsuperscript{59}
According to statistics from international organizations and the government of Tajikistan, out of Tajikistan’s then-population of 5.6 million, more than 692,000 people were displaced as a result of violence or the threat of violence. Of these, 90,000 refugees fled to Afghanistan, including 30,000 who returned right after the initial violence subsided. The other 60,000 stayed on the other side of the Amu Darya River in Afghanistan, residing in four refugee camps located in Balkh, Mazar-i-Sharif, and Kunduz. Some refugees died crossing the river; others froze to death in the winter months without shelter or food. There were also smaller refugee flows to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. After the end of the Tajik civil war, which culminated in the signing of a peace agreement between the opposing parties, Tajikistan embarked on marketization and privatization. During this time, labor migration to Russia increased, building in part upon the smaller refugee flows from the civil war, but also on structural trade and state links with Russia, and, to a lesser degree, on the burgeoning drugs trade between Afghanistan and Russia. Most importantly, as the Russian economy grew in the early 2000s, so too did its demand for labor, providing fertile ground for Tajik labor migration.

In this context, the deteriorating economic situation in Tajikistan has also created social insecurity and encouraged out-migration. Much as during the Soviet period, unemployment remains high. Although official statistics place unemployment levels at 2.5 percent, more realistic estimates have suggested an unemployment rate of around 50 percent, an increase of approximately 60 percent since the collapse of the USSR. Although this number may also be overstated, and is likely to represent individuals who are not “officially” employed rather than those who do not work, it is clear that well-paying jobs are especially scarce in Tajikistan today. As people have noted to us in Tajikistan on numerous occasions, “There are jobs, but there is no adequate pay.” At the same time, the transition to capitalism has further aggravated the economic situation for many people who live in rural areas. On the one hand, Tajikistan has always struggled with a lack of arable land: 93 percent of the country is made up of mountains, and the 75 percent of the workforce engaged in agriculture is frequently at a loss to find enough land for farming. On the other hand, privatization of agriculture has produced farm owners who are in debt to private holding companies against futures contracts, as well as under-mechanized and labor-intensive production processes, creating a reliance on severely underpaid workers.

At the same time as the economic situation was degrading from its already poor condition during the Soviet period, the marginal state guarantees that disincentivized migration evaporated. During the 1990s, the underlying nature of state-citizen relations in Tajikistan also began to change. Embracing the ideals of marketization and privatization, the state happily took a step back from its previous social obligations to citizens. One high-ranking official from the Soviet Tajik government who continued his career in the bureaucracy of independent Tajikistan noted that the major difference between the two state structures was the introduction of ideas about personal freedoms. According to this official, these “freedoms” were understood by the post-socialist bureaucracy to have replaced the socialist state’s commitment to provide jobs. These freedoms, moreover, aligned with ideas about Tajikistan’s “labor excess,” which implied that there were simply too many individuals for whom to provide jobs. Given shrinking levels of local industrial production—already meager in the Soviet past but further decimated by the civil war—the possibility of employing the population within Tajikistan seemed increasingly remote. Freedom, however, implied that the population could now solve the problem itself: it could move abroad and join wider labor markets, for example in Russia.

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60 In 1993, the Tajik government calculated that the country had 692,000 “refugees,” including internally and externally displaced persons. See TsGART f. 306, op. 27, d. 1613, l. 123.
64 Navruz Nekbakhtshoev, “Institutions and Property Rights Reform: Explaining Variation in Outcomes of Land Tenure Reform in Cotton-Producing Areas of Tajikistan” (PhD diss., Indiana University—Bloomington, 2016).
66 Soviet and Tajik bureaucrat, personal interview with the authors, February 2015.
Finally, these structural changes were occurring at the very moment when a truly open labor market was developing in the post-Soviet sphere. Although Gorbachev and the architects of perestroika had attempted to insert a fluid labor market into the Soviet economic system, their attempts essentially failed, blocked by the many internal restrictions on the sale and purchase of labor. As Karl Polanyi has argued, the commodification of labor—that is, the creation of an open labor market—requires that barriers to the movement and sale of labor be removed entirely.67

In the late Soviet Union, citizens could move about freely, but they were restricted in where they could sell their labor by registrations (propiska), housing limitations, and administrative regulations. Today, however, people from Tajikistan and other parts of the former USSR can—and do—pick up and move to Russia for work without prior institutional authorization. Post-Soviet market developments have freed employment from the restrictions of economic controls and regulations by placing it in the hands of private actors (employers). With the implementation of the visa-free regime between CIS countries, including Tajikistan and Russia, the final pieces were in place for the establishment of a truly open, modern, and capitalist labor market.

Conclusion: Out-Migration in the Context of Capitalist Precarity

We were never able to track down Solim Dodoev in Tajikistan, or learn where life may have taken him after his studies in Leningrad. Perhaps he returned to Khujand; perhaps he lives there to this day. Perhaps, like so many of his fellow Tajik citizens, he traveled to Russia again in the late 1990s and in recent decades for work; perhaps he even received Russian citizenship, joining the tens of thousands of Tajiks who have done so. Whatever the case may be, the path that he followed in the late 1980s, organized and framed by the Soviet state, managed to outline the contours of labor migration for hundreds of thousands of Tajik workers twenty and thirty years later. Once the structural conditions were primed for mobility—once civil war and the introduction of capitalism had created the necessary level of social insecurity—migration grew rapidly, much as Soviet civil servants had long hoped. Ironically enough, these very capitalist conditions let loose mobility in largely the form that had been envisioned by the USSR. Both discursively and geographically, modern labor migration from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation mirrors, and in some ways fulfills, earlier Soviet migration pathways.

By reconsidering the “pre-history” of modern labor migration from Tajikistan to Russia and its roots in late Soviet migration bureaucracy, we can view Central Asian migration in an entirely new light. These migration flows are, in part, demonstrative of the force of history: how Soviet-era institutions and bureaucracies have lived on past their official expiration date in 1991, continuing to influence and affect life decades later. Studies in Tajikistan and elsewhere in Central Asia have demonstrated how the dividing line of 1991 between Soviet and post-Soviet is essentially arbitrary in many people’s daily lives, failing to capture the changes that have occurred and are occurring in the post-Soviet landscape.68 Migration from Tajikistan to Russia also seems to fit this mold: while labor migration on a mass scale may only have come to fruition in the past ten or fifteen years, its roots lie in the late 1980s. At once a Soviet and post-Soviet phenomenon, it can only be understood through a consideration of both periods.

With this framework in mind, we can begin to ask important questions about the nature and form of modern labor migration to Russia that would otherwise go unnoticed. In particular, the contrast between the “immobile” Tajiks of the 1980s and the exceedingly mobile Tajiks of today is thrown into sharp relief. This chapter has discussed a few of the factors that have underlined this change in behavior, which was once chalked up to history, culture, and many other primordial aspects of social life. Most immediately and forcibly, we have found, Tajiks’ behavior and tendency toward mobility changed as the result of an overwhelming social shift to economic insecurity. Today, with Soviet social guarantees a dis-

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tant memory and capitalism dominant, labor migration to Russia can often seem like a lifeline to those sinking in unknown waters. It should come as no surprise to the anthropologists among us that collective behaviors may be the result not of unchanging “culture,” but instead of structural economic and social factors—and yet, at the same time, we should make sure to fully investigate these causes. Just as Tajik workers in the 1980s were not inherently but only contingently mobile, there is nothing inevitable about the mass mobility of Tajik workers today. Instead, post-socialist collapse and the structural conditions of capitalism have in effect brought Tajik workers into line with many other migrant populations around the world, all of whom travel far from their homes to overcome the basic economic insecurities they face on a daily basis. The Party may have laid the groundwork a few decades ago, but it was the market that finally brought to fruition the idea of a mobile Tajik worker.
Chapter 2. Between Strong and Weak Securitization: A Comparative Study of Russian and Turkish Approaches to Migration from Central Asia

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Russia and Turkey both have deep historical, political, social, and economic ties to Central Asia. They are also the two most important destinations for migrants from Central Asia, primarily in the areas of labor and student migration. However, the two countries have developed distinct approaches to managing legal and illegal migration from Central Asia. In Russia, nationalist-xenophobic tendencies that attempt to securitize migration from Central Asia clash with an economic rationale that requires cheap imported labor for economic development and a demographic predicament that the influx of migrants goes some way toward addressing. This leads to contradictions in the Russian approach to migration. Turkey, by contrast, has historically had an accommodationist attitude to migration from Central Asia. More recently, however, the influx of Syrian refugees en masse, as well as a growing number of terrorist attacks—some of which were perpetrated by Central Asian nationals—have led to the securitization of Central Asian migration to Turkey, albeit to a lesser extent than in Russia.

This paper presents a comparative study of Russian and Turkish approaches to migration from Central Asia. In addition to mapping out major types of migration from Central Asia to Russia and Turkey, this research asks: How has migration from Central Asia become securitized in Russia and Turkey? What explains the variation in levels of securitization of Central Asian migration in these two countries?

To help answer these questions, this paper utilizes securitization theory. First developed in the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (i.e. the Copenhagen School), the theory’s main analytical concept is securitization, understood as the construction “by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”1 Securitization theory claims that security issues do not emerge due to “objective measurements” of how threatening they “actually” are.2 Rather, securitization occurs through the discursive construction of an existential threat and an audience’s acceptance of it as such. Due to its emphasis on intersubjectivity and the role of discourse, securitization has emerged as a fruitful approach to the study of migration in Western countries.

Realist approaches to migration, with their emphasis on material interest and anarchy, have proven to be ineffective in understanding complex processes that drive approaches to migration.3 They have also generated unsubstantiated arguments, such as the fear of “coming anarchy” associated with mass in-migration to Western societies.4 Political economy approaches have been effective in creating a theory of migration that emphasizes the role of economic “push” and “pull” factors in shaping state policy. However, while this theory is concise and parsimonious, it is criticized for being reductionist and for neglecting the role of social structures and institutions.5

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2 Ibid., 30.
4 Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy.”
Several studies\textsuperscript{6} have successfully demonstrated how migration is constructed as a threat to social stability and public order in Western societies; how migrants are associated with crime, terrorism, and illegal labor in dominant discourses; and how migrant-as-a-threat narratives are rife with racist/exclusionist undertones. However, as some scholars have noted, almost no such studies of non-Western, non-democratic settings have been conducted.\textsuperscript{7} Moreover, most of the studies that exist for the former Soviet space focus on Chinese migration to the Russian East, to the exclusion of migration from Central Asia, or look at the broader issues of xenophobia and Russian nationalism. This study therefore makes a timely contribution to the literature by explaining the dynamics of securitization of migration from Central Asia to Russia.

In Turkey, meanwhile, migration studies is a rather underdeveloped field. In a recent chapter, Erder and Kaska\textsuperscript{8} lamented that “even though Turkey [considers] herself to be a country of ‘migration,’ migration studies is a relatively neglected area in the social sciences” in Turkey. The limited number of studies available have not engaged exclusively with migrants from Central Asia, nor have they problematized the dynamics of the Turkish approach to these migrants, such as discursive and non-discursive practices that construct migrants as a threat. Hence, by utilizing securitization theory, this study aims to contribute to migration studies on Russia and Turkey by investigating the complex approaches these countries have developed toward migration from Central Asia. In addition to investigating factors facilitating securitization, this paper also looks at factors that inhibit or constrain securitization. In this sense, it enters into a constructive dialogue with scholars who have recently problematized this phenomenon in the Western context.\textsuperscript{9}

Why compare Russia and Turkey? In regard to securitization of Central Asian migrants, both countries display similar features, allowing us to control for a number of factors. Both are semi-authoritarian polities with ambiguous relationships with the West. In addition, in both countries, labor migrants are largely forced into irregularity and illegality due to cumbersome and arbitrary bureaucratic procedures that deny them legal status. Another important similarity is that migration, especially of the illegal variety, is heavily managed by “differentiated informality,” whereby migrants receive differential treatment from bureaucracies and security forces depending on their national identity.\textsuperscript{10} Both Russian and Turkish migration policies were also shaped by developments that followed the collapse of their multi-national empires (the Soviet Union and the Ottoman empire) and their emergence as nation-states with titular nationalities (Russian and Turkish). Moreover, in both cases, the first objective of the migration policy was to return to the center those ethnic “compatriots” who had been left outside the borders of the new state. Turkish migration law, shaped at this juncture, was characterized by its highly stringent provisions, which granted “refugee” or “migrant” status only to those of “Turkish origin and culture” while labeling everyone else a “foreigner.” In Russia, meanwhile, a migration system rooted in Soviet practices underwent gradual reforms starting in the 1990s. Similarly to Turkey, the resettlement in Russia of the Russian-speaking populations of neighboring post-Soviet countries took precedence over other migration issues.

In what follows, I first explain securitization theory and how I utilize it to study the securitization of Central Asian migration in Russia and Turkey. In the second section, I demonstrate that there is strong securitization of Central Asian migrants in Russia, in contrast to weak securitization in Turkey. The third section discusses the security speech acts of political agents and the fourth section the role of contextual factors in shaping levels of securitization of migration in both countries.


Chapter 2. Between Strong and Weak Securitization: A Comparative Study of Russian and Turkish Approaches

Securitization Theory

The Copenhagen School (CS) defines securitization as a discursive process through which issues are constructed as an existential threat to a referent object. Contingent upon acceptance by a significant audience, securitization legitimizes the taking of emergency measures to deal with the designated threat. Securitization is “a strategic (pragmatic) practice” that emerges from the interaction between securitizing actors, audience, and context. Securitizing actors are those “who securitize issues by declaring something—a referent object—existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival.” Following the main premise of the CS, securitizing actors are understood as “those figures possessing cultural capital by virtue of their authority, expertise, or position in society,” since only they “are able to make legitimate security claims.” While securitizing actors can be located in a variety of locales—including the non-governmental sector, international organizations, and even entertainment—for the purposes of this study, securitizing actors are taken to be the political and security elites in Russia and Turkey, given their overarching influence in shaping security discourse and practice. Political actors are generally the initiators of securitization processes in Russia and Turkey.

The CS, as is developed in the works of Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, understands securitization as an Austinian “speech act”: “the utterance itself is the act … by uttering ‘security,’ a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means necessary to block it.” However, as Matt McDonald notes, the speech act is not the only form of securitizing act. Security is also practiced by networks of (in)security professionals through a range of routinized practices. In a post-modern merger of the domains of internal and external security, some security agencies—such as customs officials, border guards, and immigration officers—are at the center of the security field. Together with various “regulatory instruments,” such as restrictive regulations and national laws and rules, these security practices constitute an important means through which securitization of migration is carried out. This enlargement of the form of securitization also emanates from Laclau and Mouffe’s theoretical insight that social practice cannot be separated into linguistic and behavioral aspects, as such a distinction is not sustainable.

Following Bourbeau, I also examine “the issue of intensity of securitization.” I use institutional and security practices indicators to determine the level of securitization in each case. Institutional indicators include immigration acts that establish the linkage between migration and security and the salience of this link. Security practices indicators include interdiction “as an activity directed toward preventing the movement of people at the source” and the prevalence of immigrant detention. Finally, I added an “informal treatment” indicator to account for the fact that in both Russia and Turkey, unlike in the developed Western nations that Bourbeau examines (Canada and France), much of the interaction between authorities and migrants occurs in an informal space where the preferences of state agents override formal rules and laws. As Wilkinson and Curley and

14 Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security, 36.
17 Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization,” 55; see also Buzan, Waever, and De Wilde, Security, 24-30.
21 Balzacq, Securitization Theory, 17.
23 Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration, 42-43.
24 Ibid., 18-20.
25 Ibid., 19-20.
26 Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School.”
Herington\textsuperscript{22} have found, such informal practices have a crucial impact on security discourses and their success. Finally, this study analyzes the role of social, political, and historical contexts in facilitating and constraining the securitization of migration. As Thierry Balzacq writes, “securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) practice that occurs within a configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to the interaction.”\textsuperscript{28} External context also affects securitization: “to move an audience's attention toward an event or a development construed as dangerous, the words of the securitizing actor need to resonate with the context within which his/her actions are collocated.”\textsuperscript{29}

Some contextual factors may serve to facilitate the securitization of migration, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a refugee crisis, or a civil war. However, an important implication of the intersubjective nature of the process of securitization is that securitization is not a one-way street; not every attempt ends up being successful. A securitizing move needs to be accepted by the audience in order to have the desired effect. In addition, there are “contextual factors that constrain or limit the securitization process.”\textsuperscript{30} Securitization may clash with other state goals, such as economic development,\textsuperscript{31} or may be hindered by domestic bureaucracies unable and/or unwilling to carry out securitization.\textsuperscript{32}

**Securitization of Migration in Russia and Turkey**

**Strong Securitization in Russia**

In Russia, Central Asian migration is strongly securitized both at the institutional level and at the level of security practices. Since the early 2000s, various changes made to the laws on migration, as well as to the regulatory instruments derived from these laws, have established a strong link between security and migration in Russia.

Signed in 2002, both the Concept of Migration Processes Management and the Federal Law on Russian Federation Citizenship were primarily designed to fight illegal migration. In 2007, the Russian government started to issue quotas for immigrant workers that “divert[ed] migrants to the shadow sector” in a bid to exploit immigrants’ labor and maintain the patronage of elite groups over the economy.\textsuperscript{33} The restrictive provisions contained in these documents “narrowed the legal channels of labor migration,” condemning migrants to perennial “illegality.”\textsuperscript{34} Later, new laws introduced the centralized patent system, allowing migrants to gain legal status without depending on their employers. In 2015, tests in “Russian language and Russian history” were made mandatory for all those who want to work in Russia.\textsuperscript{35} This policy was a natural corollary to the xenophobic discourse that depicted Central Asians as “anti-social” and a threat to Russian national identity. Indeed, in 2016, Putin signed a law titled “On the Fundamentals of the Prevention of Offenses of the Russian Federation” that allows authorities and citizens to implement “a set of social, legal, and organizational information measures” to prevent “anti-social behavior,” which is defined as “violating generally accepted norms and morals, the rights and legitimate interests of others.”\textsuperscript{36} In a Soviet-style twist, the definition of anti-social behavior is conspicuously vague, allowing differential application of the law by the authorities. As Yuri Novolodsky, vice-president of the Chamber of Attorneys of St. Petersburg, and other experts have noted, it is clear that the primary intention of the law is to “deal with” migrants.\textsuperscript{37}


\textsuperscript{28} Balzacq, *Securitization Theory*, 1-2.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid., 13.

\textsuperscript{30} Bourbeau, *The Securitization of Migration*, 3.

\textsuperscript{31} Boswell, “Migration Control in Europe.”


\textsuperscript{33} Caress Schenk, “Controlling Immigration Manually: Lessons from Moscow (Russia),” *Europe-Asia Studies* 65, no. 7 (2013): 1461.


Recent national strategy documents have made similar remarks, deliberately associating migration with international terrorism and extremist ideologies and endorsing extraordinary measures to deal with these negative trends. The 2012 Concept of State Migration called for “countering the channels of illegal migration” by enhancing border security. Most recently, the 2016 National Security Strategy document conceptualized “illegal migration” as a threat to both the national security and national economy of Russia, describing it as an important component of “border activities of international terrorist and extremist organizations.”

Migrants also have to undergo a battery of tests (for HIV, drug addiction, tuberculosis, and skin diseases) and buy health insurance in order to be eligible for legal employment. These measures have been legitimized by the discursive construction of migrants as sick. Instead of decreasing “illegality,” the new regulations have promoted it, driving migrants underground by introducing obscure, non-transparent, and inaccessible legal procedures that are hard for even experts to understand and by propelling up the existing corrupt system around labor migration.

The illegal status of migrants has been widely instrumentalized as an excuse to crack down on migrant communities and individuals.

Furthermore, since the early 2000s, Russian national institutions tasked with managing migration have been geared toward the securitization and militarization of migration. The regulation of migration has become the exclusive domain of security professionals, including the riot police (OMON), the Federal Migration Service (FMS), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and, most recently, the Rosgvardia (the Russian Guard). When the security services take a prominent role in regulating migration, it affects the problematization of the issue of migration. As Huysmans claims, these institutions “have a professional disposition to represent and categorize a policy concern in a security discourse and to propose security measures to deal with it.” The restrictive legal and bureaucratic environment described above has aided security professionals in securitizing and criminalizing migrants.

Migration has also been strongly securitized at the level of security practices. Labor migrants from Central Asia are regularly racially profiled and “picked up” (detained) by security professionals. Madeleine Reeves’ study of the lives of Kyrgyz migrants in Moscow documents “the way certain bodies come to be scrutinized as...legitimate targets for checks, fines, and threats of deportation.” As Round and Kuznetsova state, “the spectacle of passport checks reinforces to the public the illegality of migrants.”

Central Asian migrants have been forced into a shadow realm where they are stripped of their rights to defend themselves and to exist as “legal” and equal members of society.

In addition, Central Asian migrants are securitized at the level of informal practices. Their “illegal” status makes them easy targets for violent attacks by ultra-right-wing racist groups and skinhead movements. It seems that such attacks against migrants are sanctioned at the highest levels of the state, given the frequent involvement of Kremlin-controlled youth movements such as Nashi, Molodaia Gvardiia, and Mestnye in these public hunts for migrants.

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41 Ivakhnyuk, “Russian Migration Policy,” 13.
43 The FMS was abolished in 2016 and its authority and responsibilities were transferred to the MIA (see “Putin Abolishes Russia’s Federal Drug Control Service, Federal Migration Service,” TASS, April 5, 2016, http://tass.com/politics/867522.
most cases, these groups have been accompanied or observed by FMS officials. The above-mentioned Law on the Prevention of Offenses provides further help to these groups.

Since 2016, the Russian government's preoccupation with Central Asian migrants has increased to hysterical levels. At the core of the new Russian approach are constant raids on migrant communities that are justified by fight against terrorism. As RT reported, "Since 2015, news about regular raids [of migrant communities] by the FSB has begun to appear almost monthly." Numerous such raids have been conducted in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Tver. On many occasions, the commanding officers charged the migrants they raided with being members of the Islamic State group and plotting terror attacks on Russian cities, despite having failed to find any weapons or illegal drugs during searches. In 2016, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in cooperation with the FSB and Rosfinmonitoring (Federal Financial Monitoring Service), conducted a large operation called "Nelegal-2016" (Illegal-2016) that "aimed to block illegal migration channels and...reduce the possibility of penetration into the country of persons pursuing unlawful actions." As a result of the operation, over 55,000 foreign workers were deported.

The measures implemented in the wake of the April 2017 metro bombing heralded the further criminalization of migration in Russia, as anti-terrorism and migration regulation efforts were increasingly fused. The National Counter-Terrorism Committee demanded that the antiterrorist commissions actively participate in efforts to monitor compliance with migration legislation, as well as check on businesses that employed migrant labor. On April 20, 2017, FSB officers, in cooperation with Rosgvardiia, raided a group that illegally registered foreign migrants. Most recently, it was reported that FSB officers regularly pick up Tajik migrants and "[demand] that they report on their 'suspicious' countrymen" to the FSB.

Weak Securitization in Turkey

In the case of Turkey, migration was securitized with the Asylum Regulation of 1994, which contained provisions about "national security and public order." The regulation was a response to growing migration flows from Northern Iraq and Bosnia due to ongoing wars in those countries. The Law on Foreigners and International Protection, adopted in 2013, maintained this emphasis on national security, clearly stipulating that, "the area of migration is a dynamic issue... that is deeply related to Turkey's public order and national security." Most recently, in August 2017, the government introduced changes to Law No. 2937, allowing the government to "repatriate [foreigners] to another country or swap them with prisoners held in other countries."

Until very recently, the security component of these laws and regulations did not particularly target Central Asian migrants, instead being directed at Kurdish refugees from Northern Iraq and Syrian refugees fleeing the civil war. This is evident from the fact that in contrast to its relations with the above-mentioned countries, Turkey established a liberal visa regime with the Central Asian states, providing them with visa-free entry and a 90-day period of stay. This policy was more accommodationist than the Russian one because it did not require visitors to

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55 Ibid., 299-301.


57 Grand National Assembly of Turkey, "Yabancilar ve Uluslararas Koruma Kanunu Tasarısı ile İnsan Haklarını İnceleme Komisyonu, Avrupa Birliği Uyum Komisyonu ve İçişleri Komisyonu Raporları.

register with any government institution during their 90-day stay, thereby promoting the legality of Central Asian migrants. Moreover, since the early 1990s, prominent figures of Central Asia’s political opposition (mainly from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan) have arrived in Turkey, including Muhammad Salih. After the Islamist AKP government came to power, Turkey also began to host Islamist opposition figures; many Islamist activists moved to Turkey with their families to escape persecution at home. Moreover, along with Azerbaijanis and Iraqi Turkmen, Central Asians were located at the positive end of “differentiated informality,” enjoying considerable tolerance of their transgressions regarding work and residence permits.59 One could argue that Central Asian migrants were not securitized in Turkey at all until very recently.

However, terrorist attacks perpetrated by individuals from the North Caucasus and Central Asia sparked a process through which migrants became securitized. In June 2016, three ISIS-linked terrorists carried out a series of shootings and suicide bombings in Istanbul airport, killing 45 people and wounding more than 230. It was later revealed that the three perpetrators hailed from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia’s Dagestan region.60 Another deadly attack, this time on New Year’s Eve, was committed by an ethnic Uzbek citizen of Kyrgyzstan, Abdulkadir Masharipov, in Reina nightclub, killing 39 and injuring 71.61 Since the Reina nightclub attack in particular, some Central Asian migrant communities have reportedly been targeted by security forces and violent mobs, albeit in a non-systematic manner. During the manhunt for Masharipov, the Turkish police conducted several raids in neighborhoods where Central Asian communities were located. In addition, angry mobs beat up several individuals from Central Asia who were taken to be Masharipov.62 (That being said, while the raids on Central Asian communities continued after the capture of Masharipov, they did not expand into the mass events we have observed in Russia.) There has also been an important shift in Turkish policy concerning Central Asian opposition figures who go into exile in Turkey: since late 2016, Central Asian communities, as well as some nationalist and Islamic news portals, have reported targeting and expulsion of these individuals.

Nevertheless, Central Asians have not been systematically targeted by security services in Turkey. Raids remain limited in both their aims and scope. Soon after the Reina attack, the Turkish media reported that the government was planning to implement a stricter visa regime with Central Asian states and that it had demanded detailed information about Central Asian citizens residing in Turkey from the security services of these countries.63 However, as of this writing, no new visa regulations have been introduced. It seems that this was an attempt by the government to defuse criticisms of the regime then being made by the opposition. Weak securitization continues to prevail in the Turkish approach to Central Asian migrants.

Security Speech Acts of Political Actors

Securitization emerges from the intersubjective interaction between the securitizing speech acts of political agents and contextual factors. The securitization process starts with securitizing the moves of political agents; the speech acts of those who “possess social power and social recognition” “are an essential social constituent of the securitization process.”64 In what follows, I analyze these securitizing moves by political agents, exploring their role in the process of securitizing migration.

Political Actors in Russia

In Russia, political and social elites, along with the state-controlled media, have constructed migrants—particularly those from Central Asia and the Caucasus—as an existential threat to Russian identity and national security since the late 1990s. Citing the demographic decline in the country, various politi-
cians and officials warn that migrants will crowd out ethnic Russians, thereby eroding Russian culture and identity.65 The securitization discourse also routinely links migrants to diseases, drug abuse, and “promiscuous behavior.”66 Notwithstanding that HIV infection rates are much lower in Central Asia than in Russia, mainstream media discourses paint migrants as the main transmitters of this and other dangerous diseases.67

Since 2015, a rather new and harsh discourse has developed that connects “illegal migrants” (usually referring to migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan) with “international terrorism” in the rhetoric of high-level politicians, including President Vladimir Putin and FSB director Alexander Bortnikov. By associating migrants with terrorism, the Russian elite has constructed migrants as the ultimate threat to national security. In a Security Council meeting in April 2016, President Putin claimed that:

As a matter of fact, [many migrants] fall out of the control of the state and law enforcement structures, [and] they are often involved in criminal or semi-criminal activities. Illegal channels of migration are trying to take advantage of criminal groups, drug dealers, foreign special services, as well as emissaries of international extremist and terrorist organizations. These attempts must be strictly suppressed, actively working along the lines of all our responsible departments. In particular, it is necessary to strengthen the protection of sections of the state border in areas that present an increased danger for the penetration of illegal migrants. All possible “windows”—loopholes—must be thoroughly closed.68

Top security officials have likewise made strong securitizing claims in recent years. In 2017, Bortnikov argued that, “the main backbone (osnovnoi kostiak) of terrorist groups [in Russia] are citizens of the CIS.”69 This “expert” discourse also identified labor migrants as a group predisposed to recruitment by international terror networks in view of the serious economic and psychological stress under which they live in Russia.70

Political Actors in Turkey

Until 2016, Central Asian migrants had hardly been discussed in mainstream media or political discourses in Turkey. Perceived as “Turkish brethren” who could easily adapt, Central Asians were hardly ever mentioned in print or broadcast media, except during bilateral state visits between Central Asian and Turkish leaders. In these infrequent cases, the media generally reported some statistics about Central Asian migration and showed interviews where Turkish and Central Asian people conveyed their best wishes to each other.

The 2016 Istanbul airport attack did bring some attention to Central Asians in Turkey, but the media did not emphasize the perpetrators’ nationality, instead focusing on ISIS as the main threat. In contrast, the Reina attack put Central Asians in the spotlight, making them an important component of media discourse for perhaps the first time. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that Turkish reactions to the attack were mixed. Some—mostly opponents—criticized the government for its open-door policy, which they claimed allowed Central Asian migrants to join the fighting in Syria, and called on the government to impose new visa regulations.71 Secular and opposition media also placed heavy emphasis on the nationality of the Reina attacker, asking why an Uzbek would try to hurt Turkey or why there were so many Central Asian ISIS fighters.72 Several columnists echoed the political opposition in calling on the Turkish government to start requiring entry visas for travelers from Central Asia.73

However, in contrast to its Russian counterpart, the Turkish government mostly abstained from en-

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65 Marat, Labor Migration in Central Asia, 21.
67 Ibid., 9.
69 Maslova, “Osnovnoi kostiak – migranty.”
gaging in this securitizing rhetoric. Neither the government nor the pro-government media emphasized the nationality of the perpetrator, instead focusing—as they had after the Istanbul airport attack—on ISIS as the main threat to national security. Evidently, the government had no desire to securitize Central Asians in general.

The Power of Contextual Factors

The securitizing moves discussed above do “not constitute a securitization”; they represent “only an attempt to present an issue as a security threat.”74 Securitization depends on the ways “agents’ securitizing moves relate to the cultural and socio-historical contexts in which they are made.”75 Hence, it is imperative to look at some contextual factors.

Securitization does not end with audience acceptance or rejection. Rather, it is a multidirectional process. As Bourbeau demonstrates, there may be gaps and contradictions between the time “when the securitization of migration was initiated” and “when political agents of each country case made their securitizing moves.”76 Equally, security practices may precede securitizing speech acts, as Wilkinson found in her study on Kyrgyzistan.77 Or, as Adam Cote argues, the audience’s responses and challenges to securitization may actively shape the securitization process.78

The multidirectional nature of the process means that there is constant feedback between agents and structure (which can be described as contextual factors).

The power of contextual factors “is best understood as the power to enable and/or constrain securitizing agents.”79 Indeed, as Bourbeau shows, such a study of contextual factors provides us with a useful framework for explaining weak and strong securitization in our comparative case studies. Weak securitization occurs “when the contextual factors represent a relatively constant constraining force on agents’ securitizing moves.”80 Strong securitization, in contrast, results "when the contextual factors are a relatively constant inducing force on agents’ securitizing attempts."81

The Impact of Post-Soviet Transformations on Russia and Turkey

During the 2000s, migration to Russia from the CIS countries in general—and the three Central Asian countries under study in particular—grew steadily. However, as the numbers of Central Asian migrants rose, public perceptions of them shifted: if before they were regarded as fellow citizens of the Soviet nation, they have now become gastarbeitery (guest workers), in the Russian borrowing of the German phrase, or simply nelegal (illegal).82 Over the years, the “friendship of peoples” promoted by the Soviet state has been replaced by growing nationalist sentiments.83 This has been accompanied by increasing public circumspection toward migrants.84 Several scholars have drawn a direct line from the Soviet collapse to contemporary xenophobia and migrantophobia. Lev Gudkov, the director of the Levada Center, argues that the rise of xenophobic feelings among Russians is related to feelings of humiliation and powerlessness, a growing sense of anxiety and uncertainty, and social fears that originated with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the loss of superpower status. Both Gudkov and Emil Pain point to the context of post-imperial humiliation and the resultant “inferiority complex” as a driver of migrantophobia.85

In Turkey, migration into the country was long governed by the 1934 Law on Settlement, which restricted immigration to people of “Turkish origin and culture.” A new phase of migration began in the late 1980s with liberalized procedures, such as a flexible visa regime, that made it easier for foreigners to travel to Turkey. Led by then-Prime Minister Turgut Özal,

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74 Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration, 98.
75 Ibid.
76 Ibid., 52.
77 Wilkinson, “The Copenhagen School”
78 Cote, “Agents without Agency.”
79 Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration, 99.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Reeves, “Clean Fake,” 513.
this policy aimed to promote trade and economic relations with neighboring countries. In the middle of this liberalization process, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Caucasus and Central Asia states, “with close linguistic and cultural ties to Turkey,” emerged. As a result of this opening, the number of arrivals in Turkey from the former Soviet Union grew exponentially: 4,500 people in 1988, 1.4 million in 2000, and 5.6 million in 2009.

It was left to the discretion of policymakers to determine whether the phrase “people of Turkish origin and culture” that appeared in the Law on Settlement applied to individuals from Central Asia and Azerbaijan. A positive determination would have given these migrants easy access to citizenship. Turkish policymakers ultimately decided against this broader application, but they nevertheless interpreted the emergence of independent Turkic states as an opportunity to connect with their “Turkish brethren” and help them in their pursuit of sovereignty and prosperity. An accommodationist visa regime and various economic and educational policies were enacted to promote exchanges. Turkey implemented a state program—the Great Student Exchange Project—to sponsor the education in Turkey of thousands of students from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan.

The main factors motivating migrants to relocate to Turkey were similar to those driving them to migrate to Russia: the high level of unemployment in Central Asia, the availability of trade, and higher wages in Turkey. Moreover, while Turkey does not have a demographic predicament like Russia’s, it nevertheless needs seasonal agricultural and construction workers. From the early 1990s, a significant portion of labor migrants from Central Asia began to engage in the so-called “suitcase trade” (bavul ticareti): traveling to Turkey, selling their “suitcase” full of products, and buying a wide range of consumer goods—generally in Istanbul—to be sold for a profit back home. Estimated at US$10 billion in 1995, the suitcase trade was generally accommodated by Turkish officials due to the income it brought to the national economy, despite involving certain “illegal” aspects: migrants overstaying their visas, making purchases without documentation, or using the suitcase trade for other purposes, such as sex work or selling drugs. The suitcase trade was interpreted not as a security threat, but as an opportunity to strengthen trade ties with Turkic countries and accelerate the movement of people and goods. Hence, in contrast to how they were perceived in Russia, the collapse of the Soviet system and accompanying arrival of swathes of Central Asian migrants were interpreted as positive developments in Turkey.

War in Syria

Another exogenous shock contextualizing securitization was the beginning of the civil war in Syria following a popular uprising against the incumbent leader, Bashar al-Assad. The war quickly gained an international character, with thousands of fighters leaving the Middle East, Europe, Turkey, Central Asia, Russia, and other regions to take sides in the ongoing war. By 2015, both Russia and Turkey were involved in the war, often on opposing sides, but also with some overlapping interests. For Russia, the conflict generated multifaceted challenges: it is estimated that 2,000 Central Asians have joined the ranks of ISIS and the Al-Nusrah Front, a large majority of whom were recruited while working in Russia.

These developments added a new dimension to the securitization of Central Asian migrants in Russia. Although Putin’s government was intent on curbing domestic xenophobia in the wake of the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the perceived growth of Islamist

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87 Ibid., 352.
88 Erder and Kaska, “Turkey in the New Migration Era,” 117.
92 Piart, Transition, Migration, Capitalism, 335; Erder and Kaşka, “Turkey in the New Migration Era,” 128.
terrorism in Central Asia reigned populist anti-immigrant sentiment and fear-mongering among politicians, pundits, and security professionals. Whereas migrants were previously been associated with stealing jobs and petty crime, “terrorism” and “extremism” have emerged as prominent frames of securitization. This has resulted in extensive surveillance and criminalization of migrant communities. Police and bureaucratic inspections in front of metro stations in Moscow have intensified.94 As I showed earlier, since 2015, FSB raids of Central Asian migrant communities have become a regular occurrence.95

The beginning of the civil war in Syria created immense challenges for Turkey as well, albeit in different ways than for Russia. As thousands of refugees started to flee the ongoing war and devastation, Turkey quickly became an important destination. By 2015, around 2 million Syrians had moved to Turkey, representing the biggest refugee flow the country had ever seen. The mass movement turned public and political attention to Syrian refugees and the potential threat they posed to national security and public order. At the same time, Turkey became an important transit country for Central Asian fighters heading to and from Syria, a fact which created immense challenges for Turkey as well, albeit in different ways than for Russia.

Other factors also constrained the securitization of Central Asians in Turkey. For one, as early as 2011, Turkey became heavily involved in the war by supporting the Syrian opposition forces against the Assad regime. The growing Kurdish presence in northern Syria was another worrisome development for Turkey. In the words of one Turkish ex-intelligence officer, “Ankara was prepared to tolerate a certain degree of Islamic State activity on its soil and on its border with Syria because it was seen as an enemy to the Assad regime and to Kurdish fighters linked to the PKK rather than as a direct threat to Turkish national security.”96 The Turkish regime preferred not to prevent ISIS’ activities—such as public gatherings, sermons, and media appearances within Turkey—and even decided not to condemn the terrorist group for its attacks in Turkey in 2014–2015. As a result, the Central Asian fighters who moved freely through Turkey on their way to and from Syria did not become the objects of public and political scrutiny at this point in time.

**Domestic Bombing Attacks**

In 2016 and 2017, a series of domestic terrorist attacks committed by Central Asians shattered Russia and Turkey. As the cases of 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in the UK have shown, such attacks might result in the securitization of the identity of perpetrators in public and political rhetoric and practice.97 In April 2017, a 22-year old male from Kyrgyzstan committed a suicide bombing attack in a St. Petersburg metro station. If the movement of Central Asian fighters from Russia to the warzone had fueled surveillance and criminalization of migrants, the attack further inflamed the public and political rhetoric around the danger posed by migrants and Muslims more generally.98

The securitizing moves made by top security and political officials became acute after the attack. Head of the Russian FSB Bortnikov went on to assert that “some of these individuals were trained and participated in military operations on the side of international terrorists in Syria and Iraq. Thus, in order to prevent militants’ attempts to penetrate Russia, it is also necessary to provide for additional measures of the border regime on the state border, on the channels of entry and exit for controlling passenger flows against persons suspected of involvement in terrorist structures.”99 He also stated that his department had prevented 16 terror plots planned by “citizens of the CIS” in 2016.100 Bortnikov’s statements signaled that the former distinction between “legal” and “illegal”...

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96 Yayla, “The Reina Nightclub Attack.”
100 Maslova, “Osnovni kostiak—migranty.”

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migrants had been erased; migrants as a whole were now considered a threat.

If illegality was previously associated mainly with economic harm and petty crime, the most recent discourse has connected it directly with international terrorism. For example, after an April 2017 raid on an office that made fake migration documents, the FSB connected this rather mundane issue with terrorism, claiming that the activities of such groups "lead to an increase in illegal migration flows to the Tver Region and the Russian Federation as a whole, [contributing] to the complication of the crime situation and the formation of terrorist threats."101

In Turkey, meanwhile, deadly terror attacks perpetrated by terrorists from Central Asia and the Caucasus have struck a nerve and fostered heated debate regarding Ankara's approach to travelers from the region. It is safe to say that these attacks constituted watershed events in Turkish perception of Central Asian migrants. While Turkey is no stranger to terrorist attacks on its soil, these attacks have usually been committed either by Kurdish guerillas associated with the PKK or Middle Eastern individuals affiliated with ISIS. As we have seen, several opposition figures and media outlets attempted to securitize the issue, questioning the safety implications of Central Asian fighters passing through Turkey.

Public Opinion

In Russia, public opinion surveys conducted since the early 2000s have demonstrated consistently high levels of xenophobia toward migrants. According to a 2017 Levada Center survey, citizens of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan are the second-most hated group (38 percent) among Russians, behind only people from the North Caucasus (41 percent).102 Furthermore, polls also found that most Russians believe that migrants increase the crime rate, despite Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics that negate this assumption. For example, while the crime rate is lower among immigrants than among Russian citizens,103 a 2011 Levada poll showed that 71 percent of Russians believe migrants increase crime in Russia.104

While the origins of these public attitudes are various, ranging from a post-imperial inferiority complex105 that fostered feelings of humiliation and powerlessness to uncertainty about the Russian state's capacity to protect the security and interests of Russians vis-à-vis migration, it is clear that Russian public opinion has facilitated the securitization of Central Asian migrants. Indeed, as Caress Schenk has demonstrated, Russian migration policy "does not reflect the demographic realities present in Russia," but rather emanates from growing xenophobia.106 This persistent anti-Muslim xenophobia has also infiltrated informal practices, such as the security services' attitude toward Central Asians.

In Turkey, however, public opinion has largely constrained the securitization of migration from Central Asia, albeit with some caveats. Various surveys have demonstrated consistently high levels of Turkish xenophobia toward outsiders, including migrants;107 however, due to their cultural and linguistic proximity, migrants from Central Asia are generally considered well integrated into life in Turkey.108 This is in contrast to migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as neighboring Iraq and Syria, who often have difficulty adjusting and face the strongly negative attitudes of Turkish citizens.109

Like in Russia, Turkish officials' approach to "illegality" is influenced by migrants' nationality.110 Feelings of national, cultural, and historical closeness mean that officials often overlook cases of illegality among Central Asian migrants. It is migrants from South Asia and Arab countries, who comprise the

103 For example, according to the MIA, foreigners accounted for only 3.8 percent of all convictions in Russia in 2012, despite constituting 8-9 percent of the total population (Round and Kuznetsova, “Necropolitics,” 11).
104 "Natsional’naiia politika i otnoshenie k migrantam" Levada Center, 2011.
108 Kirisci, "Informal" Circular Migration.
largest number of illegal migrants in Turkey,\textsuperscript{111} who have generally found themselves on the receiving end of verbal and physical harassment and discrimination. Hence, cultural proximity and relatively positive public opinion have worked to constrain the securitization of Central Asians at the informal level.

Nevertheless, positive views of Central Asians have been under pressure since the war in Syria broke out. Firstly, as various surveys have demonstrated, the large-scale influx of Syrian refugees into Turkey has caused negative perceptions of refugees—and migrants in general—to skyrocket. A 2015 German Marshall Fund poll found that 84 percent of Turks “are worried” about refugees from Syria, in contrast to 64 percent who were concerned about migrants from Africa and 54 percent who feared individuals from former Soviet and Turkic republics.\textsuperscript{112} Secondly, the perception of Central Asians took a definite hit following the Istanbul airport and Reina nightclub attacks. However, both the conservative/nationalist portions of the public and the AKP government abstained from “strong” securitization of Central Asians.

Furthermore, unlike in the Russian case, Central Asian diaspora communities in Turkey were able, through their civil society organizations and some sympathetic media, to condemn both the terrorist attacks and subsequent attacks on Central Asians. The director of International Turkistan Solidarity Association, Burhan Kavuncu, criticized the media’s emphasis on the nationality of the Reina terrorist, saying, “everybody [in our community] is praying for the perpetrator to be caught.”\textsuperscript{113} These organizations generally blamed authoritarian Central Asian regimes for the rise of terrorism and praised Turkey for hosting Central Asian people. Indeed, this was a case where, along the lines of Adam Cote’s argument, the audience spoke for itself, challenged the securitizing agents’ discursive moves, and became an active agent in the securitization process.\textsuperscript{114}

Political Platforms
As Mark Salter argues, in the process of securitization, “the audience is not always the public. There is a network of bureaucrats, consultants, parliamentarians, or officials that must be convinced that securitization is appropriate.”\textsuperscript{115} In the cases of Russia and Turkey, the most important non-public audiences are obviously the ruling regimes, which dominate politics and security in their respective countries.

In Russia, the xenophobic tendencies of the population are regularly exploited for political gain. Some of the most frequent and disturbing securitizing moves were made during the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections cycle: well aware of Muscovites’ sensitivity to the large number of immigrants in their city, the major candidates, from incumbent mayor Sergey Sobyanin to opposition figure Alexei Navalny, turned Moscow’s migrants into the central election issue. Russia’s political dynamics also serve to facilitate the securitization of Central Asian migrants. Severely corrupt and dysfunctional, the state apparatus utilizes its tough stance against migrants to prop up its claims to legitimate governance and regime legitimacy. Particularly relevant here are Russian politicians’ constant references to what they describe as the highly disturbing situation pertaining to immigrants within the European Union. In an address to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that was broadcast nationwide, President Vladimir Putin claimed, “We see with you what is happening on the borders of the European Union. We do not have such an acute problem, thank God, including thanks to your efforts. But we must not allow anything like this to happen in our country.”\textsuperscript{116}

In Turkey, on the other hand, electoral dynamics generally served to constrain the securitization of Central Asian migration. The AKP government had an interest in downplaying the identity of the perpetrators of both the Istanbul airport and the Reina nightclub attacks, as to do otherwise would have compromised its “open-door” policy toward
Syrian fighters who use Turkey as a hub. In addition, the AKP’s nationalist and conservative voters, who are generally sympathetic to Central Asians, would not have responded well to the government stigmatizing them. It can therefore be argued that “anticipation of audience responses by securitizing actors, in conjunction with expressed audience unease, contributed to a weak securitizing move.”\(^{117}\) This shows the complex intersubjective nature of the securitization process: the Turkish government’s response was below its desired level. However, the non-Western, non-democratic nature of the regime also meant that it could decide to effectively securitize certain Central Asian communities at the security practices level without constructing them as a threat in speech acts.

Instead, it was mainly the secular opposition that raised concerns about the free movement of Central Asian fighters in Turkey in order to score a political point against the government. Their ability to securitize migrants, however, remained limited, not only due to the increasingly restrictive environment of Turkish politics, but also because the issue had limited resonance among government or opposition in the face of a laundry list of higher-priority issues: corruption scandals, an abortive coup, a major crackdown on opposition forces, and the two million Syrian refugees.

### Conclusion

This chapter discussed the securitization of Central Asian migration in comparative perspective, looking at the cases of Russia and Turkey. I argued that while Central Asian migration is strongly securitized in the former, it is weakly securitized in the latter. In attempting to explain the dynamics behind this variation, I examined the multidirectional relationship between securitizing agents and contextual factors in each country. My findings showed that the collapse of the Soviet Union, the war in Syria, domestic terrorist attacks, public opinion, and political platforms all support and sustain the securitization of migration in Russia. These conditions, in conjunction with strong and frequent securitizing moves by political agents, create strong securitization mechanisms. In Turkey, on the other hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union, public opinion, and political platforms largely served to constrain the securitization of migration from Central Asia. The two domestic terror attacks perpetrated by Central Asian nationals triggered securitization, for which the war in Syria had provided background conditions. Nevertheless, given that securitizing moves were weak and infrequent, attempted mostly by politically marginalized opposition forces, these conditions resulted in the weak securitization of Central Asian migrants in Turkey.

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PART II. NEW FRONTIERS OF MOBILITY

Chapter 3. Migration, Transnationalism, and Social Change in Central Asia: Everyday Transnational Lives of Uzbek Migrants in Russia

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Transnational migration has been on social scientists’ agenda for nearly three decades. The initial approach that confined the study of migration to the territory of a single nation-state seems to have lost its relevance and been sidelined in favor of an ever-growing literature on migrant transnationalism. While acknowledging the similarities to long-standing forms by which migrants have maintained their connections to their homelands, current studies argue that today’s linkages are different from earlier forms due to rapid developments in information and communication technologies (ICT) that enable migrants to be “simultaneously situated” both in their host country and in their society of origin. The concept of migrant transnationalism rests on the idea that migrants live their lives between two (or more) nation-states, remaining part of the fabric of everyday life and social relations in their home country while becoming part of the socio-economic processes in their receiving country, thereby making home and host societies a single arena for social action. These transnational linkages are multi-stranded (economic, social, cultural, political, institutional, and emotional) and entwined in the lived experiences of migrants and the families and communities they leave behind.

A review of the international migration literature indicates that transnational migration research has gone well beyond its initial economic framing, in which migrant transnationalism was seen main-
ly as a border-spanning economic practice. Critical views, often from anthropology and cultural studies, have suggested that in addition to economic perspectives, migrant transnationalism may also reflect cultural values and affective bonds that sustain transnational activities and networks. Geographers have argued for the necessity of considering the “varied geographies of transnationalism,” illustrating the way transnationalism as a global process is locally embedded and how it varies from place to place or even from one ethnic group to another. Another account gleaned from scholarly works calls for the grounded study of transnationalism (transnationalism from below), suggesting that an analytical focus on the everyday circumstances of transnationalism at the level of individuals and families does not preclude us from exploring the impact of macro structures and forces; indeed, it is through the analysis of embodied experiences that we can understand state power and policies.

While recognizing the importance of the transnational paradigm, a number of recent works have suggested that translocalism may be more a relevant concept. Based on Appadurai’s framework, studies have emphasized the primacy of place/locality as the context for cross-border activities, arguing that the substantive links between transnationals are not actually nation-to-nation but local-to-local (e.g. village-to-village, village-to-city, or city-to-city). This rests on the assumption that migrants do not necessarily depart from a place of origin and permanently settle in a receiving country. Rather, they remain situated in one “translocal social field” that emerges through daily cross-border exchanges between migrants, former migrants, and migrants’ families and communities at home. Hence, “the formation of migrant selfhood is usually more closely related to localities within nations than to nation-states.”

As shown above, there is extensive literature on transnational practices, communities, and identities. However, much of the literature on transnational migration is based on case studies of immigrant communities living in Western democracies (e.g. the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Australia), whereas comparatively little has been said about the transnational practices of Central Asian migrants in Russia, despite the fact that Russia receives the third-largest number of migrants in the world (behind the US and Germany) and the Central Asian republics are some of the most remittance-de-
dependent economies in the world. Given the socio-political and cultural differences between Western and post-Soviet societies, we cannot assume that the methodological tools and theoretical perspectives developed in Western contexts are necessarily applicable to Russia, where the repressive socio-political environment, the lack of democratic culture, and arbitrary law enforcement leave little room for migrant legalization, transnational activism, and collective mobilization. Armed with the "varied geographies of transnationalism" perspective, it is reasonable to assume that migrant transnationalism is not the same everywhere and may take on different meanings, forms, and functions depending on the socio-political context, the legal environment, the economic system, and cultural factors. From this perspective, there is a great need for empirically grounded knowledge of migrant transnationalism.

In spite of a growing body of literature on migration flows and processes in the post-Soviet context, the literature on migrant transnationalism, especially with regard to Central Asian migrants in Russia, is still limited to a handful of review articles and empirical studies. The existing research focuses on "push" and "pull" factors influencing migration, the economic impact of migration and remittances on migrant-sending societies, migrant strategies for dealing with law enforcement and informality in the host country, sexual risks, difficult living and working conditions, xenophobia and discrimination, the political impact of migration in sending societies, and the effects of migration and remittances on the ritual economy, gender-based power relations, traditions, social norms, status, and hierarchies in sending communities. Common to this literature is a focus on social processes and events that occur in either migrant-sending societies or migrant-receiving ones, but not both.

Accordingly, there has been little scholarly investigation of Central Asian migrants’ transnational practices within the Russian migration regime. Addressing this research gap is particularly important in view of the growing use of everyday technologies of transnationalism (smartphones and social media) among Central Asian migrants in Russia, which may trigger social changes in both migrant-sending and -receiving societies. Moreover, the study of Central Asian migrants in Russia has important implications for the broader literature on migrant transnationalism, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, unlike Western-style democracies, where the rule of law is embedded into the national culture, Russia is characterized by weak rule of law, malfunctioning institutions, large shadow economies, a poor human rights record, widespread xenophobia, and weak civil society. This implies that Central Asian
migrants in Russia can hardly engage in collective action or transnational activism due to structural constraints and widespread anti-migrant sentiment. Central Asian migrants do engage in transnational practices, but their activities and networks are hidden from the public eye and based on a low-profile social order, the study of which requires the use of context-specific methodological tools and analytical frameworks.

Secondly, this restrictive socio-political environment means that transnational practices, relations, and identities are produced and maintained via smartphones and social media. The role of these technologies in everyday transnationalism is well researched within the literature on transnational migration. They play a different role in the Russian context, however, providing a virtual platform for translocal place-making and the reproduction of transnational relations, identities, and communities in an undemocratic and xenophobic environment.

Thirdly, as migrants work in the shadow economy and live in a context of weak rule of law, migrants’ transnational relations and identities serve as an enforcement mechanism for the informal market, regulating the contractual relations between migrants, their home communities, and other actors. Thus, transnationalism can be interpreted as a form of informal governance and legal order produced through cross-border interactions between migrants and the families and communities they leave behind.

The above considerations inform my position in this chapter, which is intended to contribute to the debates on migrant transnationalism in two distinct ways. Empirically, I present the results of extensive multi-sited ethnographic fieldwork undertaken in Moscow, Russia, and Ferghana region, Uzbekistan. My case study looks at Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their families and communities in Shabboda village in Ferghana. Unlike in Western countries, where migrants establish relatively functional transnational communities, there is little in the way of “Uzbek transnational community” in Russia due to the restrictive legal environment and anti-migrant sentiment. Even though Uzbek migrants’ transnational activism is hardly visible in public places, I argue that rapid improvements in communication technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to stay in touch with their home societies, as well as create permanent, telephone-based translocal communities in Moscow, usually centered around migrants who hail from the same mahalla or village in Uzbekistan. In other words, Uzbek migrants’ transnational place-making occurs via smartphones and on social media. The existence of this telephone-based transnational environment helps migrants cope with the challenges of musofirchilik (being alien) and avoid or maneuver around structural constraints such as complicated residence registration and work permit rules, social exclusion, racism, and the lack of social security.

Through an ethnographic study of Uzbek migrant workers and their families, I demonstrate the “everydayness” of material, emotional, social, and symbolic networks and exchanges that connect Shabboda village to Moscow. More specifically, I show how village-level identities, social norms, and relations (e.g., reciprocity, trust, obligation, age hierarchies, gossip, and social sanctions) are reproduced and maintained across distance using smartphones and social media, and have an identifiable impact on the outcomes of many practices in which Uzbek migrants (and other actors) engage in Moscow.

Theoretically, I use the aforementioned “thick” ethnography to advance the notion of “telephone-based migrant translocal communities” as a subset of the migrant transnationalism/translocalism literature that describes hidden and low-profile transnational practices, relations, identities, and networks in undemocratic political regimes that emerge out of the necessity to cope with the repressive politi-
Chapter 3. Migration, Transnationalism, and Social Change in Central Asia

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the socio-political and legal context of the Russian migrant market, which is instructive for understanding the nuances of Russian migration governance and the perspective I take on migrant transnationalism. The chapter then lays out the basic characteristics of the case study group (Uzbek migrants) on which my empirical data and analysis focus. I go on to present the results of my fieldwork. Finally, the chapter draws out the implications of the ethnographic material for debates on migrant transnationalism and the area studies (post-Soviet and Central Asian studies) literature, as well as highlighting the study’s theoretical and empirical contributions.

The Russian Migrant Labor Market

With 11.6 million foreign-born people on its territory, Russia is the third-largest recipient of migrants worldwide, behind the US and Germany. The majority of migrants (approximately 5 million) originate from three Central Asian republics—Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan—and generally come to Russia under the visa-free regime. These flows can be explained by Russia’s declining population and increasing demand for cheap foreign labor, on the one hand, and poverty and unemployment in Central Asia, on the other. Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Yekaterinburg have the highest concentrations of migrants.

Despite the existence of a visa-free regime between Russia and other post-Soviet republics under the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) agreement, labor migrants are required to obtain residence registration within seven days of arrival and proper documentation for employment within thirty days. The work permit (patent) is expensive and difficult to obtain, especially since legislative changes in 2015. Migrants will spend at least 22,000 rubles (US$385) on a work permit, as well as a 4,000-ruble (US$70) monthly fee. In addition, they must purchase health insurance, provide proof of medical tests, and pass a test on Russian language, history,
and law. However, many migrants can barely comply with these requirements due to their extremely low salaries and poor knowledge of Russian language and laws. Hence, most migrants remain undocumented: they lack residential registration, a work permit, or both. A large proportion of them work in the construction sector, where there is a high demand for cheap labor.

This situation is exacerbated by the Russian legal environment, which is notorious for corruption and the weak rule of law. What this means in practice is that even those migrants who possess all the required paperwork cannot be sure that they will not experience legal problems when stopped by Russian police officers and migration officials. Under these circumstances, “legal” or “illegal” status becomes contingent on contextual factors, e.g., how, when, and where the interaction between migrants and Russian state officials take place, as well as on individual factors, such as migrants’ knowledge of informal rules and their ability to adapt to the legal environment (obshchii iazyk) with state officials, bribery skills, and connections with street institutions, such as racketeers). Hence, it is almost impossible for a migrant to be fully formal.

Due to exorbitant work permit fees and the arbitrariness of the law, many migrants end up working in the shadow economy, where they can survive with limited language skills and documents. This trend seems to be confirmed by the Russian Federal Migration Service’s (FMS) 2015 statistics showing that nearly 3 million foreign nationals in Russia had violated the legal terms of their stay. Russian migration experts estimate that the number of undocumented migrants could be around 5 million, nearly twice the figure reported in official statistics. One indication of the size of the shadow economy is the lengths to which the Russian authorities go to limit the phenomenon through draconian laws and border control infrastructure, including widening the grounds for issuing re-entry bans to migrants who have violated laws during previous stays in Russia. Such bans are applied even for minor infractions. As Kubal notes, 1.8 million foreigners were banned from re-entering Russia between 2013 and 2016; the majority of these foreigners are citizens of the three Central Asian republics.

However, there is no evidence that these measures have produced the desired effect. This can be explained by dysfunctional institutions and the lack of a rule of law, which create a space for various informal strategies and allow migrants to maneuver around the restrictive legal system. This implies that the more restrictive the immigration laws are, the higher will be the value of bribes that migrants give Russian police officers, migration officials, and border guards in order to continue working in Russia.

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35 Round and Kuznetsova. “Necropolitics and the Migrant.”
36 It should be noted that FMS was disbanded on April 5, 2016 and its functions and authorities were transferred to the Main Directorate for Migration Affairs (GUVM), a newly established law enforcement agency that is part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia.
Moreover, the risk of not re-entering Russia prompts many migrants to limit their returns home and concentrate on one long stay, during which they try to earn as much as possible, knowing that this might be the only opportunity they have for a long time. A small decrease in the number of labor migrants is more the result of the recession in Russia in autumn 2014, which caused a drop in workplaces and incomes, than it is proof of the efficiency of the prohibitive measures. Thus, a distinctive feature of the Russian migration regime is a large shadow economy heavily reliant on cheap and legally unprotected foreign labor.

This restrictive legal environment can be seen as an outcome of the societal clash between the economic need for cheap labor, on the one hand, and xenophobia, on the other. The rise of anti-migrant attitudes is partly connected with the absence of formal migrant integration policies in Russia. Instead of introducing migrant integration measures, the Russian authorities balance these conflicting social and economic demands by tightening migration control policies that push migrants further into the shadow economy. These measures intensify xenophobic and pejorative attitudes toward migrants. A survey conducted by the Levada Center in 2016 showed that the majority of Russians (52 percent) agreed with the statement, “Russia for ethnic Russians,” while nearly 70 percent of respondents said that the government should restrict the influx of Central Asian migrants and that undocumented migrants should be expelled from Russia. The prevalence of such anti-migrant sentiments can be explained by biased portrayals of migrants in the Russian mass media, which have produced animosity, fear, and distrust among the host population.

Racism is an integral part of everyday life for Central Asian migrants. Such negative attitudes toward Central Asian workers existed even during Soviet times, in spite of the popular discourse of druzhba narodov (friendship of the peoples). Central Asians who worked on construction sites (limitchiki) in Moscow and Leningrad were perceived as chernye (black) and faced discrimination. According to Svetlana Gannushkina, chair of the Civic Assistance Committee, a Moscow-based migrant rights NGO, antagonism toward Central Asian migrants is no surprise; she says there has never been a warm attitude toward Uzbeks and Tajiks, even during the Soviet period. Human rights groups have demonstrated the harsh living and working conditions of labor migrants in Russia. The academic literature paints a similar picture, showing that migrants in Russia experience numerous abuses, such as exploitation, discrimination, unsafe working conditions, wage theft, physical violence, extra-judicial detention, arbitrary law enforcement, and a highly punitive judicial system. On top of this, migrants have to deal with corrupt police officers, who regularly extort money from them. Today, anyone walking on the streets...
of large Russian cities will quickly notice police officers checking the documents of Central Asian and Caucasian migrants. This is especially visible on the Moscow metro, where police officers usually stand at the top of the escalator to catch migrants.\textsuperscript{56}

Given that the majority of labor migrants are undocumented and work in the shadow economy, Russian employers have a strong incentive to exploit migrants and withhold or delay their salaries. Under the Russian Civil Code, cases regarding transactions completed in the shadow economy—in violation of labor regulations or tax codes—cannot be heard in state courts. Moreover, migrants might be reluctant to approach state institutions because doing so would reveal their undocumented status and invite punishment by the state. Even those migrants who possess all the required papers and work legally cannot be sure that they will get paid for their work. A good example of this phenomenon is the subway construction project in Moscow: a scandal erupted when it emerged that the Uzbek and Tajik migrant workers who were building the subway had not been paid for five months. Migrants gathered near the office of the Ingeocom construction company demanding their unpaid wages, but the company management said that these workers did not have the right to strike, as they were not citizens of the Russian Federation.\textsuperscript{57}

All in all, the general political situation in Russia leaves migrants entirely vulnerable to the whims of their employers.\textsuperscript{58} There are very few civil society organizations and migrant rights activists that labor migrants can approach for protection.\textsuperscript{59} Although diaspora groups are assumed to be the first port of call for migrants seeking assistance, their role and utility in migrants’ lives is quite limited. Media reports indicate that certain members of Central Asian diaspora groups have actually facilitated the exploitation of migrant workers, at times acting as middlemen between abusive employers and potential migrants.\textsuperscript{60} A rare example of an effective migrant rights organization is a Civic Assistance Committee in Moscow that assists migrants in obtaining unpaid wages and appealing deportation orders. The Trade Union of Labor Migrant Workers also assists migrants in recovering their unpaid wages from employers. It should be noted, however, that the resources and reach of these two organizations are limited to a very small segment of the migrant population; the majority of migrants rely on their transnational networks, kinship groups, and informal social safety nets to organize their precarious livelihoods.

Thus, the everyday lives of labor migrants in Russia are characterized by a constant sense of insecurity, with the ever-present threats of exploitation, deportation, police corruption, racism, physical violence, and even death. The unrule of law is pervasive and a migrant’s “legal” or “illegal” status is contingent on contextual factors and individual skills. Employment in the shadow economy is the rule for many migrants, and there is little or no room for collective mobilization. Despite all these hardships, migrants see working in Russia as a vital economic lifeline for their families back home, a fact that leads them to accept everyday injustices, exploitation, and racism.\textsuperscript{61}

It should be noted, however, that Central Asian migrants are not merely passive, agency-less subjects constrained by structural barriers. Indeed, their total lack of security has compelled them to create informal networks and structures for coping with risks and uncertainties.\textsuperscript{62} These migrant communities and networks serve as an alternative integration and adaptation mechanism, providing access to basic public goods, such as jobs, housing, and physical and economic security. The networks usually revolve around the bonds of kinship, region of origin, or ethnic affiliation, which adapt many “domestic” practices to the conditions of migration and temporary residence.\textsuperscript{63}
The existence of such informal infrastructure allows migrants to establish some form of integration in an otherwise restrictive socio-legal environment, for example by devising specific survival strategies, creating intra-group solidarity, distributing information about jobs, and building up a network for spreading livelihood risks and dealing with emergency situations (e.g., medical treatment, repatriation of a deceased individual to the home country, etc.). These networks—which have their own infrastructure of trust, security, and mutual aid—constitute an important social safety net for migrants. Some commentators refer to such migrant networks by monikers such as "Uzbekskii Peterburg," "Kyrgyztown," and "Moskvabad." Due to prevalent xenophobic attitudes and the repressive political environment, these networks are hidden from the public eye and based on a low-profile social order. Another factor contributing to this tendency is corrupt police officers, who view migrants as a source of kormushka (feeding-trough). Given that the majority of migrants have semi-legal status and work in the shadow economy without formal employment contracts, Russian police officers can easily find reasons to extort money from migrants. Even if migrants possess all the documents required by the law, they are often asked for bribes when stopped by the police on the street or metro. Due to these experiences, migrants try to stay away from public places as much as they can. They do not gather in public to socialize, instead carrying out their daily interactions in the virtual world, through smartphones and social media apps.

In sum, the distinctive feature of the Russian migration regime is the presence of a hidden world of migrants that is based on its own economy, virtual platform, legal order, and welfare infrastructure.

**Uzbek Labor Migrants in Russia**

Labor migration from Uzbekistan to Russia began in the mid-2000s. According to February 2017 statistics presented by the Russian news agency RBC, there are around 1.51 million Uzbek citizens present on the territory of the Russian Federation. The majority of Uzbek migrants are young, low-skilled men who originate from rural areas or small towns. These migrants' main goal is to earn money for wedding expenses and/or building a house. Most of them are from the densely populated Ferghana Valley, where the unemployment rate is high. Uzbek migrants mainly work in construction, agriculture, retail trade, and services, as well as in industry and transport. Due to high accommodation costs and precarious working conditions, migrants rarely bring their family members to Russia, but usually send their earnings home to provide for their families' daily needs and other expenses (building a new house, buying a car, life-cycle rituals, medical treatment, education, etc.). Hence, for the majority of Uzbek migrants, resettlement or integration into Russian society is not a primary goal. They arrive in Russia in the spring to do temporary seasonal work and then return home in autumn. Even those migrants who spend most of their time in Russia and rarely visit home regard their situation as "temporary" and maintain close ties with their family and mahalla (local community), assuming that they will eventually return to their homeland.

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65 Andrey Yakimov, "Uzbekskii Peterburg" (lecture given at the European University in Saint Petersburg, December 22, 2015).


68 Reeves, "Clean Fake"; Round and Kuznetsova, "Necropolitics and the Migrant."

69 Urinboyev, "Establishing Uzbek Mahalla."

70 Abashin, "Central Asian Migration."


72 Abashin, "Migration from Central Asia."

73 Laruelle, "Central Asian Labor Migrants."

74 Chikadze and Brednikova, "Migrants from Uzbekistan in Russia."


76 Abashin, "Migration from Central Asia."

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Even though many Uzbek migrants come to Russia as temporary workers and do not aim to settle there permanently, they actively engage in transnational activities and place-making. Anyone walking on the streets of Moscow quickly notices that there are hundreds of Uzbek cafes and choyxonas, and would probably assume that these sites provide a platform for Uzbek migrants to engage in transnational activities. However, these cafes merely serve as eating-places and migrants meet there only occasionally, for example during holidays (Eid, Navruz) and for important social events (such as birthdays). This is largely connected to the repressive socio-legal environment that compels migrants to stay out of the public gaze.

Despite these challenges, rapid improvements in communication technologies (e.g., smartphones and social media) have enabled Uzbek migrants to create permanent, telephone-based transnational identities, communities, and activities in Moscow, which usually include migrants who hail from the same mahalla, village, or town in Uzbekistan. The existence of such telephone-based transnational communities and interactions helps migrants cope with the challenges of musofirchilik (being alien) and avoiding or maneuvering around structural constraints and the lack of a social safety net. Hence, Uzbek migrants’ transnationalism is not merely an economic activity or cultural practice, an explanation that we find in the mainstream literature on migrant transnationalism, but is both a coping strategy and a mode of resistance to the repressive political and socio-legal environment.

These processes will be investigated using an ethnographic study of the everyday life and experiences of Uzbek migrants in Moscow and their families and communities in Shabboda village in rural Ferghana. The two empirical case studies will be presented in the following sections.

**Shabboda Village**

Shabboda, where I conducted fieldwork, is a village (qishloq) in the Ferghana Valley and has a population of more than 18,000 people. Administratively, Shabboda village comprises 28 mahallas (neighborhood communities. In turn, each mahalla contains 150 to 300 oilas (immediate families), which are gathered around 20 to 30 urug’s (extended families/kinship groups). This indicates that there are three interlinked social organizations within the village—mahalla, urug’, and oila—which are involved in a relationship of mutual dependence, neighborliness, and reciprocity. Village residents engage in a number of activities to make a living: cucumber and grape production, raising livestock for sale as beef, informal trade, construction work, daily manual labor (mardikorchilik), fruit-picking, and brokerage. Nevertheless, remittances sent from Russia still constitute the main source of income for many households. During “migration season,” the majority of inhabitants are elderly people, women, and children.

Most village residents have sons or close relatives working in Russia. Daily conversations in Shabboda mainly revolve around the adventures of village migrants in Moscow, the amount of remittances, deportations, and entry bans. Most villagers have smartphones with internet access, which enables them to exchange daily news with their co-villagers in Moscow. Absent migrants are “present” in the village through social media (Telegram Messenger, IMO, Viber, Odnoklassniki, and Facebook) and regular phone calls. Odnoklassniki is the most popular social media site among villagers.77

While observing everyday life, I felt that there was always someone leaving for Moscow, someone waiting there to receive them, and someone returning to the village to attend a wedding or funeral. Thus, Shabboda has become a truly “translocal village,” in that everyday material, family, and social exchanges directly connect it to Moscow. In the words of villagers, Shabboda is a “Moscow village,” as the majority of villagers work in Moscow due to the existence of village networks there. Several villagers work as middlemen in Moscow’s construction sector, serving as gatekeepers for villagers seeking access to the labor market. Young men who prefer to stay in the village are usually seen as lazy and abnormal by villagers, while those who migrate to Russia and regularly send money home acquire higher social status. Hence, migration has become a widespread livelihood strategy, a norm for young and able-bodied men in Shabboda village. The share

77 cf. Chikadze and Brednikova, “Migrants from Uzbekistan in Russia.”
of the village’s women migrating to Russia is also increasing. Everyday mahalla life and social relations in Shabboda village are thus being transformed due to migratory processes.

The state is virtually “absent” from village life due to its inability to secure people’s basic needs. During the Soviet era, when there were job opportunities and fairly good social welfare services at home, villagers felt less need for community-based welfare and mutual aid practices. Today, however, since the state can no longer provide a social safety net, villagers increasingly rely on mutual aid practices within their family, kin, and mahalla networks. These practices serve as a shock-absorbing institution for many villagers, enabling them to secure their basic needs and gain access to public goods, services, and social protection unavailable from the state. Typically, such mutual aid practices include monetary and labor exchanges, rotating savings and credit initiatives, non-compensated labor during life-cycle rituals, housing construction, and contributions to charity. The term hashar is used to encompass such mutual aid practices. Villagers actively engage in mutual aid activities, since these practices not only enable them to meet their needs but also provide space for participation in everyday life and social interactions. Guzar (village meeting space), masjid (mosque), choyxona (teahouse), gaps (regular get-togethers), and life-cycle events (e.g., weddings and funerals) are the main sites where these activities are discussed and arranged.

These mutual aid practices create a strong moral and affective bond among village residents both “here” (Shabboda) and “there” (Moscow). Villagers regularly attend most social events and have a relationship of mutual dependence. Money is not everything in Shabboda; respect, prestige, and reputation are equally important. The fact that villagers meet one another on a daily basis and regularly interact at social events acts as a guarantee that social pressure and sanctions can be applied to an individual, his/her family, or the entire extended family if the individual is not acting fairly and helping other members of the community. Villagers who ignore or fail to comply with social norms face social sanctions, such as gossip, ridicule, loss of respect and reputation, humiliation, and even exclusion from life-cycle rituals, driving many villagers to comply with social norms. As such, give-and-take rituals constitute an integral part of everyday life and social relations in Shabboda.

**Extension of Shabboda Village to Moscow**

Village-level social norms, identities, reciprocal relations, and social sanctions continue to shape Shabboda residents’ lives even when they move to Moscow. While talking with Shabboda migrants, it became evident that their decisions to migrate to Moscow were based not only on economic considerations, but also on kinship relations between migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants. To villagers, going to Moscow means joining mahalla and village acquaintances there. Once they have arrived at Moscow’s Domodedovo or Vnukovo airport, they are quickly picked up by their fellow villagers. Hence, villagers imagine their future migrant life as integrated with village and mahalla networks that already extend to Moscow.

Although most Shabboda migrants do not share common accommodations and they often work in different places in Moscow, they maintain daily contact with each other. Almost all Shabboda migrants have smartphones; they regularly use social media apps like Viber, IMO, Telegram, and Odnoklassniki to stay in touch with one another in Moscow, as well as to check the latest news, view photos of Russian and Uzbek girls, and make video calls to their families and village networks in Ferghana. New technologies allow them to remain in touch with their families and engage in a quasi-real-time exchange of information between the village and migrants in Moscow. Owing to these everyday technologies of transnationalism, news of events in Moscow quickly travels to migrants’ sending village and becomes the subject of daily discussion. Hence, smartphones allow migrants to remain part of the daily life of Shabboda village. Families and mahallas at home also take part in migrants’ everyday life in Moscow by sharing mahalla news and giving advice on important matters.

The state is “absent” not only in Shabboda, where villagers use mahalla-driven solidarity to create alternative public goods and services, but also in Moscow, where solidarity and support from mahalla networks make up for the total lack of state-provided security. The Shabboda migrants with whom I spoke were totally unaware of the existence of Uzbek diaspora organizations or migrant rights organizations that could provide some form of support. They also received little or no support from the Embassy of Uzbekistan in Moscow when they experienced problems with dishonest employers or corrupt police officers. As most of my interviewees worked in the shadow economy,
they were reluctant to approach Russian state institutions because doing so would only invite punishment by the state. Even migrants’ terminology clearly reflects their precarious livelihood in Russia. Shabboda migrants rarely used the word “migrant” to refer to their status in Russia. Instead, they used the term musofir, which provides a more contextual definition of what it means to be a migrant worker in Russia. Unlike the more neutral “migrant worker,” musofir refers to a person who works in a foreign country and experiences risks, hardships, and challenges on a daily basis. As one of my respondents summed up, “We are not living in Moscow, but we are struggling to survive here” (Biz bu yerda yashamayapmiz, vizhiyat qilishga harakat qilyapmiz).

Given the total lack of security, Shabboda migrants reproduce most of their village-level mutual aid activities in Moscow. Smartphones and social media apps serve as a platform for carrying out such activities. Shabboda migrants quickly inform each other about what is going on and mobilize resources if someone gets sick, is “caught” by the police, needs to send something home, or desperately needs money. These telephone-based translocal interactions are crucial to the survival of migrants and serve as an alternative social safety net, as illustrated in the following quotation:

We usually stay away from public places because there are hundreds of police officers on the streets, seeking to extort money from us [migrants]. Instead, we use smartphones and social media to solve problems and socialize with our co-villagers (hamqishloqlar) in Moscow, as well as to maintain daily contact with our families, mahalla, and village friends in Shabboda. It is Moscow and things are unpredictable here; we rely on our village connections when we get into trouble. We are all musofir here, so we cannot turn our back when our co-villagers are in trouble. But in order to reach your co-villagers, you must always have a telephone with you and memorize their phone numbers. For example, let’s assume that you are a migrant worker and you are caught by a police officer and brought to the police station. Normally, police officers keep you in the cell for a few hours and check your documents very carefully, which is usually done to further scare migrants. After finishing the check-up, police officers give you two options: (1) you can pay a bribe immediately and go home or (2) if you have no money, police officers allow you to make a phone call to your friends so that they can bring money and release you. The second scenario is more common, and you need to call your co-villagers for help. Therefore, you must have a telephone with you at all times. Sometimes police officers allow you to use their mobile phone to contact your co-villagers, but not all police officers are nice. If you don’t have a phone with you and are caught by police, there is a high risk that police officers will transfer your case to the court for deportation (Abduvali, 38, male, construction worker from Shabboda).

The repatriation of the deceased from Russia to Uzbekistan is another example of a telephone-based translocal practice among villagers. Shabboda migrants, like other Central Asian migrants, experience difficult living and working conditions in Moscow, including discrimination, hazardous working conditions, and physical violence. They are aware that the threat of death is always present in their daily life in Moscow. As one of the Shabboda migrants said, “Death can be the fate of any musofir in Russia, as we are working in a bespredel (limitless, lawless) country where anything can happen.” When someone is killed in a work-related accident, dies of a disease, or passes away following a neo-Nazi skinhead attack, this news spreads swiftly among villagers because migrants immediately contact their mahalla networks via smartphones and social media. Aware of their own precarious livelihoods, migrants voluntarily contribute to repatriation expenses. There is no standard contribution amount, and migrants determine how much to contribute based on their financial situation and income level. Shabboda migrants see their contribution to the body repatriation process as a form of insurance in case of their own death, as shown in the following remark:

I always make a contribution to body repatriation because I know my co-villagers would do the same favor for me were I to suddenly die from a work accident or disease. Body repatriation is a hasher—a collective mahalla project where everyone is expected to contribute. If you are greedy and don’t contribute, there is a high likelihood that your body will not be taken care of if you die. Nobody wants his body to remain in Russia; we all want to be buried in our homeland (Nodir, 26, male, migrant worker from Shabboda).

Accordingly, smartphones and social media serve as the everyday technologies of translocal place-making, reproducing and maintaining village-level identities, social norms, and relations across distance. Other studies have also shown that mobile phones do not “fracture” localities but actually extend and repro-
duce them in migrant-receiving societies. However, the literature on ICT and transnationalism has a tendency to focus on the role of ICT in facilitating the flow of information between sending communities and host countries. Smartphones and social media not only facilitate everyday information exchange between Moscow and Shabboda, but also serve as a means for extending village-level social control and norms to Moscow.

One episode I witnessed is illustrative of how Shabboda norms and practices are extended to Moscow. On the afternoon of July 2014, Zaur and I were in the car heading toward a construction site in Balashikha, a small city in Podmoskovye (Moscow province) where the majority of Shabboda migrants work. Unlike his co-villagers who work in the construction sector, Zaur works as a grocery store clerk in Moscow city, a status that has prompted his co-villagers to dub him Russkii (Russian): he receives a higher salary and is not obliged to do chornaia rabota (black work, or manual labor). As Zaur is considered to be more successful and better connected than other migrants, people from Shabboda village often contact him with requests. As we neared the construction site, Zaur received a phone call from Uzbekistan. He usually picks up calls if they come from Uzbekistan, so he answered immediately. It was Zaur’s neighbor, Ozoda, who had an urgent request. From their phone conversation I learned that Ozoda’s husband, Ulugbek, who had been working on a greenhouse farm in Vologda, had recently had an appendectomy and was on a train to Moscow. Ozoda was very worried about her husband, as he was physically unable to work and had no money to purchase a train ticket back to Uzbekistan. It was obvious that Ozoda was asking Zaur to help her husband return home. After wrapping up the conversation, Zaur said that we needed to return to Moscow city and meet Ulugbek at the railway station when he arrived from Vologda. On our way to the station, I asked Zaur to tell me more about the phone conversation, and he provided the following account:

Ulugbek and I come from the same mahalla. He is in a critical situation now, as he has neither good health nor the money to return to Uzbekistan. There is no train from Vologda to Tashkent for the next 10 days, so he must go to Moscow first and then take another train to Tashkent. Actually, Ulugbek could have taken a direct train from Vologda to Tashkent if he stayed there 10 more days. He knew that he would be taken care of by his mahalla network if he came to Moscow. That’s why he is coming to Moscow. Ulugbek is very clever. He didn’t contact me directly. Instead he contacted me through his wife since he knew that I wouldn’t refuse if someone contacted me directly from Ferghana. Of course, I have no choice but to cover Ulugbek’s expenses out of pocket. Firstly, I am driving from Balashikha to Kazan railway station and burning gasoline. If you took a taxi, you would spend at least 3,000 rubles for this trip. Secondly, Ulugbek wants to return home as soon as possible, but train tickets to Uzbekistan are usually sold out. One needs to buy a ticket at least three days before traveling. This means I have to bribe the train provodnik (conductor) and arrange a place [without a valid ticket] for him. In addition, there are many thieves and racketeers in Kazan railway station who extort money from migrants. I have connections there and I can make sure that Ulugbek boards the train safely and reaches home without any problems. Thirdly, Ulugbek does not have any money to pay for train expenses. This means I have to bribe the provodnik with my own money, and I know that Ulugbek will not return this money to me. This would be treated as my mahallasoblik obligation. But I hope he will appreciate my help and tell our mahalla about my odamgarchilik (good deeds). This is enough for me. You see how much trouble and expenses I have and the time I lose just to save face in the mahalla. If I refuse to help Ulugbek and other acquaintances, mahalla people will spread gossip about me, saying that I have no odamgarchilik. Of course, I am in Moscow now and could just ignore the gossip, but I have to consider my family members’ situation, as they are the ones who bear the consequences of my decision.

We arrived at the Kazan railway station at 4 pm. Ulugbek’s train arrived one hour later. Events unfolded exactly as Zaur had described. After meeting Ulugbek at the station, we all headed toward a small fast food cafe where migrants can get fake work permits and residence registrations. There we met an Uzbek woman who was well connected with train provodniki. Zaur paid her 7,500 rubles and she guided us toward the station and quickly arranged a special seat for Ulugbek on a Moscow-Tashkent train. After a short conversation with the conductor, she assured us that Ulugbek was in safe hands and would be in Uzbekistan in five days. Zaur gave Ulugbek an

additional 1,000 rubles and told him that he could use it for his food expenses during the long trip. We shook hands with Ulugbek and watched as the train departed for Uzbekistan.

Zaur’s fear of social sanctions is not unfounded. The story of Misha is a good example of the power of gossip. Misha is an early migrant from Shabboda village who has brought around 200 of his co-villagers and acquaintances to Moscow. He arrived in 2002, when labor migration was still a new phenomenon in the village. He currently works as a posrednik (middleman) in the construction sector, connecting migrant workers with Russian employers. Misha is fluent in Russian and Uzbek and is trusted by Russian middlemen, who approach him with many job offers (zakazy). Misha’s main role is to find skilled migrant construction workers, take full responsibility for the quality of the construction work, and address migrants’ daily concerns and legal problems.

Misha usually selects co-villagers for his construction brigade. Coming from the same village not only forges a social bond, but also creates social responsibility in the mind of workers. The families of Misha and the workers live in the same village and interact daily, such that non-compliance with the agreed obligations on either side would trigger a chain reaction, with the workers’ families putting direct pressure on the middleman’s family in the village or vice versa. There is no written agreement between Misha and his co-villagers, as they share a common village origin and their families know one another. Misha receives payment from Russian middlemen and then distributes the money to his workers, taking a dolia (share) of 10-15 percent of each worker’s salary.

At the time of fieldwork (January-December 2014), Misha’s brigada consisted of 12 migrant workers, and their main job was installing new windows in mid-rise and high-rise buildings. Almost all brigada members had smartphones and regularly used Odnoklassniki and Telegram Messenger to stay in touch with their families and village networks at home. On average, the brigada worked 10-12 hours per day, without taking any days off. They endured harsh conditions, working on the 17th floor despite the freezing cold weather (the outdoor temperature was −25°C). In return, Misha took care of his co-villagers and treated them nicely. He might have done small favors for them, such as buying cigarettes or sending money home on someone’s behalf, even if Misha had to advance the sum from his own pocket.

Hence, the brigada members are at the center of a complex matrix of relationships. In Moscow, they operate under Misha, respect his authority, and call him elder brother, regardless of their age difference. While they have little choice but to trust that he will deliver their salaries, take care of them if they face difficulties, and help them with documents, this trust is based on the understanding that, given their family connections, it would be too costly for him to cheat them. Any monetary advantage would bring only short-term benefits and would be counteracted by retaliation at the village level.

In April 2014, tensions within the brigada emerged. The team had completed half of a window installation job in Moscow but had not been paid since January. Misha took a clear stand, insisting that he, too, was a victim of circumstances and blaming the Russian middleman and the construction firm’s representative. As the brigada was in daily contact with their families, the problems in Moscow quickly traveled to Shabboda. Relatives of Misha’s workers started putting pressure on Misha’s family, spreading gossip at guzar, choyxona, and weddings. This fostered rumors in the village about Misha’s exploitative behavior and emboldened many fellow villagers to confront him through his family. Misha, in the villagers’ view, was supposed to secure the brigada’s salary irrespective of the circumstances. After all, they trusted him and worked hard during the cold winter. This was based on an understanding that a person must never assume the role of posrednik if he cannot keep his word. Tempers flared and some villagers went so far as to accuse Misha of human trafficking. He was held responsible for the brigada’s undocumented status and the possibility that, if caught, they would be banned from re-entering Russia for five years. Misha’s family was under siege, facing daily barbs on the village streets. Misha’s father was put in a particularly difficult position, as he could no longer attend guzar, choyxona, and other social events. Eventually, village pressure forced Misha to make a decision and prioritize the wellbeing of his family over his personal situation. He borrowed money to pay the brigada’s salaries. Thus, the extension of village-level affective mechanisms of guilt, shame, and gossip across borders proved to be an enforcement mechanism that determined the outcome of a dispute.

As Misha’s story shows, Shabboda migrants, despite being physically located in Moscow, continue to be influenced by the collective expectations and
norms of their village and mahalla. On the other hand, villagers are “socially located” in Russia due to their increased engagement in migrants’ everyday lives and socioeconomic relations. As Shabboda migrants work under the conditions of shadow economy and weak rule of law, they increasingly rely on their translocal social capital and practices to regulate contractual relations and obligations in the informal labor market.

**Some Concluding Remarks on Uzbek Migrants’ Legal Transnationalism and Telephone-Based Translocal Community**

In this chapter, I have argued that much of the literature on transnational migration is based on case studies of immigrant communities living in Western democracies, whereas there has been little investigation of these issues in the Russian context. In view of the socio-political and cultural differences between Western and post-Soviet societies, I suggested that migrant transnationalism is not the same everywhere and may have different meanings, forms, and functions depending on socio-political context, legal environment, economic system, and cultural factors.

Another purpose of the chapter was to examine the impact of migrant transnationalism on social change in migrant-sending societies. One important finding of my study is that rural communities in Uzbekistan are undergoing significant changes due to migratory processes. Not only are Uzbeks moving to Russia, but their village-level identities, social relations, and norms are also becoming nomadic. As my findings indicate, migration is strengthening Uzbeks’ traditional modes of organizing their lives, as village and mahalla legal orders (e.g., trust, obligation, shame, and neighborliness) have been extended across borders and have considerable impact on the lives of migrants in Russia. These village-level norms and practices serve to regulate Shabboda migrants’ contractual relations in Moscow’s informal labor market. Such legal transnationalism creates strong moral bonds that serve as the main social safety net for Uzbek migrants, whose rights and needs are protected neither by the Russian nor the Uzbek government.

Through my ethnographic study of Shabboda village and its telephone-based translocal form in Moscow, I explored the ways in which the home village is maintained in Moscow through smartphones and social media. Rapid improvements in information and communication technologies have enabled Shabboda migrants to stay in touch with their home village, as well as create a telephone-based translocal community in Moscow. Village-level identities, solidarity, reciprocity, and social sanctions are reproduced and maintained across distance and have a significant impact on the livelihood strategies of Uzbek migrants and their families at home in Shabboda. Although most Shabboda migrants in Moscow do not share accommodation and meet infrequently due to the punitive socio-legal environment, they are actively engaged in translocal place-making via smartphones and social media. I call this virtual space “telephone-based translocal community.”

In this sense, the findings of the chapter come close to Appadurai’s theory of the production of locality, where he defines locality as an essentially relational and contextual set of relationships rather than something necessarily based in particular physical spaces. Although Shabboda migrants’ telephone-based translocal communities do not have any material or physical form, their daily practices are very clearly linked to a physical place and the maintenance of village-level social norms and relations: their daily actions and decisions are determined by the norms of their home village. Migrants’ telephone-based translocal community is oriented toward the physical village—that is, toward Shabboda.

By emphasizing the role of socio-political context and regime type, I have attempted to move the migrant transnationalism literature beyond Western-centric perspectives. This study contributes new insights to the migrant transnationalism literature, showing that migrants who operate in an illiberal political context that suppresses any overt form of transnationalism and cultural diversity tend to keep a low profile in social spaces and increasingly rely on smartphones and social media to engage in transnational practices. Hence, migrant transnationalism is not just about economic activities or cultural practices, but is both a coping strategy and hidden resistance to the repressive political and socio-legal environment in which migrants find themselves.

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79 Appadurai, “The Production of Locality.”
Chapter 4. Changing the Face of Labor Migration? 
The Feminization of Migration from Tajikistan to Russia

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This research focuses on the high mobility of women from developing countries with traditional and patriarchal societies, where gender roles and norms are reinforced via socialization processes. The traditional model of labor migration, which is generally male-dominated, is changing as women begin to participate in the labor market and labor migration.

The feminization of immigration is defined as “the growing phenomenon of emigration of women from all over the world looking for economic independence, mainly working in the domestic and care sector, but often assuming an invisible social role in destination societies.” In this chapter I focus on female migration from Tajikistan to Russia. Tajikistan belongs to a small group of countries in which there is an extreme contrast between a very traditional society and increased female mobility. Tajikistan, as the poorest country in Central Asia, does not have the capacity to manage its rapidly growing workforce. Official data suggest that as of March 2016, some 863,426 Tajik citizens, predominantly men, were employed abroad; unofficial numbers indicate that over one million Tajik migrants work and reside in Russia. Annually, between 700,000 and 800,000 Tajik citizens migrate to Russia for work. Women currently constitute around 18 percent of migrants, and their number has been steadily increasing since 2002.

This research is not interested solely in how the status of women in patriarchal societies changes with high levels of mobility. Rather, it opens up a black box of contradiction between the classical sociological trend of women’s empowerment and the constraints of traditional society. It explores the obstacles that female migrants encounter and the strategies that women develop to be accepted in their society of origin. I argue that female migrants do not see immigration as a means of achieving emancipation and empowerment. On the contrary, women perceive labor migration as a setback, since they then have to regain their status by readjusting to traditional norms and values in their home society.

My study not only relates to the larger ongoing debate around gender and migration, but also demarcates the gaps within the theoretical framework on feminization of migration and expands on what other studies have established. By its very nature, scholarship on gender and migration incorporates many factors in order to understand gender differences and variation in migration experiences—and, consequently, the outcomes of the decisions made by women and by men.

Many studies examine migration processes using models that overlook the role and agency of female actors. Gender as a concept implies “the constitutive element of social relationships, and particularly relationships of power, based on perceived differences between sexes.” It is defined as “the construction, organization and maintenance of masculinity and femininity.” Ideas on masculinity and femininity differ by country and by context, as well as changing over time. Pessar and Mahler advocate for not en-

6 Marlou Schrover and Deirdre Moloney, Gender, Migration and Categorisation Making Distinctions between Migrants in Western Countries, 1945-2010 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2013), 13.
7 Ibid.
gaging in the common practice of taking gender as a dichotomous variable (i.e. male and female). They argue that gender relations interact with other forces and should be understood "to be social constructions and...not natural, innate categories or characteristics." My conceptual framework is constructed in such a way as to stress that gender is not a static concept, but rather a fluid notion that reflects the ongoing changes to conceptions of masculinity and femininity in society, especially among migrants, as well the transformation of social roles attached to gender before and after migration experiences.

Harris takes the concept of gender to the next level, defining gender as "a culture specific ideal, varying over time, that males and females are supposed to live up to in order to become intelligible to, and accepted members of, their own communities." Harris argues that gender must be acted out, that it is rendered perceptible only through repeated patterns of behavior called performance. That is, each social group has its own ideas of how men and women should behave, and articulates its expectations accordingly.

In Tajikistan, the idea of a modern woman is largely inherited from the Soviet era, when "women were able to live up to both role expectations; that is, that of the cultured woman and the traditional mother." It is highlighted that women participated in Soviet life and economic production, all while taking on full responsibility for the household and the children. These expectations persist in modern Tajikistan due to the relative continuity of a family’s—and a woman’s—economic status.

Economic crises and hardships have challenged the traditional model of migration, where men migrate and women stay at home or follow their husband-migrants. The number of female migrants who are the sole source of support for their families is growing rapidly, and unemployment of both women and men has added to the pressure on women to ensure household survival. There is overwhelming evidence that women mostly migrate—and consequently leave their children behind—to improve their families’ circumstances and cope with poverty.

In migration studies, the labor migration experiences of both men and women are portrayed within the generally accepted framework of "push" and "pull" factors. However, neo-classical models alone cannot explain the migration process in all its complexity; men and women have differential access to resources and the labor market, power disposition, agency, interests, knowledge, and networks. The differences in men's and women's migration patterns have often been explained using the concept of perceived profitability: people move if a cost-benefit analysis points to gains. Schrover and Moloney, however, argue that "most migrations do not begin with individuals' cost-benefit calculations but with enticements made to people with no intention of migrating, so that people do not merely migrate because they envision a better life." Thus, they explain women migrating in equal numbers to men as a family strategy. Rocheva and Varshaver counter that this may nevertheless be based on a cost-benefit analysis: women earn less than men, but they

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10 Ibid.
11 Harris, *Control and Subversion*.
12 Ibid.
13 See Judith Butler, Seyla Benhabib, Drucilla Cornell, and Nancy Fraser, "Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange," in Harris, *Control and Subversion*, 34.
15 Ibid.
19 Schrover and Moloney, "Gender, Migration and Categorization Making Distinction."
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
also send more money home, meaning that it may be more profitable for families left behind for women to migrate instead of men.24

My research does not exclude male migrants from its analysis. It sorts through the vast available data on male labor migration from Tajikistan and complements this with missing information about women’s experiences, which have heretofore been marginalized in the literature. While the feminization of migration is linked to socioeconomic change in migrants’ countries of origin, changes in destination-country labor markets, and changing social attitudes, the questions of how the feminization of migration occurs and how it becomes socially institutionalized remain unanswered.25 My research examines female migrants’ experiences from the decision to migrate, through the migration period, to their return and reintegration into Tajikistan. I contend that female Tajik migrants face a double burden: they are simultaneously economically active actors in the Russian labor market and maintaining their socially expected role via gendered performances in Tajikistan’s patriarchal society. Findings and analysis are based on data collected in the Sughd and Khatlon regions. I intend to continue collecting data in the Rasht and Badakhshon regions.

Methods and Data

To examine the migration experiences and reintegration strategies of Tajik women, I use a qualitative methodology that recognizes and embraces human agency, dynamic social relationships, and structural processes26 and provides context-specific details about the experiences of migrants and individual coping strategies. The research involved in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 24 returned female migrants in their homes and ethnographic fieldwork conducted mostly at their places of work in Tajikistan. Participants were selected using the snowball sampling method. Interviews were conducted in 2016 and 2017, and I interviewed some of the women more than once.

While I reported on the detailed responses of these 24 women, I also used information gathered from participant observations and small focus groups in the mountainous villages of the Sughd, Khatlon, and Rasht regions of Tajikistan. In addition, to verify the women’s stories, I interviewed two family members of women migrants, two male migrants, and several representatives of NGOs. The sample of women whose experiences are discussed here is not necessarily representative of the population of female Tajik migrants. However, although the content of these experiences may differ, there are many substantial similarities between the women’s migration experiences in Russia and their strategies for reintegrating into Tajikistan.

I began by examining women migrants’ experiences in relation to their marital status. A woman’s marital status is a key status marker in Tajikistan, and so variation in marital status can help to show variations in migration experiences and reintegration into the home society. I argue that the key factor influencing women’s decisions to migrate is a lack of economic opportunities at home, due to socio-cultural constraints that create barriers to women pursuing independent careers and curtail their access to opportunity structures. Married women tend to migrate either with a husband or alone while the husband stays in the home country. In addition, the available secondary data appear to suggest that most female migrants did not have previous work experience and/or were not active in the labor market prior to migrating.

A second category of women is the de facto widows27 left behind in Tajikistan by male migrants who work in Russia. In many cases, left-behind families are eventually abandoned by these men, the main breadwinners, leaving the women as heads of household who are compelled to migrate to support their families. I have not yet found enough data to support my assumption that there is a relationship between the increase in the number of abandoned wives and the growing number of female labor migrants from Tajikistan. Most female migrants have children at home who are left with grandparents or other close relatives.

24 Schrover and Moloney, "Gender, Migration and Categorization Making Distinction."
27 Azita Ranjbar, "De Facto’ Widows of Tajikistan,” George Mason University, 2008.
Chapter 4. Changing the Face of Labor Migration? The Feminization of Migration from Tajikistan to Russia

**Labor Migration from Tajikistan**

Tajikistan is one of the top migrant-sending and remittance-dependent countries in the Eurasian region, while Russia is one of the top recipient countries of migrants from Central Asia. The empirical data on migration in Russia suggests that the highest number of labor migrants from the Central Asian region belong to the three poorest countries: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The dynamics of labor migration from Tajikistan have undergone substantial change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Initially, the migration model was represented by seasonal and temporary labor migration. Since 1997, however, more permanent stays have become increasingly prevalent. Since the early 2000s, migrants have adapted their plans to migrate or return in line with rapidly changing immigration regulations.

In Tajikistan, labor migration is considered to be almost the only solution to economic problems on the community level; the majority of households, especially in rural areas, send family members to Russia. This creates strong tensions within a family unit, which is at the core of the social structure. It also leaves many families almost entirely dependent on remittances, a tendency that, when reproduced at national level, increases Tajikistan’s vulnerability to shocks in or from remittance-sending countries. It has therefore been argued that even if labor migration enables migrants’ families to survive and adapt to difficult economic development circumstances, it does not constitute an economic development strategy.

The government of Tajikistan (and its Uzbek and Kyrgyz counterparts) has been criticized for not taking constructive steps to shore up the domestic economy, including by creating more jobs and reducing taxes.

Within the discourse on migration from Central Asia to Russia, scholars observe that Kyrgyzstan’s more equal society, in which women have a much better position, is conducive to more gender-balanced migration. To wit, women—many of whom are under 30—make up almost half of Kyrgyz migrants. The theory goes that because Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have stricter norms for women’s mobility, migration from those countries is predominantly male.

Beliefs about women’s roles have important implications for the survival of family and household, since they shape women’s labor force participation and their ability to control resources. Among my respondents, before migrating to Russia, the majority of women were engaged in formal paid work or were independently employed. In Tajikistan, as in many traditional societies, it is the norm for both men and women to have extensive obligations to their kin in addition to their own children. While living a transnational migrant life between Russia and Tajikistan, the traditional gender division of domestic roles and responsibilities remains unchanged; many men are not willing to share in the housework, childcare, and other domestic chores. As in Wong’s study of Ghanaian women, “migration did not compromise gender identities of migrants as mothers and wives, nor did it necessarily challenge their domestic roles.”

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29 Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
30 Khusenova, “The Feminization of Tajik Labor Migration to Russia.”
31 Marat, “Labor Migration in Central Asia.”
32 Khusenova, “The Feminization of Tajik Labor Migration to Russia.”
33 Remittances make up a larger share of GDP in small economies, particularly in Central Asian countries like Tajikistan, where they make up about 49 percent of GDP (“Migration and Remittances: Recent Developments and Outlook,” World Bank, Washington, DC, 2015.)
34 World Bank, “Migration and Remittances.”
37 Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
38 Ibid.
39 Wong, “Ghanaian Women in Toronto’s Labour Market.”
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
Families Left Behind and Abandoned Wives

In Tajikistan, it is more common to follow patrilocal-ity (living with the husband's family) than neolocal-ity (living in a new household). According to Pessar and Mahler, this provides incentives for and places constraints on the labor mobility of household members. In addition, it leads to the control of females by male members of the household. Interviewees' names have been changed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality.

As a daughter-in-law I served my parents-in-law very well and didn't question their authority or hurt them by my behavior until they passed away. Nowadays, many women don't fulfill their obligations; they forget how to behave while they are in migration.

This remark is related to a common refrain about the need to discipline young women's sexuality and ensure proper behavior. Some studies reveal that adolescent girls shoulder not only their families' reputations but also those of their entire ethnic group. While in migration far from their families, Tajik migrant women are still concerned that their reputations not be contested by fellow migrants or members of the home society.

Female migrants go through a different decision-making process than men in deciding whether to migrate. The majority of migrant men are married and have at least two children. Early marriage is common in Tajikistan: not only is it culturally expected, but it also provides economic security, especially for women. This creates a dichotomy for women, since their traditional role—chiefly reproduction—is socially important, while labor migration is not expected. Women who feel constrained by these norms may, however, see migration as a means to pursue a different path in life.

All migrants from Central Asia, regardless of gender, are considered to be vulnerable and lacking in legal protection. Rocheva and Varshaver point out that there is an important gendered consequence of the Russian state's vision of labor migration, namely the limited range of legal pathways for labor migrants' families to stay in Russia long-term. This makes migrants more likely to migrate alone, with the result that women and children usually remain behind. When women accompany men to Russia, they have to either pay for a patent or seek informal agreements with migration departments; their only other choice is to remain undocumented.

Rocheva and Varshaver suggest that since there are comparatively relaxed norms governing males' romantic relations with other women, migrant men may create "second families" with Russian women and abandon their families in their countries of origin. In this study, I analyzed abandonment by Tajik migrants, finding that it has grown dramatically. Unofficial estimates suggest that more than 250,000 households have been economically abandoned by a male breadwinner who has migrated. My study did not find any relationship between a male migrant abandoning his family and a wife's decision to migrate. Some of my respondents did, however, indicate (though this is not a primary focus of the research) that a woman is now more likely to migrate if her husband has been banned from re-entering Russia. This points to a need for further investigation of re-entry bans and gender dynamics: are women replacing their husbands and contributing to the feminization of migration?

Female Migration from Tajikistan

Female migrants might not make up a substantial portion of the migration flow from Tajikistan, but they are definitely visible in labor markets and are involved at all levels of the transnational migration

42 Mahler and Pessar, "Gender Matters."
43 Harris, Control and Subversion.
44 Interviewees' names have been changed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality
45 Ibid.
46 Wong, "Ghanaian Women in Toronto's Labour Market"; Khusenova, "The Feminization of Tajik Labor Migration to Russia"; Harris, Control and Subversion.
48 Rocheva and Varshaver, "Gender Dimension of Migration."
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
regime. The recent development of the light industry and services sectors in the Russian Federation has created demand for a female workforce—and hence female migrants from Central Asia. Most of these women have full-time jobs, whether in the trade sector or as tailors in the garment industry. My interviewees indicated that there are abundant employment opportunities if a woman has the right skills.

The migrants interviewed ranged in age from 28 to 60. Eighteen are married, four are divorced mothers, and two are abandoned wives of migrants. Most of the women migrated to Russia in the past 10 years. More than half come from urban or semi-urban communities in Tajikistan. In Tajikistan, the women engaged in formal employment outside the home or informal economic activities. Most women in the sample worked prior to migrating to Russia; just two became active in the labor market for the first time when they migrated. Educationally, all but four women attained at least the equivalent of a high school diploma before migration and most have a vocational school education.

Upon entering the Russian Federation, a Tajik citizen fills out a migration card indicating the purpose of travel; the migrant then is obliged to register within 15 days. Once a traveler from a CIS country who does not intend to work has undergone registration, he or she can spend up to three months in the country, after which time he or she has to leave the Russian Federation for the next three months. A migrant who wants to work in Russia has to apply for a patent (a work permit) during the month following arrival. The application process is complex, requiring a number of documents and involving high costs and strict time limits.

The majority of women I interviewed preferred to pay for mediators to get their patents. This was not only because they did not know what documents were needed, but also—and more importantly—due to the means by which a patent was acquired. One woman who went to get a patent herself in St. Petersburg explained the process to me. She had to wait for a long time, in a small “cage” with 40 men. She did not speak proper Russian, an obstacle that made her life more difficult. She cried as she waited for her turn. When her turn came, she needed to go through a medical check, in which two moments in particular stood out: the HIV test and the gynecological exam. She was shocked that both the gynecologist and his assistant were men, and her request for a female gynecologist was ignored. Moreover, the gynecologist screamed at her when she did not want to go through with the exam, and so she had no choice but to submit to it. Such an experience would be unfathomable in Tajikistan, where women are almost always accompanied to a (female) doctor by a family member. Since returning home, the woman has not mentioned this traumatizing experience to anyone.

My analysis of return and reintegration strategies focused on labor market experiences, migration planning, and the decision to return. Questions were primarily designed to draw out detailed information on transnational migration experiences and women’s life cycles. My study echoes the findings of transnational migration research that women’s transnational experiences are shaped, in often ambiguous and contradictory ways, by gender ideologies and cultural constructions of women as wives, mothers, daughters-in-law, and sisters.

Interviewees mentioned various other barriers to integration, and also shared their coping strategies. Discussions emphasized having children to provide for as an important factor driving women to continue working abroad. Many women migrate to Russia expecting to stay for a short time, work hard, earn a good income, send remittances home (to pay off debts, finance a child’s wedding, establish a business, etc.), and eventually return to Tajikistan. Women work on average eleven hours per day during their stays in Russia. They rarely socialize with their co-ethnics or with migrants from other former Soviet countries. In one case among my interviewees, a mother and daughter migrate interchangeably, leaving the daughter’s children in the care of their grandfather.

The main driver behind women’s mobility is economic necessity. In some cases, this economic necessity intersects with other drivers, such as social stigma or the need to escape an abusive relationship. It has been argued that “the women’s point of view on the present matrimonial situation” and migra-

54 Polytaev, Feminizatsiia soobshchestv trudovykh; Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
55 Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
56 Ibid.
tion is overlooked in Tajik society. This study illuminates the experiences of female migrants who are, as Phizacklea puts it, “imprisoned in institutionalized forms of dependency.”58 Such is the case of Nilufar,59 a 44-year-old single mother who ran away from her abusive husband in 2008, taking her then-15-year-old son with her. Nilufar lived and worked in Moscow for five years, until she earned enough money to pay off her debts and buy an apartment from her brother. Upon her return, she divorced her husband, who already wanted to marry another woman.

Evidence from a classic study of Filipino women migrants seems to validate the view that women migrants keep working in low-status jobs abroad due to debts they need to repay or endless economic needs of their family members in the home country, leaving the migrant without savings or personal economic security.60 Lindio-McGovern puts forward the view that the “migration experience of women includes their reasons for emigrating, the problems they encounter as migrants in certain labor market sectors and as women, and how policies in the country of origin and destination impact on their lives.”61

While it is typical for Tajik men to resist their wives’ active participation in the labor market, when migration to Russia is necessary, their approach may change. Sometimes men encourage their wives to work immediately upon arrival in Russia. Amina, a 55-year-old tailor with thirty years of experience, migrated with her husband. Like most migrants, she experienced considerable downward mobility in terms of employment and socio-economic status, finding work as a money-taker (konduktor) on the bus her husband drove. Later, when the bus was taken away, she and her husband had to look for new jobs, and she took a job as a cleaner in a small hotel in a Moscow suburb. Eventually, she said, “a female manager of the hotel made me her assistant because she trusted me.” Like Amina, it usually takes women some time to find the most profitable and convenient jobs; they often tap into their personal networks to find these employment possibilities. That being said, Amina is somewhat of an unusual case, since despite being an experienced tailor—for which there is high demand in Russia—she did not work in a garment factory or atelier as the majority of my respondents did.62

While sharing with me the details of their life stories, few of my interviewees complained about painful conditions, long hours at various factories, the inconvenience of changing immigration policies, police inspections, etc. What mattered most was that they were able to work and to earn money. The women universally stated that they never had trouble finding a job in Russia. Gulnora, a divorced mother of a young son, said, “If you need a job, you can always find one; you just need to work hard and earn money.” All of them were satisfied with the amount of money they earned and the ability to make more money while doing overtime. Karomat, a married 60-year-old woman who first migrated to Moscow in 2009, explained, “The longer you work, the more pieces of product you produce and the more you get paid, so instead of eight hours I worked twelve hours and produced 500 socks instead of 100.” Karomat, who has worked as a tailor in different enterprises for more than thirty years, worked in two different Moscow factories before she started at her current atelier. She later rented this studio for herself and her daughter, with whom she shares the work. Karomat’s family and her daughter’s family—including the daughter’s three children—live in one household in Tajikistan. Karomat works in Moscow while her daughter and husband stay with the children in Tajikistan. Then her daughter migrates back to Russia with her husband (who also works in Moscow) and works in the atelier while Karomat returns to Tajikistan to take care of her husband and grandchildren. Karomat, who first migrated to Moscow to make money to pay off family loans and finance her son’s wedding, has maintained this transnational lifestyle for almost a decade.

### Failed Integration and Return Migration of Female Migrants

In my study, I find that migration has become part of the livelihood strategy for both male and female migrants, who—despite strict immigration regulations—consider labor migration to Russia a feasible

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59 Interviewees’ names have been changed to guarantee anonymity and confidentiality.
61 Ibid., 526.
62 This is how my respondents referred to a small studio where one or two tailors provide different sewing services on a self-employed basis.
Chapter 4. Changing the Face of Labor Migration? The Feminization of Migration from Tajikistan to Russia

Rocheva and Varshaver have found that the majority of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik migrants prefer to maintain a “come and go” transnational model of migration. However, the decision to migrate is not typically made on the basis of a careful cost-benefit analysis, nor is it generally planned far in advance. Instead, migrants just follow their instincts to migrate and see whether it works out.

For many migrants, their migration experience is transformative. Both men and women express feeling a sense of freedom while in migration alone; there are some cases in which a more egalitarian relationship between spouses develops while in migration. However, there are also extreme cases of increased social control over a wife when a husband is in migration or when both spouses migrate to Russia but the wife cannot even leave the apartment because her documents have expired and the husband does not want to renew them.

Integration into Russian society is central to the migrant’s ability to acquire new cultural and social identities, and to gain skills and resources for his or her return. Given the perpetually poor economic situation in Tajik migrants’ home country, there is also a growing tendency for them to stay permanently in Russia, applying for citizenship and acquiring Russian passports. Rocheva and Varshaver suggest that the Russian government is currently making no attempts to integrate migrants. Indeed, the reductions in social welfare and access to the healthcare system, medicine, and education have made it harder for immigrants to integrate. Recent studies indicate, however, that if the government were to attempt such an integration project, female Central Asian migrants would be better subjects than their male counterparts.

That being said, women’s opportunities for integration are currently very limited. Migrants need to choose to integrate into the country of migration—that is, choose to value the culture of the country of migration. To do this, they must have freedom of mobility and expression; without the ability to openly interact with locals, migrants cannot meaningfully gain new values or social capital, instead remaining in ethnic enclaves. The latter was certainly the case for my interviewees, who were working 12 to 16 hours a day and built their everyday lives around work. Some lived with other Tajik migrants and some with members of other ethnic groups. Most did not really communicate with locals apart from their employers at work, though most were treated well by Russian co-workers. They did not know much about the city in which they lived apart from the route from home to work and respective metro stations.

It is quite common for migrants to live in deprived conditions and lack personal space. When Nilufar migrated with her son to Moscow in 2008, they lived in a four-room apartment with 32 people. There were separate rooms for men and women. There was no space for anything and they all had to queue to shower, cook, and even sit down at mealtimes.

All of my respondents stressed the importance of speaking the Russian language. Nilufar’s ability to speak fluent Russian allowed her to defend her rights to receive her wages on time and not work overtime without extra pay, as well as to respond to Russians’ verbal insults directed at migrants. “To them, we all look the same. They don’t differentiate between Tajik, Uzbek, and Kyrgyz,” she said.

Being a Muslim is another factor that helps migrants in Russia. Nilufar said a Dagestani man hired her to work at a pharmaceutical firm because he wanted to support his Muslim sister. Coincidentally, Nilufar and her boss had the same surname, with the result that everyone in the firm actually thought they were siblings. This narrative helped her work in this firm for three years, during which time she earned the money to move to a better apartment, saved money to return to Tajikistan, and gained a lot of

63 Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
65 Rocheva and Varshaver, “Gender Dimension of Migration.”
66 Ibid.
67 Polytaev, Feminizatsiya soobshchestv trudovykh.
68 Ibid.
69 Kuschminder, Reintegration Strategies, 169.
70 Ibid.
professional skills. When she returned to Tajikistan, she began working in a pharmaceutical company based in Sughd region. “Now I earn the same amount of money I earned in Russia doing the same job,” Nilufar told me.

In contrast to the discourse of discrimination and fraud that often prevails in migrant communities, none of these women experienced bad treatment. Zamira, a forty-year-old woman who is married with two children, describes her experience like this: “You need to know your rights when you go abroad and you won’t have problems.” Karomat shares that “my supervisors at the factories acknowledge my skills and still call me to offer a job in the factory when I migrate to Russia.” These stories show that women are not always victims and can be autonomous agents while in migration.

Return Migration

Among women from Tajikistan, return migration is mostly voluntary. However, a significant number of women are also deported or compelled to return because their residence permits expire. Among those who return voluntarily, common reasons for their return include family problems, missing home, or their husband’s insistence that they return. Women who have young children are most concerned with seeing their children, with whom they remain in daily contact via mobile communication while working abroad.

The experiences of many developing countries that are heavily dependent on labor migration highlight the importance of re-integrating labor migrants into their country of origin. For female migrants from Central Asia, readjustment may be particularly challenging, since women’s geographic and occupational mobility often connotes moral impropriety in these generally patriarchal societies. Among women from Tajikistan, for example, active labor participation and migration to another country alone or with a man to whom she is not related is considered a basis for questioning her virtue. This may encourage both male and female migrants to consider remaining in Russia long-term or migrating from Tajikistan again. Brednikova and Tkach’s findings lend support to the claim that “the fact of naming the place of origin ‘home’ among migrants in many ways demonstrates the very idea of home as past, superseded, having become distant and not very relevant.”

Kuschminder highlights that during migration, women undergo processes of cultural change and adaptation, acquiring new values, cognitive frameworks, and knowledge. This was borne out in my sample: some of my interviewees who had recently arrived back in Tajikistan expressed that they would have preferred to stay in Moscow because they have friends and a life there, however financial circumstances made them return to Tajikistan. These women had lived abroad for more than five years, and it was hard for them to re-adjust. Looking at the example of Ethiopian migrants, Kuschminder suggests that for reintegration to occur, home countries must be receptive to the change brought by migrants from the countries where they worked. She further argues that feeling part of a group in the country of return is crucial to (re)developing a sense of belonging to—and identification with—one’s home country.

Are returned women migrants agents of social change or victims of the transnational migration regime? In terms of making money and sending it home as remittances, women are successful in their migration experience. This contributes to them being welcomed back by their families, which is an essential element of reintegration into the community. Kuschminder observes reintegration through social obligations to the family: female migrants are often expected to finance their relatives’ weddings and funerals. The cost of this reintegration practice, however, often exceeds women’s funds, meaning that they have to migrate again to pay off the new debts they have incurred.

Apart from economic push factors, there is also gendered motivation for emigration, such as flee-

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73 Kuschminder. Reintegration Strategies.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 169.
76 Ibid.
ing a husband’s abuse or community gossip. Unlike Agadjanian et al., who “consider that the official registered marital status” does not matter in the analysis of the return plans of female migrants to the home country,77 I found that formal registration of marriage/divorce directly influences the decision-making process. My in-depth interviews stress the importance of a woman’s husband’s opinion, the number and age of her children, and the social status of women in the host society as factors in a woman’s decision to migrate or return home.

Culture has broad implications for return and reintegration.79 Upon return to the fold of a highly patriarchal Tajik society, female migrants’ social and economic agency diminishes greatly. Pessar and Mahler therefore argue that women and men make uneven and contradictory gains from migration.80 Whereas men are simply applauded for their bread-winning efforts, female migrants not only become de facto income earners, but must also readjust to demanding social norms that require women to reproduce the patriarchy.81

In the face of these competing pulls on their identities, Harris argues, women in Tajikistan do not simply accept subordinate gender roles, but put on gender masks, becoming submissive or powerful as circumstances dictate.82 Upon their return, women balance performing their traditional role with working full-time. Some women even maintain the traditional ideal of marriage by taking care of a husband. This behavior reflects Harris’ contention that “gender must be acted out, that it is rendered perceptible only through repeated patterns of behavior that [are] called performance.”83 Each social group has its own ideas of how men and women should behave, and articulates its expectations accordingly.84 Some women, however, reject the roles they are expected to play, choosing to remain in Russia and work there without a husband. Such behavior appears to provoke negative reactions in family members and neighbors in Tajikistan, leading to the social exclusion and isolation of an unconventional woman.

There are also migrants who maintain a transnational way of life. Wong argues that “the economic uncertainties women migrants encountered in the labor market have propelled them to develop coping strategies that include negotiating gendered ideology and roles, and maintaining strong ties with their communities of origin.”85 While in Tajikistan, these women follow the social norms of their community. However, they must go beyond the boundaries of traditional gender roles to make a living and survive in Russia.

Gender-driven socialization remains very strong in Tajikistan. It is not yet socially acceptable for a Tajik woman to be the head of the family, even if this would not compromise her ability to perform her traditional roles of mother and housekeeper.86 Thus, women keep a low profile while securing their families’ survival; even unemployed, their husbands continue to enjoy the symbolic status of head of the family.87 Symptomatically, Roche observes high levels of poverty in single-mother households, since these families are excluded from social welfare policies and neglected by the government,88 despite the fact that the Tajik woman is praised in national ideology as the heart of the family and a pillar of the nation.

International labor migration has also caused internal chain migration within Tajikistan. Some women migrate from rural villages to cities in the same region or from a village in the south (Khatlon region) to one in the north (Sughd region). Internal migration is caused by a lack of job opportunities and infrastructure. Among young women, it may be motivated by the social stigma of being divorced or abandoned. Some respondents also indicated that after returning from migration they preferred to go to a city because migrants’ social transformations are not always welcomed or accepted by the local community.
Reintegration of Returned Migrants

At this stage in my research, I have found convincing evidence that female migrants who return to Tajikistan struggle to reintegrate economically and culturally into their home society. In most of the studies of return migrants in CIS countries, economic reintegration is considered the process by which a migrant is reinserted into the economic system of his or her country.89 There is still limited research on labor migrants’ reintegration in the case of Tajikistan, but case studies of Georgian and Armenian migrants who return from Russia indicate that most migrants express the intention to migrate abroad for work after failing to reintegrate into their home country.90 This failure is often caused by family problems and economic difficulties. Tukhashvili, looking at the case of Georgian return migrants, finds that some migrants became used to Russia and were no longer satisfied with the low wages available locally.91

Upon returning to Tajikistan, most women find work, whether in the same field as before migration or using the skills they acquired abroad. Others stay at home because their husbands do not want them to work outside the home. They all agree that they would make three times as much money for the same work in Russia. As such, although most of the women expressed the desire to stay and work in Tajikistan, they continue to need to migrate if they wish to build or repair their homes, improve their families’ quality of life, educate their children, finance weddings, etc.

The case of Amina is illustrative. She migrated with her husband, first to pay for her son’s education and then to finance his wedding. Since her return to Tajikistan, she has worked as a freelance tailor; she rents a small space in a studio with three other tailors in the center of her town. When I asked her about her future plans and whether she is considering migrating to Russia again, she responded:

Allah knows what will be with us in the future. If I have other financial needs, I will migrate again to earn money.

My daughter gave birth to a child, so now I need to buy her new clothes as presents and also for my grandchild. If I buy average-quality presents, she will be embarrassed in front of her in-laws. So I need to buy expensive presents—where will I get money for them?

Such uncertain plans for the future were common among the women and men in my sample. Migrants are mobile for many years, but when they reach retirement age they become concerned about their pensions. Although all the women with whom I spoke are interested in receiving a pension, not all of them are entitled to a decent amount of money. This is what Pessar and Mahler call an “ignored side of labor migration”: where, and under what conditions, will the millions of aging migrants retire?92 This is tangential to my research focus in this chapter, but it is a question that demands further investigation. It seems to me that retirement will not improve migrants’ economic situation, hence it is likely that they will continue to migrate.

Chobanyan, along with other scholars, suggests that the success of a migrant’s reintegration depends on whether their migration experience was successful, how they have integrated into the host society, and with what experience they have returned.93 Returnees’ motivations for migration and return are crucial in determining the chances that they will re-integrate: the more a returnee makes the decision to return voluntarily, the better the odds. Among female migrants from Tajikistan, these motivations can be temporary: women migrate to earn money for certain purposes and return home when they have earned enough money for their plans, only to migrate again when a new economic need arises. As such, they end up becoming transnational migrants who are not fully integrated into either country.

Cultural Reintegration

It is argued that the country and culture of return must be somewhat receptive of new cultural elements and behaviors brought by returnees.94 If these

90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 Mahler and Pessar, “Gender Matters.”
93 Chobanyan, “Return Migration.”
cultural and behavioral attributes are rejected, return migrants must either assimilate into the culture of return, thereby rejecting the attributes acquired in migration, or else migrate again.95 There are women who, after many years of living abroad, return home to marry a Tajik man but come to regret the decision because husband and wife have different expectations and values.

The structural and cultural environments to which migrants return are different for different groups, and individuals’ reintegration strategies vary.96 To summarize the discussion and my findings, I have come up with three categories of female migrants, separated by their decision-making behavior, migration experience, reintegration strategies, and social inclusion experiences.

The first category is women who embrace traditional norms and expectations. They plan to migrate only once to earn money for one specific economic reason. Upon earning the needed amount of money, they return home and either become unemployed or continue the same work they had prior to migration.

The second category includes women who react to the culture of origin or reject it. I have observed cognitive dissonance among women migrants who gain de facto empowerment and paradoxical demotion of status. The more they are empowered, the more they lose their status in their traditional society. For example, women who change their style of dress while in migration—perhaps preferring pants, skirts, and short-sleeved blouses—are criticized by relatives and neighbors upon their return. These migrants undergo a negotiation process between the two cultures when they return, rejecting or renegotiating elements of the culture of return.97 Divorced and widowed women quite often fall into this category. Gulnora, a divorced single mother, is proud that she was able to earn money abroad to support herself and her son. Now, having returned to Khujand, she is considering migrating to Moscow again in the future, this time taking her son with her.

The third category includes women who have adapted to the transnational life, living in Russia while maintaining social relations in Tajikistan. These women have worked for some time in migration; they usually have some family members working there and others (often including a husband) at home in Tajikistan. They contribute to both households and move regularly between the two.

Kuschminder suggests that through migration, returnees may acquire human, social, and financial capital that gives them increased social status upon their return.98 Karomat has strong social capital and a transnational social network because she has instructed many female tailors during her 33-year career in different studios. Her former students who live in Moscow help Karomat find work and accommodation; she also visits them to chat about their lives every time she returns.

The experiences of female Tajik migrants are consistent with observations that “women negotiate household strategies and integrate transnational practices in a purposive and strategic manner that allows for resistance to the socio-economic conditions they encounter in the host country.”99 In addition to economic challenges, Tajik women, who are de facto income earners, are also constantly involved in negotiation of their social status and social acceptance—unlike, for example, Ghanaian migrants in Toronto,100 Mexican women in the US,101 or Ukrainian migrants in Italy.102 This practice characterizes the reintegration strategy among returnees in Tajikistan.

Conclusion

My study focuses on the labor migration of women from Tajikistan to the Russian Federation, which presents an opportunity to address theoretical, empirical, and policy-oriented gaps in the study of gendered labor migration. Migration is a gendered process that transforms migrants, their families, and their communities. In this chapter, I examined the experiences of female migrants from Tajikistan, finding that gender matters: it informs return migra-

95 Ibid., 178.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., 127.
98 Ibid., 173.
100 Wong, “Ghanaian Women in Toronto’s Labour Market.”
101 Hondagneu-Sotelo, “Feminism and Migration.”
102 Montefusco, “Ukrainian Migration to Italy.”
tion and reintegration strategies. A female migrant faces the competing imperatives to earn money and behave in line with traditional norms that are suspicious of migration. This creates cognitive dissonance because women would prefer not to migrate, given the patriarchal society’s negative attitude toward migration, but feel that they do not have a choice.

In order to maintain a transnational lifestyle, women come up with strategies that allow them to perform their traditional gender roles and migrate to earn money. Regardless of how long they had been in Russia, all 24 women in my sample were constantly engaged in finding ways to align themselves with traditional social and cultural norms. Beneficial as this behavior is for reintegration and maintaining social status at home, it can create problems, as it impedes women from developing strategies to cope with the uncertainties inherent in migration.
Chapter 5. Domestic and International Mobility: Being Present and Living in the Present Moment through Educational Mobility

Nazira Sodatsayrova, University of Tsukuba

"If I remember well, I think I have changed schools 5-6 times while moving village to village and region to region... It was not only because of education, it was because of civil war...but at the same time, wherever I went, I continued my education immediately in the new place... Maybe at that time, my parents were not thinking about education as much as about our safety."

After one year of independence, Tajikistan descended into a five-year civil war (1992–1997). The collapse of the Soviet system and civil war reshaped thinking and mobility patterns within post-Soviet Tajikistan. The causes of the civil war were described as the result of "many contested events," such as the collapse of the Soviet Union, ideological kinship, and economic downturn, which created a crisis that gradually escalated to include regional and ethnic issues. It was a greater humanitarian catastrophe than any other post-Soviet country experienced.

As Zehn describes, this situation created involuntary mobility for numerous families, given the collapse of social structures and in the absence of choices or resources. Longtime inhabitants of a region became migrants, uprooted and displaced from their "home." Some ended up in other regions of Tajikistan; others were forced to seek asylum in neighboring countries. Students, too, become geographically mobile. The stories demonstrate that, unlike people in other places, Tajiks faced two big disruptions: the paralysis of the Soviet system and the impact of the civil war. However, previous studies of student mobility in various countries pay little regard to local/contextual factors, initiatives, and movements. To understand the conditions that produce domestic and international educational mobility, we must pay more attention to micro-level realities relating to educational mobility in Tajikistan.

Brief Context: Soviet Union, Civil War, and Global Connection

Tajikistan is a country in Central Asia. Young people comprise 35 percent of the population. Almost 72 percent of the population—around 2.31 million of whom are aged between 20 and 44—live in rural areas. These people are generally in search of better education and a better life. They seek education in different locations, such as regional and administrative centers.

1 Zehn, personal interview with the author, March 2017.
2 The Tajik civil war began with confrontation between supporters of the government and the opposition. Over time, it came to incorporate elements of regional and ethnic conflict.
4 Tajikistan’s independence was declared in September 1991.
6 Frank Bliss, Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs (Gorno-Badakhshan, Tajikistan), trans. Nicola Pacult and Sonia Guss with the support of Tim Sharp (New York: Routledge, 2006). Bliss highlights that during the civil war, Tajikistan was almost forgotten by the international community; the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) was the first organization to support the country. See also Akiner and Barnes, “The Tajik Civil War.” Different frames were used to study the impact of the civil war (political, gender, economic, migration, etc.), but research on education in the context of the civil war remained limited.
7 About 72 percent of the population of Tajikistan lives in rural areas. These people are generally in search of better education and a better life. They seek education in different locations, such as regional and administrative centers.
8 The increase in the youth population also created an increase in the demand for jobs. Almost one million young people are migrant workers, of whom 93 percent work in Russia and 5 percent in Kazakhstan. See “Assessment of Higher Education Tajikistan,” ADB Report, 2015, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/institutional-document/175952/higher-education-taj.pdf.
areas, and it is important to recognize that “physical remoteness goes hand in hand with the absence of political interference” in social, intellectual, economic, and institutional structures.

The country was governed under the Soviet system for 70 years, a period during which it was known as the Tajik Socialist Soviet Republic (founded in 1929). Significantly, the period saw a dramatic increase in the literacy rate, as the Soviet system placed a high priority on education and promoted the establishment of educational institutions. In the beginning of the Soviet Union:

Three parallel educational systems functioned in these areas. The first was a centuries-old system of traditional schooling in maktabs and madrasas, which had gained strength throughout the 19th century... The second system comprised the “Russian-native” schools, founded by Russian officials and missionaries after the annexation of Turkestan. The third system consisted of schools operated on “new principles” [maktabhoi-usuli-jadeed], founded by activists of the Jadid movement whose modernizing objectives included educational reform.

The Soviet system established schools even in the remotest areas of Tajikistan, along with standardizing the educational system. In 1925, the Nisbati Mahvi Besavodi (Down With Illiteracy) strategy was launched in Tajikistan. That being said, the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan contained few academicians until 1971, and the “Tadzhik SSR employed 347 members with Candidate of Sciences and only 35 with the Doctor of Science degree,” implying that research in the country was underdeveloped.

After achieving independence in 1991, the country faced civil war. During the civil war, a very few NGO development programs, such as the Aga Khan Development Network and the Japan International Cooperation Agency, provided humanitarian support. Later, these NGOs paved the way for students to undertake international education. The government of Tajikistan also encouraged students to continue their education abroad. The number of Tajik students overseas stood at 30,000 as of mid-2016.

This chapter argues that although a hostile environment may destroy many things, values can endure, resulting in positive outcomes such as students being able to pursue higher education abroad. It demonstrates how civil war created involuntary mobility within the country and how this mobility was amplified after the war due to the unstable environment associated with the transition: a lack of teachers, the economic system, the uneven quality of education, and the search for better employment. The voices of the students clearly show that these events—civil war, the new system, and globalization—are interlinked.

**Global Connection**
At independence, Tajikistan was eager to build relationships with the global community. At the same time, Western and Eastern countries alike had geopolitical reasons for wanting to build connections with the newly independent countries of Central Asia.

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11 Geographical location also creates sharp inequality between regions in terms of quality of education, professional opportunities, and social status, which in turn encourages young people to consider mobility.
12 Before the Soviet Union, the literacy rate among Tajik men was around 4 percent and among women around 0.1 percent. See Sarfaroz Niyozov and Stephen Bahry, “Challenges to Education in Tajikistan: The Need for Research-Based Solutions,” in Education Reform in Societies in Transition: International Perspectives, ed. Jaya Earnest and David F. Treagust (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2006), 211-231.
15 Bliss, Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs, 25.
17 Ibid.
18 Niyozov and Bahry, “Challenges to Education in Tajikistan.” 213.
given the region’s status as an “important land bridge between Europe and Asia.”

Connections between Japan and Tajikistan

The fall of the Soviet Union was a double-edged sword. Besides the destruction of educational systems it wrought, it also brought creation, as it allowed global powers to establish relationships with the newly independent countries. Japan was among the first countries to accept Tajikistan’s independence in 1992, and for both countries, the relationship signaled a new direction in their foreign policy. Japan established its soft power by supporting different institutions and creating new programs. One such initiative focused on building the skills of young diplomats through human development programs, educational and institutional exchange programs, and other developmental projects.

Studies of the internationalization of Japanese education illustrate that the role of Japan as a global contributor also changed over time, from supporting developing countries to focusing on Japan’s global presence and national branding, including “the role of [Japanese] education in promoting international relations.” This shift had political, academic, economic, and cultural aspects, from developing human resources to the internationalization of universities to filling the labor gap by encouraging a large number of students to attend Japanese institutions (see Figure 5.1).

25 Since 2008, the JICE/JICA program has supported five government employees and two exchange students from Slavonic University of Tajikistan annually. In 2017, the quota increased to seven government employees; the program signed a new contract with the Japanese Language faculty of Tajikistan to support exchange students from that faculty as well. See “Japan Increases Scholarships Quota for Tajikistan Beginning from 2017,” Asia-Plus, July 27, 2016.
26 The role of the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) is to collaborate and contribute to developing countries by providing official development assistance (ODA) to foster human resources and support infrastructure development. See “JICA Profile,” Japan International Cooperation Agency, accessed August 24, 2017, https://www.jica.go.jp/english/publications/brochures/c0b0m00000trasw2-att/jicaprofile_en.pdf.
31 Shao, “Japanese Policies and International Students” Shao highlights that in the early years of students were recognized as sojourner (ichijiteki taizai-sha), but later they extended their visas and remained longer.
Literature Review: Soviet Union, Civil War, Mobility

Many studies have been conducted on the Soviet education system and policies, as well as on labor migration. The literature on higher education mostly focuses on comparative education, which provides a broad picture of the movement of students, but the relationship between mobility and education in Tajikistan specifically has rarely been the object of study.

There is also a large amount of research on the civil war and the collapse of the Soviet Union in relation to great-power competition in Central Asia and the role of the state in peacebuilding, but these findings have not necessarily been connected to education. Most studies focus more on the macro level, looking at economics and politics, rather than the micro level (student mobility and experiences). That is, labor migration is depicted mostly through an econometric lens, as one type of migration in the Tajik context.

Domestic and International Mobility, Brain Drain, and Push-Pull Factors

Migration studies and OECD reports demonstrate an increase in international student mobility/migration (ISM) within the borders of two different contexts: “home” and “host.” Domestic (“home”) mobility does not receive much attention in such studies, nor is the link between “internal” and “international”—or how students might proceed from one context to the other—established. There is, however, evidence that such mobility in pursuit of knowledge existed in the past, both in Central Asia and globally. The present chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by looking at students’ mobility, as well as regional programs that transitioned from one system to another. In addition, the chapter seeks to contribute to an understanding of how educational mobility motivators drive students to cross domestic and international borders.

Brain Drain

Empirical and theoretical studies of mobility/migration, particularly those relating to educational mobility, have long included the notion of “brain drain,” the phenomenon of talented people leaving a country. More recently, the companion term “brain gain” has been proposed to recognize the positive impact of mobility. The literature on “brain drain” has developed tremendously: it began by arguing that human capital was being drained from developing countries, then transitioned to the idea of brain


38 Tajikistan’s civil war led to greater connections with countries with which it shared historical and political connection, as well as those (like Japan) that did not have any historical connection with Tajikistan.


41 Mobility of people from Tajikistan in particular has only been analyzed through the labor migration lens, which describes economic concepts, but the reality is more complex. Student mobility, for instance, needs to be understood as part of human resource migration.


cultural benefits of mobility in specific contexts. It is reflected in the case of Tajik students abroad.

Push-Pull Factors

There are a variety of "push" and "pull" factors that scholars consider mobility motivators. Unfavorable or negative conditions in the home country, students' positive perception of international education, the desire to understand a foreign culture, and intention to migrate are seen as "push" factors, while scholarships, countries' attractiveness/prestige, and the opportunity to work part-time are "pull" factors. However, Li and Bray argue that conditions in home countries and institutions "not only have negative force[s] which push some students abroad but also positive forces to keep students at home." Although "push" and "pull" factors are external, they can impact the decisions and behavior of agents, as reflected in the case of Tajik students abroad.

Conceptual Framework: Educational Mobility

Mobility is a simple concept, but it can describe a "complex and changing field of movements." Mobility is usually seen as a physical movement from one place to another. In this chapter, I have conceptualized mobility as voluntary/involuntary, domestic/international, social, and educational. There are always multiple factors driving an individual's decision to live at "home" or move abroad, whether in the field of labor migration or education. The actions begin at specific times, are related to specific contexts and programs, and are decided by an individual who has been impacted by geography, life condition, global technologies, programs, or people. Thus, mobility is a mixture of multiple aspects of human life; it is an expression of multiple complex motivations that have been part of human endeavors in the past and persist to this day. Engaging in educational mobility and moving to another country is a complex, life-changing process that is impacted by economic, social, political, and cultural motives.

The literature indicates that students' international mobility is becoming a normal option that "has become a marker of success and social status," with domestic mobility playing the same role for the majority of students from rural areas. This paper demonstrates that the concept of mobility connects...
the past and present, different localities (domestic and international), the physical and intangibles (intellect, education, status).

Methodology

This research takes a qualitative approach, using respondents’ educational biographical narratives to understand their motivations from early childhood (before mobility) to the point at which they were interviewed (during mobility). They were also encouraged to discuss their motivations for studying in Japan and their experiences there. Data was collected from 35 participants who studied for more than a year in Japan (see Appendix 1); research was carried out in Tajikistan (among former students) and Japan (among current and former students). This paper draws primarily on the experiences of 19 students who were mobile within the confines of Tajikistan (see Table 5.1) and later moved abroad, specifically to Japan, for their studies. Ethical issues are a central concern of this paper, hence for the purposes of anonymity and confidentiality, the researcher uses pseudonyms.

Table 5.1. Profile of research participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Region</th>
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<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>Urban</td>
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<td>26</td>
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The request to “Tell me about yourself and your educational journey” illuminated students’ educational motivation and their experiences of moving to new places, which connected their pre-mobility motivation with their present experience. In this, the research followed Raghuram,63 who suggests that it is important to go back to pre-migration—or past subjectivity—and see the connection between this and the present moment. The key research questions were:

- What motivated you to continue your education in Tajikistan and abroad?
- What motivated you to choose Japan as your educational destination?

Findings: Mobility Motivators

My interviews with the students revealed that educational mobility and other forms of mobility are connected to multiple factors: quality of education at a particular school (linked to the presence of qualified teachers); opportunities in the specific context; an individual’s interests; where students live; and other economic, political, cultural and social aspects. Students’ narratives demonstrate that there is a link between the civil war and students’ mobility and education: “War destroyed all hopes except one; education was our only hope for [the] future.”64

Prior research on the civil war65 indicates the relationship between sociopolitical transformations and students’ memories of schooling. My research findings demonstrate how the process created new forms of mobility. It also shows the connection between the old system (the Soviet Union) and the new one (global connections). Whether their mobility was domestic or international, I found that almost half the students interviewed for this research were positive about continuing their education.

For the sake of clarity, the first section will touch on the civil war and then move to discuss the transition from the Soviet Union to independent Tajikistan. Civil War and (Dis)-Continuity: Education as Hope

Students’ interviews revealed that the civil war created involuntary mobility among students, forcing them to move from the places they called home to safer locations. The impact of the civil war is evidenced by the fact that for almost 60 percent of the research participants who were students during the civil war, their life decisions and plans were dramatically affected by the civil war. For them, this impact persisted even after the signing of the peace treaty. They emphasize the importance of education during these moments, saying education remains a motivating factor in people’s lives.66

Students’ perspectives on educational mobility also open the way to understanding people’s educational and professional lives during and after the civil war, education was prioritized in some regions.

64 Kuibek, personal interview with the author, October 2016.
66 Previous research such as Anise Waljee, “The Meaning of Educational Change in Post-Soviet Tajikistan: Educational Encounters in Badakhshan—How Educators in an In-Service Institution in Rural Badakhshan Understand and Respond to Educational Change” (PhD diss., University of London, 2010); Niyozov, “Understanding Teaching in Post-Soviet, Rural, Mountainous Tajikistan” also shows that despite the difficulties of the civil war, education was prioritized in some regions.
war. For many students, the desire to continue their education was their only goal during the war—either their other dreams and goals changed or collapsed with the collapse of the Soviet Union or "...it was better to do something [i.e. continue their education] than to sit at home." Findings also reveal how people coped during the civil war and changed the direction of their lives, particularly their professional lives. My interlocutors indicated discontinuity in their life plans, professions, and dreams, but at the same time showed themselves to be resilient to change, continuing their education and changing their professional situations in a time of crisis:

After finishing grade 9, I left my village and went to Dushanbe. I applied to Suvorov school but the war began and I went back...I applied to the history faculty in my region... Previous research on education also demonstrates "the speed with which they [students] switched courses and careers to cope with the demands of transition and globalization" as well as the civil war. Students’ narratives portray the effect as long-lasting—"memories of schooling" bring to light the struggles that students faced and depict the wounds they carry to this day:

You know it is because of war we remained "half baked" [we did not develop properly]. I mean we did not learn anything deeply. We [students] could not develop well; if we learned any language we did not learn it well, as [a result] of a lack of teachers or the existing situation. Most of the time, students came to school hungry; they did not have anything to eat for breakfast, [so] how it could be possible to concentrate? We [children] worked a lot in the fields to help our parents...

Even our school was given to the group of pro-government fighters (gurashi fronti khalqi)... Existing research further demonstrates the importance to students of having teachers' support during the civil war. Teachers' support was a significant impetus for students to continue their education. However, students were not the only ones who struggled to contend with the difficult and frightening situation created by the war:

...teachers were trying their best to teach but it was obvious that their thoughts were about safety and food, even though they were trying to hide it.

I remember the first of September very well. I could not go to school because I did not have new clothes to wear. What I did was I rode my horse and went to a mountain. I cried the whole day there because I knew the other kids at school were learning something but not me... That evening I met my teacher and he told me, "Bacham (my son), your knowledge is important, not your clothes. I look forward to seeing you tomorrow at school." His words changed me and my life...

The data suggest that a lack of choices and opportunities in the area where students live pushed them to move to other regions, villages, and cities for safety, but they sometimes found it very challenging. As Yusuf explained, "It was not only that life and the situation were unfair toward us, but also that people in different locations were not fair to people from remote areas"—after moving from a village to the capital, he found that he was not treated equally. That being said, students admit that the situation is now very different. Seven participants who moved from rural to "urban" areas emphasized this "equal treatment" in the new locations as part of domestic mobility. To quote Kuibek,

The hard life during and after the civil war, particularly my life as a student at that moment, changed me a lot [implying unfair treatment]. It hindered my confidence and did

67 This topic was addressed by Saido, Mullo, Kuibek, Khonum, Sayob, Zafar, and Anvor.
69 Suvorov Military School was one type of military boarding school. Teenage boys, in particular, could continue their education at this school.
70 Kuibek, personal interview with the author, October 2016.
72 Faucher, "Narratives of Schooling," 145.
73 Sayob, personal interview with the author, June, 2016
74 Olim, response to questionnaire, 2017.
75 Yusuf, personal interview with the author, June 2016.
76 Yusuf, personal interview with the author, February 2017. My own life experience also resonates with the students' narratives.
77 Faucher, "Narratives of Schooling," 157
78 Anvor, personal interview with the author, February 2017. My own life experience also resonates with the students' narratives.
79 This does not mean urban in the Western sense, but is a context-specific reference to population centers seen as urban places.
not allow me to nurture my thinking. At that time, the connection between regions was also not good. Some groups abused new students a lot. They stopped us and asked how much money we had. It was hard. Nevertheless, I should also underline that today it is different (sigh...), changed. Today, student life is much better and for some students, our stories would just be stories (laugh...).80

Like Kuibek, many respondents found arriving in a city from a small village to be a challenging experience. Students had expected cities to be intellectual spaces with no discrimination or prejudice, a vision that was not reflected in reality:

I thought city life would be different. It is fair and all intellectuals live there. I thought city meant civilization, maldaniyat. But when I came to the city, I could see how they looked at village people differently, which shows their low intellectual and thinking capacity.81

During interviews, students underlined that “the Tajik people were [historically] very kindhearted and very respectful toward one another but now we are changed. [This might be because of] the civil war and also the difficulty of life today.”82 Now, students and migrants become “foreigners” at home. However, these difficulties have helped the interviewees to become strong and resilient, and encouraged them to fight for change.

The Transition and New Mobility Motivators: Facing New Challenges
After the challenges of the civil war, students were faced with a new challenge: the transition.83 Moving from one system to another was difficult, not only for institutions but also for individuals. As the situation worsened, most qualified teachers left schools.84 Historically, teachers played a central role in Tajik society, as underlined in classical literature and local proverbs such as “Qadri ustod az padar besh hast va Ustod az padar pesh hast” (the role of a teacher is more important than that of a father). Many students from small villages moved to other villages, districts, and towns in the absence of qualified teachers in rural areas.85

I changed school, moved from one village to another due to not having good conditions at school and not enough teachers. One year we had a physics teacher and the second year he/she left... Then I stopped going to that village because of the harsh winter, because of avalanches and wolves. When you live in one area you have a different mentality and when you move you will find there are different mentalities in the new area, within your country and outside...86

The impact of the war was severe in the capital and some regions, “but it did not impact my region that much,” Zafar recalled.87 The collapse of the Soviet Union also led to the establishment of new institutions, such as private schools called colleges and lyceums. In addition, those who had a “good quality education” at school now face another challenge at the university level due to their constant drive to seek better opportunities, he indicated:

While there was a civil war in the capital city, in my region life was better. There were challenges but in terms of education and studying we did not have a problem. I moved from my village to another village to study in a so-called college. After finishing college, I came to Dushanbe. I went to Dushanbe together with my classmates. I wanted to be an engineer. I did not know where to apply, how to apply. Finally, I applied to the Faculty of Irrigation...It was frustrating because it was not challenging. I had a very strong educational foundation as our college was very strong. Coming to university, I realized that the education there did not challenge us to learn something new. To me, it seemed that I did not learn anything at university.88

Students move from one location to another in pursuit of opportunities that may be lacking due to the political or economic context and even their geo-

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80 Kuibek, personal interview with the author, October 2016.
81 Sayob, personal interview with the author, June 2016.
82 Zafar, personal interview with the author, February 2016.
86 Rauf, personal interview with the author, July 2016.
87 Zafar, personal interview with the author, February 2017.
88 Zafar, personal interview with the author, February 2017.
Chapter 5. Domestic and International Mobility

Graphical location. Living in a small village means going without good education and employment. In some villages, there is no cinema, theater, or even any facilities for sports or community education. Importantly, however, given that almost 72 percent of Tajikistan’s population lives in rural areas, even the most remote village has a school. The search for quality education and qualified teachers has prompted an increase in internal mobility: families choose to transfer their children to new villages, districts, or towns to live with relatives or in dormitories and continue their education. This education-driven mobility has become a “stage adjustment to urban life” and to new employment opportunities. As one parent explained:

My husband works in construction in Tajikistan. Sometimes he finds work and sometimes not. Because of the civil war, I could not continue my education. I lost my documents so now I work on my land. I sell fruits and vegetables to save money for my son to go to university. I really hope I can support him to get a good education and become who he wishes to be. I do not need anything from him, but I want him sohibi khudash shavad (to become the master of his own destiny).

Sayob’s take on the issue is also illuminating:

You know in the village, the bull is the most precious thing, as it is with the bull that you cultivate the land. Because of me, to allow me to continue my education in the capital, my parents sacrificed their own life: they sold their bulls and sent me money to pay for my education… I am also grateful and always indebted to my brothers, particularly to one of them, who said, “Now it is your time to study, as you are older than me. If you study and find your way in life, then you can support me.” Therefore, he left for Moscow to work, earn money, and support me, so now I feel responsible for supporting them [my siblings].

Research finds that mobility patterns have changed since the collapse of the Soviet Union: mobility no longer starts after students finish secondary education, but instead as early as grade 5 or 6 within students’ local areas. Findings also indicate that the transition from a centralized command system to a market economy led to the development of private schools that created opportunities for a younger generation of students to become mobile:

We live in a remote place and at school we had computers, but because of electricity we could not use them. Usually, we [students] collected money and bought petroleum for the electric generator to use the computers. But I moved to Hojimirzo school and then Hotam and PV school, which is in the capital. If I had continued my education where I lived, I would never have dreamed of going abroad and studying in Japan. Our public school could give us knowledge, but not up-to-date and satisfying knowledge and information.

However, private schools also created a new gap between rich and poor, a village-urban divide that further affected the mobility of students. I should be very clear that it is not only private school students who go abroad; there are also students who studied in public schools who now study internationally. Equally, family will and private education are not in themselves sufficient to make it possible for students to continue their education abroad; as most participants emphasize, it depends on an individual’s kushish (effort and persistence). Saido summed up this perception:

In my family, education is the priority. We all get influence from my father…the conditions [in Tajikistan and Japan] are very different, but in both cases the results depend on individual kushishu ghairat (effort and persistence).

Looking Forward: New Borders

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, some—though not all—secondary schools gradually be-

89 See Bliss, Social and Economic Change; Waljee, “The Meaning of Educational Change”; Niyozov and Bahry, “Challenges to Education in Tajikistan.”
90 Almost all undergraduate research participants and those students in search of private education went through this pattern.
91 King, Skeldon and Vullnetari, “Internal and International Migration,” 5.
92 Parent, personal interview with the author, August 2016.
93 Sayob, personal interview with the author, June 2016.
95 Saido, response to questionnaire, July 2017.
96 There are a handful of private schools for primary students, but the majority of private schools are secondary schools. One reason for this may be that secondary students can live far from their parents and can travel long distances to get to school.
gan to privatize and developed their own courses of study, with a focus on hard science, English language, or computer science, for example. Younger students have inherited a system that has already gone through significant change, making them more open to continuing their education internationally. Significantly, most of the research participants who moved from rural to urban areas actively searched for opportunities to move internationally. Students’ choices of destination country change over time, depending on specific circumstances. The students I interviewed chose to study abroad in Japan for a number of reasons: the availability of scholarships, the opportunity to attain better education than at home, prior exposure to Japanese programs such as JICA, the prestige of Japan as a country, and the presence of other Tajik students in Japan. Interestingly, it was the “positive forces”97 of education at home earlier in these students’ educational trajectories that paved the way for them to study abroad. Fez explained:

My father told me that Hotam and PV98 school had qualified Soviet teachers, so I should continue my education there. Now, I think back and realize how lucky I was. If I had not moved, I would not have gained that knowledge and I would not be here [in Japan].99

For Jalil, too, the opportunities available at home served to increase the appeal of going abroad:

I participated in one international Olympiad and I received a gold medal. There, I realized that I could compete internationally.100

For their part, undergraduate students made connections and moved within their own society through “awareness zones.”101 Yet students see international education as a better experience because “nobody asks you where you are from and you feel like you are treated equally, as a human being.”102 Hamid summarized:

I found democracy here. I had heard about democracy, but I see it in practice [here]. Everything works according to the law. In Islam, it is the same. If you do wrong, you will be punished. Here, too, if you do not follow the law you will be punished no matter what your position and who you are. Everybody is equally responsible under the law.103

It was also evident from students’ comments that they worked hard to achieve their goals, even without their families’ moral support. Most of them are aware of how much their parents went through to get them to this point, hence they try to support their families by becoming international students:

I tried to work as a volunteer, to find my way and find friends. Through my friends, I found that there were scholarship opportunities. I filled out the forms and applied. I was waiting for almost a year but my parents did not know anything about what I was going through, as I did not want them to worry about me.104

There are now choices and students can make decisions. The transition from the Soviet system created a broader sense of possibilities for the people of Tajikistan, as Zafar mentioned: “…From the time I first visited Japan for a short period, the idea of going again and again to Japan emerged within me.”105

Since students find it hard to go back to their villages, many search for opportunities overseas. Those who live in rural areas have less access to NGO and government resources and healthcare personnel,106 so the general quality of life is lower. Sayob lamented, “I really wish to go back to my village, but if I think about my future, what will I do there? What will my children do there? I did an MA and finished my Ph.D. in 5 years. Going back to my

97 Li and Bray, “Cross-Border Flows of Students,” 3.
98 There are some private lyceums/schools, such as Hotam and PV, Hojimirzo, Turkish Lyceum, and Aga Khan Lyceee and International School.
100 Jalil, personal interview with the author, July 2016.
102 Kuibek, personal interview with the author, October 2016.
103 Hamid, personal interview with the author, July 2016.
104 Odil, personal interview with the author, November 2016.
105 Zafar, personal interview with the author, February 2017.
106 Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, most qualified personnel (teachers, doctors, and other professionals) left the villages where they had lived, either relocating to urban places within Tajikistan or becoming labor migrants in Russia.
village means erasing my international education from my life."107

The issue of wasting their education108 emerges from these respondents’ discussions of rural-urban and local-international mobility. Those who make it to the international arena are concerned and ask, “If I go back, what happens to my qualification?” as there are limited opportunities for highly educated individuals in Tajikistan’s villages. Most students also emphasize that their thoughts on whether they should stay away from home or go back evolve while they are mobile.109

Discussion

The data reveal that becoming mobile is linked to political and economic structures, as well as to the context (rural and urban), location (lack of qualified teachers in the area), and individual (personal resilience and persistence). Different situations create different forms of mobility (voluntary and involuntary). Mobility and travel are typically seen as a “gift from Allah” (Az tu harakat az Khudovand barakat) among Tajik people, but in some situations travel was seen less as a blessing than as a necessity, in light of hostile situations such as the civil war.110

The theoretical lens of mobility shows that students are not mobile only “from one nation state to another; [movement] also occur[s] within nation states.”111 Students’ determination “to shape their own destiny,” coupled with the absence of social and economic opportunities in their local areas, spurred increased local and international mobility. Students broaden their horizons in search of better opportunities. For their part, global structures both attract students to study internationally and encourage them to return home to serve their country.

The concept of mobility suggests that youth are looking for an “escape”: from the political situation, the low quality of education, and a poor quality of life, but also from the uncertainty of the future. The interviews indicated that students fought to achieve success in higher education at home at the same time as facing unexpected attitudes toward internal mobility, creating a mental battlefield on which individuals began to question their own identities. Through their education in local areas, students cross many boundaries: minority/majority, linguistic, cultural, social, and political. The aforementioned students’ experiences, local and international, typify many aspects of mobile Tajik students’ experiences and future trajectories. I did not explore the experiences of students who remained in rural areas and did not move internationally, although those who moved now ask “What will we do if we go back?,” which indicates the importance of finding somewhere to use their knowledge to improve their life chances and choices.

Students’ narratives demonstrate how political and economic issues could negatively affect them while simultaneously building their resilience to existing challenges. After the collapse of the Soviet system and with the onset of the civil war, people searched for higher-quality schools, such as private schools, and higher-quality education. The research indicates the desire and willingness of students to seek better education, due in part to the shortage of professional teachers, which impacted the global competitiveness of students in rural areas, but at the same time led to greater student mobility. Despite regional challenges, students were resilient and wanted to go further from home to continue their education.

The data speak to the importance of education for all people—rural and urban, poor and rich, domestic and international—no matter how they are constrained and influenced by political, social, and economic systems. Domestic mobility increased involuntarily due to war, with the unintended consequence of allowing individuals “to expand outside the set geographical confines.”112 Students’ narratives demonstrate their connection to the world and their ability to act as agents in decision-making and knowledge formation. Digging deeper, one finds that the civil war was not the only agent of change: with the transition from the Soviet system to independence, students found themselves in a fundamentally different system.

107 Sayob, personal interview with the author, June 2016.
109 Mentioned by Hamid, Odil, Saido, Khonum, Bahrom, Fez, and Doro.
110 The civil war in Tajikistan was known as jangi burodarkush, meaning “war of brother-killing.” See also Epkenhans, The Origins of the Civil War in Tajikistan; Waljee, “The Meaning of Educational Change,” 148-250; Bliss, Social and Economic Change in the Pamirs.
112 Rizvi, “Rethinking Brain Drain.”
that, in turn, created a more complex landscape of life, education, escape, and mobility. The above testimonies indicate that quality education and privatization seem to be part of “the pursuit of happiness.”

The polarities of involuntary and voluntary, domestic and international are central to the argument of this article, as there are specific motivators in each context that lead people to become mobile. Indeed, student mobility (domestic and international) continues to evolve. Mobility should be recognized as a part of “wider life course mobility,” as students’ stories, lives, employment, and families intersect with each other. Local mobility seems to be even more complex than its international counterpart, as people who know each other’s backgrounds are more likely to deploy stereotypes and put up barriers. As such, my respondents suggest that it is sometimes better to be in an unknown place among unknown people. To quote Hamid,

“I was a labor migrant for two years in Moscow. I found it so hard. I could not believe there was so much hatred in the world. I was beaten for nothing… Here nobody asks me “Where you from?”

Unlike previous studies, which have focused on the mobility of children whose families were also mobile in the past, this research finds that young people in post-war Tajikistan are independently pursuing mobility with the goal of improving their own lives and those of their family members, particularly their siblings. Youths prefer mobility to stability, but they search for contentment in whatever they do. The responses speak to the absence of an enabling environment: the area people live in nurtures a mobility mindset, which was evident in the case of Zehn and many others. The data indicate that the educational and professional gap between generations is widening, particularly in rural areas, and most students cannot rely on their parents’ material and intellectual support. Students are growing up with a sense of responsibility not only for themselves but also for their family, siblings, and children, which in turn “reproduces social advantage within [their] families.”

As Odil explained, “My aunt helped me to learn and become who am I today, and my aim is to help my siblings and my cousins to become someone [successful] in the future.”

Moreover, the study makes it possible to understand post-Soviet youth in a new way, illuminating how the context of post-Soviet, post-conflict Tajikistan transformed the notions of knowledge-seeking, education, and self in different situations. To follow Rizvi, it is important to appreciate that “in an age of globalization, the key issue has become not where people are physically located, but what contribution they are able to make to the social, cultural and economic development of the countries with which they identify.” During the Soviet period, anyone who completed a Bachelor’s degree could find a decent job and have a good life, but now labor market demands are changing, causing people to become either labor migrants or educationally mobile. Crucially, educationally mobile individuals are not only impacted by this mobility, but are also agents in it, shaping and transforming their families’ lives as well as their own.

Conclusion

This study has three main findings. Firstly, the value of education is demonstrated by the fact that students were willing to confront all the issues they faced. Secondly, students emphasize the importance of resilience in each period: the civil war, the transition, and the time of new opportunities thereafter. Thirdly, students are not content with the opportunities available to them locally; they are continuously in pursuit of new opportunities and possibilities for themselves.

113 Clare et al., “Conceptualizing International Education.”
114 Ibid.
115 Hamid, personal interview with the author, July 2016.
119 Odil, personal interview with the author, November 2016.
120 Rizvi, “Rethinking Brain Drain,” 189.
121 ADB research findings also demonstrate that there is a mismatch between labor market demand and available skills. See ADB, “Assessment of Higher Education Tajikistan.”
and their families, even if it means moving abroad. However, it is important to underline that this study is not a comparative study, nor does it aim to understand the views of those students who did not go abroad.

Focusing on mobility demonstrates that in Tajikistan there is an under-explored intersection between higher educational mobility, on the one hand, and the civil war and transition to independence, on the other. The political situation was found to be a constraining factor on mobility, but at the same time, it developed students’ resilience and became a “push” factor for mobility. In the absence of light, people search through the darkness for windows. Education was one window for some people during the civil war that kept the hope of a brighter future alive. The presence of Tajik students in Japan shows that this hope was not misplaced.

Today, Tajik youth face many challenges as they pursue mobility and which drive mobility: the rural-urban divide, professional or career competition, and responsibility for looking after their siblings and children. Studying educational mobility in context allows for a better understanding of mobility as a whole. This study invites further research on the notion of mobility and immobility within internal and international borders. While it is not possible to generalize about whether students who move internally are likely to move abroad, this would be an interesting theme for further research. Another promising path for further research—though beyond the scope of this article—would be to examine the role of education in the trajectories of those who survived the conflict and either went abroad or stayed home.
## Appendix 1

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*— filled out interview questions Japanese

MEXT—Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology
JDS—Japanese Grant Aid (funded by the Government of Japan through Official Development Assistance [ODA])
Migration has played a key role in shaping modern Kazakhstan. The history of migration over the past century and a half has engendered many of the challenges the country now faces with regard to border integrity, national identity construction, and interethnic relations.1 In the modern era, significant out-migration dates to at least the 19th century and caused a wholesale reconfiguration of the steppe’s ethnic geography.2 Legislation such as the Steppe Statute of 1891 and the Virgin Lands Policy of the 1950s resulted in massive numbers of external migrants, mostly Russians, settling the traditional grazing lands of the three zhuz.3 Following Kazakhstan’s independence in 1991, policymakers and scholars alike paid considerable attention to the issue of Russian emigration and the immigration of the Oralmanlar (ethnic Kazakh returnees).

Beginning in the late 1990s, labor migrants also began to arrive in significant numbers, drawn by rapid economic growth in Kazakhstan, which offered greater employment opportunities and higher wages than those available in migrants’ home countries. Many of these migrants were working illegally, since they had not obtained the required work permit. This flow slackened in the wake of the significant decline in global petroleum prices in 2014, which caused the Kazakh economy to slump. Inevitably, there will be a rebound in the petroleum market; when this happens, the patterns of the pre-2014 period will likely not only be re-established, but also expand. Indeed, at least in the case of labor immigration from neighboring Kyrgyzstan, the number of workers appears to be on the rise.

It is imperative to define and comprehend patterns of labor migration in Kazakhstan if the country is to develop mechanisms for addressing regional disparities in income and economic opportunity. Effective resource management and allocation, internal investment, and infrastructure planning are all at least partially dependent on predicting labor supply and quality in a given region. It therefore follows that understanding the spatial parameters of labor migration is vital to future economic planning and development. In the case of Kazakhstan, this is true both for the movement of workers domestically and for external sources of labor migration.

Economists, geographers, and sociologists have long used gravity modeling as a theoretical frame. The concept has frequently been applied to migration flows, both internal and international.4 A recent field survey conducted in Kazakhstan determined that internal migration patterns “revealed a very strong gravity effect,”5 but how this conceptual approach applies to external sources of labor immigration remains unclear. In this chapter, we will apply gravity modeling to labor migration in Kazakhstan, a meth-

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odology that casts light on the dynamics and consequences of these vital labor flows.

**Official Labor Migration in the Republic of Kazakhstan**

The transformation of Kazakhstan’s Soviet planned economy into a market-oriented structure took almost ten years following independence in 1991. During this period, major institutional reforms were implemented, many state enterprises were privatized, positive changes were observed in the country’s foreign trade turnover, and the budget deficit began to decline, among other economic improvements. In 2002, the United States and other countries officially recognized Kazakhstan’s economy as market-oriented. In the 2000s, the country experienced rapid economic growth that in most years approached or exceeded 10 percent, peaking at 13.2 percent in 2001. As a result, in 2005, the Economist Intelligence Unit placed Kazakhstan on the list of the ten most rapidly developing countries in the world. The main factors driving this economic growth were increased foreign direct investment (FDI), the oil boom, and market infrastructure.

A number of other factors also contributed to Kazakhstan’s economic growth. Although quite controversial at the time, the transfer of the capital city from Almaty oblast to Akmola oblast in 1997 played an important role in boosting the national economy. The relocation of the country’s political apparatus spurred a construction boom. Although this primarily affected the new capital, Astana, it also impacted other urban areas and had spillover effects on national infrastructure, leading to the construction of new railways, highways, and production enterprises.

In the 1990s, Kazakhstan experienced a high rate of emigration of highly qualified workers, primarily ethnic Russians who left for Russia and other former Soviet republics. In the 12 years between 1991 and 2003, approximately 2.13 million people emigrated from Kazakhstan,6 many of whom had been employed in industry. To counterbalance this trend, the government implemented strategies to not only attract members of the ethnic Kazakh diaspora (*Oralmanlar*), but also bolster the foreign labor force.

It should be noted that Kazakhstan has been more open to the introduction of guest workers than other Central Asian countries, primarily due to current or impending labor shortages. The arrival of a foreign labor force was regulated by the government through a quota system to control the numbers of workers who entered the country legally. The process for recruiting guest workers was quite specific—if a company wanted to invite foreign employees, the firm was required to advertise open positions in local and regional mass media, then submit documentation to the regional administration that it could not find qualified employees in Kazakhstan. The local administration was subsequently required to document the numbers of foreign workers and file this information with the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, which in turn compiled statistics on the total foreign labor force and submitted them to the government. After considering the unemployment rate and the number of economically active domestic workers, the government would compose a quota for the foreign labor force for the following year. This process meant that the quota system was mostly focusing on the skilled labor force, and not on unskilled labor.

Between 2001 and the first half of 2017, the government invited almost half a million foreign workers into the country—a figure that, of course, does not include those who arrived illegally. Representatives of more than 150 countries worked officially in Kazakhstan, among them individuals from such distant locations as Fiji and Puerto Rico; however, these countries typically sent no more than two people, meaning that they comprised a very small share of the total foreign workforce. As Figure 6.1 shows, Turkish and Chinese workers made up the largest two contingents of foreign laborers, together comprising almost half the total.

This supports the “gravity model” proposed by Paul Krugman and other economists who have investigated international trade and labor relations between countries.7 These “gravity” relations and/or interactions are manifested in the following expression:

\[
T_{ij} = A \cdot Y_i \cdot Y_j / D_{ij}
\]

Where

\(T_{ij}\) is the volume of trade between country \(i\) and country \(j\).

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6 Tatibekov and Hanks, *Gravity Model of Ethnic Migration*.
A is a constant;
\( Y_i \) is the Gross Domestic Product of country \( i \);
\( Y_j \) is the Gross Domestic Product of country \( j \); and
\( D_{ij} \) is the distance between country \( i \) and country \( j \).

As can be seen from the above expression, the gravity force in the external trade relations between countries \( i \) and \( j \) is directly proportional to their economic potential (GDP) and is inversely proportional to the distance between them.

Similar laws of gravity apply to population migration processes. Some works suggest that the gravity force in migration depends on the number of people living in areas \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) and the distance \( D \) between these areas, which can be expressed as follows:

\[
G = \frac{P_1 \cdot P_2}{D}
\]

Where
\( G \) is the gravity force;
\( P_1 \) is the population of area \( P_1 \);
\( P_2 \) is the population of area \( P_2 \); and
\( D \) is the distance between areas \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \).

According to the gravity model, in addition to the size of the economies of two countries and the distance between them, cultural affinity is a very important determinant of strong economic ties. Indeed, cultural affinity explains the fact that many Turkish employees worked in Kazakhstan, representing more than one-quarter of all foreign employees (26.4 percent) working in Kazakhstan. During the same period, Chinese workers represented more than one-fifth of all employees (22.2 percent).

Over a 16-year span, certain dynamics can be observed. Figure 6.2 shows the number of official labor migrants who worked in Kazakhstan between January 1, 2001 and July 30, 2017. The number of

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foreign laborers was not constant. Between 2001 and 2007/2008, their number increased from 10,720 people annually to 58,810 and 54,204, respectively. In 2009, however, their number almost halved; the dramatic growth of the early 2000s has not resumed since. Thus, we can divide official labor migration in Kazakhstan into two stages. The initial stage sees migration rise in line with economic growth. This growth collapses with the global economic crisis of 2009, which inaugurates the second stage. Interestingly, the total cohort of workers in the period leading up to 2009 is almost the same as that in the years since 2009: 248,700 and 236,397 respectively.

Figure 6.2. Number of labor migrants working officially in Kazakhstan, January 1, 2001–July 30, 2017 (persons)

Having identified these distinct periods, we now explore the geographical parameters and spatial dynamics of labor migration in Kazakhstan: from the beginning of 2001 to mid-2009; and from mid-2009 to the end of 2017.

Spatial Dynamics of External Labor Migration in the Period of Economic Growth

During the first period, the majority of official labor migrants worked in the western regions of Kazakhstan. These oblasts (West Kazakhstan, Atyrau, and Mangistau) are coastal zones on the Caspian Sea. Many official labor migrants also worked in Akmola oblast (including Astana city) and Almaty oblast (including Almaty city). The main factors drawing workers to these regions were related to Kazakhstan’s development strategy, namely:

- Kazakhstan’s comparative economic advantage in the oil and gas sectors;
- The construction of a new capital (Astana);
- The huge power potential of the old capital (Almaty); and, most importantly
- The Kazakh economy’s openness to global markets and desire to integrate into the world economy.

Figure 6.3, which was composed using GIS technology, displays the total number of official labor migrants working in different regions of Kazakhstan from January 1, 2001 to July 2009.9

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9 Two polygons—Akmola and Astana oblasts—reflect not only the number of labor migrants to these oblasts but also the number of labor migrants to the cities of Almaty and Astana, respectively.
Chapter 6. Spatial Dynamics of External Labor Migration in Contemporary Kazakhstan

Figure 6.3. Official labor migration in Kazakhstan, January 1, 2001–June 30, 2009 (persons)

One-fourth of official labor migrants during the period in question worked in Atyrau oblast, mostly in the spheres of construction, real estate, mining, hotel and restaurant services, and transport and communication. That being said, the number of labor migrants who worked in the sphere of construction far exceeded the number of those who worked in other branches of the economy. In 2008, for example, 70 percent of the official foreign labor force worked in construction. The majority of migrants were skilled specialists.

Labor migrants in Atyrau represented more than 120 countries. A plurality of them—almost 40 percent of the total—were Turkish citizens. Large groups of migrants also came from the UK, India, and Hungary. Next came citizens of Italy, the Philippines, and the US, followed by migrants from Canada, China, Thailand, Russia, and Ukraine. One of the features of labor migration in Atyrau oblast during this time was tremendous growth in the number of labor migrants from India, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Notably, there was comparatively little official labor migration to this region from the former Soviet Union. This can be explained by the fact that, in the absence of a visa regime between Kazakhstan and Russia, Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan, many migrants from those countries worked in Kazakhstan illegally. This was facilitated by their knowledge of Russian or Kazakh, which made them less visible than foreigners from other countries, who typically struggled to integrate into the local culture.

Mangistau oblast, the least populated region of the country, is gaining in importance because of the port city of Aktau, which is playing an increasing role in the transportation of crude oil, wheat, and other goods to Azerbaijan, Russia, and Iran. Export of different goods through the port of Aktau is strategically important for Kazakhstan’s future development and integration into global markets. Given its oil and gas resources, the oblast is very attractive to foreign companies and thus draws labor migrants from various countries: Cyprus, Romania, the UK, Russia, Moldova, Philippines, and Ukraine, among others. During this period, foreign labor migrants worked primarily in the spheres of construction, mining, transport and communications, and processing.

In contrast to Atyrau and Mangistau oblasts, where the plurality of labor migrants were Turkish, in West Kazakhstan oblast, citizens of India, the UK, and Italy made up the largest groups of foreign laborers. This was connected, at least in part, to the fact that between 2001 and 2009, the economic development of the region was defined by local and foreign companies, among them Kazmunaigaz, British Gas, Adjip, and others. The oblast’s foreign labor force largely worked in the oil and gas industry; foreign workers were also involved in the extraction of other natural resources.

In 2001–2009, the plurality of labor migrants in Kazakhstan (25 percent) worked in Almaty, due to the high number of employment opportunities to be found there. As the most populous urban center in the country, the “southern republic” has tremendous
potential to act as an engine of Kazakhstan’s development. Migrants were employed in a diverse range of sectors: processing, mining, trade, hotel and restaurant services, transport and communication, real property business, finance, education, etc. Migrants in Almaty most commonly found work in construction. The majority came from Turkey and China, but Russia, the UK, the US, North Korea, and India were also represented.

An important event affecting migration patterns was the relocation of its capital from Almaty to Astana. This not only created new job opportunities for citizens, but also attracted significant numbers of foreign workers. Labor migrants arrived from various countries—Kosovo, Iran, Macedonia, Serbia, Yugoslavia, Russia, etc.—to work in the new capital, but again the top two migrant-sending countries were Turkey (70.2 percent) and China (13.2 percent). Among labor migrants who worked in Astana, 65.3 percent were professionals in the sphere of engineering. A further one-fourth were education professionals.

A temporal analysis of labor migration shows that it largely paralleled Kazakhstan’s economic development. As the economy grew from 2000, so too did migration. By 2008, when economic growth began to drop off, the number of labor migrants was also in decline. Figure 6.4 highlights, however, that not every oblast followed this general trend. In West Kazakhstan oblast, the highest number of labor migrants was recorded in 2001–2002.

**Figure 6.4. Dynamics of labor migration to oblasts of Kazakhstan, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 (persons)**

![Graph showing labor migration to oblasts of Kazakhstan](image)

**Source:** Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

**Labor Migration from Neighboring Countries**

Kazakhstan has received—and continues to receive—many labor migrants from neighboring countries. For citizens of Kazakhstan’s Central Asian neighbors, migrating to Kazakhstan makes sense not only due to the latter’s geographical proximity to their home country, but also from an economic perspective. Table 6.1 gives the average monthly salary in Kazakhstan and other former Soviet republics, including neighboring Central Asian countries, in the period between 2001 and 2009.

With the exception of Russia, monthly salaries in Kazakhstan exceeded those of any other post-Soviet country during the period. The biggest differences can be observed between Kazakhstan, on the one hand, and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, on the other. In 2001, the average monthly salary in Kazakhstan was US$118, compared to $30 in Kyrgyzstan, a four-fold difference. In the same year, the monthly salary in Kazakhstan was almost 12 times higher than that in Tajikistan. By 2008, salaries in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had both risen substantially, but workers in Kazakhstan still made 3.4 times as much as their Kyrgyz counterparts on a monthly basis (US$503 to US$147). The disparity between Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, meanwhile, almost halved in that period, leaving the Kazakh figure 7.3 times higher.

**Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan**

Spatial analysis of labor migration from Kyrgyzstan between 2001 and mid-2009 shows that more than 96 percent of the country’s labor migrants worked in oblasts of Kazakhstan that bordered Kyrgyzstan, such as Almaty and Zhambyl (see Figure 6.5).
Table 6.1. Monthly salary in former Soviet republics (US$)

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Figure 6.5. Labor migration from Kyrgyzstan, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

This pattern developed in large part due to geographical proximity: gravity modeling suggests that Zhambyl oblast was the favored oblast among Kyrgyz migrants. Also important was the fact that Almaty had a comparatively developed business environment with many opportunities for migrants. Notably, when the capital was moved to Astana, creating new jobs, numerous migrants began to go there, despite the fact that it was further away from Kyrgyzstan.

Kazakhstan’s developed market, high salaries, and high consumer demand were attractive to Kyrgyz labor migrants. Many of them worked in the agriculture sector, thanks to a labor migration cooperation agreement that allowed Kyrgyz migrants to work officially on collective farms in Almaty and Zhambyl oblasts. Their labor helped cover Kazakhstan’s shortfall during the harvest. Others engaged in trade, selling goods that they produced in Kyrgyzstan and/or bought in China.

Labor Migration from Uzbekistan

One of the main challenges facing labor migration from Uzbekistan to Kazakhstan during the period was the absence of official agreements between the two countries and the lack of mechanisms, on the Kazakh side, for “officializing” unskilled migrants.
As a result, the majority of Uzbek migrants worked illegally, though a small share did manage to work officially. Figure 6.6 shows official labor migration from Uzbekistan between the beginning of 2001 and mid-2009.

The majority of labor migrants from Uzbekistan were employed in one of the country's two capital regions: Astana city and Akmola oblast (40 percent) and Almaty city and its oblast (27.2 percent). The main reason for this was the jobs created by the construction boom in urban areas, which was especially pronounced in Astana and Almaty. Uzbeks are traditionally considered to be good construction workers, allowing many of them to find work in this sector. A smaller group of Uzbek migrants (15.1 percent) worked in the Zhambyl and South Kazakhstan oblasts, which border Uzbekistan. According to an International Organization for Migration survey conducted in this region, labor migrants from Uzbekistan were employed in harvesting cotton and tobacco, trade, and education.10

Labor Migration from Turkmenistan
Despite its proximity, Turkmenistan's emigration policy meant that comparatively few migrants worked in Kazakhstan. Indeed, the number of official labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan exceeded the number from Turkmenistan by 60 times.

Of the migrants who did arrive from Turkmenistan, more than half (56 percent) worked in Mangistau oblast, which borders Turkmenistan. Smaller groups worked in the Atyrau, Akmola, and Almaty oblasts. Thus, as Figure 6.7 shows, the distance or geographic factor was very pronounced in labor migration from Turkmenistan.

Labor Migration from Russia
Russia is Kazakhstan's northern neighbor. The border between these two countries is the longest continuous border in the world. Six oblasts of Kazakhstan border the Russian Federation, but in the 2001–2009 period, the majority of Russian labor migrants in Kazakhstan worked in a single oblast: West Kazakhstan. (See Figure 6.8.)

West Kazakhstan was attractive to Russian migrants due not only to its geographical proximity to Russia, but also to its booming economy. As mentioned above, West Kazakhstan oblast has oil, gas, and other natural resources, sectors Russia dominated during the Soviet era; Russian migrants continue to hold higher qualifications than their Central Asian counterparts in these professions. Moreover, natural resource extraction meant that salaries in the region were much higher than in the five other oblasts of Kazakhstan that bordered Russia. Comparatively high numbers of Russian migrants could also be found in Atyrau and Mangistau oblasts: in the period of economic growth, these three oblasts combined to attract 59 percent of official Russian labor migrants.

Chapter 6. Spatial Dynamics of External Labor Migration in Contemporary Kazakhstan

Figure 6.7. Labor migration from Turkmenistan, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Figure 6.8. Labor migration from Russia, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Labor Migration from China
Between the beginning of 2001 and mid-2009, the total number of labor migrants from China exceeded the number of labor migrants from all other neighboring countries combined. More than 40 percent of official Chinese labor migrants worked in Almaty city and its oblast (see Figure 6.9).

Most Chinese labor migrants in Almaty engaged in small- or medium-sized business, trade, and agriculture. About one-fifth of them also worked in Astana and Akmola oblast as a whole, where they were employed in construction by Chinese companies. A further one-sixth worked in Aktobe oblast, where an agreement between Kazakhstan and China to develop the region’s oil and gas sector and construct an oil pipeline to western China created jobs. All these job opportunities in Kazakhstan meant that official labor migration from China increased by more than 18 times between the beginning of 2001 and mid-2009.
Analysis

On the whole, the plurality of official labor migrants from neighboring countries worked in the oblasts of Kazakhstan that bordered their countries. Such a finding is in line with the gravity theory mentioned above. However, these numbers likely do not tell the whole story. Owing to complex procedures for gaining the right to live and work in Kazakhstan, many small and medium-sized businesses or domestic employers prefer not to extend official invitations to foreign workers. Thus, many labor migrants from neighboring countries work illegally, a situation made possible by the short distances between countries and visa-free travel agreements between Kazakhstan and its neighbors.

An overall analysis of the spatial dynamics of external labor migration in the period of economic growth (from the beginning of 2001 to mid-2009) shows that five regions of Kazakhstan—the oblasts of West Kazakhstan, Atyrau and Mangistau, and the cities of Astana and Almaty—were the main areas of foreign labor force activity. Labor migrants worked in these regions because of their economic potential and geographical proximity to migrants’ home countries.

International Labor Migration from July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2017

As mentioned above, the total number of foreign laborers was almost the same during the period of economic growth and the post-2009 period. Comparative spatial analysis of the foreign labor force, however, highlights some differences between these two periods. Although the same five regions of Kazakhstan—the oblasts of West Kazakhstan, Atyrau and Mangistau, and the cities of Astana and Almaty—continued to attract the majority of the foreign labor force, the distribution of migrants changed.

After the beginning of the global economic crisis, the number of labor migrants working in Akmola region (including Astana) and Mangistau oblast increased. In Almaty and West Kazakhstan, by contrast, the number of official labor migrants decreased, while the number in Atyrau oblast remained fairly static. In addition, the latter period saw a rise in the number of foreign workers in East Kazakhstan oblast, Pavlodar oblast, South Kazakhstan oblast, and Zhambyl oblast, where labor migration had previously been negligible.

Migrants from China and Turkey continued to dominate the official foreign labor force in Kazakhstan, with more than 10,000 workers apiece. Figure 6.10 shows the change in the composition of the foreign labor force among the next group of countries: those with at least 1,000 workers employed officially in Kazakhstan. In the second period, the number of workers from the UK, India, Italy, and South Korea increased. At the same time, Hungary, Romania, the US, and the Philippines experienced a decline in the number of their citizens working abroad in Kazakhstan.
Labor Migration from Neighboring Countries

One of our aims in this paper is to show the gravity model in action. In our analysis of labor migration from neighboring countries between the beginning of 2001 and mid-2009, we concluded that this model works: in many cases, labor migrants from neighboring countries tried to work in the regions of Kazakhstan that bordered their home countries. After the onset of the global economic crisis, many of these migrants continued to work in Kazakhstan. Below, we present a comparative analysis between these two periods.

Figure 6.11 shows that the majority of labor migrants from Kyrgyzstan continued to work in Almaty region following the economic crisis. This was due not only to geographical proximity, but also to Almaty’s developed business climate. Indeed, many Kyrgyz now own businesses in Almaty: they work there during the week, then make the three-hour drive home to see family members on the weekend. They also continue to work on the collective farms of Almaty oblast, chiefly harvesting different fruits and vegetables. One notable change is that a significant number of Kyrgyz migrants (more than 1,000) began working in Mangistau oblast following the global economic crisis.

On the whole, however, labor migration from Kyrgyzstan declined dramatically with the global financial crisis. As Figure 6.12 shows, more than 12,000 Kyrgyz migrants worked officially in Kazakhstan during the period of economic growth, whereas in the period between mid-2009 and mid-2017, that number stood at just 2,500.

That being said, the data for the second period are not entirely representative of the situation on the ground. It appears from the figure that labor migration from Kyrgyzstan dropped to zero in 2016. However, this is merely indicative of the fact that Kyrgyzstan became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) that year, with the result that Kyrgyz citizens no longer needed labor permits to work in other EEU countries.

Figure 6.13 provides a spatial comparison of labor migration from Uzbekistan in the two periods. As noted above, during the period of economic growth the majority of labor migrants from Uzbekistan were employed in Astana city and Akmola oblast (40.0 percent), as well as Almaty city and its oblast (27.2 percent), mostly in the booming construction sector. Many migrants also worked in Zhambyl and South Kazakhstan oblasts, where they were employed in harvesting cotton and tobacco, trade, and education. The destinations of labor migrants from Uzbekistan diversified with the global economic crisis. Migrants began to work in Atyrau and Mangistau oblasts: 40 percent of all labor migrants from Uzbekistan in the latter period were employed in these two oblasts.

Figure 6.14 shows the dynamics of labor migration from Uzbekistan. Labor migration grew particularly rapidly in 2015 and 2016, to the point that 4,000 Uzbek migrants were officially employed in Kazakhstan in 2016.

As for Turkmenistan, migration to Kazakhstan diversified following the global financial crisis. Not only did migrants continue working in South Kazakhstan, Karagandy, and Aktobe oblasts, but they also found work in the western regions of Kazakhstan: Mangistau oblast, Atyrau oblast, and West Kazakhstan oblast (see Figure 6.15).
Figure 6.11. Labor migration from Kyrgyzstan by destination region: January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2017 compared (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Figure 6.12. Labor Migration from Kyrgyzstan, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2017 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Figure 6.13. Labor migration from Uzbekistan by destination region: January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2017 compared (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Figure 6.14. Labor migration from Uzbekistan, 2001 to June 30, 2017 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Figure 6.15. Labor migration from Turkmenistan by destination region: January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2017 compared (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan

Figure 6.16. Labor migration from Turkmenistan, January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2017 (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
No numerical trend can be established in this labor migration, however. As Figure 16.6 shows, migration fluctuated widely in both periods. A total of 402 labor migrants from Turkmenistan worked in Kazakhstan between 2001 and June 30, 2017, equally split between the two periods.

Moving beyond Central Asian migration, we turn to the case of Russia. Since the global financial crisis, Russian migrants have continued to work in the same regions as they did during the period of economic growth. They have also diversified their geographical presence, finding jobs in the South Kazakhstan and Pavlodar oblasts, among others (see Figure 6.17).

As in the case of Kyrgyzstan, Russian labor migrants enjoy free movement and the right to work in EEU countries. As a result, there are no statistics on official labor migrants from Russia to Kazakhstan as of 2014, though this does not mean that the number of Russians working in Kazakhstan has dropped. On the contrary, Russians may now have more job opportunities there.

Figure 6.17. Labor migration from Russia by destination region: January 1, 2001 to June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2017 compared (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
All in all, we find that some countries sent more migrants between 2009 and mid-2017, while labor migration from other countries decreased. Migrants’ destination regions also diversified: although the same five regions continued to attract the most migrants, South Kazakhstan and Pavlodar grew as migrant-receiving regions. Accordingly, the gravity model had less explanatory power than it did during the period of economic growth. Labor migrants worked in regions that were far from their countries, as in the case of Kyrgyz in Mangistau oblast. Thus, the economic imperative to find a job outweighed concerns about its proximity to home.

**China and Turkey: Labor Migration Compared**

As mentioned above, the majority of Kazakhstan’s foreign labor force during the entire period came from two countries: China and Turkey. However, in the first period there were more workers from Turkey than from China, whereas Chinese workers were more numerous than their Turkish counterparts in the second period. (See Figure 6.19.)

The main drivers of this reversal were: Chinese activity in the western regions of Kazakhstan, which have tremendous natural resource wealth; Chinese companies’ engagement in the construction of the new capital, Astana; and the realization of China’s new economic policy, “One Belt One Road,” in the south of Kazakhstan.

Figure 6.20 looks at the regions where China’s official labor force found employment in the two periods. Chinese workers diversified their places of employment substantially in the latter period. Not only did they find employment in the East Kazakhstan and Pavlodar oblasts—as the gravity model would predict, since both oblasts border China—but they also began to work in southern regions, such as the South Kazakhstan oblast.

Figure 6.21 displays the dynamics of Chinese labor force activity by region of Kazakhstan. As we can see, Chinese labor migrants became much more active toward the end of the latter period. Activity almost doubled between 2013 and 2014, and increased by two-thirds between 2014 and 2015. In this time, migrants increased their activity in almost all regions of Kazakhstan (exceptions being the North Kazakhstan, Kostanay, and West Kazakhstan oblasts). In Pavlodar oblast, the Chinese labor force experienced almost ten-fold growth between 2013 and 2014, while East
Chapter 6. Spatial Dynamics of External Labor Migration in Contemporary Kazakhstan

Figure 6.19. Number of labor migrants from China and Turkey, 2001 to 2016 (thousand persons)

Kazakhstan saw a twelve-fold increase during the same period. In Astana, where the largest share of Chinese migrants (26.3 percent) were employed after the financial crisis, their number increased by 52.8 percent between 2013 and 2014. This trend accounts for the overall increase in the foreign labor force between 2009 and 2017.

We now turn to Turkey, which also sent tens of thousands of labor migrants to Kazakhstan. During the period of economic growth, the majority of them worked in three regions of Kazakhstan: Atyrau oblast, Astana, and Almaty. (See Figure 6.22.) In the period of economic crisis, Turkish activity in Atyrau oblast and Almaty city fell by about four times.

Between 2001 and 2007, the number of workers from Turkey gradually increased, to the point that almost 30,000 Turkish nationals were employed in Kazakhstan. With the onset of the global economic crisis, however, this number declined to almost one-third of this peak. Whereas a total of 94,700 Turkish migrants worked in Kazakhstan between 2001 and mid-2009, only 35,300 found employment in the country between mid-2009 and mid-2017.
Figure 6.20. Labor migration from China by destination region: January 1, 2001–June 30, 2009 and July 1, 2009–June 30, 2017 compared (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Figure 6.21. Chinese labor force activity by region of Kazakhstan (persons)

Source: Composed by the authors using data from the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Republic of Kazakhstan
Conclusion

As a brief conclusion to this overview, we can say that in the period of economic growth between 2001 and mid-2009, labor migration from Turkey was in line with the gravity model from the perspective of cultural affinity. In China, the gravity model prevailed from the perspective of distance and economic potential in the latter period. It seems that cultural affinity became a less important factor in determining labor migration than economic potential and geographic proximity. We can predict that labor migration from China is destined to increase.
PART III. COPING STRATEGIES

Chapter 7. Exploring the Effect of Registration Documents on the Citizenship Rights of Rural Migrants in Kyrgyzstan

Ajar Chekirova, University of Illinois at Chicago

Internal migrants may, under certain conditions, face both formal and informal barriers to obtaining social services like education, healthcare, and government assistance that are more common for transnational migrants than mobile citizens. Propiska or post-propiska migrant registration regimes in post-Soviet countries—such as those in Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan—restrict access to identification documents (passport, driver's license, etc.), employment, pensions, banking, and voting for internal and international migrants alike. As a result of state policies that require citizens to provide documentation that proves their legal right to be there, internal migrants find themselves with diminished citizenship rights in their own country.

The majority of migration and citizenship studies, however, do not address this phenomenon, instead focusing on international migration, particularly from the Global South to the Global North. In recent years, a small but growing body of literature has begun to address international migration between developing countries, but the politics of internal migration and the citizenship rights of rural migrants in cities remain largely under-researched, with just a few studies offering comparative analysis of internal migration, of which a subset focus on post-Soviet states. Thus, in spite of the extent and urgency of the problem, there are gaps in scholarly understanding of the relationship between internal migration and the concept and practice of citizenship in developing and democratizing states.

This chapter attempts to address the issue of diminished citizenship rights using a case study of post-Soviet urban registration, or propiska, in Kyrgyzstan. There are an estimated 350,000 internal migrants in Bishkek, the capital city, who together comprise almost 30 percent of the city's population. These individuals, however, typically lack propiska, or local registration. In order to obtain an urban propiska, an internal migrant needs to prove that he or she owns real estate or has a formal rental agreement in the city, something that is beyond the financial means of many migrants. Instead, they tend to build homes on land obtained illegally, such that their property rights are not recognized by the state. As a result, many unregistered rural migrants in Bishkek have limited access to healthcare, education, social services, the banking system, or formal employment. Moreover, registration requirements have been integrated into other laws and policies concerning issuance of identification documents, property inheritance, criminal justice, welfare, marriage, and elections, thereby socially and politically disenfranchising these migrants. In essence, the lives of unregistered internal migrants are not dissimilar to those of undocumented international immigrants. The crucial distinction, however, is that rural migrants are de jure citizens of the state.

4 "In the Soviet Union (and briefly in the Russian Federation and other Warsaw Pact countries): a permit entitling a person to reside (and therefore work) in a particular city or town" (Oxford English Dictionary).
This chapter explores the question of how undocumented internal migrants experience encounters with the state through their routine everyday interactions with government bureaucracies, law enforcement, the public education system, and the public healthcare system. By exploring how these everyday experiences affect the way in which they perceive the nature of the government and themselves as citizens, this provides a bottom-up perspective of how institutions are practiced in everyday life and how rural migrants’ experiences with the state inform their broader political orientations. The core argument of this chapter is that political-administrative institutions that require documentation such as propiska are integrated into major aspects of human life and require routine interactions with the state bureaucracy, thus shaping people’s understanding of the state in general and their place within it.

**Literature Review and Methodology**

This chapter speaks to the social science scholarship on migration and citizenship. Propiska-based exclusion and discrimination of internal migrants in post-Soviet Central Asia has been well-researched by various scholars. However, the relationship between propiska, internal migration, and the conception and practice of citizenship in urban Central Asia remains unexplored.

Citizenship is a complex, multifaceted concept. It has been variously defined and conceptualized in terms of legal status, identity, justice, social welfare, and culture. The idea of citizenship as a legal status dates back to the Roman Empire, where it was defined in terms of rights and privileges, i.e. one is a citizen if one has access to these rights. This Roman imperial concept of citizenship resembles the individualistic emphasis and legalistic framework of modern liberalism, where citizenship is a set of individual rights (civil rights and liberties) and responsibilities (paying taxes, army service, etc.). From this perspective, citizenship is a dual concept: it is inclusive, as it grants certain privileges to all those who belong to a community, but it also delineates “outsiders,” making these communities exclusive. Thus, in the words of Bosniak, “[citizenship] represents both an engine of universality and a brake or limit upon it.”

In contrast to the emphasis on legal status, Marshall’s idea of social citizenship points to the conflict between the concept of citizenship as a system of equality and capitalism as a system of inequality between social classes. Based on the experience of England, Thomas H. Marshall divides the historical evolution and expansion of citizenship into three parts: civic, political, and social. The civil part is the rights and freedoms granted to citizens, such as freedom of speech and faith, private property rights, and so on. The political part is the right to political participation, e.g. voting and running for political office. Finally, social citizenship—Marshall’s original conceptualization of citizenship—is “the whole range: the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society.”

Marshall argues that the historical sequence of citizenship evolution in a liberal capitalist state is that people first gain civil rights, then achieve political rights. Once they have a political voice, they can form labor unions and advocate for social and economic welfare. As citizenship rights continue to expand, Marshall argues, so too does the contradiction between civil rights that provide protection from the state and social rights to welfare benefits guaranteed by the state. There is, by extension, a social conflict between inequality in a capitalist system protected by civil rights and social citizenship. At the same time, Marshall indicates that citizenship and social class are comparable, since citizenship itself is “the architect
of legitimate social inequality.”

Marshall thus hints at the presence of “second-class citizens”—individuals of lower socio-economic status—in a capitalist system. Similarly, Bosniak argues that the normative principle of citizenship is the baseline of economic well-being that is necessary for democratic inclusion, i.e. measures that include laws that guarantee a right to employment, housing, and food, as well as other social welfare policies.

Until recently, citizenship debates have been disproportionately based on evidence from industrialized countries, but these theories do not work well when applied to developing states. Recently, however, the issues facing developing countries have received greater scholarly attention. For instance, Yashar explores changing citizenship regimes and how they affected indigenous communities and their political mobilization in Latin America. Although the indigenous groups described by Yashar enjoyed the same access to social rights as workers and peasants (education, healthcare, pensions, etc.), the state did not extend them political rights, thereby excluding indigenous groups from citizenship by depoliticizing their ethnic identities, even though they held legal citizenship status in their respective states. Based on evidence from Southeast Asia, Sadiq develops a model of “blurred membership and documented citizenship,” where citizens by birth are not recognized by the state due to their lack of official documents, while illegal immigrants gain access to fraudulent documents through informal channels. This happens because the parents of many children born in poor rural areas in South Asia and elsewhere in the developing world did not—and still do not—get birth certificates, which serve as proof of citizenship and the basis for other official documents. At the same time, undocumented immigrants from other countries are able to obtain fake or fraudulent “papers” informally, including on the black market, which is outside state control. The importance of this research is manifold: it draws attention away from the definition of citizenship to its everyday practice, particularly in the context of developing states with weak institutions. It also emphasizes the importance of identification documents and official “papers” to an individual’s ability to exercise citizenship rights.

The citizenship literature has evolved and expanded to address many issues of belonging and the citizenship rights of social classes, cultural minorities, and immigrants. An increasing number of scholars are investigating these dynamics in developing countries, yet the colossal body of citizenship literature contains very few studies that examine the implications of internal (rather than international) migration on citizenship outcomes. Scholars of social citizenship focus on class inequalities, scholars of multicultural citizenship on racial and cultural inequalities, and neither takes into account differences between rural migrants and “native” city residents in terms of the practice of citizenship.

One of the few studies to explore such issues is Holston’s work on “insurgent citizenship”—that is, the sharp conflict between the exploitation and deprivation of the urban poor living in the Sao Paolo slums and their increasingly coherent demands for social justice and inclusion in urban citizenship. Similarly, looking at Mumbai and Kolkata, Abbas shows that although Indian laws guarantee the right of free movement of people, local policies and practices limit the citizenship rights of internal migrants, making discrimination a daily reality for those from lower strata. For instance, local government officials make it difficult for the lower classes to obtain the ration cards that serve as the basis of social welfare and the election cards that serve as the basis of voting. Moreover, rural migrants are often perceived as outsiders “flooding” cities, degrading city culture and straining local resources. Although rural migrants play an important role in cities’ development by providing cheap labor for construction projects, manufacturing, and services, they are “socially rejected” by both “native” urban residents and the state. State approaches to urban renewal often mean bulldozing areas with high concentrations of poor migrants,

13 Bosniak, “Citizenship, Noncitizenship, and the Transnationalization…”
15 Ibid., 49.
19 Ibid.
while those who earn informal income face police intimidation.20

Although the right of internal movement within a country is itself conferred by citizenship,21 this right is often constrained by specific state policies. Most often, such policies are encapsulated in registration requirements. In Malaysia, citizens are required to obtain documents and permissions in order to visit the country’s eastern states of Sabah and Sarawak.22 Vietnam has a special system for categorizing residents of rural and urban areas, on the basis of which they receive government services, but internal migrants are largely excluded from these entitlements, diminishing their social citizenship. 23 Household registration (hukou) in China restricts rural peasants’ ability to permanently relocate to cities.24

Similarly, while local permanent registration (propiska) in post-Soviet states does not formally restrict movement, it creates sharp distinctions between “natives” and “migrants,” de facto allowing public bureaucracies to treat the latter as second-class citizens. Research on post-Soviet migration and the propiska system has historically taken a state-centric approach, focusing on labor migration from the former Soviet republics to Russia. The institutional endurance of the propiska system in Russia has been explained from a federalist perspective,25 from a market perspective,26 and as a tool of state migration control.27 This chapter follows previous work on migration and registration regimes in Central Asia in utilizing a bottom-up ethnographic perspective. It integrates the issues of rural-urban migration into citizenship debates and contributes to scholarship in several ways: 1) providing a bottom-up, individual-level perspective of the institutional effects of migration policies; 2) developing a new direction in the study of citizenship and inequality; and 3) drawing attention to an under-researched region.

The data for this research come from legal analysis of current laws and normative acts governing citizenship rights and the propiska regime in Kyrgyzstan, as well as 78 semi-structured interviews with unregistered internal migrants, which took place in January–September 2016. In order to ensure within-case variation, several communities were selected based on variation in population size, year the community was established (i.e. older and new-er neighborhoods), and the legal status of the land. The selected neighborhoods include Dordoi, Ak-Jar, Altyn-Kazyk,Aktilek, and Kalys-Ordo.

Findings

**Laws Governing Registration and Their Practice**

One of the biggest problems with legislation governing international migration and registration is the contradiction between various national and local policies, which leaves a great deal of room for bureaucratic discretion. For example, the law states that internal migrants who plan to stay in the city for more than 45 days must apply to the authorities for a new registration no later than five working days after arriving. According to national laws, in order to apply for a permanent or temporary registration, an individual need only fill out an application form and provide an identification document. However, a Bishkek city ordinance states that authorities are allowed to require additional documents. In practice, the lack of a public list of “other” documents creates the grounds for abuse of authority.

In Bishkek, the registering authorities further require proof of deregistration from the previous residence and documented proof of property ownership or a formal rental contract, which are often unavailable to rural migrants. Since many rural migrants have limited financial means and move to the city in search of work opportunities, they often cannot afford to buy apartment or houses, particularly considering that registration is required to apply for

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22 Sadiq, Paper Citizens.
25 Light, Fragile Migration Rights.
26 Buckley, “The Myth of Managed Migration.”
a mortgage. All the migrants I interviewed cited lack of financial means as a reason for living in novostroi-kas, the slums of Bishkek, instead of buying or renting a proper apartment or house in the city. A few interviewees described a situation in which they tried to apply for a bank loan but were denied due to lack of registration. It is also very difficult to convince a homeowner to establish a formal rental agreement, as homeowners want to avoid hefty taxes on rental income and higher utilities payments, and are also afraid that people registered at their dwelling may claim property rights in the future. They may have grounds for that fear: according to the State Public Notary Office, if other relatives fail to claim a property within six months of the owner's death, it transfers to the individuals registered at the dwelling. In view of these issues, migrants typically live in squatter settlements, which, due to the informal status of the property, they cannot officially register as their place of permanent residence.

Exercise of Civic Citizenship: Voting Rights
Of the 78 migrants I interviewed in Bishkek, one in three said that they did not participate in the 2015 parliamentary elections because they did not have Bishkek registration. Some of them were not aware of the special procedure for voting in a place different from their place of permanent residence. Other respondents were turned away from the polling station because they could not find their names on voter rolls and were directed by the precinct administration to vote in their place of permanent residence.

Another third of the migrants interviewed did not vote for reasons other than lack of Bishkek registration, such as illness or business. However, half of those who cited other reasons for not voting exhibited feelings of low political efficacy, saying things like “my vote does not change anything” or “voting does not make sense, it is a waste of time.” Only 23 internal migrants in my sample exercised their right to vote: among them, eight voted in their hometowns or villages, where they have propiska, meaning that only 15 voted in Bishkek. All 15 had received higher education and were employed, which means that they had greater access to information.

Analysis of post-election data collected in collaboration with a local nonprofit organization shows that in the 2017 presidential elections a large number of people did not vote due to registration problems.28 A random sample of 1,020 registered voters nationwide was asked about whether they voted and their reasons for participating or not participating in the elections. According to the State Registration Service, 56.3 percent of all registered voters participated in these elections. Survey respondents, however, reported a 76.5 percent turnout rate, which can be explained by social desirability bias. Even considering that turnout was over-reported, 12.6 percent of those who said they did not vote cited their lack of propiska and lack of knowledge of how to register to vote without it as their main reason for not participating in the elections.

Exercise of Social Citizenship: Welfare Rights
Education
The Kyrgyz Republic has signed on to international treaties that proclaim non-discrimination in citizens’ right to education, and its national laws and education policies reflect that commitment. For example, the Law on Education states that citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic have the right to education regardless of their gender, nationality, language, social and economic status, occupation, religious and political beliefs, place of residence, and other status. Theoretically, all individuals residing in the country should be allowed to attend elementary and secondary educational institutions.29 In 2004, the “Access to Education” program, which was approved by the President, introduced new mechanisms for protecting all children’s rights to education, emphasizing unhindered access to public schools for all children (regardless of location and living conditions) as one of its most important tasks.

However, the implementation of such progressive legislation prohibiting discrimination against migrant children is not being realized in practice.

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28 For more information about the survey and the results, visit the Public Fund Civic Platform website, http://platforma.kg/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/%D0%9E%D1%82%D1%87%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BE%D0%BE-%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B7%D1%83%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%82%D0%B%0%0B%D0%BC-%D0%BE%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82-%D0%B2%D1%8B%D0%B1%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B D%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D0%B5%D1%84%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%0%B-%D0%B3%1%80%D0%B0%D1%84%D0%B4%D0%B0%D0%BD-1.pdf

29 Paragraph 43 of the Standard Statute on General Educational Institutions issued by the Minister for Education, Science and Culture of the Kyrgyz Republic.
The 90 public schools that comprise the elementary and secondary educational system in Bishkek receive almost one-third of the city budget. Even so, these schools cannot meet the needs of Bishkek’s growing population: city schools are overcrowded and forced to work in shifts, overstretches administrative and teaching capacity. To control enrollment, principals often refuse admission to migrant children, technically a violation of the law.

Of the 78 internal migrants in Bishkek whom I interviewed, 28 had school-age children. Twelve of them reported being asked for propiska when applying to public schools in the city, and 9 out of 12 paid bribes or informally negotiated school placement through relatives in government positions. One female respondent relentlessly pressured the Ministry of Education to facilitate the admission process because education is a right, while another mother sought help from a children’s rights NGO:

When I tried to put my son in kindergarten, the administration rejected us because we did not have a Bishkek propiska. When it was time for him to go to elementary school, again we were rejected. For a year and a half, I was battling with the school. I asked for help from an international organization called Child Protection Center, and with their pressure the school finally accepted us. But now my boy is 9 years old and just starting first grade… He should have the same right to education as other children, but it took us almost two years.

—B., 29, female, registered in Osh; has lived in Bishkek for five years

…I feel that people without propiska are treated unfairly. I have been denied jobs because of it. It was difficult to put my children in school because of it. At school, my daughter’s classmates asked her whether she was from Bishkek and where she was from before befriending her. Even my youngest daughter was asked about it in kindergarten.

—S., 42, female, registered in Kayindi; has lived in Bishkek for 14 years

Although parents would prefer to send their children to city schools, which they believe provide better-quality education, most children of low-income internal migrants attend schools in novostroikas, where they are not asked for propiska.

Healthcare

In terms of healthcare, the law states that all citizens have the right to health, social justice, equality, access to medical assistance, and social protection in the event of loss of health. Furthermore, “all citizens have the right to healthcare regardless of…their place of residence, by granting equal opportunities to exercise the right to medical assistance.” In practice, however, rural migrants experience discrimination in public healthcare. In some instances, doctors or administrators require higher payments from migrants or refuse treatment due to lack of proper documents. In these situations, migrants either resort to bribery or turn to private hospitals, which are more expensive.

Of the 78 interviewees, 62 had received medical treatment in the public healthcare system. Of those 62, 55 percent were able to get free care at public hospitals with a referral from a clinic in their novostroika; 21 percent reported always seeking healthcare in private hospitals due to the better attitude of medical staff and better overall conditions; 12 percent reported paying higher fees due to lack of registration; and 11 percent reported initially being denied care at public hospitals or clinics due to their lack of propiska, but eventually negotiating for care through bribes or social connections.

When my children are sick, I take them to private hospitals. My youngest daughter has a weak immune system and she is often sick. In private hospitals they treat us well and provide good service, but we have to pay a lot of money. If we had a Bishkek propiska, we could get the same service for free at public hospitals, but the level of bureaucracy is very high there…

—S., 42, female, registered in Kayindi; has lived in Bishkek for 14 years

Retirement and Disability Benefits

In Kyrgyzstan, retirees can receive their pensions either through direct deposit to their bank account or in cash at the post office in their place of permanent registration. Indeed, many retired internal migrants collect social benefits through banks, which gives them the flexibility to withdraw money from any location. Among my interviewees, 20 are receiving or used to receive social benefits, and half of them collect it through banks.

30 Article 4 of the Law of Kyrgyz Republic “On Health Care in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
31 Article 61 of the Law of Kyrgyz Republic “On Health Care in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
However, this convenience is only available to retired people. For people with disabilities, it is much more difficult to obtain the social insurance payments to which they are entitled, since benefits must be paid in the beneficiary’s place of registered permanent residence.33 Additionally, applications for disability benefits, aid for needy families with dependent children, and aid for children with disabilities, HIV, and AIDS are only accepted at the location of propiska registration.34 Although these payments can be collected in cash or via direct deposit, applications for bank services must be filled out in the place where an individual has propiska.35 Moreover, the expert commissions that determine eligibility for disability benefits conduct medical assessments only in the place of permanent residence, i.e. propiska registration. Here again, different laws and local regulations contradict each other and allow bureaucratic administrations to make case-by-case decisions based on informal arrangements.

During the interviews, it became apparent that many people who are eligible for social benefits are either not aware of the new procedures and the availability of bank deposit options or the benefits are inaccessible to them without going back to their place of registration:

… I have four children and I used to receive help from the government when I lived in Kayindi. But when we moved to Bishkek, we stopped receiving benefits.
—S., 42, female, registered in Kayindi; has lived in Bishkek for 14 years

…I am unemployed and I have two little children. I tried to apply for unemployment benefits in Bishkek, but I was told to either show my propiska or apply in Issyk-Kul. When I called the Issyk-Kul office they explained the complicated procedure to me. In the end, I gave up on [applying for unemployment benefits]. Now I just sit at home with my children.
—A., 43, female, registered in Issyk-Kul oblast; has lived in Bishkek for 15 years

My uncle got sick. He had a problem with his kidneys. His son was a donor and he gave one kidney to his father. After the surgery, both of them were declared persons with disabilities. However, they could not get any welfare payments until one of our relatives who works in the government helped them. My uncle and his son do not have Bishkek propiska but they didn’t have any problems because one of the akims36 handled the issue personally. If we didn’t have any relatives in the government and the akim hadn’t helped them, they would still be facing these problems.
—T., 26, female, registered in Naryn region; has lived in Bishkek for three months

Discussion

The main problem with the current national laws and local regulations governing the propiska system is that they often contradict each other. Moreover, street-level officials can exercise a large degree of discretion in interpreting these laws and making decisions related to propiska cases. As a result, internal migrants often do not comply with registration procedures and avoid contact with the state. Due to a lack of residence registration, rural migrants face barriers in access to education, medical services, public welfare, and employment. Even when the law prohibits discrimination based on registration status, medical and public school staff continue to deny services to unregistered migrants and their children.

In essence, the problems that internal migrants face due to lack of local registration are not dissimilar to those of undocumented international immigrants. Citizenship rights based on possession of certain documents lead to de facto different levels of inclusion among individuals who are supposed to be equal members of a political space. For example, the most basic legal right and duty of a citizen—the right to vote—is hindered by local registration requirements. Many internal migrants are not aware of additional steps they must take to be able to vote in the city, because they often simply assume that it is not possible in the first place. As a result, rural migrants in the city become disenfranchised from national and local politics.

The legal conceptualization of citizenship is a dual concept, which is simultaneously inclusive of all community members (or “insiders”) and exclusive in

33 Article 22 of the Law “On the Principles of Social Services to the Population of the Kyrgyz Republic.”
34 Article 12 of the Law “On State Benefits in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
36 An akim is a local government leader.
that it delineates “outsiders.” This conceptualization has usually been applied to the politics of international immigration, but in the case of rural migrants in Bishkek it could also be applied to rural migrants. One of the most basic privileges of legal citizenship—the right to vote—is inaccessible to them. Thus, from the state’s perspective, those without proper documents are invisible and their rights and interests are not represented.

On the social level, one of the implications of “second-class citizenship” is that it shapes the meaning and everyday practice of citizenship for ordinary people. Firstly, possession of documents becomes closely intertwined with how ordinary people understand the very definition of citizenship. For example, when I asked my interviewees to explain in their own words what the term “citizen” means, many indicated that a citizen was someone who had a passport or other documentary proof of citizenship. Nearly a quarter described a citizen as someone who possesses identification documents.

This understanding of citizenship is in sharp contrast to the liberal notion of citizenship as a set of norms, values, rights, and responsibilities. Therefore, even in light of democratic reforms, the legacy of Soviet and post-Soviet bureaucratic institutions dictates who gets what, and these practices are justified by the already constructed meaning of citizenship and rights attached to it. The notion of “second-class citizenship” is normalized to the point that few question the legitimacy of propiska-type institutions. Secondly, the implication of such an understanding of citizenship at the most basic level is that it delineates between two groups—those who have the proper documents and those who do not—and thus justifies discrimination and prejudice against rural migrants without registration. Discrimination and prejudice on the part of the street-level bureaucrats who interpret complex national and local regulations leads to migrants’ exclusion from social citizenship.

Although the law guarantees freedom of movement and equal access to public goods, and some progressive measures—such as using banks to facilitate access to welfare transfers—have been implemented in recent years, many migrants are not aware of such changes and remain unable to access the social benefits to which they are entitled. In part, this is due to street-level bureaucrats’ high degree of discretion in determining eligibility for public services. Exclusion from public services and social benefits labels citizens as “deserving” or “undeserving.” Those who have proper registration are “deserving” because they pay local taxes and contribute formally to the local budget, while those without it live in illegal settlements and “take advantage” of the city by consuming urban public goods. This kind of discourse is not uncommon on the streets of Bishkek, among both older and younger generations.

Certainly, possession or lack of propiska is not the only variable contributing to unequal access to social rights and public benefits. Socio-economic status, level of education, age, gender, and ethnicity also contribute to these outcomes. However, the propiska system exacerbates these divisions because it is the rural poor who move to cities for work and are unable to purchase real estate, which is necessary to become a documented permanent resident of the city. Thus, in Bishkek low-income unregistered rural migrants are excluded from both political and social citizenship. However, this does not mean that they are simply passive subjects of the state: they do negotiate and circumvent formal institutional barriers through community activism and informal social practices.

Conclusion

The current scholarship on migration and citizenship is often so focused on immigration flows from one state to another that it neglects to look at migration within these states. Moreover, citizenship studies tend to be state-centric, looking at laws and policies without seeing how they are understood and experienced by citizens. However, the everyday practice of citizenship has profound effects on how people experience politics. Routine interactions with state bodies, such as the educational system, the healthcare system, and public bureaucracies, shape citizens’ perceptions of the state and their position vis-à-vis the state. Therefore, as unregistered migrants are time and again turned away from voting and public welfare, their social and political rights are diminished to “second-class citizenship.”

In other words, in post-Soviet cities such as Bishkek, citizenship rights are embedded into prop-

37 Bosniak, “Varieties of Citizenship.”
38 From my discussions with local people in the streets and university students.
iska, which normalizes and justifies unequal access to the political system and unequal distribution of public goods. Even if the propiska were to be reformed or substituted with a different policy, the damage has already been done. The institution of propiska has delineated between “insiders,” who belong to the city and are entitled to public welfare, and “outsiders,” who do not and are not. The present case study of the propiska system in Kyrgyzstan has important implications for the citizenship literature. It brings to light the challenges of internal rather than transnational migration and points to the limitations of political and social rights that rural-to-urban migrants face in post-Soviet Bishkek. These limitations marginalize rural migrants, making them de jure equal citizens of the state but de facto second-class citizens in the city. The discrepancy between how citizenship is constructed at the national level and how it is interpreted and practiced at the local level opens new arenas of social inquiry.
Chapter 8. The Impact of Russian Re-Entry Bans on Central Asian Labor Migrants’ Coping Strategies

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"After receiving a re-entry ban, my life has changed: there is pressure from my uncle for not properly arranging my paperwork in Russia, from my pregnant girlfriend in Chelyabinsk who is desperate because I am not and will not be around for a few years, from my mother back home who expects money from me each month, and from my handicapped siblings who are in acute need of expensive medicine. I will definitely need to figure out something, but now I am lost."

—21-year-old migrant from Tajikistan

The lion’s share of Central Asian labor migrants opt to go to Russia to find a job that will allow them to meet their families’ needs. The Russian market seems attractive due to the availability of jobs, higher salaries, and established networks. In 2013, in spite of high demand for unskilled labor, Russian authorities decided to introduce and enforce a re-entry ban list, on which a migrant could be placed even for such minor administrative violations as a discrepancy between their registration and actual place of residence, a mobile phone bill in arrears, or late payment of fees. As a result, a large number of labor migrants ended up on the list and were banned from re-entering Russia, typically for between three and five years. Russia is set to host the World Cup in June and July 2018, and Russian authorities no doubt wish to control the number of labor migrants in the country during the event; this may explain why many labor migrants’ bans will expire at the end of 2018.

In the interim, however, labor migrants who find themselves blacklisted encounter a number of difficulties. First of all, they are usually unaware of the reasons for the ban, its duration, and other peculiarities; typically, when they leave Russia to visit their families back home, no one informs them that they are subject to a re-entry ban and will be unable to return to Russia. Thus, the entire process of banning individuals remains rather opaque. Currently, nine different government agencies can put a migrant on the re-entry ban list without explaining their decision. The migrant can go to court to challenge an unfair ban, but this has to be done while in Russia, which presents problems for those who only discover that they have been banned when they attempt to return to Russia from outside the country. Moreover, labor migrants’ legal knowledge is typically rather poor, and they often have limited faith in the court system due to biased courts (Soviet path dependence) and religious considerations (a sense of fatalism). Under these circumstances, migrants banned from re-entering Russia have to come up with their own coping strategies for dealing with this new reality while beyond Russia’s borders.

To understand banned migrants’ experiences, it is necessary to explore the legal, economic, and social issues that come along with a re-entry ban. It is also worth investigating whether Kazakhstan—which lies along the transit corridor that brings Central Asian labor migrants to Russia—has become an alternative destination for those migrants who find them-
Chapter 8. The Impact of Russian Re-Entry Bans on Central Asian Labor Migrants’ Coping Strategies

selves subject to travel bans. The question of whether Central Asian governments have any particular programs for supporting the increasing numbers of migrants banned from re-entering Russia also remains undiscussed in the literature. This chapter therefore aims to address three key questions:

- How do returning labor migrants address their legal, economic, and social issues?
- Is Kazakhstan a transit country or an emerging destination for labor migrants from Central Asia who are banned from re-entering Russia?
- What measures are the governments of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan taking to support returning migrants who are banned from re-entering Russia?

The aim of this paper is to examine and analyze the coping strategies of banned migrants from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and the interplay of various factors that influence the wellbeing of returning migrants. The paper is based on extensive fieldwork, namely 640 interviews and focus group discussions conducted in 2016–2017 within the framework of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) Central Asia Office’s project “Migrant Vulnerabilities and Integration Needs in Central Asia: Root Causes, Social and Economic Impact of Return Migration.”

**Country Backgrounds**

Each country under investigation has its own developmental nuances, such as unemployment rates, remittance flows, and political engagement with international institutions such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).

Different sources report different unemployment rates in the Central Asian republics; there are no authoritative figures (see Figure 8.1). In 2016, local statistics in each country boasted of low rates of unemployment: 2.2 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 2.3 percent in Tajikistan, and 5.2 percent in Uzbekistan. The World Bank’s figures for the same year, however, were 3.9 times higher for Kyrgyzstan (7.7 percent), 4.7 times higher for Tajikistan (10.8 percent), and 1.7 times higher for Uzbekistan (8.9 percent). This can be attributed in part to the differing methodologies employed by the agencies, but some interview respondents from the Kyrgyz public sector did note that official numbers are also lower than the real numbers because many unemployed citizens prefer not to register.

![Figure 8.1. Unemployment rates in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (percent)](image)


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9 National Bank of Tajikistan, 2016.
All three countries have experienced a decline in remittances since Russia introduced the re-entry ban in 2014 (see Figure 8.2). For both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, total remittances have halved since 2014. Kyrgyzstan’s numbers have rebounded slightly since then, but they have nevertheless failed to reach the 2014 figures. This partial recovery can be explained by Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the EEU and consequent successful negotiation between the Kyrgyz and Russian governments regarding the removal of many Kyrgyz citizens from the re-entry ban list. That being said, at the same time as some Kyrgyz citizens are having their names removed from the system, new compatriots find themselves on the list. This is an ongoing process that cuts against the proclaimed freedom of movement within the EEU.

In addition, the responses of Kyrgyz migrants in Russia and in Kyrgyzstan paint a controversial picture. Although the majority of migrants working in Russia are positive about Kyrgyzstan’s membership of the EEU, which has meant that they no longer need to acquire patents (work permits), others have found that Russian employers have become reluctant to hire Kyrgyz nationals because they want to avoid taxation and unnecessary paperwork, prompting them to choose Tajiks and Uzbeks (who are not EEU members). Thus, it would appear that accession to the EEU has had rather uneven results for Kyrgyzstan.

The above-mentioned decline in remittances is strongly linked to the increasing number of migrants banned from re-entering Russia. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia, the list includes 117,000 Kyrgyz citizens, 330,000 Tajik citizens, and about 1 million Uzbek citizens (the exact number is unknown) out of the approximately 1.7 million foreign nationals whose names are on the list. There is no centralized re-entry ban database shared by all nine of the Russian agencies that can put people on the list. As such, labor migrants can check whether they are blacklisted by the Ministry of Internal Affairs by visiting its website, yet the border-crossing system (managed by the FSB) may contain different information. This situation complicates the situation of labor migrants, causing them frustration and additional expense when they try to re-enter Russia.

It is interesting to note that the re-entry ban list is a separate issue from deportation, but many labor migrants mistakenly believe that they were deported. Some migrants are familiar with their re-entry ban status and therefore decide to remain in Russia, sometimes attempting to obtain Russian citizenship in order to stay. Others are unfamiliar with the situation: once they leave the country, they are unable to return to Russia. Travel agencies in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan check all passengers trav-

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12 Central Bank of Russia, 2017.
15 KirTAG, “Migrant ne smozhet.”
Kazakhstan as an Alternative Destination

For those labor migrants who decide to travel by bus or by car, the journey may turn into an unpleasant adventure. Buses generally cross the territory of Kazakhstan, and as labor migrants are perfectly legal there, they can easily cross out of Kazakhstan. On the Russian side of the border, however, they are informed that they are on the re-entry ban list and therefore cannot enter the Russian Federation. Border officers do not provide any explanation and do not issue any documents substantiating this decision, putting migrants in a difficult situation: cast adrift in Kazakhstan, they have to operate in a terra incognita, without a plan, means, or networks.

This is the situation for an increasing number of migrant workers, who have to either stay in Kazakhstan and look for employment or return to their home countries. As labor migrants usually have little or no money on them, since their plan was to earn money in Russia, they have to find some means to survive if they are going to remain in Kazakhstan. According to Kazakh legislation, labor migrants from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have to register themselves within 5 days. As EEU members, Kyrgyz citizens enjoy a longer registration period. Since no one informs migrants of this at the border, and they tend to lack established networks in Kazakhstan which could provide this information, many fail to register on time and therefore find themselves in Kazakhstan illegally:

I was lost on my way to Russia. They [Russian Border Police] did not let me in. I had to stay in Kazakhstan, but I knew nothing about Kazakhstan. It was not easy to register at all.

—26-year-old banned migrant from Tajikistan

Migrant workers’ typical approach is to get to a big city and explore bazaars in search of compatriots, who may provide information and help them settle in Kazakhstan. The second option is to go to a mosque, where they can take shelter for a day or two and find out whether there are members of their diaspora in town. Very seldom do stranded migrants address NGOs directly, as they are generally unaware of them and unfamiliar with the work they conduct, resulting in very low levels of trust in NGOs. Even less often do they address state bodies for information or support. This is mostly due to the fact that migration is arranged individually and sporadically, without state involvement, and migrant workers exhibit low trust toward any state institution. In addition, they usually have only bad experiences of interacting with officials in Russia: they are often abused, subject to extortion, and verbally and/or physically assaulted. This does not dispose them to seek out representatives of state agencies in Kazakhstan.

Notably, most migrants prefer to stay and test their luck in Kazakhstan rather than return home. This can be attributed to limited employment opportunities in the rural areas of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan from whence the majority of migrant workers originate. Furthermore, breadwinners (usually males) do not want to be viewed as losers who failed to earn money and provide for their families. That being said, the bulk of those who manage to stay and find a job in Kazakhstan view the country as a temporary place of employment; they intend to move to Russia as soon as the ban is lifted or expires. The primary reason for this is higher salaries in the Russian Federation. The secondary reason is an established “comfort zone” in Russia, where everything feels known and familiar.

The number of Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik citizens registered in Kazakhstan continues to rise exponentially (see Figure 8.3). This is especially apparent in the case of Uzbekistan: in 2014, the number of Uzbek citizens registered in Kazakhstan totaled 530,683; in 2015, this number increased by 1.5 times, for a total of 796,258 individuals; and in 2016, the number of registered individuals increased a further 1.3 times compared to 2015. Yet a point of methodological clarification has to be made here: as an individual leaves the country and returns to Kazakhstan, he is counted as a separate individual. In other words, the system counts all border crossings as different individuals, an approach that does not account for frequent shuttle crossings. Moreover, this statistic does not focus on migrant workers per se; it counts all

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16 Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, 2017.
citizens of a country who register in Kazakhstan, no matter the purpose of their visit. As such, these numbers should be taken with a grain of salt: they portray the trend rather than paint an exact picture.

As seen in Figure 8.4, a drastic increase in work permits issued to citizens of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan has occurred: there was a 12-fold increase in the number of Tajiks obtaining work permits and a 4-fold increase among their Uzbek counterparts in the period from 2014 to 2016. These numbers clearly demonstrate how Kazakhstan is turning into a de facto destination country, the inevitable option for migrants banned from re-entering Russia who find themselves stuck in transit. Again, these numbers do not apply to banned migrants alone, but this group represents a significant subset of newly-registered foreign citizens. Kyrgyz citizens are exempt from obtaining work permits since Kyrgyzstan is an EEU member state.

In spite of this growing trend, the Kazakh government does not view migrants who choose Kazakhstan as their labor destination after being banned from Russia as a separate group. As a result, these migrants fly largely under the radar. The Kazakh authorities are focused on reintegrating Oralmans—ethnic Kazakhs who claim Kazakh citizenship based on their ethnicity—and attracting a skilled labor force. As most banned migrants who find themselves in Kazakhstan represent unskilled labor, there is no government program directed toward them.

Coping Strategies Back Home

Those labor migrants who return to their respective countries have to deal with new realities back home. Considering that some of them have spent a significant part—a decade or more—of their working life in Russia, the re-entry ban engenders a number of reintegration problems. First and foremost, a returning migrant has to find a job in a market where employment opportunities are limited, especially in rural areas. Secondly, even if a returnee can find a job, the salary will be barely sufficient to support the household. As there are usually a high number of dependents, it becomes hard to maintain the fami-

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Figure 8.4. Work permits issued for private individuals or households in Kazakhstan (number)

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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>#N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>980</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>12,041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>302,422</td>
<td>103,309</td>
<td>69,204</td>
</tr>
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Source: Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of the Population of the Republic of Kazakhstan, 2017

ily without earnings from Russia. Thirdly, the ban creates psychological issues: the breadwinner loses his status in the household and community. As a respected member of the community, he should be able to invite his neighbors and relatives over during festivities to maintain his status. However, this becomes rather difficult on a domestic salary. Fourthly, there are few migrants who can capitalize on the skills gained in Russia due to different demands in urban Russian settings and in rural Central Asian ones. Thus, the skills gained in Russia are often not in demand back home. Fifthly—and surprisingly—returning migrants do not keep in touch with their networks in Russia, mostly out of embarrassment and despair. Last but not least, there is an additional burden on young people and divorced women, who may be stigmatized at home as a result of their overseas experience.

The problems of returning migrants can categorized as legal hurdles, economic hardship, and social adaptation. All these issues are closely intertwined and either cause or enhance each other. That is, legal issues prevent a labor migrant from entering Russia. As a result, he cannot provide for his family and so experiences economic hardship. This in turn affects his social status within the household and community he lives in. As he has no means to bring his case to court in Russia, nor does he have a network or a way to become part of one elsewhere, he faces legal and social issues (see Figure 8.5). The cumulative effect of these factors may be psychological and health issues. Finally, as a labor migrant who worked for many years in Russia without proper paperwork, the returning migrant finds himself outside the pension system and unable to access other social benefits. In the end, this all boils down to legal hurdles (see Figure 8.6).

To balance this gloomy picture, it should be noted that the re-entry ban means many families have been reunited after years of separation due to migration, which is a strong positive factor. Many migrants also mentioned that the re-entry ban experience had taught them a lesson and made them more disciplined about dealing with paperwork.

18 Farrukh Irnazarov, “Labor Migrant Households in Uzbekistan: Remittances as a Challenge or Blessing?” Central Asia Fellowship Papers 11 (September 2015).
Migrants banned from re-entering Russia employ various coping strategies. Some migrants’ immediate reaction is to obtain passports with fake names (that is, names that are not on the re-entry ban list) to try to cross the Russian border. A number of mediators—mostly in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—also offer to get a migrant’s name removed from the system or to issue a new passport with a different name. However, this illegal approach is rarely successful: many migrant workers learn by word of mouth that such attempts are easily exposed at the border, which strongly discourages them from pursuing this option.

Another approach is to look for an alternative destination. As shown above, Kazakhstan is turning into a situational—but also a purposeful—destination for Central Asian migrants. When Kazakhstan is used as a transit point, it becomes the only available destination for migrant workers who cannot get through the Russian border. Yet an increasing number of labor migrants are intentionally seeking jobs in Southern Kazakhstan, mostly in Shymkent and Taraz:

I cannot clearly compare Russia and Kazakhstan as destinations for labor migration, but I believe that Kazakhstan might be a better option due to the geographical proximity to Uzbekistan and better climatic conditions.
—40-year-old banned migrant from Uzbekistan

These migrant workers usually come from Uzbekistan, due to its geographic proximity, and they consider Kazakhstan a place to work, without taking much interest in the social aspects of their life in the country of migration. In other words, they decide to keep a low profile, live at the construction sites where they work, refrain from attending mosques and other public places, save up as much money as possible, and bring it all home with them afterwards (that is, not send funds through money transfer operators). In the town of Saryagash, for example, Uzbek migrants do not need to change their SIM-cards, as geographic proximity allows them to stay in the coverage zone of Uzbekistan, with the result that migrants can remain in constant contact with their families back home. During the off-season, they return home to be with their families, and even during the on-season they are able to reunite for a week or so every few months. Thus, they spend most of their time in Kazakhstan but remain closely linked to Uzbekistan.

Turkey and South Korea also clearly stand out as alternative destinations. Turkey appears to be an attractive destination for Central Asian labor migrants due to cultural and linguistic factors, as well as the possibility of visa-free travel. According to interviews, one million Uzbeks are settled in Turkey. However, recent turmoil and upheaval in Turkey, along with the geographic proximity to Syria and Central Asian governments’ anxiety, seem to have affected migrants’ choice of this destination.

Central Asian governments, especially Uzbekistan, have managed to sign bilateral agreements to send labor migrants to South Korea through official channels. However, the Korean quotas are rather low and insufficient to absorb all migrants returning from Russia. Moreover, not all potential labor migrants can even qualify for the Korean program, as it requires some basic knowledge of the Korean language (though preparatory courses are provided) and all applicants have to pass an exam to be able to work
in Korea. Those migrants who get there, however, are very pleased with their work and life experiences in Korea, especially when they juxtapose them with experiences in Russia.

In addition, just as in Russia, labor migrants typically decide where to migrate on the basis of where they have networks. Since few returning migrants have connections beyond Russia, many alternative destinations remain closed to them. When alternative destinations, middlemen, and fake passports are not able to help banned migrants overcome legal hurdles, we can observe a breadwinner shift:

Some people told me that I can change the name in my passport and try my luck at the border. Others warned me that it is absolutely useless. So I had to send my wife to work along with my brother in St. Petersburg.

—23-year-old banned migrant from Kyrgyzstan

If there is a male of working age in the household who can replace the banned migrant in Russia, this appears to be a decent coping strategy. Sending a female from the household to replace the re-entry banned migrant is also an option if there is a trustworthy network in Russia that will take care of the female in migration. Thus, the ban list has created a trend toward female migration that has seen women become or replace breadwinners in their households. This is particularly apparent in the case of Tajikistan, where it is challenging a strong societal bent toward patriarchy.

Once the previous options are exhausted—there is no way for the banned migrant to migrate or to send someone else in his stead—banned migrants turn to public agencies, such as employment centers, to explore official channels of removal from the re-entry ban list. In Kyrgyzstan, employment centers thoroughly check the names in the system, provide legal and economic advice, share in-country employment opportunities, inform migrants about alternative destinations, and provide social and psychological assistance to stranded returnees. With the help of the IOM, some migrants may qualify for a direct assistance program, which connects qualified migrants banned from re-entering Russia with in-kind contributions (computers, home repair toolkits, car repair equipment, sewing machines, etc.) to launch their own businesses. The IOM and other donor organizations cannot cover all returning migrants within the framework of their programs, but they nevertheless create opportunities for—and provide advice to—those migrants who wish to (re)settle at home and (re)integrate into their communities.

In spite of all the above-mentioned coping strategies, being banned from Russia inaugurates a difficult period in the lives of many migrants, who often feel unfulfilled and unnecessary. For some, these feelings translate into social tensions, isolation, and avoidance of social gatherings. While there are no clear cases of ostracism, some returning migrants consciously decide to withdraw from community life. To address this issue, mahallas are providing social and financial assistance packages to returning migrants in need in Uzbekistan.

Government Measures

All Central Asian governments are working to mobilize their resources to address the issues related to return migrants. First and foremost, they try to negotiate with their Russian counterpart to achieve amnesty and get their citizens removed from the ban list. The Kyrgyz government has been particularly successful in this due to its full-fledged membership of the EEU. Out of 117,000 Kyrgyz migrants who have been placed on the ban list, about half might find themselves eligible for re-entry because they have only committed minor administrative infractions. Nevertheless, with the introduction of the re-entry ban list, Russia has obtained powerful political leverage over Central Asian labor-exporting countries. As dependence on Russian remittances is extremely high in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, these countries are particularly compelled to coordinate with Russia.

The Central Asian governments are also trying to diversify the destinations of their citizens. In addition to the aforementioned Turkey and South Korea, the governments are concluding negotiations with Poland, the Czech Republic, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and many others. However, as there are currently about 1.5 million Central Asian migrants who are banned from re-entering Russia, finding markets capable of absorbing such a huge labor force appears to be a daunting challenge.

The governments are not only working on external aspects of migration, but also trying to create employment opportunities internally. It is important to note, however, that these programs do not particularly target migrants banned from re-entering Russia; they are general job-creation programs. The govern-
ments are reluctant to create specific perks for returning labor migrants in order to avoid pressure on the domestic labor market. Instead, they create micro-loan programs and encourage SMEs to develop, grow, and engage returning migrants.

Conclusions

As we have seen, migrants banned from re-entering Russia face a number of legal, economic, social, psychological, and health issues when they find out about their re-entry ban status and upon return to their home countries. These issues are all intertwined, and while individual legal coping strategies should be encouraged, the Central Asian governments should also enhance the solutions they offer. Ignoring and neglecting the rapidly growing cohort of banned labor migrants might be fraught with unpleasant consequences, not only for migrant workers, their households and communities, but also for their countries and beyond, as these migrants may make desperate decisions and fall victim to unscrupulous mediators and recruiters.

To become a competitive and attractive destination in its own right, Kazakhstan might consider resolving a number of issues. Firstly, the complicated registration procedure—namely the requirement to be registered and the short window for registering (5 days)—mean that labor migrants often find themselves inadvertently in the irregular sphere. Secondly, labor migrants have to be registered at their employer’s place of work, and this dependence creates the potential for abuse. Thirdly, under Kazakh law, it is rather difficult to prove exploitation, such that many unscrupulous employers get away with mistreatment. Fourthly, while labor migrants are entitled to emergency medical help, other social and health benefits remain unattainable. Fifthly, migrant workers often consider the monthly price of the patent (work permit), at KZT42 (approximately US$13), to be too high for them to work legally. However, public officials firmly believe that the price is more than fair in view of migrants’ earnings. Additional research to reconcile these conflicting positions is evidently required. Last but not least, integration initiatives for all groups of migrants might help improve the well-being of labor migrants in Kazakhstan.
As with most mega-cities, no one is really sure of the size of Moscow’s population. Despite a permit and registration system that should in theory regulate and count the city's inhabitants, it is accepted that Moscow’s true population is far higher than the official figure of 11.5 million suggested by the 2010 census.\(^1\) As a result of unregistered internal and international migration, a more realistic figure is somewhere between 14 and 16 million.\(^2\) It is within this statistical ambiguity that Moscow’s super-diversity lies: according to the census, 92 percent of inhabitants identify as ethnic Russian, but among those who are not officially counted, there are an estimated three million international labor migrants, making the country the second highest recipient of labor migrants in the world. The majority of such migrants come from former Soviet republics. The highest percentage come from Ukraine, followed by Central Asian republics such as Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, with significant flows also from Vietnam and China. In total, over 130 nationalities are represented in the Russian capital.

Russia needs such high levels of inward migration due to a combination of the country’s low labor productivity, which ranks third lowest in the world, and a dramatic decline in people entering the labor market, as a result of the fertility slump that followed the economic and social chaos of the “transition” period in the early 1990s. Thus, when President Putin launched Russia’s “Migration 2020 Concept” in 2013 to streamline and improve the regulation of the migration process, it was no surprise that the economic imperative took center stage. Indeed, Putin went so far as to say that the “country’s economic future depended on the labor of international migrants.”\(^3\) The goal of this chapter is to explore the contradiction that exists between this need for migrant labor and the state-led marginalization of Central Asian migrants in Moscow, the impact this has on the mobility of migrants in the city, and how migrants develop coping strategies.

Theoretically, this contradiction is important because, as the chapter argues, it has led to the creation of spaces of exception where the migrant is outside the nation’s legal framework, often as a Homo Sacer figure who can be abused with impunity by the state and employers. This is important, as work to date on states of exception has concentrated on bounded spaces such as asylum detention centers\(^4\) or refugee camps,\(^5\) or at the state level on governments acting explicitly outside legal frameworks, such as the Nazi regime\(^6\) or the issues surrounding spaces such as Guantanamo Bay.\(^7\) By concentrating on the city, where in theory the migrant has freedom of movement, this chapter demonstrates that the state of exception does not have to be bounded.

To enable these discussions, the chapter is structured as follows. The first section demonstrates how

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Central Asian migrants in Russia are demonized by the state and media, thus facilitating the state of exception and the abuses that occur within it. Next, the methodologies which enabled the research upon which this chapter is based are detailed. This is followed by an exploration of how the state of exception can be an unbounded phenomenon, and thus can be seen as a banal practice rather than an “extraordinary event.” The chapter goes on to explore how this impacts the mobility of Central Asian migrants in Moscow and show how they endure the actions of the state as they operate outside the country’s legal frameworks, before turning to detail how interviewees develop coping tactics in order to ensure their everyday survival. It should be noted here that many of the ambiguities of everyday life, especially around work and access to services, apply to Russian citizens as well as to migrants. Obviously, however, Russian citizens, even North Caucasians, are not demonized in the same manner and their intra-city mobility is not compromised to the same extent.

The Construction of Central Asian Migrants in Moscow

Central to the discussions that follow is the state- and media-led differentiation between those labor migrants who come from Ukraine (and thus “look” ethnically Russian) and those from Central Asia, China, and Vietnam (who are visibly “different”). For example, at a workshop organized by the authors, a leading professor repeated commonly-held attitudes, stating that Ukrainian migrants are welcomed, as they pay taxes and come from a country where there are functioning education and health systems, whereas their taxes and come from a country where there are unhealthy due to their failing health systems, and are uneducated. Regardless of their status, and ignoring an international convention stating that a person cannot be “illegal,” Central Asian migrants are constructed as an illegal group, i.e. they are working in Russia without proper documentation and/or are working for cash in hand and not paying taxes. The vast majority of Russian newspaper reports use “illegal” as shorthand to criticize migrants and the government for failing to regulate the “problem,” while simultaneously failing to discuss the numerous challenges migrants face in attempting to operate formally, even when they have formal work permits. From this base of illegality, migrants are further constructed as criminal and diseased. The apogee of such debates took place around the 2013 Moscow mayoral elections, which descended into a race to the bottom as to which side could demonize migrants the most. Incredibly, the incumbent, Sergey Sobyanin, himself an internal labor migrant to Moscow, went so far as to argue that if migrants were forced out of Moscow, then it would be the most law-abiding city in the world. Meanwhile, the main opposition candidate, Alexei Navalny, lauded by many in the West as a liberal alternative to Putin, stated that “they [Central Asian migrants] aren’t going to die of starvation if they don’t find work. One can grab a purse in the metro; one can take somebody’s money away in the elevator with a knife.” This fed a persuasive media discourse that 50 percent of all crimes in Moscow were committed by Central Asian migrants, which became a de facto “truth” around election time. (The official figure is around 4 percent.)

Furthermore, Central Asian migrants are simultaneously portrayed as a drain on the Russian health system and as a danger to the health of the Russian population, with a representative of the Moscow city government going so far as to call for advertisements to be placed around the city advising Russian women not to have sexual relations with Central Asian men as they “spread HIV.” There is little basis for such stigmatization, as HIV infection rates in Central Asia are in fact lower than in Russia.

Like many Russians, labor migrants struggle to be fully formal in their daily practices, as employers are reluctant to employ people formally in order to avoid the 30.2 percent payroll tax and the time-consuming, ever-changing bureaucracy involved in formally hiring people. Property owners are similarly reluctant to register tenants officially so as to avoid paying tax on their income and escape being identified by the state as “wealthy.” Even fully formal migrants cannot access social services such as the Russian healthcare system without paying, except in cases of life-threatening emergency.

Methodologies

The interviews on which this chapter is based come from a broader project exploring the everyday lives of Central Asian migrants in Russia. Over three hundred in-depth interviews were conducted between July 2013 and June 2016 with migrants from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan who are currently living in Russia or who had returned temporarily to Tajikistan. They were approached through existing contacts, their workplaces, NGOs working to protect migrant rights, and community “gatekeepers.” From here, the snowball method was used to approach further interviewees. While there are differences in migration experience between nationals of the three countries, these will not be fully elaborated upon below for reasons of space. A broad spectrum of people was interviewed, with an almost equal split between men and women, and covering young migrants, migrants with children, and people in their forties and fifties.

Variation in how long migrants had lived in Russia was also captured: interviews were conducted with migrants who were entering the country for the first time on buses from Tajikistan, as well as those who had received citizenship after a prolonged stay in Russia. The majority of interviewees had worked in Russia for between two and four years. The interviews took place in a number of locations, including workplaces, cafes, and open-air spaces that migrants use, such as the courtyards near their living-places and/or homes. The interviews lasted between 20 minutes and two hours and were often recorded; if the interviewee was not comfortable having the meeting recorded, extensive notes were taken immediately after the interview. Interviews took place either in Russian or in the interviewee’s preferred language, with the assistance of a translator, and were logged pseudonymously so as to protect migrants’ identities. While respondents were understandably somewhat reticent to discuss personal practices that are legally ambiguous, the vast majority were willing to discuss the problems they faced. There is little reason to doubt the validity of what was discussed, as interviewees were under no illusions as to the inability of the research project to benefit their lives. Moreover, the points raised were, in the vast majority of cases, validated, as they recurred in several interviews. Numerous interviewees were also asked to take photographs of their daily practices and living conditions, as well as how they spent their leisure time. While this was not wholly successful, as there were concerns that the photographs might identify people, these images provided many insights into migrants’ daily lives.

Over 1,000 media articles, blogs, and political speeches were cataloged and tagged using an Evernote database between 2013 and 2014; these were then analyzed to demonstrate how discourses concerning labor migrants were developed and disseminated during this period. Interviews were further carried out with representatives of NGOs that work to help labor migrants, providing a detailed framework for understanding the legal issues they face and the actions of police and employers. We also met with state actors, although few were willing to talk on the record—unsurprising given that migration became such a politically charged issue around the time of the mayoral elections. What these conversations did provide, however, was insight into the tensions between the federal government and local administrations, and the competition between federal ministries to “capture” the migration Zeitgeist and to control future policy.

It should also be noted that the first author spent the majority of 2011–2014 living in Moscow as a labor migrant. This experience of working under the “highly qualified migrant” scheme was obviously very different from that of labor migrants

from Central Asia, yet it provided many insights into the struggle for formality, the endless bureaucracy surrounding the migration process, and the legal ambiguity of many of the rules and regulations to which migrants should adhere. In addition, participatory methods were employed, from traveling with migrants through various spaces to gauging the reactions of the “powerful,” such as security guards in supermarkets or shopping malls. The actions of the police were observed at length to witness their practices, which—as will be discussed further below—enact spaces of exception and limit mobility. For a three-month period, the assumed ethnicity of those stopped for document checks was also noted, but this eventually proved a futile exercise, as only those of Central Asian appearance were stopped outside of legal frameworks and had their documentation scrutinized.

**States of Exception within States**

Schmitt’s argument that “there are no political ideas without spatial referent, just as there are no spatial principles (or spaces) without corresponding political ideas” is central to this chapter’s reading of the concept of the state of exception and the marginalization of the Homo Sacer within contemporary urban spaces of migration. In this context, whereas Agamben states that “today it is not the city but rather the camp that is the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West,”21 we argue that the relatively unbounded spaces of the city are key to understanding the creation and practice of biopolitical regimes against marginalized groups. Mbembe’s concept of necropolitics19 is also of crucial importance here, as decisions are made about who can be “let to die” through the denial of medical care and the lack of any health and safety assessment of migrant workplaces (such as construction sites), as well as the promulgation of xenophobic rhetoric which can be used to justify physical attacks or vigilante actions.20 As Mountz and Hiemstra note, ideas of “chaos and crisis” are often put forward by the state as justification for the continuing securitization of migration policy and the argument that “they are tied intimately to geographical assertions of sovereign power.”21 Such scare tactics of “migrant danger”—whether connected to crime, unemployment, and/or the destruction of national identities or not—are common across the globe,22 but what makes the Russian case atypical is how this is used as justification for the suspension of the legal rights of millions of migrants, rather than “just” their demonization. The promulgation of fear and insecurity is, according to Huysmans, a method of state rule, and in the case of Moscow it applies to both the titular population (migrants as the danger) and the Central Asian population (fear of the police and the titular population).23 This obviously has “geographical assertions,” producing spaces of fear within the city for both groups.

It is argued here that the state of exception can be seen as a banal practice, codified into the everyday, as opposed to an “exception” to the norm. This diverges from Elden's view that “the 'state of exception' is an extraordinary legal moment, made possible by a number of state constitutions, where the normal rule of law is suspended.”24 We argue that in Moscow the rule of law is not suspended, but is practiced outside of the legal framework; while politicians might posture that increasing migration levels are an “extraordinary” moment, this is not an excuse for the actions of certain state actors. It can be argued that if ignoring a law becomes so commonplace, then it becomes a permanent state of ex-

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22 Vertovec, “The Cultural Politics.”
24 Elden, *Terror and Territory*, 55.
ception, to be used to marginalize/abuse those without recourse or who are deliberately misinformed as to the role and function of this law. Of course, even if a law is repeatedly misused, it can still be considered an exception if the misuse is targeted against a certain group whereas others are treated correctly according to the law.

Central to this is the construction of the Central Asian labor migrant in Russia as "illegal," which disregards the fact that it is impossible for a body to be illegal and that there are differing levels of documented status for migrants (for example, they might have the right to be in a country but not to undertake work) as well as numerous, often impenetrable barriers to "legality." Lefebvre’s metaphor of the “floating mists”25 of everyday life is apt when looking at the legality of migration: while there might be regulations and structures in place regarding a particular practice, how it is mediated in daily life can be very different, such that local knowledge is needed to understand how it operates. For example, while migrants can be legally in Russia, their construction as illegal creates a mist within which the police can operate outside of the law, be it through document checks, detention, or corruption, or because of the “chaos and crisis” this illegality supposedly entails.26 Often, the migrants themselves lack up-to-date knowledge of Russia’s ever-shifting immigration regulations and feel unable to ascertain their rights if they are stopped by the police.

Furthermore, there is the mist of corruption, whereby migrants are asked for informal payments to be spared detention/expulsion or to be allowed to make legal border crossings, corruption that becomes codified into the migrant everyday. As a newspaper editorial put it, “the police display loyalty not to the Kremlin, but to the local vegetable market,” where they can receive bribes from labor migrants.27 This “mist” also exists for employers, property owners, etc., who both exploit and are exploited by the ambiguities that the state promotes. This is a scalar process, as often the public-facing actor has to make a regular payment to their superior, who in turn makes a payment to those above them, and upwards, and upwards. For example, at a border crossing often used by migrants, border guards discussed how they had to pay US$5,000 per day to the main chief or else they would be reassigned to somewhere less lucrative.28 All of this combines to produce an everyday where legal norms are regularly suspended in relation to a certain ethnic group, creating a state of exception within which Central Asian migrants are forced to live.

In the above contexts, the concept of Homo Sacer in relation to Central Asian migrants is extremely apt, though it can be argued that the process operates differently to Agamben’s conception. The migrant, as Homo Sacer, is not in this instance cast out of the city (though many of them are fearful of entering) or placed in a camp, but denied basic rights and not free to move within the city due to the discursive borders erected by politicians, the media, public discourse, and neo-liberal desires (such as the exploitation of labor and the wish to keep “undesirables” out of spaces of consumption).29 Rather than wander, they try to remain out of view whenever possible to avoid confrontation and possible expulsion from the country. Their spatialities also present a different set of problems to the Homo Sacer than in the camp or other bounded spaces. Whereas in the camp, as Ramadan notes, there are usually a multitude of actors involved—such as NGOs, diaspora groups, etc.—the unbounded nature and sheer scale of the Moscow space of exception mean that it is extremely difficult for outsiders to conceptualize the abuses that migrants face.30 For example, much media attention is paid to the predicament of migrant workers working on World Cup stadiums in Qatar, but relatively little to similar problems (death, exploitation,

28 This was corroborated at three separate border crossings, in different regions, during the research for this chapter, and has also been witnessed in previous research projects (see Williams, Round, and Rodgers, The Role of Informal Economies).
30 Ramadan, "Spatialising the Refugee Camp."
This difference of attention, it can be argued, is because in the former case migrants are often bound-ed, in that they are not allowed to leave the workplace without permission (both in terms of physically leaving the site or trying to change jobs) and they are only allowed to leave the country after a fixed period of work, whereas in Russia the “free” movement of migrants makes their issues much easier to hide. While there are some extremely dedicated NGOs working to try and protect migrant rights, the sheer scale of the problem, all interviewed senior managers noted, means that they can only assist in the most extreme cases of abuse. Thus, whereas Ramadan expertly identifies the power and networks that develop within the camp, and the camp’s relations to the outside world, in the state of exception in Moscow, those who are cast aside have very little power and few sites of resistance. Their situation is further complicated by the fact that the vast majority of migrants are in Moscow by choice, in the sense that they have made a rational decision to live there and they can, in theory, leave at any point.

Therefore, the city, like the camp, can be seen as a space of exception, as the actions of state actors are outside the legal framework. In effect, the labor migrant is cast out of the city and is only allowed to perform certain functions and occupy certain spaces. In Amagben’s sense, the everyday is for many a bare life, as migrants are stripped of all rights, with only a few overworked NGOs to support them. Moreover, Uzbeks and Tajiks receive very little support from their home governments or diaspora networks within Russia. Security agents infiltrate Uzbek migrant communities pretending to be migrants themselves, adding a further layer of fear and confusion to the already problematic everyday. Thus, returning to Schmitt’s arguments, the Russian political idea of migration has an explicit spatial reference: that Central Asian migrants are not considered worthy of inclusion in the city beyond their value as expendable economic units to be exploited. The spatial principle is that if they adhere to a list of demands, which are surrounded in “mists,” they can at best be guests within the city. To cope with this, and the spatial limits detailed in the following sections, labor migrants develop sets of tactics to help alleviate their status as Homo Sacer. As we will see, these often follow the concept of tactics put forward by de Certeau when he states that “[s]trategies are able to produce, tabulate, and impose these spaces, when those operations take place, whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces” and that “[t]he space of the tactic is the space of the other.” Thus, although stripped of their rights, the majority have the ability to develop practices that minimize the risks and exploitation they must face.

Compromising Mobilities

The most overt way in which Moscow’s state of exception is expressed is through the legal ambiguity of passport and documentation checks. In addition to at points of entry into the country, this is often enacted during raids on accommodation or workplaces where “illegal” migrants are expected to be found. On the street, the police only have the right to stop you and ask to see your documentation if they suspect that you have committed a crime. However, the reality is totally different, as the police stop Central Asian migrants with impunity. It is hard to exaggerate how often this group is stopped while on or around metro stations compared to the frequency with which ethnic Russians have their documents checked. In 2006, the Open Society Institute conducted a survey of ethnic profiling on the Moscow metro, finding that a

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31 For a discussion of migrant issues in Qatar, see Michelle Buckley, “On the Work of Urbanization: Migration, Construction Labor, and the Commodity Moment,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 104, no. 2 (2014): 338–347. At the time of the research, the main international gaze on Russia was based on the banning of promotion of homosexual lifestyles to schoolchildren. Although a completely misguided and reactionary piece of legislation (see Cal Wilkinson, *Russia’s Anti-Gay Laws: The Politics and Consequences of a Moral Panic,* *Disorder of Things* [blog], June 23, 2013, https://thedisorderofthings.com/2013/06/23/russias-anti-gay-laws-the-politics-and-consequences-of-a-moral-panic/), it did not see the banning of homosexuality that was implied in much of the international reporting on the issue (which happened almost at the same time in India to little international outcry). While hate crimes were/are committed against the LGBT community, Russia is not atypical in this, whereas the everyday lives of migrants are far more precarious (given the lack of safety in the workplace, their visibility in public life, etc.), and far more lost their lives in 2013 than as a result of hate crimes toward ethnic Russians. When a major international NGO was approached about the migration issue in Russia, the authors were told this did not have enough “international traction,” even though they were campaigning about migrant welfare in other regions of the world.


33 Ibid., 37.
non-ethnic Russian was 21.8 times more likely to be stopped by the police than an ethnic Russian.34 This, they note, is the “most extreme and egregious ethnic profiling ever documented through a statistical survey of the practice,” with the previous highest figure, 4.85, recorded in New York. The study found that non-ethnic Russians made up only 4.6 percent of the people in metro stations, but accounted for 50.9 percent of those stopped. For the project on which this chapter is based, we originally planned to conduct a comparative survey, but after looking at pilot studies and simply making trips on the metro, it quickly became statistically meaningless: in 2013–2014, only non-ethnic Russians were stopped on and around the metro for document checks.35 If their papers were not in order, or in numerous cases even if they were, the migrant was taken to the police station present in every station or to a quiet corner where a cash payment could be requested.

There are numerous reasons for this targeting of Central Asians, but it largely appears to be driven by an assumption that migrants are powerless and will simply pay to extract themselves from the situation, whereas a tourist, for example, might be more likely to make a formal complaint about the police’s actions. Class also plays a role in these power relationships: when non-ethnic Russians wearing visibly expensive clothes were asked about these police stops, they all said they had never experienced them. There is an assumption on the part of the police that with wealth comes power, and such targets are passed by. It must be reiterated here that the police do not have the right to ask for documentation unless there is a suspicion that a crime has been committed, which is extremely unlikely to happen as someone steps out of a metro car. However, migrants are (as discussed above) inscribed with illegality; as such, with the exception of NGO groups concerned with migrant rights, no ethnic Russians question such practices, as they are seen as making the metro safer, despite a total lack of evidence that the space is unsafe due to the presence of migrants.

Such document checks are not exclusive to the metro and train stations, as often the police will apprehend people on the street or near their workplace. One interviewee, who is fully documented, told of how she was stopped near her apartment:

> My passport was in the apartment, but I did not want the police to go there, as I was worried about the landlady thinking I was a troublemaker and kicking us out. I had to go to the police station, and although they could check my documents on the computer, they would not let me go. My husband was at work, so he could not bring my passport, and after seven hours I was beginning to worry for my safety, so I gave them my wedding ring as a bribe so they would let me leave. (Kyrgyz woman, interviewed in Moscow, May 2015)

This was by no means an isolated story among interviewees and reveals much about the power relationships between police and migrants. Interviewees discussed how even if all of their documents were in order, the police would make some excuse, such as a missing stamp, to ask for a “fine.” Instances of this increased when the work permit system was streamlined and the patent system was introduced. Under this system, migrants working for private households—as cleaners, for example—do not need a work permit, but can pay US$20 per month for a stamp in their passport that allows them to work. Interviewees working under this system described how police officers would simply say that the stamp was a fake and that they must pay a “fine.”36 Thus, migrants are stripped of the rights afforded to them through the freedom of movement treaties that exist between the relevant countries.

Perhaps the most pernicious example of such practices was observed at the metro station nearest to the office where labor migrants have to register their work permits. To access the building, migrants enter a caged walkway in which they often wait many hours until they are admitted. Once in the building, they are required to leave their passports and paperwork in order for them to be processed. After witnessing the caging of migrants, the first author walked back to the metro station and saw 12–14 Central Asian migrants sitting in the police van. The author realized

35 This is not to say that ethnic Russians are not arrested on the metro, such as for drunkenness, but they are not stopped by the police for routine document checks.
that the police were waiting for migrants to walk back to the metro and stopping them to ask for their documentation. Obviously, the migrants were without their paperwork at this stage; they were therefore detained in the police vehicle until they were prepared to make a cash payment in exchange for their release. Interviews with legal groups that offer assistance to migrants revealed that when a police station needs to complete its arrest quota, officers will simply go out, arrest migrants, and charge them with fictitious crimes. In court, the migrant is advised to plead guilty, and in return they will simply be extradited rather than sent to prison. As one interviewee who went through this process stated:

My Russian is OK, but everyone was talking so quickly it was hard to follow what was going on. I was told I had to sign a sheaf of papers and I was not given time to read what I was signing. It turned out I had signed away my right to a translator, so I could not follow what was going on in court. It was easier just to plead guilty to whatever they said I had done just to get it over with, as I felt under so much pressure. (Uzbek man, interviewed in Moscow, September 2014)

If a migrant is detained by the Russian police but is not allocated a translator within three hours, then he has the right to be released. However, among interviewees who had gone through this process, none had been offered such a service. What all this clearly demonstrates is that migrants live in a state of exception where, while there are clearly defined rules about who has the right to ask for documentation and about the processes surrounding detention, these are totally ignored in relation to Central Asian migrants. They are stripped of any legal protection and are extremely vulnerable to the predatory nature of this section of the state.

If the police are enacting a state of exception through the practice of document-checking, the fact that sections of the state are also encouraging members of the general public to do so demonstrates how deeply entrenched it is becoming. At various points in 2013 and 2014, the Moscow city administration called for senior citizen volunteers to form groups to check migrants’ documentation around train stations and for Cossack groups to patrol Moscow doing the same. Even though such groups have not gained much traction, the fact that they were proposed by the government is revealing and opens up new spaces for such practices. For example, the lead author has witnessed airport staff whose role it is to screen baggage as people enter the terminal also check the documentation of Central Asian migrants. If there were a “problem,” and during the observation period there was, then a police officer would be called over and the migrant led away.

Perhaps most worrying of all, however, is the rise of far-right nationalist groups that argue that it is their right to check migrants’ documentation. Salomatín has embedded himself in such groups to witness these processes, and has documented raids by groups such as “Moscow Shield.”37 This organization, whose motto is “struggling with migrants,” targets migrants living in informal spaces such as basements or abandoned factories. They break down doors, often dressed in masks and armed with air pistols,38 and demand to see the documents of the people living there.39 This is done with the explicit approval of the police: Salomatín’s photographs show that the police are in the background waiting to make arrests or extort payments.40 Whether or not the migrants are “illegal” is not really the point, as such practices are likely to spread fear in the community and to “reclaim” spaces from migrants. More often than not, those checked have documentation. A RIA Novosti article discussed how 60 migrants were arrested after a Moscow Shield raid turned violent: all of them were released, with only two formally fined for migration offences.41 However, Moscow Shield billed the event as “A big raid! Bring your friends! We can’t let any of the illegals get away!”42

Thus, in Moscow, there is a situation where a Central Asian migrant can be fully formal (albeit that this is extremely difficult to achieve due to the actions of employers and property owners) and fully enti-

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40 Salomatin, “Russia: Hunting for Migrants.”
41 RIA Novosti, “Putin: nuzhno kontrolirovat.”
tled by law to use the city’s infrastructure and move about freely, but, due to the practices of state actors, they are fearful to do so. These practices are against Russian legislation, but are codified in the everyday actions of the police and other officials. Migrant interviewees almost universally stated that even if they knew the current legal regulations, they would not challenge a police officer nor refuse to show their documentation, for fear of antagonizing the officer. Thus, migrants are effectively stripped of their rights within the city, and while they are not “cast out” in the Agamben articulation of the state of exception, they are not free to move about due to the culture of fear that they live in. It was thus no surprise that almost all interviewees discussed how this situation compromised their mobility in the city:

I hardly ever use the metro, as it is too much of a risk with so many police about. Even though it takes me much longer, I take the bus to work, as the police do not bother with us as much there and there are more Kyrgyz on there as well, so there is safety in numbers. Often, the driver is from Central Asia, so that also gives us some protection. (Kyrgyz woman, interviewed in Moscow, February 2016)

Given Moscow’s traffic, this trebles the interviewee’s commute to over an hour, after which she works a 12-hour day before making the journey home, but this is seen as preferable to the risk of using the metro.

Such beliefs are entrenched further when the police make wide-scale raids on the metro. After a fight between a police officer and a worker from Dagestan (so a Russian citizen, not an external migrant), the police launched an operation late the following Saturday night to “clean up” the metro, with the aim of demonstrating the scale of “illegal” migrants using it. This backfired because those without full documentation often would not risk using the metro; as such, of the 3,000 people briefly detained, only a few were arrested for migration offenses. As there was extensive media coverage of the event, it was difficult for those involved to monitor it, and more people were arrested for “hooliganism” than for other crimes. Yet despite the failure of such spectacles, politicians still attempt to portray the metro as seething with migrant criminals. Navalny has even gone so far as to say that migrants should be banned from the network because they “don’t pay taxes and therefore should not take advantage of the state subsidization of the metro.” Unsurprisingly, therefore, Central Asian migrants carve out spaces in Moscow in which to operate as far from the gaze of the state as possible. The chapter now turns to explore such spaces, while noting how even these are constructed negatively by certain elements of the state.

Migrant Spaces: Coping with Everyday Risk

In late 2013, a series of events occurred that further constricted the mobility of migrants. The most prominent was the riot that occurred in Biryulyovo after an ethnic Russian was stabbed to death by an Azerbaijani migrant. After several days of violence, the region’s food market, one of the largest in Moscow, was closed, affecting the employment of many thousands of migrants and enabling the redevelopment of the market into spaces more profitable for the landowners. The ethnic tension was seized upon by politicians, who argued that increasing migration was making Moscow an unsafe place for Russians; over 50 percent of people polled in the city claimed that migration was Moscow’s main problem. Mayor Sobyanin went so far as to say:

Moscow is a Russian city and it should remain that way. It is not Chinese, Tajik, or Uzbek. People who speak Russian badly and who have a different culture are better off living in their own country.

This issue of what is “cultural” is essential for understanding how the space of exception is used by elites to bind migrants to particular spaces. At an urban forum attended by the authors, which quickly descended into a diatribe against labor migrants, the leader of a major city’s social inclusion unit said, “If a migrant comes to our city and abides by our laws, pays his taxes, and adapts to our culture, then he is welcome to be our guest.” Thus, officially, the “best” a migrant can hope for, if they obey all of these rules (many of which are not even followed by ethnic Russians), is to be a guest in the space of Russians. “Culture” here

43 Navalny, “Chto proizoshlo.”
44 Round and Kuznetsova, “Necropolitics and the Migrant.”
is taken to mean the high culture of ballet, opera, and literature, even when the cost of the first two is prohibitive for many Russians. Furthermore, there is simply no reflection on what adaptation means, nor on how Russian identity and culture relate to that of “outsiders” in such discourses.  

During the interviews, migrants were asked about the places they visited during their free time. Only a handful had visited the city center, as it was considered too dangerous to do so because of the heavy police presence there. Not a single interviewee had visited a museum due to the cost, the lack of free time, and the fact that they felt that they would not be welcome in such spaces. After the Biryulyovo riot, interviewees were noticeably more fearful about moving around the city. As one said:

Why would we ever go to the center of Moscow? We walk around with our heads down so as not to catch the attention of anyone. We spend as little time as possible anywhere where we [migrants] are not meant to be. (Uzbek man, interviewed in Moscow, December 2013)

The week after the riot, an Uzbek national was murdered in Moscow by a gang of youths, an event that received almost no media attention, leading migrants to fear further reprisals. Thus, although the city authorities declare that migrants should adapt to Russian culture, there are almost no spaces where this can take place—and, as the above quote from Sobyanin shows, if you do not fit this “migrant ideal,” then you are not welcome in the city.

In response to this overtly unwelcoming attitude, the fear of attack, and the behavior of the police detailed in the previous section, migrants develop tactics to minimize the everyday dangers they face. As noted above, many adapt their commute to minimize contact with the police, even if it takes far longer. The majority of interviewees work 6- or 7-day weeks for an average of 12 hours per day, which, coupled with long travel times, means there is very little time for leisure activities. The majority of their spare time is spent around their accommodation because, as migrants explained, they feel safer in such spaces, as they are familiar and there is a lower police presence. Shopping also tends to be completed locally and at one specific chain, due to its comparatively low prices. A good salary for a migrant worker is US$1,000, and food goods are equally as expensive as in a British supermarket, if not more expensive. This, combined with extremely high accommodation costs, means there is almost no money to spare for leisure activities after money is remitted home. The following was a typical budget:

I earn 17,000 rubles [US$500] a month for a 70-hour week, which is less than the rent of the room I share with my husband. From his salary, we have to buy food, pay the bills, and send money home for our parents and children, so there is no money to spend on ourselves. Our treat is my husband going to McDonald’s once a month. (Kyrgyz woman, interviewed in Moscow, February 2016)

Younger male migrants spend free time in park areas and there are some instances of organized sports events or fitness clubs (though this tends to be only within the Kyrgyz community), but there is little, if any, interaction with ethnic Russians in these spaces. There is little space for intimacy, as many migrants share rooms, with as many as eight or ten people crammed into makeshift dormitories.

Due to the states of exception that exist within the city, many people prefer to work outside the boundaries of Moscow, where there is a lower police presence and there is familiarity with those who patrol such areas. Round et al. have discussed how some labor migrants lived in a school gymnasium during the summer vacation, with regular payments made to the local police chief to protect them from harassment. Work in the regions outside of Moscow has a gendered component, as it is mainly in the male-dominated areas of construction and providing security to the homes of rich Russians. Among interviewees in long-term relationships, there were many instances where the woman had migrated first to arranged work in the city center, to be followed by her partner who did not have a formal work permit. As the accommodation in Moscow is in shared rooms and there is anxiety about what would happen if the man were stopped without the correct paperwork, he often decides to work outside the city. As one interviewee said:


47 Salomatin, “Russia: Hunting for Migrants.”

48 Round, Williams, and Rodgers, “The Role of Domestic Food Production.”
9. States of Exception in a Super-Diverse City: The Compromised Mobility of Moscow’s Labor Migrants

I have not seen my husband for six months. He works on building sites around Moscow and it would take over three hours by public transport to get to him, if it is possible at all. I work 12 hours a day, and on Sundays I clean apartments for cash in hand to earn extra money to send home. We speak once or twice a week, but we don’t like to spend too much money doing this. We have no choice but to live like this because if we could find a similar job back home [in Tajikistan] then we would only earn enough money to eat and not enough to support our parents and children. (Tajik woman, interviewed in Moscow, May 2016)

Often, parents are separated from their children, as it is extremely difficult for migrants to access childcare, healthcare, and schools in Moscow. This, coupled with the fact that migrants work such long hours, leads them to leave children with their grandparents back home. As Round and Kuznetsova have shown, healthcare access for Central Asian migrants is extremely problematic, even if they are fully documented, and is often provided only in life-or-death situations. From interviews with NGOs, we know that if a worker is injured in the workplace they are often placed on the street outside so that the employer is not liable for their healthcare costs.

Conclusions

The treatment of Central Asian labor migrants in Moscow reveals much about the fractured nature of its current mode of governance, the difficulty migrants face in their attempts to be formal, and the way in which—in both formal and informal terms—neoliberalism is the only imperative for urban development. There is no concern given to the health and welfare of migrants; informality makes them extremely vulnerable to the nefarious practices of employers and property owners and constrains their mobility, as they wish to avoid the police, who often see them as a means of bolstering income and/or improving arrest statistics.

Thus, this chapter has argued, an “everyday state of exception” can be seen across the city. This extends traditional readings of the notion of exception beyond the camp, demonstrating that state policy/attitudes forces migrants to move about the city as a type of Homo Sacer: they are stripped of their legal rights, compelled to use the city in specific ways, and (out of fear) denied entry into many spaces. Practices such as stopping migrants and demanding documents, requests for informal payments, and racial profiling have become codified into the everyday life of the city even though they take place outside the law. Furthermore, the above discussions extend the debate developed by Ramadan about issues of agency and identity within the state of exception. As opposed to the camp, where there are often relatively high levels of outside assistance and its bounded nature enables people to develop some forms of resistance, the spaces of the city often preclude this. The sheer scale of the human rights abuses in operation against labor migrants in Russia, combined with punitive legislation that limits Russian civil society, mean that it is almost impossible for Russian NGOs to help all but the most serious cases and there is little interest in the issue on the part of the international community. At the same time, many Central Asian migrants in Moscow have no choice but to live under such conditions, as their potential income back home is simply not enough to provide for their families. In many instances, they experience multiple deprivations, such as not seeing their children for extended periods, living in substandard accommodation, and undertaking work that is well below their skill level, as well as unwillingly performing the role of an object of disgust for many ethnic Russians.

Given the issue’s scale, the need of Central Asians to migrate for work, and the benefits of the everyday state of exception for many state actors (collecting bribes, etc.) and employers (the ability to pay extremely low wages without providing any benefits), there is little reason for optimism about alternative futures for labor migrants. Despite the federal government’s argument that inbound labor migration is vital to the country’s continued economic growth,
regional politicians will continue to tap into the xenophobic Zeitgeist and enable the abusive practices outlined above. Given the close ties between big business and the political sphere, there is little chance that governments would be willing to introduce legislation that would curb the abusive practices of many companies. The federal government argues that if migrants could integrate more into Russian society, then the friction between groups would be reduced; as such, it is introducing requirements for those applying for work permits to pass Russian language and culture exams. There is, however, little evidence that this would curb the worst excesses: the above suggests that an exam system will simply become a new site of informality where payments will be expected in return for passing the test. Therefore, until there is a change to Russia’s system of governance and economic structure, there is little chance of the everyday lives of Moscow labor migrants improving. Instead, they will be forced to live in a state of exception where abuse is the norm. While many migrants develop tactics for coping with this, such as avoiding certain spaces and/or people, everyday life for many in this group is extremely stressful, with long-term implications for their health and family structures, as well as for the development of Central Asian societies and economies.

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Chapter 10. Socio-Economic Factors Affecting Uzbek Labor Migrants in Turkey

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In today’s global economy, capital, labor, goods, and services move easily within countries and across borders. One of the key determinants of globalization is migration, with 250 million people—or 3 percent of the world’s population—living outside their birth country. In recent years, numerous studies on migration from Central Asia have focused on migrant flows to Russia and Kazakhstan, but large numbers of Central Asian migrants can also be found in Turkey. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of the new states; it created a scholarship program, known as the “Great Student Project,” for Central Asian students, and in 2006-2007 established visa-free travel for all categories of visitors from Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan (up to 30 days), and Kyrgyzstan (up to 90 days).

As Figure 10.1 shows, the numbers of travelers to Turkey from Uzbekistan increased in 2007 after Ankara implemented a visa-free regime. Many members of the Uzbek middle classes choose Turkish resorts like Antalya and Bodrum as vacation destinations. Labor migrants have also taken the opportunities created by the visa regime to find jobs in Turkey. As such, the numbers of Uzbeks working officially in Turkey are probably only a fraction of the total. The Immigration Office of Turkey has declared that 18,270 residence permits were given to Uzbek citizens in 2016; this can be broken down into 9,830 short-term residence permits, 2,330 family residence permits, 1,798 student residence permits, 2,081 job permits, and 1,580 categorized as “other.” Yet the fact that 1,648 illegal migrants from Uzbekistan were caught and fined by the authorities in 2016 supports the hypothesis that the official numbers are just the tip of the iceberg.

Figure 10.1. Distribution of foreign visitors arriving in Turkey by nationality, 1998–2016 (persons)

Source: Calculated and created by the author using data from the Tourism Ministry of Turkey

The purpose of this research is to study the socio-economic factors that prompt labor migrants from Uzbekistan to come to Turkey. The main objective is to describe the profile of these migrants and to analyze the most significant factors in their choice of Turkey as a labor destination. This research is based on a survey of 70 migrants and semi-structured interviews of 20 migrants working in Ankara, Istanbul, Konya, Izmir, Eskisehir, and Kırklareli. The results of the survey are aggregated as a “migrant profile” to give a general portrait of respondents, while the discussion explored participants’ reasons for migration, their social networks, and their future plans.2

Literature Review

Recent research on migration has looked at the relationship between remittances and GDP in Central Asian countries, specifically the effect of migrants’ savings on the economic growth of migrant-sending countries.3 Pull-push models—which evoke neoclassical economics and are based on maximization of utility, rational choice, factorial differences of wages and government authorities have also paid significant attention to human trafficking issues.5

The gender dimensions of labor migration have been studied in depth. Women typically work in the home doing housework and child/elderly care, or else work as sex workers and/or in entertainment. The majority of immigrant women live at their place of work, where they are employed as caretakers, nannies, and maids. Women are the majority of immigrant women.6

Numerous researchers and officials indicate that there are no accurate data on migrants in the case of Turkey as a migrant-receiving country or Uzbekistan as a migrant-sending country. Akpınar argues that illegal labor migrants come to Turkey as tourists, taking advantage of the flexible visa system for their countries, and then stay and work.4 This flexible attitude on the part of the Turkish state should be considered and evaluated within the context of the large commercial and economic relations that Turkey has established with post-Soviet migrant-sending countries. Gökmem claims that the most important characteristics of immigration to Turkey are: the short periods of time that migrants stay; the irregularity of their modes of entry into the country; the ready availability of work for an illegal immigrant; and competing migration flows from Middle East, Asia, and the Black Sea region7 (Georgia has the highest number of informal workers in Turkey, closely followed by Uzbekistan).8 Generally, migrants prefer to work in the Turkish cities of Istanbul, Izmir, Ankara, Muğla, Bursa, Samsun, Trabzon, and Rize. In addition, many citizens of former Soviet countries undertake seasonal work in tourist regions like Antalya and Muğla.9

The gender dimensions of labor migration have been studied in depth. Women typically work in the home doing housework and child/elderly care, or else work as sex workers and/or in entertainment. The majority of immigrant women live at their workplaces, where they are employed as caretakers, nannies, and maids.

maids, etc.\textsuperscript{10} Living where they work eliminates the need for these women to search for housing during their first months in Turkey; it also means that they often work extended hours, as they do not need to travel to work and are available in the night.\textsuperscript{11} Sex workers and entertainers, meanwhile, tend to rent accommodation with members of their ethnic group; as the group grows, they move to a larger apartment.

Akalın discusses the work experiences of female immigrant domestic workers who have migrated from post-Soviet countries to Turkey since the 1990s.\textsuperscript{12} She notes that migrants may be socially and culturally isolated because they work in the private sector and/or do domestic work. Even during weekends and on days off, most Uzbek women migrants spend their time at the home where they work or visiting other migrant women in the cities where they live. They may go to a nearby mosque together, especially during the month of Ramadan. Many studies indicate that relatives, friends, and agencies play an important role in women's migration and employment.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Data Collection and Methodology}

The data used in this research was collected through face-to-face questionnaires. In the first part of the questionnaire, I gathered demographic information about the participants. In the second part, a 5-point Likert scale was used to collect data on job satisfaction and living and working conditions. I visited catering enterprises, migrants' houses, their places of work, nightclubs, etc. to forge connections with Uzbek migrants and become familiar with their living and working conditions. I surveyed 70 migrants—including those with white-collar and blue-collar jobs—as well as conducting semi-structured interviews with 20 migrants, allowing me to draw a typical portrait of an Uzbek migrant in Turkey. According to my interview and survey data, migrants occupied the following jobs: caretaker, babysitter, nurse, cleaner, waiter/waitress, farmer, busboy, plumber, and construction worker.

In most quantitative studies, the goal is to obtain a representative sample, which may enable researchers to generalize from the sample to the general population.\textsuperscript{14} In this qualitative study, the representative group was selected by the method of "easily accessible case sampling." The sample is used to understand the context, rather than to produce statistically significant results. Semi-structured interviews developed by the researcher—in this case consisting of open-ended questions about migrants' experiences and perceptions of pull-push factors in the migration process—provided additional information. They also gave me, as the researcher, a greater chance of being seen as a knowledge-producing participant in the process, rather than hiding behind a preset interview guide.\textsuperscript{15}

I carried out individual interviews with migrants between April and July 2017. A voice recorder was used to collect the data. Migrants were de-identified to render the interview anonymous. The process lasted for an average of 45 minutes. In some cases, it was difficult to collect data from migrants. One 28-year-old migrant was afraid to give an interview because he thought it would be uploaded to YouTube. All survey participants were between 22 and 50 years old. Seventy percent of respondents were men (49) and 30 percent were women (21).

In terms of education, 26.4 percent of interviewees had higher education (university), 32.4 percent had attended a college or special secondary institution,\textsuperscript{16} 39.7 percent had completed high school (11 years), and 1.5 percent had finished secondary school (9 years). The educational level of the surveyed migrants was relatively high, but because of the limited size of the interview pool, this data cannot be assumed to be representative. It does, however, help

\textsuperscript{10} Ahmet İçduygulu and Şule Toktaş, \textit{Yurtdışından gelenlerin nicelik ve niteliklerinin tespitinde sorunlar}, vol. 12 (Ankara: Turkish Academy of Sciences, 2005).
\textsuperscript{11} Şenay Gökbayrak, "Refah devletinin dönüşümü ve bakım hizmetlerinin görünmez emekçileri göçmen kadınlardır," \textit{Çalışma ve Toplum} 2, no. 21 (2009).
\textsuperscript{12} Ayşe Akalın, "Ev işlerinde yeni emek çağının", \textit{Express Dergisi} 99 (2009).
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{16} In Uzbekistan, "special secondary" refers to a college teaching a higher vocational subject (e.g. nursing, physiotherapy, practical engineering, or veterinary technician) and normally lasts from age 16-19.
interpret the ways that respondents discussed their working conditions and opportunities in Turkey.

Each respondent was asked to designate one factor as the most significant in their choice to migrate to Turkey, as opposed to somewhere else. As Figure 10.2 shows, migrants gave the following as their main reasons for choosing Turkey as their labor destination: religion (33 percent), culture (29 percent), social networks of other migrants (30 percent), and high salary (8 percent). Evidently, therefore, cultural identity—presumably the shared Islamic and Turkic heritage—were key influences on individuals who migrated from Uzbekistan to Turkey.

An important element determining migrants’ ability to integrate into Turkish society is their level of Turkish language ability. All the respondents in this study had at least intermediate Turkish, if not advanced Turkish. They indicated that it takes only one or two months to become conversant on everyday topics. Migrants’ mentions of the existence of social networks in Turkey that ease their transition echo the findings of many studies about the economics of labor migration. That being said, such networks would also be present in other potential migration destinations. A second question helped shed more light on the role of social networks in bringing migrants to Turkey, highlighting that few migrants would have arrived there without invitations and job offers from members of their social networks. Relatives, friends, and neighbors share positive experience of living and working in Turkey with their relatives and friends in Uzbekistan; they also offer them jobs in Turkey. Within this sample, 45.7 percent of migrants arrived through relatives, while 45.7 percent came through friends. Fewer than 10 percent made the decision to migrate to Turkey without the influence of such support networks.

Migrants were also asked whether they felt scrutinized by the Turkish police. In response, 22.7 percent indicated that their official documents (passports, residence permits, etc.) had been checked, while 77.3 percent had not had such an interaction with the police. During interviews, most migrants further confirmed that bribery and corruption are more widespread in the Russian police force than in its Turkish counterpart. If the Russian police caught a labor migrant, they would demand a bribe even if the migrant had all the required documents. In Turkey, by contrast, some migrants had lived and worked for years without documents (it was, however, common for these migrants to be fined upon leaving Turkey). A lack of legal permission to live and work in Turkey was a preoccupation for 27.9 percent of migrants, approximately one-third of the 73.3 percent of respondents who reported not having residence or work permits. Concern about being caught (1.6 percent) and uncertainty about earnings (1.6 percent), meanwhile, were far more marginal worries.

When migrants were asked if they had experienced stress and anxiety—and if so, what had caused it—the most frequent responses related to homesickness and the struggle to maintain family ties (68.9 percent) (see Figure 10.3). 61.7 percent of migrants were alone, while 27.7 percent had come with family and 10.6 percent had migrated with other relatives. Labor migrants also worry about the economic expectations placed on them to send money to the families they have left behind in the form of remittances. They see migration as a path to emancipation and financial empowerment, but the pressure to provide for family members at home can be substantial.

We did not ask about average monthly earnings, but we asked respondents to quantify their average monthly remittances (shown in Figure 10.4). As other scholars have noted, such data cannot be verified, but migrants in the sample reported sending between US$200 and US$700 on a monthly basis. The majority (53.3 percent) remitted US$400-500, followed by 23.7 percent sending US$300, 18.4 percent US$200, and 2.6 percent reaching US$600-700. When these responses are broken down by gender, we can see that women remit more money than men (see Table 10.1):
Like labor migrants anywhere, they plan to use these remittances for a variety of purposes. Figure 10.5 shows migrants’ primary goal for their remittances. The largest proportion of respondents planned to build a house back in Uzbekistan:

On the basis of all the data given above, it can be said that both economic and social factors influence a migrant’s decision to migrate. Most migrants perceive labor migration to be a short-term way to improve their socio-economic status. As such, 50 percent of my interviewees plan to remain in Turkey for 1-2 years, 39.6 percent for 3-5 years, and 10.4 percent for 10 or more years. In terms of trips home to Uzbekistan during that time, 21.3 percent of my sample indicated that they went home every year, 2.1 percent said that they went every other year, and 70.2 percent responded that they had not yet gone home.

Since they return home infrequently, migrants maintain their links with Uzbekistan in other ways. Economic ties include remittances to family members, as well as paying for relatives’ mortgages and study fees. Emotionally, migrants’ homesickness keeps them connected with Uzbekistan, and even

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**Table 10.1. Mean monthly remittances for male and female migrants**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Std. Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0.874</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2.40</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>0.984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Author’s estimates*
stimulates some migrants to return home permanently. Other migrants choose to remain in Turkey, acquiring Turkish citizenship and often—in the case of women—marrying Turkish men. Information ties, meanwhile, are maintained via the Internet and social media.

The questionnaire was designed to measure how much migrants enjoy their job and how they rate working conditions and opportunities for career advancement (see Figure 10.6). The results showed that 52 percent of respondents were satisfied with their job conditions, 21 percent very satisfied, 14 percent neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 9 percent dissatisfied, and 4 percent completely dissatisfied. Typically, therefore, migrants leave Turkey only when they have saved enough money to achieve the goal that drove them to migrate. Job and life satisfaction encourage them to remain in Turkey for a longer period of time, as well as recommend the country as a migration destination to friends and relatives at home.

When migrants explain why they chose to go to Turkey, what comes across most clearly is their desire to help their children get a good education and succeed in life. It is evident that migrant parents do their best for their children: “I didn’t study at university; I want my children to be educated” (female migrant, 38). Said another migrant:

I came to earn money for my daughters’ education. My elder daughter is 21 years old. It is quite hard to make marriage ceremonies. I have three children: two daughters and a son. I want to provide a good future for them (female migrant, 42).
People who are satisfied with their life conditions are less likely to leave their homes. It is people who face social, economic, or religious problems who take the risk of moving somewhere else, as this migrant’s testimony highlights:

I graduated from Sport College and I worked as a sports trainer for children in Uzbekistan. I am a member of a political party in Uzbekistan and actively participated in political issues. I wrote articles, most of them critical. Corruption was widespread and the salary was quite low. I chose Turkey because my uncles and brother worked here. I didn’t care about my salary or job; the social networks were what were important to me, and there are 1,700 migrants from my village working in Ankara. I am from a well-educated family, so my reason for leaving Uzbekistan is more emotional than financial: my sweetheart married another man (male migrant, 24).

Another reason to choose Turkey as a labor destination is that Turkish police control of labor migrants is comparatively humane. As a 24-year-old male migrant explained:

I came to Turkey 5 years ago and worked as a waiter, a seller at a petrol station, and a packer. My salary is 1,200 lira [approximately US$335]. I take on all the expenses of my second sister, who is studying in the center of the region, I bought a car and built a house. The police have caught me 3-4 times. I showed my passport, they asked where I was from, I answered, “From Uzbekistan” and said that I work in Turkey. They did not say anything and returned my passport.

Studies underline that women have historically migrated primarily as dependents, following husbands who were moving for work. In the 1990s, this trend underwent a substantial shift across most of the world, as large numbers of women became independent labor migrants. Indeed, an interesting phenomenon I observed during my interviews was that a man may now move to Turkey to follow his wife. “My wife came to Turkey a year before me. According to Muslim traditions, a husband and wife should live together. So I came after her,” a 44-year-old male migrant told me.

Other studies have analyzed the labor migration processes of women in the tourism sector, including sex tourism and human trafficking. Turkey has a reputation for attracting female migrants, my respondents indicated: “Russia is more for male migrants and Turkey is for female migrants” (female migrant, 42).

The Challenges Migrants Face

From the interviews and survey data, a picture of the typical Uzbek migrant woman in Turkey emerged. She is usually divorced or widowed, has a low level of education, and comes from a rural part of Uzbekistan:

I am divorced from my husband; he was an addict. I was married at the age of 19. I was infected with diseases during my family life. I left my 7-year-old daughter with my mother. My relatives helped me find a job in Turkey. I am a nanny here; I have cared for two Turkish kids for one-and-a-half years. My boss is very good. My salary is good enough, I send US$500-600 per month home. I came to earn money to build a house. I worked in a textile factory and restaurant in Uzbekistan, where my salary went on daily expenses. I could not save for a house. My father died; my brother is with me in Turkey. We are planning to build a house, then give my brother a wedding party. If I can earn enough money, I am going to open my own business, like a sewing factory. I will work in Turkey 2-3 more years and then return to Uzbekistan.

In Turkey, migrants, especially young women, face “migrant stereotypes.” A 23-year-old migrant woman shared her experiences:

When I first came, I encountered bad attitudes from local people. On the whole, Turkish men behave toward girls from Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan as if they are prostitutes. Girls from those countries usually sleep with Turkish men for money. I was quite young when I came. I was under my mother’s control. I studied at university, so they respect me. Ten percent of girls go to university and build their life themselves. Men don’t think to get engaged or married to migrant girls, just

19 See, for example, Gökmen, “Türk turizminin”; Bulut, “Eski Sovyetler.”
make love to them. Eighty percent of women with bad behavior blacken the 20 percent of decent women.

Newly arrived migrants, especially those who have left their families behind, typically intend to earn the money they need for their plans and leave Turkey as quickly as possible:

I send US$500 a month to Uzbekistan, I don't spend even 1 kurush for myself. I came to earn money to put wooden floors in my house. My husband is working in Russia. I came to Turkey because to my mind, the Russian labor market is for men and Turkey's is for women. I really miss my family, my children. I cannot stay here long, even though I have a residence permit for two years. I am using a very old type of mobile phone, I do not want to waste money on buying a new one. I want to earn money and go back to Uzbekistan as soon as possible. Turkey is good, working conditions are good; I can get my salary on time (caregiver, 31).

Some migrants complained about the passivity of the Uzbek embassy in the migration process and/or continuous observation, which impedes mobility. A migrant from rural Uzbekistan who moved to Turkey as a farm worker in 2012 now owns his own business. He complained about the registration process at the Uzbek embassy in Turkey:

The Uzbek Embassy requires temporary registration at the embassy when we need support from them. The embassy or Uzbek government does not help when we need a paper from our embassy. As we are illegal migrants, we do not have a residence permit to register. If we do not register at the embassy, this can be a problem if someone has a health issue or accident. There is no interaction between the Uzbek people and the embassy. I think the government should be closer to people. There is no one behind the Uzbek migrants.

Irregular migrants find themselves caught in a vicious circle: they do not have a residence permit, and in this particular case neither the Turkish side nor the Uzbek embassy will support them. Nevertheless, they blame the Uzbek embassy for the problem, rather than taking responsibility for their choice to be an irregular migrant.

Migrants from Uzbekistan also complain about the short visa-free period for Uzbek nationals (30 days) compared to nationals of Kyrgyzstan (90 days):

I think 30 days visa-free is too short to get a residence permit. It would be better for our government to make an agreement with the Turkish government to extend the visa-free period to three months. It is quite hard to get a residence permit, not to mention a work permit. You have to answer 100 questions to get it at an immigration office. You make an appointment, and after three months they call and ask questions about what I am doing. They know that we are working here.

Migrants usually do jobs that involve hard work and have less prestige than those chosen by Turks. Earlier research found that many highly educated specialists emigrated from Uzbekistan in the 1990s, some of whom ended up in Turkey. Today, however, it is primarily those with lower levels of education who migrate. An exceptional story is that of a 50-year-old white-collar migrant who has made Turkey her home:

I was invited to work at the Ministry of Culture. My family is quite rich, all my family members are musicians, and most of them live abroad, so I don't send money to them. I am not sure about going back to Uzbekistan; I will retire in Turkey. I bought a house in Turkey, living and working conditions are good, no problem. I graduated from university with honors in Uzbekistan. There is still a lack of qualified choir and orchestra conductors in Turkey. It is not easy to be an associate professor in Turkey, because Turkish is not my mother language, even though I speak it fluently.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In this study of the socio-economic factors affecting Uzbek labor migrants in Turkey, I found that cultural proximity and migrants’ networks have affected their choice of destination country. Thirty percent of migrants interviewed in this study moved to Turkey without any idea what kind of job they would do. In light of these trends, migration information centers should be established to help them acquire residence and job permits in cities where there are already large communities of Uzbek labor migrants. Aslan’s re-

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search shows that Uzbek respondents complain about the lack of state involvement to help them deal with the issues they face.21 This is a legacy of the Soviet era: people still expect the state to provide security and justice, as well as to guide their economic activities, particularly in terms of their investments and business initiatives. It seems that in order to increase the developmental potential of migration and remittances from migrant-receiving countries, national governments must be more active.

In transition countries, labor migration is one of the main ways for people who cannot find employment at home to earn money. The migration corridor between Central Asia and the Russian Federation illustrates this pattern. According to United Nations Population Division estimates, 4.96 million people from Central Asia participate in labor migration.1 The Russian Federation and Kazakhstan host between 74 and 80 percent of registered migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Since 2011, remittances have comprised a higher share of the GDPs of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan than of any other country worldwide (28-43 percent in Tajikistan and over 30 percent in Kyrgyzstan), with more than three-quarters of these remittances coming from the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan.

Central Asian countries’ dependence on remittances from labor migrants working in Russia gives Moscow a lever that allows it to exert pressure over Central Asia. Suppose, for instance, that Russia were to impose restrictions on migration. As a result, a share of the migrant workers would be compelled to return home. This would increase the unemployment rate in migrants’ home countries, pushing up government spending on social services. Moreover, the decline in remittances would increase poverty and decrease consumers’ purchasing power, causing the supply of goods and services to outpace demand. Consequently, entrepreneurs would be forced to reduce production and fire excess workers. This would not only increase the population of unemployed people in the home country, but also mean that entrepreneurs were paying less in taxes, putting the government further into debt. As this process continued, macroeconomic equilibrium would be weakened.

The possibility that this scenario might occur suggests that donor countries might be in an emigration trap. I use the term “emigration trap” to describe a condition where the economic stability of the country is contingent on the flow of remittances from migrant laborers abroad and depends on the migration policy of destination countries. In such cases, destination countries can use migration policy to control or influence the economic situation of donor countries.

In this paper, the following questions will be analyzed: i) how can the remittance-dependence of economies be measured and at what point can a country be considered to have fallen into the emigration trap?; ii) what are the socio-economic consequences for Central Asian countries of decreasing remittance levels?; iii) what is the estimated dependence of national economies on the macroeconomic situation in recipient countries?; iv) how effective are existing migration flows compared to potential migration flows to other destination countries?; and v) what measures should Central Asian states take to free themselves from the emigration trap? The answers to these questions will be sought through a combination of analysis and synthesis, induction and deduction, comparison, and econometric panel modeling. Data will be drawn from the datasets produced by national statistics committees and international organizations.

Literature Review

The existing literature on this topic can be divided into two main trends: literature on the migration process in Central Asian countries and literature on migration in other countries.

To begin with the literature on the migration process and its causes and consequences in countries outside Central Asia, Shelburne and Palacin examined the influence of remittances on economic growth and poverty reduction in transition economies.2 They

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showed that remittances had a positive overall impact on economic growth, but the emigration of skilled workers produced a negative effect. They found that less developed financial and capital markets interrupted the productive use of remittance inflows and decreased their potential developmental impact.

In their paper devoted to the impact of remittances on economic growth and poverty in the Asia-Pacific region, Imai et al. demonstrated a positive relationship between remittances, economic growth, and poverty reduction. However, they also indicated that remittance flows could be a source of output shocks during times of economic uncertainty. As such, they recommended using remittances to make physical and human capital investments. Thagunna and Acharya, looking at Nepal, drew similar conclusions. Nevertheless, according to them, if remittances in developing countries are channeled into public infrastructure, it helps strengthen the domestic market and improve the business climate, resulting in greater economic return, which has a negative impact on migration flows. Gradually, the economy itself gets rid of remittance dependence. Numerous other scholars who have examined migration processes in specific countries or regions concur with these main findings, including Tambama (Zimbabwe), Abdullaev (countries of the former Soviet Union), Dilshad (Pakistan), Blouchoutzi and Nikas (Moldova and Albania), Larsson and Angman (99 developing countries), and Fagerheim (ASEAN).

Only one study, looking at migration in sub-Saharan Africa, had contradictory results. Many scholars have discussed migration flows in the Central Asian context in particular. Schroogen looked at determinants of remittances in the countries of the former Soviet Union, finding that remittances can be explained, at least in part, by income. Other main reasons why people go abroad and send money home are the performance of the domestic banking sector, the quality of institutions, and levels of international integration. Marat investigated the impact of the global financial crisis on the flow of migrants from Central Asia and came to the conclusion that the global financial crisis put Central Asian migrants in a difficult situation due to the unfavorable macroeconomic situation in the Russian Federation. In his research, Akmoldoev focused on migration flows from Kyrgyzstan, finding that the main reason for the declining economic effectiveness of remittances was directing remittance flows toward consumption rather than investment.

Delovarova, Shkapyak, and Kukeyeva analyzed the “Central Asian migration system” as the system including the five Central Asian countries and Russia. Looking at the main reasons for Central Asian migration, its consequences and challenges, they recommended intensifying cooperation on the main issues, both between Central Asian countries and other countries or regions concur with these main findings, including Tambama (Zimbabwe), Abdullaev (countries of the former Soviet Union), Dilshad (Pakistan), Blouchoutzi and Nikas (Moldova and Albania), Larsson and Angman (99 developing countries), and Fagerheim (ASEAN).

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and between Russia and Central Asia. According to them, Kazakhstan has real potential to become a main migration destination and a driver of reforming migration cooperation in the region. Delovarova et al. analyzed this process more generally as part of regionalism and regionalization in Central Asia.16 They noted the underdevelopment of transnational cooperation between these countries, with cooperation initiated primarily by the Russian Federation, and likewise concluded that Kazakhstan could help push for Central Asian integration. The impact of remittances in Tajikistan was analyzed by Sultonov, who found a positive correlation between remittances and imports.17 Since the country is highly dependent on remittances, it becomes highly dependent on imports, he argued. According to him, in order to maximize the positive effects of remittance flows, the government should implement a long-term policy to encourage people to save and stimulate the domestic production of consumer goods.

Danzer, Dietz, and Gatiska analyzed migrant stock by gender, age, and income level using a household panel survey.18 Although risks for Tajik migrants in the Russian Federation are increasing, the Tajik government is not planning to create jobs and improve infrastructure in order to decrease emigration flows from the country. Malyuchenko likewise analyzed labor migration from Central Asia to the Russian Federation.19 According to her, remittances from Russia improve living standards in these countries by increasing consumption and domestic investments. However, poor infrastructure means that these small-scale improvements do not noticeably improve Central Asian countries' economic development. She considered social insurance, health insurance, pension provision, and citizenship to be the main issues on which Central Asian countries should facilitate negotiations with the government of the Russian Federation. She further suggested that international organizations should participate in these negotiations in order to improve their effectiveness. According to Eromenko, meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan show symptoms of Dutch disease—which is caused by large inflows of foreign currency—due to their high levels of labor migration.20 The high proportion of remittances in the economy causes the appreciation of the real exchange rate, a decrease in tradable sectors, and an increase in non-tradable sectors.

This paper contributes to these existing bodies of literature by analyzing the consequences of emigration flows using regression models; creating a new indicator of emigration dependence; finding mechanisms of identifying the border values of this indicator, which indicates whether or not a country is in an emigration trap; and comparing the effectiveness of migration channels.

**Trends in Migration and Remittances in Central Asia**

The Soviet Union's constituent republics existed as a single economy and could not function independently. At that time, the Central Asian countries essentially specialized in agriculture. Those factories that existed were optimized to serve as part of the Union-wide industrial structure. After the collapse of the USSR, it became necessary to create independent economies. Russia had been the industrial, financial, and regulation center of the Soviet Union, but the country's birth rate was very low, leading to a shortage of workers. The Central Asian states, for their part, faced high levels of unemployment as the number of workers outpaced the jobs available. This situation caused the migration corridor between Central Asia and Russia to emerge and develop. It would be a mistake, however, to say that this corridor emerged after the collapse of the USSR. In fact, the same dynamics existed during the Soviet era, and the Soviet government addressed them using an internal migration process.

In this section, I will discuss the process of migration from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and remittance flows from them to the Russian

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Federation. Data related to migration stock is based on bilateral migration estimates produced by the United Nations Population Division. Remittance information is computed by the World Bank on the basis of bank transfers.

**Kyrgyzstan**

Migration is very important for the Kyrgyz economy as a tool to overcome the population’s unemployment and poverty. The number of people working abroad increased gradually between 1990 and 2015, growing at almost the same rate as did the economically active population. As such, the share of emigrants in the labor force remained more or less static, at between 27 and 30 percent of the total (see Figure 11.1). Statistics indicate that 78-82 percent of migrants prefer Russia, with Kazakhstan the second-largest recipient country.

**Figure 11.1. Number of migrants from Kyrgyzstan and their share of the total labor force, 1990–2015 (persons and percent)**

![Figure 11.1](image)

**Source: World Bank statistics**

**Figure 11.2. The amount of remittances received and their share of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP between 2006 and 2015 (US$millions and percent of GDP)**

![Figure 11.2](image)

**Source: World Bank statistics**

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21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
In the first years of independence, migrants made very little money, with the result that few used bank transfer services to send money home. It is therefore difficult to determine how much money was sent to Kyrgyzstan as remittances, since statistics were not transparent and remittances were not tracked by international organizations. (This is true of all Central Asian countries.)

According to the World Bank, before 2002 remittances accounted for less than one percent of GDP, a figure that was almost stable. Thereafter, it began to grow rapidly, to the point that it now comprises around 30 percent of GDP (US$1.7 billion—see Figure 11.2). The majority of remittances came from the Russian Federation (77–80 percent of the total). This illuminates why the amount of remittances—and remittances as a share of GDP—declined during the global financial crisis.

**Tajikistan**

Tajikistan is the poorest country in the region. Poor economic infrastructure and a low standard of living push the economically active population to go abroad to work. The country lost years of development because of the civil war (1992–1997); for some Tajiks, working abroad, especially in Russia, became their only way of making a living. The number of emigrants declined gradually between 1990 and 2000, and then started to grow again, reaching 587,000 in 2015 (see Figure 11.3). Between 15 and 25 percent of the economically active population worked abroad between 1995 and 2015, 77–80 percent of whom were employed in the Russian Federation.

![Figure 11.3. Number of migrants from Tajikistan and their share of the total labor force, 1990–2015 (persons and percent)](image)

If we want to analyze the Tajik economy’s dependence on remittances, we should discuss remittances as a share of the country’s GDP. With the exception of the post-2014 period, the value of remittances and remittances as a share of GDP have both increased (see Figure 11.4). The level of dependence peaked at 49.3 percent of GDP in 2008 and is now decreasing (28.8 percent in 2015). The high level of remittance dependence has prompted many analysts to recommend that the Tajik government develop domestic infrastructure and other sectors of the economy, including creating new places of employment. Some scholars even warn of a “migration Dutch disease” in Tajikistan.

**Uzbekistan**

Uzbekistan, a country of about 32 million people, reputedly has very high economic potential. It has a higher GDP growth rate than its neighbors, but still faces problems related to unemployment, weak

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23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
Figure 11.4. The amount of remittances received and their share of Tajikistan’s GDP, 2002–2015 (US$ millions and percent of GDP)

Source: World Bank statistics

Figure 11.5. Number of migrants from Uzbekistan and their share of the total labor force, 1990–2015 (persons and percent)

Source: World Bank statistics

26 Ibid.
economic and legal infrastructure, corruption, and a poor banking system. Incomes are typically too low to cover the cost of living, prompting even citizens with higher education to go abroad to work in construction, retail, and other blue-collar jobs. As in other countries, the number of migrants increased between 1990 and 2015, from 1.4 million to about 2 million (see Figure 11.5). About 60 percent of all migrants work in Russia, and Uzbek nationals comprise 5-11 percent of Russia’s migrant population.

As Figure 11.6 shows, remittances have been on the rise, except during the global financial crisis and sanctions against Russia. Remittances peaked in 2013 (US$6.7 billion) and started declining after sanctions.

As noted above, flows of migrants from Central Asia are directed toward the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan has the potential to be another key recipient of migrants from neighboring countries. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan evidently have a high degree of dependence on remittances; migration is these countries’ main answer to unemployment and poverty at home. Uzbekistan’s labor market depends on migrants, but the country’s economy would not find itself faced with a macroeconomic crisis in the absence of remittances. The sections that follow discuss the dependence of the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek economies on migration and assess whether there is an emigration trap in these countries.

Methodology

To determine whether or not these countries find themselves in an emigration trap, we first need an objective indicator of countries’ dependence on migration. In most of the literature on this topic, remittances as a share of GDP is used as a proxy for a country’s remittance-dependence. However, this estimate looks only at income; we need an indicator that also takes the labor force into account. When a recipient country stops receiving immigrants from donor countries or places new restrictions on immigration, this has an impact both on income and on the labor force in donor countries, which in turn affects the donor country’s macroeconomic situation.

This paper therefore proposes to calculate dependence on migration as follows:

$$DLE = \sqrt{Rem_{share} \times Emig_{share}}$$

Where

- $DLE$ is a country’s level of dependence on emigration (%);
- $Rem_{share}$ is the share of the official GDP comprised of remittances (%); and
- $Emig_{share}$ is the share of emigrant workers in the economically active population.

The geometric mean is used rather than the arithmetic mean in order to reduce the level of sub-

27 Ibid.
stitutability between sub-indicators while ensuring that a one-percent decline in the first sub-indicator has the same impact on the DLE as a one-percent decline in the other sub-index.

The index above measures an economy’s overall dependence on emigration. However, a high concentration of emigration flows is more risky for the macroeconomic situation in a country. To reflect the concentration in this indicator, a market concentration index can be used. In this paper, the easiest to compute and most effective indicator, the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI), is used:

\[ DLE_{\text{concentration}} = \sqrt{\text{Rem}_{\text{share}} \times HHI_{\text{rem}} \times \text{Emig}_{\text{share}} \times HHI_{\text{emig}}} \]

Where

\[ HHI_{\text{rem}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} s_i^2 \]

\[ HHI_{\text{emig}} = \sum_{i=1}^{N} g_i^2 \]

Where

\( s_i \) is remittances from country \( i \) as a share of total remittances;

\( g_i \) is emigrant workers in country \( i \) as a share of emigrants from the donor country; and

\( N \) is the number of countries where emigrants from the donor country work.

The indicators above analyze a country’s general level of dependence. As this paper seeks to analyze the extent to which the migration policy of a recipient country with a high level of migrant workers affects a donor country’s economic dependence, we use the following estimate:

\[ DLE_i = \sqrt{\text{Rem}_{\text{share}} \times \text{Rem}_{\text{share}i} \times \text{Emig}_{\text{share}} \times \text{Emig}_{\text{share}i}} \]

Where

\( \text{DLE}_i \) is the dependence level of the economy on the emigration flow in country \( i \);

\( \text{Rem}_{\text{share}i} \) is remittances from country \( i \) as a share of total remittances; and

\( \text{Emig}_{\text{share}i} \) is emigrant workers in country \( i \) as a share of total emigrant workers.

For different countries, the levels of dependence at which they can be regarded as “in” the emigration trap vary. This level can be determined using econometric models that show the relationship between the macroeconomic situation and emigration flows. If internal indicators have a higher influence on the macroeconomic situation than do external indicators (which are related to emigration flows), the emigration trap is not observed. Otherwise, the economy may be in the emigration trap.

In general, this model can be summarized by the following equation:

\[ Y = DLE_i \times \sum_n (\beta_n \times X_{\text{external}_n}) + \sum_m (\beta_m \times X_{\text{internal}_m}) + \alpha + \varepsilon \]

Where

\( Y \) is the macroeconomic indicator (GDP, unemployment, and exchange rate);

\( X_n \) is an explanatory variable;

\( \alpha \) and \( \beta_n \) are coefficients of variables; and

\( \varepsilon \) is the random error of the model.

If

\[ \frac{DLE_i \times \sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n})}{\sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n})} \geq \frac{\sum_m (|\beta_m| \times X_{\text{internal}_m})}{\sum_m (|\beta_m| \times X_{\text{internal}_m})} \]

then there is a high possibility that the economy is in the emigration trap. From this inequality, the limit value of DLE can be calculated:

\[ DLE_{\text{limit}} = \frac{\sum_m (|\beta_m| \times X_{\text{internal}_m})}{\sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n})} \]

In this paper, we try to model three macroeconomic indicators: GDP, unemployment rate, and exchange rate. Using three regression models, three limit values of DLE are calculated; the lowest among them is the most reliable for determining whether an economy is in the emigration trap.

To estimate national economies’ dependence on the macroeconomic situation in recipient countries, we can use the following formula:

\[ DMSRC = \frac{\text{DLE}_i \times \sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n})}{\text{DLE}_i \times \sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n}) + \sum_m (|\beta_m| \times X_{\text{internal}_m})} = \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\sum_m (|\beta_m| \times X_{\text{internal}_m})}{\text{DLE}_i \times \sum_n (|\beta_n| \times X_{\text{external}_n})}} \]

If the national economy’s dependence on the macroeconomic situation in the recipient country (DMSRC) is higher than 0.5, there is a high likelihood that the economy is in the emigration trap.
To compare the effectiveness of emigration flows in certain countries, the value of remittances per migrant is calculated. This comparison illuminates new effective corridors of migration, which (if followed) might eliminate concentration in a single economy as well as the migration trap more broadly. Researching the causes of migration, which identify the direction of it, allows for the elaboration of policy recommendations.

**Regression Models**

As mentioned above, in order to find the limit value of an economy’s dependence on emigration flows, we use three regression models, which describe the three main macroeconomic indicators and main patterns of macroeconomic equilibrium. The critical task is to choose the correct variables.

The first indicator is Gross Domestic Product. To model this indicator, we use the following variables:

**Table 11.1. Variables to model gross domestic product**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Unit of measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittance from the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Rem</td>
<td>US$million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate of ruble</td>
<td>Ex_rate_rus</td>
<td>Dollar/ruble</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate of national currency unit</td>
<td>Ex_rate_nat</td>
<td>Dollar/national currency unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net export in Central Asian countries</td>
<td>XN</td>
<td>US$million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment</td>
<td>FDI</td>
<td>US$million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The variables above are value-creating indicators and exchange rates, which describe the general macroeconomic situation in the country. It is expected that all coefficients are more than zero (positive). Theoretically, we could also add other variables, but there is insufficient data to incorporate these variables.

The second indicator is the unemployment rate. The following variables are chosen to model the unemployment rate:

**Table 11.2. Variables to model unemployment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Unit of measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrants as a share of the economically active population in the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Emig_share_Rus</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>GDP_growth</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign direct investment as a share of GDP</td>
<td>FDI_share</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The GDP growth rate indicates changes in a country’s macroeconomic situation. If the macroeconomic situation in the country is prosperous, new jobs will be created, leading to a reduction in the level of unemployment. Migrants are not registered as unemployed, hence a high level of migration means a low level of unemployment. Another job creator is FDI. If it constitutes a large share of the country’s GDP, this reduces unemployment. It can therefore be concluded that coefficients are less than zero (negative).

The third indicator is the exchange rate. The following table shows the factors that describe changes in the exchange rate:

**Table 11.3. Variables to model the exchange rate**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Unit of measurement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Remittances from the Russian Federation</td>
<td>Rem</td>
<td>US$ billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate of ruble</td>
<td>Ex_rate_rus</td>
<td>US$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net exports of Central Asian countries</td>
<td>XN</td>
<td>US$ billion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>Inf</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The main foreign currency sources in Central Asian countries are remittances and net exports. The inflation rate reflects, in part, the depreciation of national currencies. The ruble exchange rate influences the exchange rate of national currencies because migrants’ salaries are denominated in rubles. It is expected that the correlation coefficient between the exchange rate and all variables besides the inflation rate is positive; the expected coefficient of the inflation rate is negative.

**Results**

To determine countries’ degree of dependence on remittances, we produced three regression models. In the GDP model, econometric analysis showed that of the variables considered, only the amounts of remittances and foreign direct investment impact GDP. These two indicators create more value than others; other economic cycles can also be described by these indicators.

In the unemployment rate model, econometric analysis led us to use “share of Russian migrants in total labor force of countries” and “GDP growth rate” as descriptive variables. GDP growth rate explains...
how the economy is working and whether new jobs are being created. Emigration is a main tool for addressing unemployment in these countries.

In the exchange rate model, we removed the inflation rate and the ruble exchange rate from the model, instead constructing the regression with the variables of "remittances from Russia" and "net exports." These changes produced the optimal models and overcame the problems of multicolinearity and endogeneity.

For all three countries, the coefficient of determination is more than 70 percent in the GDP model, but in the other two models, it does not exceed 40 percent. This is a consequence of omitted variables and a lack of data. Let us take a look at the results of these models for Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 11.4. Results of models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrgyzstan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>const</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emig_share_Rus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP_growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R square</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* — significant with a 99% confidence  
** — significant with a 95% confidence  
*** — significant with a 90% confidence

In some of these models, the coefficients of determination are very low and some coefficients are significant with a very low level of confidence.

With the help of the calculated regression, coefficients, and the method explained in the previous section, the limit value of dependence on migration was calculated and compared with the real values of this indicator. In Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, limit values have been about 0.15 since 2016, with the dependence of the national economy on the macroeconomic situation in recipient countries higher than 0.55. In Uzbekistan, the limit value is about 0.3. When we compare real and limit values, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have been in the emigration trap since 2006, whereas Uzbekistan is not heavily dependent on external factors. Figure 11.7 shows the percentage of emigration dependence experienced by the three countries:

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have high enough levels of migration dependence to conclude that they might be in an emigration trap. In Uzbekistan, this level is less than 10 percent, indicating that the economy is not highly dependent on remittances and migration. The hypothesis is thus confirmed for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, but rejected for Uzbekistan. However, this conclusion is not highly reliable, because there was insufficient data and the author calculated some omitted indicators himself. The hypothesis could be assessed with more confidence if national or international organizations were to provide quarterly or monthly data on the issue.
Conclusion

The results of econometric model estimations and data analysis show that Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are dependent enough on migration to be considered “in” the emigration trap. In these countries, the real values of this indicator are higher than its limit value, meaning that their macroeconomic situations are explained by external indicators related to remittances and the macroeconomic situation in recipient countries. In both countries, remittances are the main tool for solving many macroeconomic problems, such as unemployment, poverty, etc. Nevertheless, if a donor country does not decrease its dependence on emigration to a single country (namely Russia), it gives the recipient country the power to determine the donor country’s macroeconomic situation. For instance, the governments of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan may face macroeconomic crises if Russia imposes restrictions on immigration.

To overcome this dependence, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan should finance economic infrastructure and try to create more work opportunities in their domestic markets. Thagunna and Acharya’s empirical analysis of remittances to Nepal suggests that countries can begin to overcome their economic dependence on migration by financing economic infrastructure and creating more places of employment. To minimize the effects of the emigration trap—namely Russia’s ability to influence outcomes in Tajikistan and Tajiks’ vulnerability to economic variation in the Russian Federation—more migration destinations could also be explored. In order to make more detailed recommendations, it would be necessary to analyze the reasons for migration, vulnerable sectors, factors limiting the effectiveness of economic reforms, and the main macroeconomic problems facing Central Asian countries.

28 Thagunna and Acharya, "Empirical Analysis of Remittance Inflow."
Chapter 12. Remittances and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence From Kyrgyzstan

Gulnaz Atabaeva, Alatoo International University

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kyrgyzstan has seen economic crisis, a high unemployment rate, and a lack of investment activity. The combination of these factors has resulted in massive labor migration to other countries. High population pressure in rural areas and limited employment opportunities have pushed people to look for better jobs in oil-rich Russia and Kazakhstan, which have experienced increased demand for labor resources to support their high rates of economic growth.¹

The main reasons for labor migration are the so-called “push factors”: lack of employment prospects; high rates of unemployment, particularly among youth (17.3 percent in 2015); and low incomes at home. However, “pull factors”—economic advantages, countries’ geographical and cultural proximity, and a growing network of compatriots in the destination country—also influence individuals’ decisions to migrate. Another important factor is the growing demand for labor in Russia and Kazakhstan,² both of which are contending with aging populations.

Figure 12.1. Dynamics of emigration from Kyrgyzstan, 1990–2015 (persons)

Source: Constructed by the author based on data from the National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, 2017

As the number of migrant workers has increased over the years, remittance income has emerged as one of the primary modes of external financing for Kyrgyzstan. Remittances have enabled the population to improve its living conditions and access social infrastructure, especially in rural regions. These funds have also contributed to entrepreneurial activity. It is well known\(^3\) that households use a large part of the remittances they receive to purchase consumer goods. From a macroeconomic perspective, this means that private consumption is positively correlated with remittance inflow, a finding supported by statistical analysis. As private consumption comprises the largest share of gross domestic product (GDP), remittances may also have an indirect positive effect on GDP growth, yet the data indicate that remittances have a weak positive impact on GDP. Analysis does not reveal any measurable impact of remittances on investments in fixed capital.

In general, the emigration of Kyrgyz citizens is a partial solution to the surplus labor problem facing the country’s government, as it alleviates unemployment, especially in the south of the republic (Osh and Jalal-Abad oblasts), the origin of many migrants.\(^4\) The remittances these migrants send home raise the standard of living for family members who remain, as well as helping migrants themselves accumulate start-up capital for a business and learn skills they can use when they return home.

Over the past decade, as an increasing number of Kyrgyz have chosen to migrate, remittance inflows have increased by a factor of seven. Remittances are vulnerable to external shocks, in particular Russia’s policies toward migrants and its general economic performance. For instance, remittance flows were affected by low oil prices and weak economic growth in Russia. The economic crisis and currency depreciation in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan also caused a decline in remittances, but inflows began to rise again in 2016 (see Figure 12.2).

![Figure 12.2. Amount of remittances and their share of Kyrgyzstan's GDP, 2000–2016](image)

In terms of remittances as a share of GDP, Kyrgyzstan had the highest level in the world as of 2016, with remittances comprising 34.5 percent of GDP, according to World Bank estimates. Tajikistan, the top recipient in 2015, registered a significant decline in remittances—mainly due to Russia’s economic adjustment to low oil prices, international sanctions, and the slight depreciation of the euro against the dollar—and slipped to sixth position.\(^5\) This trend may be due to the fact that the Kyrgyz Republic and the Russian Federation are both members of the Eurasian Economic Union, leading Russian employers to favor Kyrgyz migrants over their Tajik counterparts.

In recent years, remittances have been growing quickly. As Figure 12.3 shows, they are now the country’s second-largest source of foreign income (the first is exports of goods). In Kyrgyzstan’s small, open economy, such significant external inflows of money have the potential to affect virtually all economic variables. Remittances sent by migrant workers have played an important role in promoting economic development. They have minimized the problems that result from a shortage of foreign exchange reserves. They also cover a large proportion of Kyrgyzstan’s substantial trade deficit (the country imports three times more than it exports). It is undeniable that in the early stages of development, a poor country like Kyrgyzstan needs foreign exchange to pay for the imports it needs.

Remittances also have an impact on poverty. Recent empirical research on Kyrgyzstan found that international remittances largely alleviate poverty by increasing household expenditure.\(^6\) Households that receive remittances have higher incomes, higher levels of consumer expenditure, and lower levels of ex-

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Chapter 12. Remittances and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence From Kyrgyzstan

treme poverty than similar households that do not receive remittances. Accordingly, the national poverty level has declined from 55.3 percent in 1999 to 32.1 percent in 2015. This reduction in poverty levels is most noticeable in the southern regions, from whence the majority of migrants originate. For example, in Jalal-Abad oblast, the poverty level was 77.4 percent in 1999, compared to 45.1 percent in 2015. In Osh region, the poverty level was 70.1 percent in 1998 but declined to 28.9 percent by 2015. In Batken oblast, the poverty level was 69.0 percent in 2000 and fell to 41.2 percent in 2015.

If channeled toward investment, increased consumer activity and trade driven by remittance inflows can increase economic competitiveness. Moreover, research findings show that remittances can positively impact economic growth and development by improving rates of saving and investment. At the same time, the inappropriate use of remittances—spending them on immediate consumption rather than investing them—has led many remittance-dependent countries to fall into import-dependence, a situation where domestic production can no longer survive. As such, the aim of this chapter is to investigate the impact of remittance income on key macroeconomic variables—such as GDP, consumption, government spending, investment, imports, and exports—of Kyrgyzstan's economy and so determine whether the country risks import-dependence.

Impact of Remittances on Economic Growth

With the increase in remittance income worldwide, economists have begun to study remittances as one source of external financing. Opposing perspectives have emerged regarding the impact of remittances on economic growth in migrant workers' countries of origin: some argue that remittances have a positive impact on economic growth, while others hold the opposite view. Whether remittances' impact is positive or negative, however, there is general agreement that it is significant.

Empirical studies of the impact of remittances on poverty show that they contribute considerably to sustaining households. However, short-term poverty reduction may not necessarily adumbrate sustainable long-term growth. Remittances provide low-income segments of the population with resources, sustaining consumption and lifting households out of poverty. However, using remittances for current consumption may not support long-term economic policy objectives. Putting remittances to productive use—by investing them in entrepreneurship and human capital—is considered preferable, as this is expected to increase a remittance-receiving economy's productive capacity in the long term.

Other studies are less optimistic, suggesting that remittances have potentially adverse effects in that they create a strong disincentive for domestic savings and support private consumption of (imported) goods instead of financing investment. This, it is argued, may hamper competitiveness and increase trade deficits.

In general, it is believed that remittances support a developing country's economic growth and development by helping to offset the rising trade deficit, build up foreign exchange reserves, and increase disposable income. It has been found that remittances help promote growth in less financially developed areas.


countries by providing a substitute for inefficient or nonexistent credit markets, thus allowing consumers to reduce credit constraints and finance investment in an alternative way.\(^\text{10}\) Access to credit can help increase investment opportunities in areas of developing countries that previously produced little, leading to growth and a positive correlation between GDP and remittances.

Remittances also encourage economic growth when they are used to finance children’s education and welfare expenses, such as healthcare.\(^\text{11}\) Investing in children’s education and welfare will increase labor productivity in the long term, which in turn positively impacts growth. Even if remittances are spent on consumption or real estate, these activities still have multiplier effects and stimulate increased demand for goods,\(^\text{12}\) once again showing the positive relationship between remittances and GDP.

Building on previous research, this chapter develops direct and indirect impact channels of remittances on GDP and, in view of the resulting effects, distinguishes positive impacts from negative ones (see Figure 12.4). Direct impact channels include direct financing of investments; increases in household savings; increased economic activity; agricultural productivity effects; increases in consumption; and an effect on the public budget. Indirect impact channels, meanwhile, consist of human capital growth; foreign exchange rate stabilization; coverage of the trade deficit; increased foreign exchange reserves; and substituting for credit markets. The consequences of direct and indirect impact channels influence macroeconomic variables such as investment, government purchases, consumption, imports, and exports. These macroeconomic variable changes in turn impact total output.

Figure 12.4. Impact channels of remittances on economic growth

Source: Compiled by the author based on the listed scientific literature

12 Ibid.
Chapter 12. Remittances and Economic Growth: Empirical Evidence From Kyrgyzstan

The abovementioned remittance impact channels are described from the point of view of developing countries, where the importance of remittances is high. In 2016, developing countries received US$429.3 billion of the total US$575.2 billion of world remittances, or about 75 percent. Overall, remittances comprise 27 percent of developing countries’ GDP. According to the World Bank, remittance flows to the developing world have been as high as US$444.3 billion (in 2014) and are now the second-largest source of external financial flows, behind foreign direct investment.

The impact of labor migrants’ remittances on the economy is multidirectional—and ultimately, their net effect depends on how the government chooses to use them. Remittances increase the consumption level of rural households, which might have substantial multiplier effects, because these funds are more likely to be spent on domestically produced goods.\(^\text{13}\) Using transferable money to support local production increases the competitiveness of the country’s goods and promotes short- and long-term GDP growth, as Figure 12.4 shows. Conversely, if remittances are spent on imported consumer goods, the potential positive effect may decrease, while simultaneously increasing import demand and inflation. This has the effect of making exports less competitive while stimulating imports. Increased import dependence and reduced export competitiveness have the potential to severely damage the economy in the long term.

**Hypotheses Development**

Matuzeviciute and Butkus conducted a study of 116 developed and developing countries, including Kyrgyzstan, over the period 1990–2014 and found that the impact of remittances declines as the remittances-to-GDP ratio—that is, remittances as a share of GDP—increases.\(^\text{14}\) It turns out that the possibility of the marginal impact becoming negative is very high when the remittances-to-GDP ratio reaches 10.4–11.9 percent. Their analysis shows that countries that do not reach a GDP per capita level of about US$8,500 (constant PPP) do not have the internal capability to channel remittances in a way that promotes long-term economic growth. Countries that exceed an 11 percent remittances-to-GDP ratio become too dependent on remittance flows, distorting internal economic growth in the long run.

The study’s authors found that, of the countries studied, Kyrgyzstan has the lowest likelihood of experiencing a positive effect of remittances on economic growth. A low level of development, along with structural economic problems such as an unstable political climate, economic policies selected, and corruption—all of which are common in developing countries—do not create a favorable environment for the use of remittances for productive investment. If remittances are used for personal consumption, but not for investment in productive activities or businesses, they promote at best short-term economic growth.

Under conditions of high reliance on worker remittances, which represented about 30 percent of GDP in 2011–2015, it is important to analyze the impact of remittances on economic growth in Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, the additional income can be used to invest in an existing household enterprise or to start a new business. On the other hand, large amounts of remittances may stimulate imports and reduce the competitiveness of domestic production. Although some previous studies on remittances in Kyrgyzstan have focused on household welfare and agricultural productivity effects, there are no empirical studies on the impact of remittances on economic growth. This research aims to fill that gap. For this analysis, annual time series data for the period 1993 to 2013 assesses seven variables: remittances, consumption, government spending, investment, imports, exports, and GDP.\(^\text{15}\)

Based on the literature, I have developed the following hypotheses:

- **Hypothesis 1:** Remittances have a short-term impact on GDP through the consumption channel, due to high import-dependence;\(^\text{16}\) and

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\(^\text{16}\) Kireyev, “The Macroeconomics of Remittances.”
Hypothesis 2: Remittances have a significant impact on imports and a negative impact on investment.17

Methods

Several studies have employed the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to assess the impact of remittances on macroeconomic variables. Siddique et al. studied the causal link between remittances and economic growth in three countries—Bangladesh, India, and Sri Lanka—by employing the Granger causality test within the framework of Vector Autoregression (VAR).18 Valetko employed the VAR model to make macroeconomic forecasts and perform impulse response functions and analysis of the effects of remittances on macroeconomic variables in Belarus.19 Similarly, Singh et al. examined the impact of international remittances on the Indian economy by analyzing time series data using VAR analysis.20

We use annual time series data for the period 1993 to 2013 to study the transmission mechanism of remittances’ impact on the Kyrgyz economy. The data set includes the following variables: DLREM: remittances; DLCONS: consumption; DLG: government purchases; DLGDP: gross domestic product; DLI: investment; DLM: imports; and DLX: exports. The data is drawn from the Bulletin of the National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic (2014).21

According to the Pairwise Correlations test, there is a strong positive linear correlation between consumption and imports ($r=0.88$), which suggests that most consumption in Kyrgyzstan is of imported products (see Table 12.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12.1. Pairwise correlations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Variable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLCONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLGDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLREM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 12.2. Pairwise Granger causality tests</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample: 1993-2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lags: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypothesis:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLGDP does not Granger Cause DLCONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLGCONS does not Granger Cause DLGDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLREM does not Granger Cause DLCONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLCONS does not Granger Cause DLREM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLREM does not Granger Cause DLGDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLGCONS does not Granger Cause DIDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLREM does not Granger Cause DL REM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLI does not Granger Cause DLI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLX does not Granger Cause DLX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author’s calculations.

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The test indicates that the constructed model produces a significant Granger effect between the following variables (see Table 12.2): DLREM → DLCONS, DLREM → DLGDP, DLGDP → DLCONS, and DLI → DLX. It means that remittances have a significant effect on consumption and a significant effect on total output. This suggests that remittances might have an effect on total output through remittance-financed consumption.

**Results and Interpretations**

Impulse responses measure the time profile of the effect of a shock, or impulse, on the (expected) future value of a variable. The impulse response function was used to determine the response of DLCONS, DLG, DLGDP, DLI, DLM, DLREM, and DLX to the shock of DLREM, thus elucidating the impact of DLREM on the other variables.

Impulse Response analysis reveals that a positive shock to remittances causes significant responses in the DLCONS and DLGDP of Kyrgyzstan for only one year, becoming negative in the second year. A positive shock to remittances also causes significant response in DLM, which becomes negative in the third year (see Figure 12.5).

This is in line with the findings of my previous research on Kyrgyzstan, which indicated that import-dependence led remittances to have a short-term impact on economic growth. The empirical analysis above shows that remittances, consumption, and imports in Kyrgyzstan are interdependent. Since remittances are spent mainly on consumption (which accounted for 96 percent of GDP in 2014), increased consumption demand increases imports because Kyrgyzstan is an import-dependent country—imports made up an average of 82 percent of GDP over the ten years between 2006 and 2015. This has a short-term effect on GDP, since remittances flow out of the country in the form of imports, thus confirming Hypothesis 1 (see Figure 12.6).

The results of this empirical analysis align with my hypotheses that remittances have significant positive effects on both consumption and imports. The significant elasticity of these variables is confirmed by the fact that a one-percent rise in remittances increases consumption by 0.13 percent and a one-percent rise in remittances increases imports by 0.15 percent. The results of empirical analysis also indicate that remittances have positive but insignificant effects on both total output and exports, and an insignificant but negative effect on investment, as increased imports—a result of increased consumption demand stimulated by remittances—will eventually hinder domestic production, thus adversely affecting investment (confirming Hypothesis 2).

The VAR model of remittances’ impact suggests that they have a significant positive effect on consumption and on imports. The pairwise correlations test shows that there is a strong positive linear correlation between consumption and imports in Kyrgyzstan; on the other hand, there is a negative correlation between remittances and investment. Impulse response analysis reveals that a shock to remittances has a short-term effect (a one-year lag) on consumption and total output due to import-dependence. These results confirm that by boosting consumption, remittances increase import-dependence. Therefore, increased import-dependence causes a decline in investment, making exports less competitive in the long term.

**Policy Implications**

Over the last 15 years, remittances from migrant workers have become an increasingly important source of foreign income in Kyrgyzstan. Remittances have enabled the population, especially in the southern region of the country, to improve living conditions and access social infrastructure, and have contributed to poverty reduction and human capacity-building. Since remittances mainly finance primary consumption, they have had a noticeable impact on poverty alleviation.

Using time series data for 21 years (1993–2013), the study found that remittances have fueled consumption and growth. Between 2000 and 2015, remittances in Kyrgyzstan increased by an average of 55.4 percent annually; household final consumption expenditure grew by an average of 13.2 percent annually. While per capita gross national income (GNI) increased by an average of 10 percent in the period

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Figure 12.5. Impulse responses of DLCONS, DLG, DLGDP, DLI, DLM, DLREM, and DLX to DLREM

Source: Author's calculations.

Figure 12.6. Dynamics of remittances and imports in Kyrgyzstan (US$millions)

Source: Constructed by the author based on data from the World Bank, 2017
2000–2015, the expansion of imports by 14.4 percent is largely attributable to remittances. The short-term effect of remittances on economic growth can be explained by the fact that more remittances are used on consumption than on productive domestic investment and job creation. Booming domestic demand for imported consumer goods will eventually stimulate a further increase in remittance-financed imports. The regression results suggest that investment and remittances were negatively correlated in the period 1993 to 2013. This result is consistent with the findings of Kireyev, which point to the potentially adverse effects of remittances: they support private consumption of imported goods instead of financing investment, which can potentially erode competitiveness and increase trade deficits (see Figure 12.7).23 As Kireyev pointed out, increased consumption of imported goods stimulated by remittances can be severe enough to reduce economic activity in the long term.24

In conclusion, it must be underlined that remittances have had a significant impact on Kyrgyzstan’s economy. The study results indicate that a one-percent rise in remittances increases imports by 0.15 percent, yet machines and equipment comprised just 13 percent of the country’s imports in 2015. Kyrgyzstan should therefore focus more heavily on importing new technologies and capital goods instead of consumer goods. Government policies should encourage individuals to “channel” remittances into productive investment, because it matters how this hard-earned money is being used. Drawing on the experience of other countries that have managed significant inflows of remittances could be a helpful starting point.

23 Kireyev, “The Macroeconomics of Remittances.”
24 Ibid.
Chapter 13. Remittances as a Source of Finance for Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan

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Transforming the remittances and savings of labor migrants into a source of financing for entrepreneurship—as well as other development projects—is the focus of the migration policies of many governments in migrant-sending countries. Unilateral transfers from overseas are playing an increasingly important role in the economies of developing countries. To take the case of Uzbekistan, labor migrants’ remittances and savings have facilitated the development of the country’s financial sector by prompting the development of sophisticated money transfer operators. However, the degree to which these flows finance the needs of business enterprises remains unclear.

The aim of this research is to analyze the degree to which remittances from labor migrants are easing the financial constraints on small businesses in Uzbekistan. To put it another way, the research looks to shed light on the significance of labor migrants’ remittances and savings for entrepreneurship. As such, this research has important policy implications. Small businesses are believed to be crucial for job creation and economic growth. The results of this paper indicate that the link between labor migration and business investment in Uzbekistan is rather equivocal. Data on the use of remittances from relatively large-scale surveys show that only a small number of recipient households invest in entrepreneurship. This may be due to the fact that the remittances Uzbek households receive are small and are mainly used to address immediate consumption needs. As the size of remittance income increases, households exhibit a greater desire to invest. Remittances, therefore, have the potential to become a vital investment source for MSMEs (micro, small, and medium enterprises) if augmented with a bank credit and/or an increase in the amount of remittances. Moreover, even if households do not invest remittances in entrepreneurship, Uzbekistan’s financial sector appears to be benefiting from this inflow of funds. A small part of remittances may even be turning into the bank loans that private enterprises need to grow.

In addition, some small-scale surveys hint that the effect of remittances on MSME investment could be much more noteworthy than large-scale surveys might suggest. Ultimately, analysis of household survey data indicates that to increase the positive effect of remittances, policymakers should consider strategies to reform the banking sector so as to boost its role in financing micro- and small businesses; encourage migrants’ families to invest remittances into MSMEs by educating migrants on how to run a business; and improve the business environment.

The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on the topic. Section 3 briefly describes the context in which remittances are received in Uzbekistan. Section 4 introduces the data and methodology of the paper. Section 5 presents analysis of the empirical observations, and section 6 draws conclusions and discusses policy implications.

Literature Review

Small businesses face significant financial constraints even under the best of circumstances. Evidence suggests that even in mature economies, the formation and survival of small firms often depends on owners relaxing capital constraints by injecting their personal funds. Entrepreneurs in developing countries confront much less efficient credit markets; available evidence from World Bank Enterprise Surveys indicates that access to credit is a major concern for about

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one-third of surveyed enterprises in the developing world.²

The New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM), developed by Stark and others,³ links remittance behavior to migration decisions. According to NELM, migration decisions are a collective choice or family strategy, pursued with the goal of not only maximizing income, but also minimizing risks, diversifying sources of income, and relaxing financial constraints through remittances. The framework of NELM offers an important insight into the migration decision by linking labor migration decisions with public policy and capital market failures in migrant-sending countries. In making the decision that a family member will migrate, households design their own strategy to cope with the absence of appropriate credit, insurance instruments, and public protection. Remittances from a family member abroad provide an additional source of funding, insurance in case the main source of family income falters, and financial protection in case of rainy days. As such, migration can be viewed as a risk-mitigation strategy on the part of a household that has insufficient income. In general, the NELM has proven to be an innovative, realistic, useful framework, with the result that it has been widely applied in recent migration studies.

Critics of the NELM highlight its shortcomings, which are chiefly associated with its strong assumption that households act rationally and its neglect of the role of informal institutions (community, extended family, informal associations, etc.) as noneconomic determinants of human behavior.⁴ In the context of Uzbekistan and Central Asia, these informal institutions and social networks seem to play a significant role in migration and remittance decisions.

Focusing on insurance, Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo measured the insurance motive by distinguishing between self/family insurance and altruism.⁵ They did so by looking at what remittances are used for. If remittances respond to income risks in the host economy and are used for consumption, they are sent to the family as part of a co-insurance agreement. If they are instead used for asset accumulation, the family acts as an investor for the migrant, so remittances are sent for self-insurance; in essence, they are like savings. The authors’ findings show that those migrants with greater income risk remit more and that different types of migrants use different insurance methods.

Rapoport and Docquier, in their thorough review of the literature on the economics of migration and remittances, note that most of the empirical literature on migration and entrepreneurship concentrates on migrants who return to their home countries.⁶ One reason for this may simply be that the return migration channel is quantitatively more important than the remittances channel. Another reason has to do with data constraints: while the data sets on returned migrants are relatively rich, household surveys generally provide no information on wealth distribution prior to self-employment and do not always properly track the exact uses of remittances. Moreover, Rapoport and Docquier argue that while the relative importance of self-employment is a distinctive feature of the labor force of most developing countries, evidence suggests that the credit market plays only a minor role in financing investments in small businesses. For example, Mesnard indicates that in the 1980s, 87 percent of the entrepreneurial projects started by Tunisian returned migrants were financed entirely by savings accumulated while abroad, with only 13 percent receiving complementary financing from governmental programs and none relying on private bank credits.⁷ Similarly, Dustmann and Kirchkamp show that only 1.2 percent of Turkish returned migrants who were self-employed in 1988 resorted to bank credits as a major source of financing for their start-up costs.⁸ It is therefore clear that for many prospective entrepreneurs in developing countries, temporary

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⁴ Kursad Aslan, “International Labor Migration from Rural Central Asia: The Potential for Development in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan” (PhD diss. Kent State University, 2011); Jessica Hagen-Zanker, “Modest Expectations: Causes and Effects of Migration on Migrant Households in Source Countries” (PhD diss., Maastricht University, 2010).
migration is the means of developing their own enterprises.

Using econometric methods, Woodruff and Zenteno estimated the impact of access to remittances on capital investment in micro-enterprises in Mexico. The analysis indicates that remittances are responsible for more than one-quarter of the capital invested in micro-enterprises throughout urban Mexico. The authors estimate that in the ten states with the highest rates of migration to the United States, more than 40 percent of the capital invested in microenterprises is associated with remittances. Brown finds that those migrants who intend to return home send more remittances. McCormick and Wahba, using a probit model, document that the amount of savings and the duration of overseas stays positively influence the probability of becoming an entrepreneur among literate Egyptian migrants. Among illiterate migrants, savings alone increase the probability of engagement in entrepreneurship. Considering the link between remittances and entrepreneurship in the Philippines, Reyes et al. find that the factors inhibiting recipients of remittances from engaging in entrepreneurial activity include number of dependents, food expenditure, level of wages received by the household, and construction of shelter. There are also facilitating factors, such as age, number of household members employed, and specific occupation of household members. Highly educated migrants also tend to have higher entrepreneurial income compared to less-educated ones. Furthermore, households with members who are professionals or technicians are likely to have higher income from entrepreneurial activity.

In Uzbekistan, labor migration is seasonal and migrants typically expect to return home at season’s end, which may encourage migrants and their families to invest remittances in MSMEs. However, in many cases these migrants have to rely on their own funds because, as noted by Ruziev and Midmore, a large group of individuals in Uzbekistan is considered “unbankable” by the formal financial system due to the high transaction costs usually associated with small loans, higher perceived risks, low profit margins, and—most importantly—a lack of traditional collateral. This could be an important reason why remittances do not make a significant contribution to the development of Uzbekistan’s economy. Uzbek migrants who do start their own MSMEs usually limit themselves to opening small retail outlets, buying an apartment and renting it out, opening small internet cafes, running a restaurant, or buying a car to drive as a taxi. As a matter of fact, in another Central Asian country (Tajikistan), Clément, using propensity score matching methods, fails to find any evidence of remittances having a positive impact on households’ investment expenditures.

Another reason why many Uzbek migrants fail to become successful entrepreneurs could be that the majority of them spend their hard-earned income on lavish cultural ceremonies, such as weddings. Responses to a small-scale survey conducted in Moscow by Juraev and UNDP-sponsored surveys in Uzbekistan indicate that many Uzbek workers overseas joined the ranks of labor migrants in order to raise funds for a wedding.

Finally, there is a strand of literature on the effects of migration and remittances that documents...
Chapter 13. Remittances as a Source of Finance for Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan

the decrease in labor supply and increase in leisure among migrant-sending or remittance-receiving households,19 which negatively impacts investment in entrepreneurship. Nevertheless, Yang reports that income effects matter most: favorable exchange rate shocks in the Philippines, for instance, raised hours worked in self-employment and led to greater entry into relatively capital-intensive enterprises by migrants’ households at the end of the 1990s.20

Remittances in Uzbekistan

With a population of about 30 million people, Uzbekistan is the most populous country in Central Asia and one of the leading sources of migrants in the post-Soviet region. Russia is the main destination for the majority of Uzbek labor migrants. According to Russia’s Federal Migration Service (FMS), the number of Uzbek laborers in Russia peaked in 2014 at about 2.7 million, but because of the fall in oil prices and the devaluation of the Russian ruble, the number had decreased to about 1.8 million by 2016. Despite the slump, Uzbekistan is the top recipient of remittances from Russia among Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members.21 Most Uzbek laborers migrate because of limited job opportunities in Uzbekistan and a large wage differential between home and destination countries; the number of families that depend on remittances is therefore large. Between 2006 and the 2014 economic downturn in Russia, recorded remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan increased at double-digit rates, exceeding US$6.6 billion (approximately 12 percent of Uzbekistan’s GDP) in 2013.22 Part of this increase in recorded remittances was due to decreased transfer fees; another contributing factor was an increase in the number of labor migrants.23

Notwithstanding this spectacular growth in migration and remittances, Central Asia—particularly Uzbekistan—remains underexplored in terms of remittances’ causal impact on household investment in small business. Brück et al. argue that Central Asia is understudied because of the lack of household-level datasets.24 The present paper bridges this gap by using unique household-level survey data collected by the German Agency for International Development (GIZ) and the World Bank.

Data and Methodology

Data

This research uses data from a survey of the jobs, skills, and migration destinations of citizens in Uzbekistan—“Uzbekistan Jobs, Skills, and Migration Survey”—to explore the link between remittances and investment. The survey was jointly developed and conducted by the German Agency for International Development (GIZ) and the World Bank in 2013–2014. The survey collected comprehensive information not typically captured by traditional household surveys and is representative at the national and regional (oblast) levels, as well as across the urban/rural divide. Two distinct instruments are employed in the survey: a core questionnaire and a skills questionnaire. The sample size of the core questionnaire is 1,500 households, for a total of 8,622 individuals. One individual per household was randomly selected to respond to the skills questionnaire. The skills questionnaire sample thus consisted of 1,500 individuals.

1. Core questionnaire. The core questionnaire contains modules focusing on the following topics: education, employment, migration, health expenditure, remittances, government transfers, financial services, subjective pover-
ty, housing conditions, and household expenditures.

2. Skills questionnaire. The skills questionnaire contains detailed modules on labor and work expectations, migration and preparation for migration, language skills, and technical skill training.

In addition, this chapter also uses secondary data from small-scale surveys conducted by Juraev and the UNDP.25

**Methodology**

In this chapter, quantitative and qualitative research methods, along with deductive reasoning, are used to address the research objective: an inquiry into the impact of labor migration and remittances on entrepreneurship. The chapter investigates the effect of remittances on entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan by examining remittance recipients’ investment decisions and comparing households that receive remittances from abroad with those that do not. Analysis of statistical data from the survey was used to shed light on this issue.

**Analysis and Interpretation**

Access to finance remains one of the most daunting obstacles to the growth of MSMEs in the developing world. According to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys, most businesses in surveyed countries list this problem as one of the three main obstacles to growth. The EBRD maintains that “limited access to finance is a particularly acute problem for firms younger than five years.”26 Uzbekistan is in a unique situation as regards its access to finance: the country ranked last among transition countries in terms of the percentage of firms using banks to finance investments, according to Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) IV, conducted in 2008–2009. As Figure 13.1 illustrates, less than 10 percent of firms reported having a loan or a line of credit in that period’s BEEPS. However, in the next wave of BEEPS (BEEPS V), conducted in 2013–2014, this share increased to more than 25 percent.27 Incidentally, remittances to Uzbekistan also increased substantially during the period between BEEPS IV and V. According to the Central Bank of Russia,28 remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan via money transfer operators (MTOs) reached US$5.58 billion in 2014, whereas in 2009 this flow stood at just over US$2 billion. Estimates show that if remittances from other countries are taken into account, total inflows to the Uzbek economy as a result of labor migration may have been as much as US$7-8 billion in 2014, which is equal to almost half the country’s export volume and several times the volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) into the country that year. Remittances’ share of GDP also increased substantially during this period. The increase in the proportion of firms using loans is in line with empirical research showing the positive impact of remittances on financial development and credit creation.29

However, at the micro level, according to GIZ/World Bank survey respondents’ subjective self-assessments, only a small percentage of households that receive remittances invest in a small business. As depicted in Figure 13.2, 449 of 1,500 households indicated that they receive remittances. Of these, only 7.4 percent of households responded to the question “What do you use remittances for?” by mentioning investments in an enterprise or farm.

These results are broadly in line with the findings of a survey conducted by the Tahil research center and funded by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In that study, only 6.4 percent of respondents indicated that the main aim of their temporary migration was to earn money for start-up capital for their own business.30 By contrast, almost twice as many respondents (11 percent) in a small-scale survey of 150 labor migrants in Moscow conducted by Juraev declared that they were considering saving money for entrepreneurship activities back

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27 Ibid.
28 Central Bank of Russia, “Cross-Border Remittances…2014.”
30 UNDP, Labour Migration in Uzbekistan.
Chapter 13. Remittances as a Source of Finance for Entrepreneurship in Uzbekistan

Figure 13.1. Remittances from Russia and firms borrowing from banks to finance working capital and investment (percent)


Figure 13.2. The number of remittance-receiving households investing and not investing in an enterprise or farm (households)


home. This discrepancy between the results of GIZ/World Bank and UNDP surveys, on the one hand, and Juraev’s survey, on the other, may be due to the fact that the survey conducted in Moscow captured those migrants who do not remit (37.8 percent of respondents to Juraev’s survey). These migrants may be more likely to save up funds and invest in a business upon their return.

The results of the three surveys discussed above contrast with the results of interviews conducted by Juraev with a limited sample (30 households) in the Olot district of Bukhara region, Uzbekistan. His

31 Juraev, “Labor Migration from Uzbekistan.”
32 Ibid.

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interviews with household members indicated that 20 percent of households that received remittances from Russia invested in a small business or entrepreneurship. Furthermore, 21 respondents (71 percent) reported that remittances were used to buy cattle—a type of agricultural investment. One of the reasons for this disparity in results, in addition to the small sample size, could be that households systematically underreport remittances in household surveys.\(^{33}\)

In Uzbekistan, this underreporting may be because respondents are afraid of unexpected repercussions from divulging precise data about their income. Therefore, it is possible that respondents in Olot were more honest in their responses than households interviewed in the GIZ/World Bank survey and Juraev’s Moscow survey. Indeed, the interviewer in Olot approached the interviewees with the help of a local assistant, and this may have helped to establish a frank and sincere setting. One way to test this hypothesis, although outside the scope of this paper, could be to compare expenditures of households receiving and not receiving remittances with their reported income, similar to the approach taken by Abdulloev, Gang, and Landon-Lane looking at the case of Tajikistan.\(^ {34}\)

As Figure 13.3 shows, the plurality of GIZ/World Bank survey respondents (28.41 percent) say that their main reason for not investing in a business is inadequate entrepreneurial skills. The other two main reasons are insufficient funds for investment (22.84 percent) and other commitments to meet (21.45 percent). These commitments probably include urgent family expenditures on consumer goods, health, education, and traditional rites.

Juraev also reports that unwillingness to invest in a business could be due to the fact that many migrants doubt they could earn good money by running a small business.\(^ {35}\) The majority of respondents to Juraev’s Moscow survey (55 percent) further indicated that they did not have sufficient savings to start a business—it is notable that they did not even consider borrowing from a bank. About one-third of respondents cited lack of knowledge and managerial skills as an impediment to engaging in entrepreneurial activity, while 26 percent were concerned about their lack of business experience.

Issues associated with banks top the list of barriers to entrepreneurship in the interviews conducted in Olot. Juraev reports that 29 of 35 interviewed migrants complained about different aspects of dealing


\(^{35}\) Juraev, “Labor Migration from Uzbekistan.”
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With banks in Uzbekistan, which makes running a successful small business difficult. A sizeable proportion of respondents to this small-scale survey also mentioned a lack of essential knowledge (42.9 percent), inspections by state agencies (40 percent), and corrupt local officials (34.3 percent). These are problems that all entrepreneurs in Uzbekistan face, and it appears that they discourage migrants from starting small businesses.

Remittances may influence beneficiaries’ desire to invest in a business in the future. To find out, the World Bank/GIZ survey asked all households if they intended to start a business (in their home country or overseas). Figure 13.4 compares households that receive remittances with those that do not in terms of their willingness to start their own businesses.

It appears that the percentage of households receiving remittances and intending to start a business in their home country is slightly higher than that among households that are not receiving remittances. At the same time, a higher proportion of beneficiaries of remittances also declared that they do not intend to start a business.

In order to explain the investment motivation of households from the data collected in the survey, the next three figures further examine how the proportion of total income constituted by remittances affects households’ investment decisions.

Figure 13.5 shows how remittance recipients’ intention to start a business varies depending on what share of the household’s total income is made up of remittances. Notably, households that receive the smallest share of their income from remittances (0.3-9 percent) are most likely to express the intent to start their own business. This suggests that households that only receive a small portion of their income in the form of remittances would invest in entrepreneurship if they had more capital. Those who have such capital, meanwhile, may not intend to start businesses because they have already done so.

Figure 13.6 illustrates the relationship between the amount of remittances households receive and investment in an enterprise or farm. Households are divided into four yearly remittance income brackets—US$0-500, $500-950, $1,000-1,950, and $2,000-9,600—and the percentage of households investing in a business is calculated for each bracket. As expected, the percentage of those investing in business in the highest income bracket is greater than in any other bracket. In combination with the analysis of Figure

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36 Ibid.

Figure 13.4. Percentage of households intending to start own businesses among those receiving and not receiving remittances (percent)

Source: “Jobs, Skills, Migration, Consumption” survey, World Bank-GIZ, 201
13.5, this indicates that households may not invest at least in part due to a lack of funds.

Let us now turn to look at which households are likelier to invest in Uzbekistan depending on the timing of the return of a migrant household member. It is expected that households with a migrant who returned recently would have a greater propensity to invest than those in which migrants returned a while ago, since the latter group of households would already have spent the savings accumulated during migration.

As Figure 13.7 shows, households with family members who returned from labor migration more recently invest more than those who came back earlier, resulting in investment decay over time. It appears that the longer ago a migration experience was, the...
less likely a household is to invest. In other words, since the earnings of migrants are not large and a significant portion of migration savings go on other types of expenditures, the longer it has been since the migration period, the less money there is left for investment. Only 1.6 percent of households with a migrant who returned in 2010–2011 invested, compared to 6.62 percent among those with a member returned in 2012. In addition, 4.85 percent of households with a migrant still abroad are investing. The low percentage of the latter is probably due to the fact that migrants who work in neighboring countries like Kazakhstan still bring most of their earnings home with them when they return.

**Conclusion**

The results of the present research indicate that the impact of remittances on entrepreneurship must be studied carefully. Relatively large-scale surveys of remittances reveal that remittances do not make a substantial contribution to development. However, some small-scale surveys show that remittances as a share of MSME investment may be underestimated in bigger surveys. Moreover, a closer look at the investment generated by the savings of migrant returnees is necessary to have a comprehensive picture of the situation. Further analyses point out that remittance-receiving households do not invest for a number of reasons: the small size of remittances, a lack of entrepreneurial skills, the inadequate banking system, and the presence of other pressing expenditure needs.

However, even if beneficiary households do not put their remittances directly into entrepreneurial ventures, they still facilitate credit creation by helping households buy physical assets, such as cars and jewelry, which could be used as collateral in the future. This is crucial for banking systems similar to that of Uzbekistan, where lending is mainly facilitated by collateral.

It appears that the best way to stimulate efficient use of migrants’ remittances and savings is to create an economic environment that facilitates development in general, including a favorable business climate and a functional financial system. An education system focused on developing entrepreneurial skills would also induce migrants to invest in their home economies and take better advantage of the potential benefits of remittances.

**Figure 13.7. Investing among households with returning migrants (percent)**


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37 The survey was conducted in 2013.
Chapter 14. Social Remittance Dynamics in Central Asia: Potential and Limitations

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The migration corridor between Russia and Central Asia is one of the largest labor migration routes in the world. Due to difficult economic conditions in their home countries, many Central Asian citizens migrate to Russia, where they work in different sectors of the Russian labor market. High unemployment and low salaries are important push factors, while the visa-free regime, high wages, and demand for labor are the main pull factors that make Russia an optimal destination.¹

Each year, millions of citizens of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan migrate to Russia looking for job opportunities that will allow them to take care of their families. For many households, these remittances are either their only income or a significant share thereof. In 2015, labor migrants worldwide sent US$601 billion to their home countries, US$441 billion of which went to developing countries.² This amount is three times larger than total global foreign aid, meaning that migrant workers provide more financial support to developing countries than do donor states. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan all fall in the top 10 remittance-receiving countries in terms of remittances as a share of gross domestic product (GDP).³

However, discussions of remittance transfers often neglect the importance of social remittances. The term, coined by Levitt, indicates that labor migrants not only remit money, but also transfer ideas, know-how, practices, and skills, thereby influencing the development process of their countries of origin.⁴ Yet how these ideas and values travel and under what kind of conditions they could contribute to and reinforce institutional change in various sectors of the home country’s economy and social structure is not well understood.⁵ According to Levitt, social remittance flows occur when labor migrants communicate with their friends, family, and compatriots, visit their hometowns, or return to their countries of origin. By living and working abroad, they gather skills and experiences and are exposed to new ideas, behaviors, and habits in their host country. During visits home, they transfer social capital to their local economy and society.⁶ Yet in practice, this transfer does not always happen; there are many factors that can limit or hinder social remittance transfers. These include migrant workers’ lack of will to contribute, migrants’ decision not to return home, switching between occupations in the home and host countries, inability to find a suitable job, differences in the level of technological development between the home and host countries, lack of sufficient financial capital, etc. It is therefore important to analyze the transfer process in order to identify the necessary conditions for effective delivery of social remittances, as well as factors that limit their flow.

This chapter aims to explore the characteristics of the accumulated social capital of Central Asian migrant workers and the process by which this capital is turned into social remittances. In so doing, the chapter seeks to determine the potential and limitations of social capital flows to home countries. The significance of this paper is that it largely focuses on

⁵ Ibid.
work experience transfers and attempts to identify the sectors with the highest incidence of social capital transfer by analyzing migrant profiles and demand for migrant workers in the Russian labor market.

**Social Remittance: Definition, Reasons, and Potential for Change**

A remittance can be described as an outcome of the migration process that contributes to the home country in monetary and non-monetary ways. Economists and anthropologists analyze different aspects that enhance our understanding of the remittance process. Economists primarily analyze capital transfers, looking at their impact in the home country at various economic levels, from the household to the national economy. Anthropologists work on the social side of the topic, analyzing the social impact of remittance transfers and their effect on the lives of migrant workers and their beneficiaries.

When migrants send part of their earnings home, it attracts the attention of economists, and when this additional income affects the lives of recipients, anthropologists become interested in the process. To date, however, few researchers have analyzed the non-monetary effects of remittances, such as the flow of ideas, values, beliefs, and skills, collectively known as “social remittances.” Yet Isaakyan does not consider every transfer of ideas to be a social remittance, saying that only if an idea, value or practice impacts something greater than a migrant’s family can it be considered a social remittance. Thus, while Levitt defines every transaction as a social remittance, since each one has the potential to create a social or economic impact, Isaakyan limits the term to an achievement that has a spillover effect on the entire community.

**Reasons for Sending Remittances**

Some scholars take a different approach to defining remittances. Carling proposes defining remittances as a script and uses the script definition as an analytical tool to describe the reasons for sending remittances. He defines remittance transfers as complex transactions because they include various emotional attachments alongside the material one. In his view, the reasons for sending remittances are complex and cannot be arranged along a continuum from altruism to self-interest as in Lucas and Stark’s work. This interesting approach does not impose any limitation on the definition of a social remittance and mostly focuses on the reasons remittances are sent.

Carling mentions that there may be many different reasons why migrants send remittances. He proposes a conceptual framework of remittance scripts that are designed to address this variation and complexity. In his work, he lays out 12 scripts—or “structures of expectations for specific types of situations which facilitate social interaction”—that apply to specific situations. The idea of a script indicates the connection between money and the emotional attachment embedded in this money.

Of the 12 scripts, pooling, obligation and entitlement, and allowance represent the main reasons for remittances mentioned in the household survey done by the Central Bank of Russia. In the pooling script, migrant workers contribute to the family budget like other family members, the only difference being that they work abroad. This is the case for many Central Asian migrants who, being unable to find a job in their hometown, decide to migrate to somewhere they can find employment in order to share their families’ economic burden. The obligation and entitlement script is similar to pooling, but whereas in the latter case multiple members of the family contribute to the budget, in the former adult children

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8 Ibid.
10 Levitt, “Social Remittances.”
11 Carling, “Scripting Remittances.”
13 Carling, “Scripting Remittances.”
14 Ibid.
16 Diana Ibañez-Tirado, “‘We Sit and Wait’: Migration, Mobility and Temporality in Guliston, Southern Tajikistan,” *Current Sociology*, Sussex Research Online, September 2017, <http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/70080/1/accepted%20version%20we%20sit%20and%20wait%20sep%202017.pdf>
often care for their elders by migrating abroad to remit money to their dependents.\textsuperscript{17} Allowance is somewhat different, in that the money is often sent home to save for the future rather than to spend on the family’s immediate needs. Moreover, in the previous cases, migrant workers send money but do not dictate how the recipient should use this extra income. Under the allowance script, recipients use money in accordance with the sender’s directions. This is often the case when a migrant worker wants to establish a business at home while working abroad.\textsuperscript{18}

In addition to explaining the reasons for transfer, this paper presents the idea of social membership, based on Carens’ theory of social membership.\textsuperscript{19} Carens states that people develop strong relationships in the environment where they live and, over time, become social members of their community.\textsuperscript{20} In our case, the idea of social membership is based on family values and the concept of belonging, where being a member of the family comes with responsibilities. Fathers and mothers support their children by working and earning money. When they grow old and are unable to work, their children support them.

It could be said that one of the main reasons for migrants to send remittances (whatever their monetary value) is the need to pay social membership dues to their families, hometown, or country, a payment which can be described as anything from a gift to self-interest. This idea may also explain why some remit and others do not: migrants stop remitting when they decide to cancel their social membership or increase remittances to enlarge their membership and become a protector for many beneficiaries. This should not be understood as a universal explanation—every migration decision is an individual choice affected by various economic and social factors—but the desire to improve their own living conditions and those of their families is key for many migrants.\textsuperscript{21}

### Potential for Change: The Impact of Social Remittances

The potential for social remittances to ignite institutional change attracts the attention of many scholars. Since a social remittance is a transfer of ideas, values, and practices, it works in both directions, with migrants as the agents of these transactions.\textsuperscript{22} Different migrant groups around the world transfer different ideas for various reasons and we can group these motives into broad economic, social, and political categories.\textsuperscript{23} For instance, Indian migrants are known for their technical and entrepreneurial skills; they remit mostly economic skills back home, along with spreading their cultural values in their host countries.\textsuperscript{24} On a political level, Levitt’s work on Dominican migrants in the United States shows that they remit the value of freedom of speech back home to improve free speech in the Dominican Republic.\textsuperscript{25}

In the Central Asian case, it could be said that migrants’ reason for transferring social remittances is more economic, as it is oriented toward improving living standards by accumulating social and economic capital abroad, and using this capital to start a new business or find a job with a decent salary at home.\textsuperscript{26} Therefore, the institutional change we are discussing is more likely to happen in the business sector. From there it could spill over to various sectors of the economy and eventually to the entire national economy by creating more jobs and contributing to economic growth. Eventually, this might reduce the number of migrants seeking work abroad, since there would be a significant number of job opportunities at home.

Thus far, however, we have not seen institutional change in the business sector of any Central Asian country heavily dependent on remittances. On this point, there is a need to investigate why social remittance transfers are not igniting institutional change in the business sector. Although this type of analysis is beyond the scope of this chapter, one possible

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\textsuperscript{17} Carling, “Scripting Remittances.”
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{22} Isaakyan, “Capital Transfers and Social Remittances.”
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{25} Levitt, “Social Remittances.”
answer is associated with the type of jobs migrants do and the destination country’s labor demand structure. Even after a successful return, labor migrants generally work in different sectors than those in which they were employed in Russia, and open sole proprietorship (SP) shops or restaurants that employ few people. The economic literature on small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and SPs indicates that although SPs are good for increasing the rate of employment opportunities, their small-scale operations mean that their macro-level contribution to the economy is rather insignificant. It is therefore important to assess transferred skills and their potential implications for the business environment in the recipient country.

Transferring accumulated knowledge obviously depends on the sector. For instance, a farm worker who learns how to use a drip irrigation system can much more easily transfer this experience to his hometown than a worker in the automobile industry can transfer his knowledge, because the former requires a less technologically equipped workspace than the latter. It is also important to consider that there might not be an automobile factory in the place to which the latter migrant returns. If a labor migrant’s job does not require the skill set he or she has developed, the potential for experience transfer is limited.

The example of Syrian refugees in Turkey shows that the potential achievements are attainable. After the start of the civil war in Syria, trade relations between Turkey and Syria deteriorated greatly, and the trade volume fell multiple times. However, starting in 2012, the increasing number of Syrian entrepreneurs in Turkey have invested their economic and social capital in their businesses, helping to boost trade relations between the two countries to the pre-war level as of 2015. Thus, despite various difficulties, they have managed to create institutional change that has had a macro-level effect. Syrians migrants use their connections at home to their advantage and build on them in order to mediate between the two countries.

Central Asian migrants who worked abroad need to find the right place to invest their social and economic capital in order to benefit from their migration experiences.

**Social Remittance Dynamics in Central Asia**

According to surveys conducted by Denisenko & Varshavskaya and Nesperova, almost half of Central Asian migrants are unskilled with a general secondary education background; skilled workers account for nearly one-third and high-skilled laborers only around 3 percent. Unskilled migrant workers are primarily concentrated in wholesale and retail trade (including repair of motor vehicles and household goods), the construction industry, and communal and personal services.

As Figure 14.1 shows, the largest proportion of labor migrants work in sectors like wholesale, repair and household goods, and construction. The first two sectors combine to provide job opportunities for 55 percent of migrants. The reason for this concentration in a handful of sectors is Russian demand for workers in these industries. Given that most migrants work in these fields, the bulk of their social capital (in terms of skills and experiences) is accumulated in these areas. Therefore, it is to be expected that work experience in trade and construction is most frequently transferred by labor migrants to their

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33 Rosstat, “Labor, Employment and Unemployment in Russia.”
home countries. Labor migrants prefer to start SME or SP businesses due to their limited financial capital and the comparative simplicity of starting a smaller business.\textsuperscript{34} Analysis of return migrants to Kyrgyzstan indicates that more migrant workers choose to open their own business than work as an employee. This is related to labor-market conditions at home: unable to find well-paying jobs, migrants consider self-employment as a temporary measure until they can find their desired job.\textsuperscript{35}

As it stands, almost half of migrants are unaware of government support programs that give entrepreneurs certain privileges and financial assistance, according to an International Organization for Migration (IOM) survey.\textsuperscript{36} Respondents further indicated that bureaucratic obstacles, bribes, and—in certain cases—the business climate impede them from expanding their businesses at home.\textsuperscript{37}

Furthermore, there are issues with transferring work experience. Not all the accumulated knowledge and skills can be used at home, since there are many cases where migrants’ employment in Russia does not line up with their jobs at home. Skilled Central Asian migrants, for instance, often work in Russia in jobs that do not use their skills, exchanging their status for higher salaries. Russian employers are also sometimes unwilling to recognize migrants’ diplomas from Central Asian institutions, impeding these migrants from finding skilled work abroad.\textsuperscript{38}

The following cases—mostly drawn from the International Organization for Migration’s 2014 survey—allow us to determine under what kind of con-

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\textsuperscript{34} IOM, Diaspora—Partner in the Development of Tajikistan.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{38} Ibid.
ditions migrant workers successfully transfer their social remittances to their hometowns, or fail to do so. In addition, these cases suggest why some migrants contribute to the development of their community and local economy while others do not.

After working for ten years in Russia and accumulating a certain amount of capital, a Tajik labor migrant returned to his city and opened a shop. During his time abroad, he had mostly worked in the trade sector, and when the time came, he moved home and transferred his economic and social remittances to Tajikistan’s business sector. This case is a good example of the potential benefits of migrant experience that theories propose: while working abroad, he accumulated sufficient financial capital to start his own business, and working in the same sector allowed him to transfer his professional experience to his new enterprise. He therefore managed to transmit his social and economic capital to his local economy.39

Another case tells us of a Tajik labor migrant, a teacher by profession, who traveled multiple times to Russia, where he worked in the construction sector. Every time he returned to his hometown, the lack of teachers meant that he was able to find a job at the high school. By contrast, he found it hard to find a teaching post in Russia, with the result that he switched professions as he moved between home and host countries. Though he quickly integrated into the local labor market, the work experience he gained abroad has not been put to use due to the switch between professions (though he did manage to transfer economic profits to his hometown).40

Deportation from Russia is one of the major reasons why many labor migrants return home without achieving their migration goals. This type of return immediately changes their expectations and future plans. For most, finding a job in their home country is difficult, especially if they lack skills. With a reduction in income and an inability to transfer their social capital to their job while they are unemployed, their contribution to society and the local economy will be limited.

As survey data from the International Organization for Migration’s report “Diaspora—Partner in the Development of Tajikistan” indicates, one group sought to invest their social and economic capital in the business and education sectors. Regardless of sometimes limited means, these migrants find creative ways to assist their compatriots. A Tajik labor migrant established a 5,000-ruble (US$84) scholarship for high-achieving students. The report indicates that he wanted to contribute to the development of his country by providing financial support to students from low-income families to encourage them to continue their education. In this case, we see a migrant who wanted to help people outside his extended family and chose to invest his capital in the education sector for the good of his country’s youth.41

In other cases, however, the will to provide support is limited to family and friends. One Tajik migrant indicated that he does not think about his country’s development and is focused on supporting his nephews’ education. In the former example, the labor migrant’s drive to contribute is more altruistic, while in the latter case it is more exclusive.42

There are cases where migrants abroad want to support their country’s economic development but have not yet taken any steps toward doing so. In Marina Kayumova’s survey, a member of the Uzbek diaspora in Russia signaled that she wanted to initiate community-based social entrepreneurship that would bring individual entrepreneurs together and establish links between farmers and markets. The purpose of this initiative is to create something that would be economically sustainable and have a social impact. Another Uzbek migrant expressed similar intentions, but had concerns about the existing barriers to and difficulties of conducting business in Uzbekistan. She indicated that many migrants were homesick and would be willing to invest in their home country (since the majority of them have relatives at home), but economic prospects in their potential investment area and other difficulties discouraged them from investing.43

As one interviewee in the IOM survey indicated, although many labor migrants would like to return to their home country, they prefer to stay in Russia due to low demand for their professions back home. This is a missed opportunity for the migrant-sending

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39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
countries created by unsatisfactory domestic labor market conditions.44

The status quo in the home country is one of the choke points for social remittance flows. In a sense, work experience as a social remittance has similar characteristics to investment flows, as the transfer will occur only if those with capital believe it will be valuable. Only if an investor thinks making an investment will increase his/her capital will he/she make such an investment. Similarly, if a labor migrant thinks his/her skills will have market value in the home country, he/she might consider returning home to work; otherwise, it would be a waste of his/her abilities. This is one of the main factors limiting the transfer of social remittances based on work experience.

There are also cases where migrants do not want to help develop their home countries. One of the primary reasons for this is weak social connections with their hometown. According to a member of the Tajik diaspora in Russia, he lost contact with many of his acquaintances and relatives during his time in Russia and does not regularly send money home, since his brothers are taking care of the family. Due to the weakened social network at home, he does not know which of his friends and relatives he could help and is reluctant to help others.45

As these examples show, migrant experiences are different and social remittance flows to their home towns vary. If we wish to analyze the potential and limitations of social remittance dynamics in Central Asia, Cerase’s influential work on Italian migrants is quite useful, as it allows us to understand who contributes, why they do it, and why others prefer not to. He identifies four categories of returned migrants: failed, retirement, conservative, and innovative. This typology allows us to group Central Asian labor migrants and answer the question above.46

People who return home without achieving their goals can be considered failed migrants, with deportation, family reasons, or inability to integrate into the host society and labor market some of the most frequent reasons for their failure. However, they may still prosper at home if they have well-established social connections there or happen to return to places where there is a demand for their skills.47

Retirement is a self-explanatory category: labor migrants who are approaching retirement may decide to return home in order to spend the rest of their days there. For some, this decision is driven by the desire to be buried in their motherland, while others are convinced to return home because their age has made it harder for them to find jobs.48

Cerase describes “conservative” migrants as those who have successfully reached their goals of social and economic capital acquisition. They therefore return to their homeland in order to invest their capital and achieve the goal that drove them to migrate in the first place, be it building a house, buying land, or starting a business. This definition describes the goals of the majority of Central Asian migrants, who travel to Russia in order to improve their families’ economic conditions back home. However, the conservative typology also states that these migrants’ goals end after satisfying their own and their relatives' needs; conservative migrants do not attempt to change the social or economic structure of their countries. Therefore, even after their successful return and economic integration, these migrants’ potential to contribute is limited by their will to contribute.49

Another successful group is innovative migrants, who are prepared to return and support their home country by using their experiences and financial capital. Cerase defines these migrants as “carriers of change,” since they have all the necessary tools to act: money, skills, and will. This group does not limit the scope of application of their capabilities and resources to their families, but is open to investing in the development of their compatriots. The group may contain anyone from a diaspora member who has not visited their home country for decades to circular migrants who spend extended periods of time abroad. The most productive members of the group, however, are returned migrants, since their contributions have a direct effect on the local economy and society.50

Analyzing the dynamics of social remittance flows to the Central Asian countries using Cerase’s

44 IOM, Diaspora—Partner in the Development of Tajikistan.
45 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
typology helps us identify who contributes and who does not, which is an important question for defining the potential and limitations of social remittance flows. I contend that the migrant-exporting Central Asian countries have great social capital potential but use only a fraction of it. One of the reasons for this is migrants’ limited will to contribute. Although there are three successful groups (conservative, innovative, and retired) that have the capacity to contribute, only innovative migrants invest their social and economic capital for purposes beyond their immediate family. The majority of Central Asian migrants, meanwhile, belong to the conservative group. They remit social capital, but its structural effect on the local economy is limited.

Conclusion

Analysis of social remittance dynamics in Central Asia drawing on migrant profiles, work experience, and identification of obstacles indicates that the migration process increases the well-being of the families of labor migrants and has the potential to make a positive contribution to the trade and construction sectors in their hometown. Many return migrants open businesses in which they invest their social and economic capital, while others find jobs and transfer their accumulated knowledge and experiences to their new places of employment. However, a small number of sectors receive the majority of the benefits from social capital transfer, and technology transfer remains low due to the type of skills migrants typically gain abroad.

The will to contribute and the scope of support are important to the development process of Central Asian countries. It looks as though there is an unorganized will to improve the conditions in their home country, where each migrant chooses his/her method of contribution to the country. Following Cerase’s typology, a large share of Central Asian labor migrants are conservative migrants who limit the scope of their social remittance transfers to their families. Conditions at home can also be considered a limiting factor, since many innovative migrants—who would otherwise provide assistance to their compatriots—hesitate to contribute due to economic uncertainty and other factors like corruption and bureaucratic obstacles.

There is considerable social capital potential waiting to be harnessed and channeled to the home country. The trade and construction sectors, in particular, could benefit from the experiences of labor migrants. In addition, there is a willingness to increase the education level of youth by remitting both money and social capital. However, without solving the problems that exist at home, the full potential of social remittance flows to Central Asian countries cannot be realized. Therefore, government officials, labor organizations, and diaspora representatives need to work together to find ways to use migrants’ social capital more efficiently, with the goal of transferring their knowledge, skills, and expertise to underdeveloped sectors and industries that have high potential to benefit from social remittance transfers. For instance, encouraging entrepreneurial activity at home by introducing new support programs and informing people about existing structures would allow Central Asian countries to capitalize on the positive potential of SME development and thus benefit from migrants’ accumulated social and economic capital.

The absence of support from responsible authorities, meanwhile, puts the economic burden entirely on migrants, who then find it difficult to put their financial resources to use in the service of the local economy.

\[51\] Ibid.
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About the Central Asia Program (CAP)

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It is an exciting time to study migration in the Eurasian region. Migration policies and patterns are receiving crucial attention from governments, scholars, and activists alike. Old, new, and changing patterns are making important impacts on home and host societies. The region is marked by some of the freest migration in the world through the free labor zone of the Eurasian Economic Union and the visa-free regime of the Commonwealth of Independent States. At the same time, however, it faces restrictions in the form of Soviet-era registration procedures, active use of re-entry bans in Russia, and heavy-handed efforts to regulate emigration in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In this context, migration is not only an issue requiring domestic policy attention, but also a critical focus of geopolitical bargaining.

Given the political and theoretical salience of migration in the Eurasian region, the NAC-NU Central Asia Studies Program chose as its second theme “external and internal migrations in Central Asia.” The call for papers generated proposals related to the development of Central Asian economies from migration and remittances, the dynamics of migration to Russia (the major destination), rising alternative destinations, and political factors in home and host countries. On the basis of these papers, we convened a conference in Astana in September 2017, which brought together junior and senior scholars with ties to the region and to international academic institutions. This group of scholars is well placed to mediate the empirical work being done in the region and broader theoretical perspectives.

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